We use cookies to enhance your browsing experience. If you continue to use our website we will take this to mean that you agree to our use of cookies. If you want to find out more, please view our cookie policy. Accept and Hide [x]
It is undeniable that the Human Rights Act has had a significant impact on the work of the Supreme Court. Just under a quarter (14 of 61) of cases decided during the Court’s 2018-19 term featured a determination on at least one issue relating to the Act or the European Convention on Human Rights. The UK Supreme Court is soon to begin Hilary Term 2020, and whilst the docket of cases it is set to hear this term seems to largely steer clear of controversial human rights issues we can nonetheless be confident that 2020 will feature its usual share of big human rights cases. What follows is a short preview of some of the more interesting and controversial of those cases, all of which the Court is due to hand down at some point this year.
It is well established that, under Article 3 ECHR, the United Kingdom cannot deport an individual to a country where, there is a “real risk” of them being subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. This has been extended to include situations where the deportee would be placed in circumstances which might occasion a significant deterioration of health, including where they lack access to life-saving treatment.
The question in this case is whether Article 3 prohibits deportation in AM’s situation. He is an HIV-positive individual, whose condition for many years was being managed by anti-retroviral drugs in the UK. If deported to Zimbabwe, he would be very unlikely to have access to the same treatment. Although some medical options would be available to him, they would likely be significantly less effective for the management of his condition.
Previous authorities had restricted the application of Article 3 to ‘deathbed’ cases only, where the deportee would likely die quickly following their removal from the country.
The Government has announced that it will introduce emergency legislation to prevent terrorists from being automatically released after they have served half their sentence. Under the proposals, the parole board would have to authorise offenders’ release from prison. Individuals will need to have served two thirds of their sentence before being eligible.
The changes come after a knife attack in Streatham, London, in which a number of people were stabbed. The police and parole board were not able to prevent the automatic release of Sudesh Amman, the perpetrator of the attack.
When she was fifteen Shamina Begum slipped unimpeded out of the country to join ISIL. Only her image, walking with two school friends, was captured as she made her way through Gatwick Airport onto the aircraft. Her return to the UK, five years on is proving more difficult.
After the collapse of ISIL’s stronghold in Raqqa, Ms Begum appeared, heavily pregnant, in a camp in northern Syria, held by the Syrian Democratic Forces. In an interview she said she wanted to return but did not regret having gone to Syria.
On 19 February 2019, the Secretary of State, Mr Javid, informed Ms Begum’s family he considered she posed a threat to national security and issued an order depriving her of her nationality.
As was her right, Ms Begum issued an appeal against the deprivation order to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). Permission to enter the UK to pursue the appeal was refused by the Secretary of State.
In the previous post under this topic, I referred to Mr Justice Binnie’s proposal for the exercise of the standard of reasonableness review in the 2007 case of Dunsmuir v New Brunswick. This would eventually resurface in Vavilov, where the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the starting point should be a presumption that the reasonableness standard applied. In the interim, there had been much academic, practitioner and judicial commentary on the lack of clarity and consistency in the application of the principles espoused by the majority in Dunsmuir in subsequent cases and on the difficulty in applying such principles in claims. Members of the Supreme Court also expressed concerns in subsequent cases, for example, Abella J in Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd 2016 SCC 29. The majority in Vavilov explicitly refers to such criticism coming from the judiciary and academics but also from litigants before the Court and organizations representing Canadians who are affected by administrative decisions. As the Court stated,
These are not light critiques or theoretical challenges. They go to the core of the coherence of our administrative law jurisprudence and to the practical implications of this lack of coherence.
The Court also referred to concerns that the reasonableness standard was sometimes perceived as “advancing a two-tiered justice system in which those subject to administrative decisions are entitled only to an outcome somewhere between “good enough” and “not quite wrong”.
On
Friday, the UK left the EU. In the midst of jubilation, despair, and relief,
questions remain about the human rights implications this decision may have, as
we continue to negotiate the precise terms of our exit. Clause 5 of the European
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 already confirmed that the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights would not be included in ‘retained’ EU legislation after
Brexit. Now, the Conservatives may be able to move forward with their long-term
commitment to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 and introduce a ‘British Bill of
Rights’. Boris Johnson’s manifesto promise was to ‘update’ the legislation, as
part of a programme of constitutional reform, looking at “the relationship between the government,
parliament and the courts.”
As the coronavirus continues to provoke anxiety,
China has come in for criticism for its handling of the epidemic, in the New York Times and on Human Rights Watch. After concealing new cases in Wuhan in early January, there has been
censorship of online posts about the epidemic, bans on speaking to the media
and journalists, and the government has been interrogating web users accused of
‘spreading rumours’ and ‘publishing and spreading untrue information
online’.
Stratas JA has said, “Administrative law matters”. Every individual’s life is affected, in some cases profoundly, by administrative decisions. Judicial oversight of administrative decisions engages questions of importance and sensitivity in democracies where separation of powers is an intrinsic principle. In the view of the Supreme Court of Canada, the act of judicial review by a court is a constitutional function that ensures executive power is exercised according to the rule of law. At the same time, review must be exercised without undermining the democratic legitimacy of the executive or the intention of the legislature. The standards applied by courts to determining the lawfulness of administrative decisions are therefore of central importance to the proper functioning of our country.
Disclaimer here, to apply to this and the next post. The views expressed here are purely in a personal capacity, as I am now counsel with the UK charity, Justice.
This and the following post will consider what a ‘reasonableness’ standard of review means in the contexts of Canadian and UK administrative law. The standard has recently been given new emphasis by the handing down of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Vavilov [2019] SCC 65 in which the court restated its conception of reasonableness and how a decision should be analysed in light of that standard.
In the UK, a series of cases has revealed that jurisdiction’s Supreme Court grappling with reasonableness primarily in its relationship with the other standard of review, proportionality. As this essay will show, both Canadian and UK courts have struggled ever since the advent of judicial oversight of administrative decisions to formulate a standard of reasonableness which ensures unlawful decisions do not stand but does not allow the court to remake the decision that is the proper remit of the administrator.
In AC (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2020] EWCA Civ 36, the Court of Appeal gave a trenchant warning that once it ceases to be lawful to detain an individual, the ‘grace period’ allowed within which to make arrangements for release can only be a short period. Moreover, the reasons for which any such grace period is required will be be closely scrutinised by the courts.
Background
Unsurprisingly, there continue to be a very significant number of judicial review and county court claims for unlawful detention brought by current and former immigration detainees. What is perhaps more interesting is that despite the relatively well-understood law governing the lawfulness of immigration detention the precise legal limits of the Home Secretary’s power to detain for immigration purposes continue to be tested and developed.
In the latest episode on Law Pod UK, Emma-Louise Fenelon talks to Shaheen Rahman QC about Samira Ahmed’s decisive Employment Tribunal victory, handed down on 10 January 2020.
Last autumn I was privileged to spend six weeks in the United States as a scholar on the Pegasus Programme. This gave me the opportunity to learn a great deal about the similarities and contrasts between our legal systems, as well as the latest developments across the Atlantic.
In this piece I will tell you about what I learned about the US Supreme Court — its history, its role and what the Presidency of Donald Trump may mean for its future.
The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court is the highest court in the United States and acts as guarantor and arbiter of the Constitution. It has the power to establish (and extend) the content of constitutional rights and to strike down not only government acts, but also primary legislation incompatible with those rights.
In this article,Uzay Yasar Aysev and Wayne Jordash QC of Global Rights Compliance analyse the two cases which have been brought in the international courts relating to the persecution of the Rohingya people by the Myanmar authorities.
Readers may want to read the first article about this topic published on the Blog here.
On 11 November 2019, Republic of The Gambia initiated a case against Myanmar before the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’ or the ‘Court’), alleging that the atrocities committed against the Rohingya people during “clearance operations” from around October 2016 violated the Genocide Convention (‘Convention’).
In
its application, The Gambia requested the Court to instate six provisional
measures. Provisional measures are ordered to safeguard the relevant, plausible
rights of the Parties that risk being extinguished before the Court determines the
merits of the case (LaGrand Case, para. 102). The Gambia contended that the Rohingya were facing threats
to their existence and had to be protected from Myanmar’s genocidal intent.
On 23 January 2020, the Court issued an Order granting four of the six provisional measures requested. Myanmar was ordered to:
Take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of genocide against the Rohingya;
Ensure that its military, any irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it, any organizations and persons which may be subject to its control direction or influence, do not commit, attempt or conspire to commit genocide, or incite or be complicit in the commission of genocide against the Rohingya;
Take effective measures to prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence related to allegations of genocide; and
Submit a report to the Court on all measures taken to give effect to the provisional measures order within four months and thereafter every six months, until the Court renders a final decision.
Civil liberties groups have responded with opprobrium to the Metropolitan Police’s plan to begin using live facial recognition (LFR) cameras on London’s streets as of next month. Purportedly, the Met’s technology compares the structure of faces to those recorded in a database of suspects, and alerts officers on the scene if a match is found. If no alert is generated, the image is deleted. The Met has claimed that the system is 70% effective at spotting wanted suspects and only produced a false identification in one in a thousand cases. In addition, it claimed 80% of people surveyed backed the move.
Following his
headline-grabbing finding on 3rd January
2020 that “ethical veganism is a philosophical belief which qualifies as a
protected belief within the meaning of section 10 of The Equality Act 2010”, Norwich Employment
Tribunal Judge Postle has now provided his full determination.
Background
The judgment was handed down following a preliminary hearing in a matter between the Claimant, Mr Jordi Casamitjana Costa, and his former employer, The League Against Cruel Sports. The facts of the case are set out in more detail in an earlier article from earlier this month.
In short, the Claimant is pursing complaints, inter alia, of indirect discrimination, direct discrimination or harassment and victimisation by reference to his belief in “ethical veganism”. “Ethical veganism”, according to the Vegan Society,it is a philosophy and way of life which
seeks to exclude, as far as is possible and practicable, all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose.
Angus McCullough QC is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row with experience of acting as a Special Advocate in closed proceedings since 2002.
The Government has still not implemented the review of Closed Procedures that Parliament had dictated should take place when passing the Justice and Security Act 2013. A review is required to cover the first five years after the Act came into force, and should have been completed “as soon as reasonably practicable” thereafter. That period expired in June 2018, and there are still no signs of a reviewer being appointed.
Readers familiar with closed procedures and their background may wish to skip the first half of this post.
‘Secret Justice’ is a deliberate oxymoron, used by some legal commentators as a term for Closed Material Procedures (CMPs). Justice, of course should generally be open and transparent, not secret. The principle of open justice dates back centuries, and the law reports are full of reiterations of its importance. Here’s one example, this from Lord Woolf in R v Legal Aid Board, ex p Kaim Todner [1999] QB 966:
The need to be vigilant arises from the natural tendency for the general principle to be eroded and for exceptions to grow by accretion as the exceptions are applied by analogy to existing cases. This is the reason it is so important not to forget why proceedings are required to be subjected to the full glare of a public hearing. It is necessary because the public nature of proceedings deters inappropriate behaviour on the part of the court. It also maintains the public’s confidence in the administration of justice. It enables the public to know that justice is being administered impartially. It can result in evidence becoming available which would not become available if the proceedings were conducted behind closed doors or with one or more of the parties’ or witnesses’ identity concealed. It makes uninformed and inaccurate comment about the proceedings less likely. If secrecy is restricted to those situations where justice would be frustrated if the cloak of anonymity is not provided, this reduces the risk of the sanction of contempt having to be invoked, with the expense and the interference with the administration of justice which this can involve.
An equally fundamental principle of fairness in legal proceedings is that a party should know the evidence and case against them. This has even been given a Latin epithet (audi alteram partem). But you don’t need to be a scholar of either classics or law to appreciate that being aware of the material that the other side is putting before the court, and having the opportunity to challenge and answer it, is a cardinal feature of fair legal proceedings. The personification of Justice (see picture) is blindfolded, to represent her impartiality; but litigants are expected to have an unimpaired view of the proceedings.
The case is significant for two reasons. First, in recent years there has been a spate of local authorities applying for injunctions which prevent Romany and Travellers setting up unauthorised encampments in their boroughs. There are now 38 of these injunctions nationwide.
Despite the clear effect on Romany and Travellers of these injunctions, this case was the first time the Romany and Traveller community was represented at a hearing where an injunction was sought. Further, it is the first case where an injunction of this sort has been considered by the Court of Appeal.
Lord Justice Coulson, delivering the leading judgment, gives clear guidance for local authorities, significantly limiting the scope for use of injunctions against the Romany and Traveller community in the future.
Second, in its judgment, the Court of Appeal reaffirms the centrality of a nomadic lifestyle to Romany and Traveller tradition and culture.
Drawing on European case law, the court was clear that measures which affect the ability of the community to stop their caravans have profound human rights implications. Not only do they impact upon the rights of Romany and Travellers to respect for their home, they also affect their ability to maintain their identity and to lead their private and family life in accordance with tradition. The European Court of Human Rights has found an emerging international consensus, that recognises the special needs of minority communities, and the obligation to protect their security, identity and lifestyle.
The Claimant’s belief in Forstater – that “sex is biologically immutable” — denied trans people their legal right to be recognised as the sex they had transitioned to even when they had obtained a Gender Recognition Certificate. This right has been recognised for over a decade by the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) and by domestic law in the Gender Recognition Act 2004. The Claimant’s belief — in the words of Judge Tayler — also violated the dignity of trans people and created an “intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment” for them.
Regrettably such beliefs are not as uncommon in the UK as one would hope. In fact, similar beliefs are likely to be shared by others (albeit some of their views may be less extreme than the Claimant’s in Forstater). And this raises the question – what effect might such beliefs be having on the lives of trans people in the UK?
This blog is maintained for information purposes only. It is not intended to be a source of legal advice and must not be relied upon as such. Blog posts reflect the views and opinions of their individual authors, not of chambers as a whole.
Our privacy policy can be found on our ‘subscribe’ page or by clicking here.
Recent comments