12 December 2025
Introduction
In this case, the High Court considered the appropriate legal test for leaving findings of fact to juries in Article 2 inquests. Is it that such findings are arguable? Or is it that there is sufficient evidence to support them? The answer, quite firmly, is the latter.
10 December 2025
By Samuel Talalay
Introduction
In its judgment in the case of IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, handed down on 26 November 2025, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the correct test for establishing the existence of family life between non-core family members under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human rights (“ECHR”). It also clarified the proper conceptual framework for considering the subtle interaction between the rights of non-claimant family members and the UK’s Convention obligations to individuals outside its territory. Finally, it emphasised the centrality of the Government’s immigration policy to any exercise considering the proportionality of an interference with an individual’s Article 8 rights in the immigration context.
4 December 2025
By Georgina Pein
To what extent does the law afford protection to couples looking to foster children, in circumstances where that couple possesses (and vocalises) strong religious beliefs? This was the issue for consideration before Turner J, who heard this appeal in the King’s Bench Division of the High Court. Judgment was handed down on 18 November 2025.
13 November 2025
Re B and C v D and H (Anonymous Surrogacy) [2025] EWFC 366
Put simply, intended parents should avoid embarking on a surrogacy arrangement where they do not meet, have any knowledge of or means of contacting the surrogate who carries their much wanted child. (Mrs Justice Theis DBE)
This case concerned an application by intended parents for a parental order in respect of an 18-month-old child following a surrogacy arrangement with a surrogate in Nigeria whom neither of the intended parents had met and about whom they had no information.
10 November 2025
By Emily Higlett
Introduction
The Court of Appeal in Re D has overturned final care and placement orders made at an Issues Resolution Hearing (“IRH”), stating that judges must give clear, reasoned findings on the threshold criteria under section 31(2) Children Act 1989 (“CA 1989”), even where proceedings are uncontested or parents are absent.
In delivering the judgment, Cobb LJ, with whom Baker LJ and Miles LJ agreed, criticised the short form reasoning used by the Family Court and stressed the need for transparent judicial decision-making when the State intervenes in family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).
23 July 2024
R (World Uyghur Congress) v National Crime Agency [2024] EWCA Civ 715
This landmark decision was a successful appeal from the judgment of Dove J ([2023] EWHC 88 (Admin)) on the single issue of whether the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) misdirected itself when reaching the decision (i) not to investigate alleged offences under Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”) and (ii) not to commence a civil recovery investigation under Part 5, in respect of certain cotton products brought into the UK alleged to be the product of forced labour and other human rights abuses.
The Appellant contended that when taking those decisions the Defendant had laboured under two fundamental misapprehensions, namely (i) that it is necessary to identify specific product as criminal property before commencing an investigation; and (ii) that the presence within the supply chain of a person who can rely on the exemption under section 329(2)(c) of POCA has the effect of “cleansing” criminal property so as to preclude its recovery, or the recovery of the proceeds of sale.
The court noted that it was well established that the decisions of an independent prosecutor or investigator would only be disturbed in highly exceptional circumstances: see R (Corner House Research) v Serious Fraud Office (2008) UKHL 60 at paragraphs 30-32. However, the discretion of decision makers was not unfettered; they must direct themselves correctly in law.
The challenge in this case was not advanced on Wednesbury principals. Rather, it was based on the alleged errors and misdirection in law. The Appellant contended that the Judge had nonetheless proceeded to deal with the matter on the basis that it was a rationality challenge. It was also contended that the Judge had reached the wrong conclusions insofar as he did address the substance of the challenge.
The NCA contended that it did not make the first error of law alleged, on a proper reading of the decision letter. It accepted the second error had been made but contended that it was immaterial and did not affect the substance or validity of its reasoning, namely that there was insufficient evidence from which to develop an investigation which had any prospect of bearing fruit. The Appellant accepted if that was the NCA’s reasoning, they would have been entitled to take that view.
Accordingly, this appeal turned on close analysis and the correct interpretation of the decision letter.
Sir James Eadie KC on behalf of the NCA frankly accepted that as a matter of law it would be wrong to refuse to commence an investigation under POCA because criminal property could not be identified at that time. Indeed, he contended that it would have been so obviously absurd to approach matters on the basis that that you needed to know the outcome of the investigation before taking a decision to commence it, it was highly improbable that the NCA had taken that approach.
Whilst recognising this as a powerful forensic point, the Court nonetheless concluded that, on the face of the decision letter, that was indeed the approach that was taken, and it was a clear misdirection in law.
Moreover, the Court did not agree that the second error within the decision letter was immaterial. That was the identification of a hypothetical individual within the supply chain who could rely on the exemption under section 329(2)(c) of POCA, which provides that a person will not commit an offence under section 329(1) “if he acquired or used or had possession of the property for adequate consideration”. In their view, this error appeared to play an important part in the decision-maker’s line of reasoning.
The judgment also noted that it was common ground there was a “diverse, substantial and growing body of evidence that serious human rights abuses are occurring in the XUAR cotton industry on a large scale”. Further that products derived from forced labour of the proceeds of sale could amount to “criminal property” for the purposes of Part 5 of POCA and “recoverable property” for the purposes of Part 7.
The Court agreed, and it seemed to be accepted by the parties, that the Judge had never directly identified the question whether the position expressed by the NCA in correspondence amount to an error of law.
It held that there was legitimate concern that the judgment endorsed the proposition that there is a need to establish criminal conduct or criminal property before an investigation under POCA can begin. In particular, the Court noted the submissions of the Intervenor “Spotlight on Corruption” that the judgment, if left undisturbed, would discourage the NCA, the police and other UK investigative bodies from commencing investigations into corruption, particularly where it occurs overseas, in the absence of concrete evidence of particular crimes carried out by particular persons. Spotlight also raised concerns at the suggestion that criminal liability or civil recovery was precluded where the proceeds of crime passed through several hands where adequate consideration was paid.
The Court confirmed that the proposition that, where the importer pays market value, they will not be tainted, was wrong in law. To the extent that the Judge accepted that at any point in a supply chain stretching many thousands of miles, the chain could be broken merely by using adequate consideration in any of the transactions involved, he was wrong to do so.
The Court held that there was force in the Appellant’s submission that the Judge had treated the challenge as if it were on the grounds of irrationality. More importantly, it was clear that the NCA had misdirected itself based on the two errors of law identified by the Appellant. The question of whether to carry out an investigation under Part 7 or part 5 of POCA was accordingly remitted to the NCA for reconsideration.
This judgment has significant implications for those trading in goods known or suspected to have been produced using forced labour or other human rights abuses, who may face investigation and prosecution even where adequate consideration has been paid. It has been hailed as a victory for those subjected to forced labour and human rights abuses.
Shaheen Rahman KC is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row Chambers
28 June 2023
Introduction
The advent of the Human Rights Act 1998, and the incorporation into domestic law of the Article 2 right to life, has transformed coronial investigations and inquests over the last two decades. Lord Bingham’s magisterial creation of the ‘enhanced’ investigation and conclusion in R (Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner [2004] UKHL 10, [2004] 2 AC 182 (later adopted by Parliament) gave coroners greater responsibility to hold the state to account for deaths. That, in turn, has significantly improved the ways in which all inquests are conducted, not just those where Article 2 is found to be engaged. Inquests are no longer haphazard affairs. They are (ordinarily) carefully planned and structured processes; and their participants, the ‘interested persons’, are far more involved in assisting coroners with the task of identifying the proper scope of their investigations and the lawful ambit of their conclusions.
Article 2, then, has already conquered and occupied the terrain of the coroners’ courts and it is only at the frontiers of its application that legal skirmishes still occur. One such fight is the case of R (Maguire) v HM Senior Coroner for Blackpool & Fylde and another [2023] UKSC 20, which was argued before the Supreme Court on 22nd and 23rd November 2022, and in which judgment was given on 21st June 2023.
The central issue in the case was whether Article 2 required an enhanced inquest into the death of highly vulnerable woman, Jackie Maguire, who had become seriously unwell while in a private residential care home and had later died in hospital. The Supreme Court held unanimously that it did not. More importantly, in doing so, it took the opportunity to provide a detailed and authoritative account of how Article 2 applies to coronial investigations and inquests.
1 February 2021
In Privacy International v Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the Divisional Court held that s.5 Intelligence Services Act 1994 does not permit the government to issue general warrants to engage in computer network exploitation (“CNE”) – more commonly known as computer hacking. The court also offered valuable guidance on warrants and what is required to make them lawful.
The Issues
There were three issues:
1. Does s.5 Intelligence Services Act 1994 (“the 1994 Act”) permit the Secretary of State to issue ‘thematic’ or ‘general’ warrants to hack computers? General warrants are those which purportedly authorise acts in respect of an entire class of people or an entire class of acts (e.g. ‘all mobile phones in London’).
2. Should the court allow the claim to be amended to include a complaint that, prior to February 2015, the s.5 regime did not comply with Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights?
3. If permission is given to amend the claim, should the new ground succeed?
4 February 2019
The Supreme Court has upheld challenges to the legal regimes for disclosing criminal records in England and Wales, and Northern Ireland, finding them to be incompatible with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).
R (P, G and W) and Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Anor [2019] UKSC 3 – Read Judgment
10 January 2019
ARB v IVF Hammersmith & Another [2018] Civ 2803 (17 December 2018) – read judgment
Legal policy in the UK has traditionally prohibited the granting of damages for the wrongful conception or birth of a child in cases of negligence. In this case the Court of Appeal has confirmed that this bar is equally applicable to a wrongful birth arising from a breach of contract.
The facts of the case are set out in my podcast on the first instance decision (Episode 12 of Law Pod UK). Briefly, an IVF clinic had implanted the claimant father’s gametes into his former partner without his consent. This occurred after the couple had sought fertility treatment at the clinic resulting in the birth of a son some years previously. Following standard practice, the clinic froze five embryos made with their gametes. Subsequently, the couple separated. Some time after this separation the mother, R, attended the clinic without ARB and informed the staff that they had decided to have another child. The form requiring consent from ARB for thawing and implanting the embyro was signed by R, and the clinic failed to notice the forgery. R went on to give birth to a healthy daughter, E, who is now the sibling of ARB’s son. There is a Family Court order confirming parental responsibility and shared residence in respect of both children.
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3 December 2018
In the Courts:
Conway, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] UKSC B1: The Supreme Court has refused to hear an appeal from a sufferer of motor neurone disease, in the latest of a line of challenges to the UK’s ban on assisting suicide. The applicant was contesting the Divisional Court’s refusal to declare the statutory ban on assisting suicide to be incompatible with his article 8 rights.
The question for the court was whether his case raised “an arguable point of law of general public importance” which ought to be heard by the Supreme Court at this time. Whilst the points of law were undoubtedly arguable, and the public importance obvious, the court concluded “not without some reluctance” that the applicant’s prospects of success did not justify granting permission to appeal. Rosalind English has more detail here.
Stott, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] UKSC 59: The appellant was a prisoner who had been classed as ‘dangerous’ and accordingly given an Extended Determinate Sentence (EDS), under which he would become eligible for parole only after serving two-thirds of the appropriate custodial term. This was in various ways narrower than the ordinary parole eligibility of other categories of prisoner. The appellant claimed unlawful discrimination under Article 14 ECHR, combined with Article 5 (the right to liberty).
15 October 2018
The cake at the centre of the controversy — Image: The Guardian
Lee v. Ashers Baking Company Ltd – read judgment here.
On Wednesday the Supreme Court handed down its much-anticipated judgment in the ‘gay cake’ case. The Court unanimously held that it was not direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or political opinion for the owners of a Northern Irish bakery to refuse to bake a cake with the message ‘Support Gay Marriage’ on it, when to do so would have been contrary to their sincerely held religious beliefs.
The judgment is a significant and welcome affirmation of the fundamental importance of freedom of conscience and freedom of speech. The Court emphasised that refusing to provide a good or service to someone because they are gay (or because of any other protected characteristic) is unlawful discrimination — this judgment should not give anyone the idea that discrimination is now acceptable. However, the Court made clear that the purpose of equality law is to protect people, not ideas, and that no-one should ever be compelled by law to make a statement or express a message with which they do not agree.
27 May 2018
Image Credit: The Guardian
In a landmark moment for women’s rights, the Irish electorate has voted in favour of abolishing the 8th Amendment by a stunning two-thirds majority of 1,429,981 votes to 723,632.
Whilst abortion has long been illegal in Ireland under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the notorious 8th Amendment, which gives the foetus’ right to life absolute parity with that of the woman carrying it, was enacted after a 1983 referendum lobbied for by pro-life activists. By virtue of the amendment:
“The state acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.”
Lawyers for Yes emphasised that the amendment created ‘absolute legal paralysis in dealing with crisis pregnancies’ and had to be repealed if women in Ireland were to receive ‘appropriate’ and ‘compassionate’ healthcare. Also on the UKHRB, Rosalind English shares a powerful analysis of the extraordinary nature of the legal obligations imposed on women’s bodies by this provision.
11 March 2018
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
Photo credit: The Guardian
In the News:
Over 100 female detainees have gone on hunger strike at Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre.
The women began their strike on the 21st February, over “inhuman” conditions, indefinite detentions, and a perceived failure to address their medical needs. The UK is the only European state that does not put a time limit on how long detainees can be held.
This week, the strikers were given a letter from the Home Office warning their actions may speed up their deportation. Labour criticised the letter, but Caroline Nokes, the Immigration Minister, said the letter was part of official Home Officer guidance and was published last November on its website.
Continue reading →
3 September 2017
Clinical Genetics is a field of medicine concerned with the probability of an indvidual’s condition having an hereditary basis. The journal Medical Law International has just published an article about the scope of potential duties of care owed by specialists in this field to people with heritable diseases. The authors draw out the features of genomic medicine that open the door to new liabilities; a potential duty owed by clinicians to third party family members, and another legal relationship that may be drawn between researchers and patients.
Background
There is no legislation on the duties involved in genome sequencing in the United Kingdom, and, in the absence of this, any new legal duties on the part of professionals in clinical genomics need to be established within the common law of negligence. Civil lawyers are familiar with the standard framework for establishing whether a duty of care is owed, based on these three consecutive questions:
These principles are neat enough as they are laid out but only take us as far as the facts of any particular case, particularly the Caparo test outlined in para (3).
This relatively new field of medical endeavour is unusual in that it is concerned with the management of a family rather than one individual. More generally, in the field of genomic medicine, there is a “close interaction between care and research”, resulting in “the real possibility” that genomics researchers will be found to owe a legal duty to disclose findings to participants.
So we have two new possible avenues of liability here; that of clinicians to third parties, and that of researchers to patients.
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This blog is run by 1 Crown Office Row barristers' chambers. Subscribe for free updates here. The blog's editorial team is:
Commissioning Editor:
Jasper Gold
Assistant Editor:
Allyna Ng
Editors:
Rosalind English
Angus McCullough KC
David Hart KC
Martin Downs
Jim Duffy
Jonathan Metzer
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