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Secretary of State for the Home Department v Hirtie [2026] EWCA Civ 1000, handed down by the Court of Appeal on 30 July 2026, is a deportation appeal that turns less on the substance of Article 8 than on procedural discipline: whether a party who unequivocally withdraws a ground of appeal before the Upper Tribunal (”UT”) can resurrect it before the Court of Appeal. The Court’s answer, delivered by Stuart-Smith LJ, was a firm no, reinforcing a growing body of authority requiring parties to identify and narrow the issues in dispute at the earliest opportunity.
Background
Mr Hirtie, a Romanian national, was convicted of section 18 wounding with intent (the most serious form of assault) and sentenced to 39 months’ imprisonment, making him a “foreign criminal” under section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 and liable to automatic deportation.
The Secretary of State (”SSHD”) rejected his human rights claim in September 2023, finding that neither exception to deportation under section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 applied and that there were no “very compelling circumstances” outweighing the public interest in removal.
The decision letter was structured throughout on the assumption that Mr Hirtie’s partner and children would remain in the United Kingdom following his deportation — the “stay” scenario. As Hirtie records at §13: “The structure of the SSHD’s reasoning is clear beyond argument: the possibility of Mr Hirtie’s partner and children going to live in Romania was simply not in issue.”
The route through the tribunals
Mr Hirtie’s skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) expressly identified the “go” scenario as a matter not in dispute, and the SSHD never contradicted this. The FtT allowed the appeal, finding that separation from Mr Hirtie would have a “profound” impact on his partner — going “beyond undue hardship” — given her traumatic history of losing her parents young and being raised in an orphanage, and that this amounted to “very compelling circumstances” under section 117C(6).
On appeal to the UT, the SSHD raised the “go” scenario for the first time as Ground 1, drafted in terms the presiding judge, UTJ O’Callaghan, considered misleading. Hirtie records at §31: “The end result was that the Senior Presenting Officer who was appearing for the SSHD agreed that Ground 1 … should be withdrawn. The withdrawal was unequivocal, albeit in the face of a heavy judicial headwind.” The UT went on to reject the SSHD’s remaining ground and upheld the FtT’s decision.
Reviving a withdrawn ground
Before the Court of Appeal, the SSHD sought to resurrect the “go” scenario, arguing that section 117A(2)(b) of the 2002 Act obliged the tribunal to consider it regardless of whether either party had raised it. Warby LJ, granting permission, deliberately left open whether a party could revive an argument withdrawn below.
Stuart-Smith LJ rejected the attempt at §52: “She had been properly represented before the UT and was not forced to withdraw the ground. No good reason was offered for resurrecting it on appeal.”
Applying Singh v Dass [2019] EWCA Civ 360, decided 7 March 2019, the Court set out the governing test for admitting a new point on appeal. Haddon-Cave LJ held at §16-17 of that case: “An appellate court will be cautious about allowing a new point to be raised on appeal that was not raised before the first instance court… An appellate court will not, generally, permit a new point to be raised on appeal if that point is such that either (a) it would necessitate new evidence or (b), had it been run below, it would have resulted in the trial being conducted differently with regards to the evidence at the trial.”
Applying this in Hirtie, the Court held at §53 that admitting the “go” scenario would require fresh evidence about relocation difficulties, that the FtT hearing would have unfolded differently had the issue been live, and that this was not a pure point of law the Court of Appeal could resolve without remittal.
The deeper procedural principle
More fundamentally, the Court held that allowing the SSHD to raise the “go” scenario now would conflict with the case-management philosophy established in Lata (FtT: Principal Controversial Issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC), decided 23 June 2023, and endorsed by the Court of Appeal in AL v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 370, handed down 31 March 2026.
Lata’s headnote states at point 4: “It is a misconception that it is sufficient for a party to be silent upon, or not make an express consideration as to, an issue for a burden to then be placed upon a judge to consider all potential issues that may favourably arise, even if not expressly relied upon.”
In AL, Elisabeth Laing LJ endorsed this approach, explaining at §78 that upon proper engagement with the appeal skeleton process “a judge sitting in the First-tier Tribunal can properly expect clarity as to the remaining issues between the parties by the date of the substantive hearing.” She further held, applying the narrow Robinson-obvious exception (from R (Robinson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1998] QB 929), that a decision cannot be criticised for failing to address an issue neither party raised, unless it was “a point which has strong prospects of success if it is argued. Nothing less will do” (Robinson at 946B-D, cited in AL at §68).
Hirtie held at §54-55 that the SSHD was not exempt from this obligation. Having omitted any reasoned discussion of relocation difficulties from the decision letter, and having failed to challenge Mr Hirtie’s skeleton assertion that the “go” scenario was not in dispute, her silence was, per Stuart-Smith LJ, “consistent with the issue not forming part of her decision-making process and not being in dispute between the parties.”
The “very compelling circumstances” ground
The SSHD’s second ground argued that the FtT’s finding of “very compelling circumstances” was legally flawed, inadequately reasoned, and perverse — partly because the judge did not expressly cite section 117C, and partly for want of expert medical evidence about the partner’s mental health.
The Court disagreed. At §62-63, Stuart-Smith LJ held that although the FtT judge did not set out section 117C verbatim, he plainly understood and applied the correct “very high bar,” relying on Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60, decided 16 November 2016 (also cited as Hesham Ali), for the proposition that the public interest in deporting foreign criminals must be accorded very significant weight. The absence of a concluding checklist recapping the relevant factors was immaterial (§64).
On perversity, the FtT judge had found the partner and Mr Hirtie’s brother “honest and credible” witnesses giving “sincere and heartfelt evidence” (§66-67), and the Court held that FtT judges are entitled to make findings about the psychological impact of separation on the basis of accepted witness evidence alone, without corroborating expert medical evidence. The judge’s conclusion, reached “by a narrow margin,” was nonetheless sufficient to withstand appellate scrutiny (§68).
Comment
Hirtie offers several practical lessons for immigration and public law practitioners handling deportation and Article 8 appeals:
Withdrawal is generally final. A party that unequivocally withdraws a ground before the UT, while properly represented and without compulsion, should not expect the Court of Appeal to allow its resurrection absent compelling justification (Hirtie at §52).
Case-management discipline applies to the Secretary of State too.Lata and AL are not confined to appellants; the SSHD is equally bound to identify and narrow issues at the earliest stage (Hirtie at §55).
Silence has consequences. Failing to engage with an opponent’s stated “matters not in dispute” will be treated as acceptance, not oversight (Lata headnote, point 4).
New points face a high bar.Singh v Dass remains the touchstone: a new point requiring fresh evidence, or one that would have changed how the hearing below was conducted, will not be entertained on appeal (Singh at §16-17).
The FtT’s reasoning need not be exhaustive. Provided the tribunal identifies and applies the correct legal test in substance, a judgment will not be struck down merely for lacking a concluding checklist (Hirtie at §64).
Witness credibility can suffice without expert evidence. Findings about the psychological impact of separation may properly rest on accepted witness testimony alone (Hirtie at §67).
The case is a useful, moderately short illustration of how tightly the appellate courts are now enforcing the “principal controversial issues” discipline established in Lata — a discipline that applies as much to the Home Office as to any other litigant.
In Cherrington v University of Derby [2026] EAT 107, the Mr Justice Cavanagh in the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) held that an Employment Tribunal (“ET”) was not obliged to consider the Appellant’s Article 10 ECHR right to freedom of expression of its own motion when deciding whether or not his dismissal was fair. His right to freedom of expression did not “shout out” from his case, and nor was the ET obliged to consider the ECHR “as a matter of course” in unfair dismissal complaints, or even particular species of unfair dismissal complaints.
This case note briefly sets out the background to the case and the judgment, and then offers some brief comments by way of conclusion. References in square brackets are to paragraphs of the judgment.
In R (Al Hashimi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 943, the Court of Appeal held that a woman living in the United Arab Emirates could not invoke Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) to challenge sex discrimination in UK nationality legislation. The preliminary obstacle was Article 1: she was not within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction for Convention purposes (§1).
The decision is a clear restatement of the territorial limits on the ECHR. A decision taken in the UK, even one that substantially affects the interests of a person abroad, does not itself establish jurisdiction over that person (§§28-29, 39).
This decision, arising from the long running Under Cover Policing Inquiry (“UCPI”), was the first time a Court has heard full argument about the extra-territoriality of a notice issued under section 21 Inquiries Act 2005 (the “IA”). Simply put, the Court decided that an Inquiry Chair does have the power to issue a s21 notice to a person residing overseas. This represents a departure from the approach of previous public inquiries.
A Court of Appeal panel of five Judges, including the Lady Chief Justice, Lady Carr LCJ, the Master of the Rolls, Sir Geoffrey Vos, the Vice President of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), Edis LJ, and Lewis and Whipple LJJ has overturned the Divisional Court’s decision quashing the proscription of Palestine Action, holding that it erred in its approach both to the challenge brought under the Home Secretary’s relevant policy and to whether a fair balance had been struck with reference to the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
This article takes an extended look at the reasoning in this decision.
This decision has wide-ranging implications for people in care settings across the UK, public bodies, and practitioners, and reframes the approach to deprivation of liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”).
The decision originated with a reference brought by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland on the meaning of deprivation of liberty for adults (defined as those aged 16 and above) assessed as lacking mental capacity to make decisions about their residence and care arrangements, and living in community settings. The Minister of Health for Northern Ireland (“the Minister”) sought to revise a code of practice in Northern Ireland to provide that even where an adult had been assessed as lacking the relevant mental capacity, they could nevertheless provide valid consent to their care arrangements through the expression of wishes and feelings which go beyond mere acquiescence to their confinement. The Minister sought to issue the revised code of practice under section 288(4) of the MCA 2016 to replace the existing Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards Code of Practice issued under section 288(1) of the MCA 2016.
The issue for the Supreme Court to determine was whether this revised code would be incompatible with Article 5 of the ECHR. If so, the revised code would be unlawful.
On its face, R (on the application of Martin) v the Chancellor of the Exchequer [2026] EWHC 1123 (Admin) was a garden variety public law challenge to a government consultation on two technical forms of tax relief for agricultural property. It features on this blog, however, because of its contribution to the caselaw on the proper constitutional limits on the jurisdiction of the courts vis-à-vis the two other branches of the state, especially Parliament.
Case overview
The three Claimants – two farmers, a father and son, and an unincorporated association set up in 2025 to advance agriculture and farming through good governance practices and tax policy – sought permission to apply for judicial review of a technical consultation conducted by HMRC designed to elicit views on a specific aspect of the government’s proposals for reforming tax relief on agricultural property. Those proposals were eventually incorporated as legislative measures into what is now the Finance Act 2026. At the time of the hearings, on 17-18 March 2026, the legislation was in the form of the Finance (No 2) Bill 2025-26 and was still awaiting Royal Assent.
At its core, the Claimants’ case was that the government had promised to consult on changes to Agricultural Property Relief (“APR”) and Business Property Relief (“BPR”) but had failed adequately to do so (see [5]). The consultation process, they claimed, was therefore unlawful. They sought a declaration to that effect by way of relief.
Both the first and second Defendants – the Chancellor of the Exchequer and HMRC – denied that the Claimants had a legitimate expectation of consultation, and resisted the three other grounds of review advanced (see [32]). They also denied that the third Claimant had standing to bring judicial review proceedings and argued that, in any case, the claim was brought out of time.
More interestingly, for our purposes, they also argued that the issues raised by the claim were non-justiciable both because of their essentially political character and for reasons of parliamentary privilege. The Office of the Speaker of the House of Commons took the lead on making submissions that the claim trespassed on parliamentary privilege and was therefore non-justiciable.
Whipple LJ and Fordham J sat as a divisional court for a rolled-up hearing to consider both permission and substantive judicial review proceedings, handing down judgment on 12 May 2026.
Parliamentary privilege
The law
A decision might benefit from parliamentary privilege, such that it falls outwith the Court’s jurisdiction, because of Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689, which provides that “the Freedome of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament.”
The sort of thing which Article IX precludes from being ‘impeached or questioned’ by the courts was examined by the Supreme Court in the case of R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 51 at [47]:
[T]he principal matter to which article 9 is directed is freedom of speech and debate in the Houses of Parliament and in parliamentary committees. This is where the core or essential business of Parliament takes place. In considering whether actions outside the Houses and committees fall within parliamentary proceedings because of their connection to them, it is necessary to consider the nature of that connection and whether, if such actions do not enjoy privilege, this is likely to impact adversely on the core or essential business of Parliament.
While the idea of ‘speech and debate’ in Parliament is self-explanatory, then, Chaytor sets out two questions which must be answered in order to determine whether something outside the Houses and committees – something which, in Whipple LJ’s words at [83], is “incidental to the core or essential business of Parliament” – counts as a ‘proceeding in Parliament’ and therefore attracts parliamentary privilege:
What is the nature of the connection between the matter in question, on the one hand, and the core and essential parliamentary business within the Houses and committees, on the other?
Given that connection, would a failure to extend privilege to that matter adversely impact on the core and essential business of Parliament?
A matter might nonetheless be protected by parliamentary privilege, and therefore be non-justiciable, even if it is not protected by Article IX: R (SC) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions at [164]-[165]; Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 AC 321.
In her judgment, Whipple LJ put it this way, at [105(i)]:
Parliamentary privilege goes wider than merely protecting proceedings once they are initiated in Parliament. It encompasses the comity between Parliament and the courts, based on mutual respect and the separation of constitutional powers.
The parties’ submissions
The Claimants relied heavily on Chaytor to support the contention that parliamentary privilege should not be accorded overly liberally and to buttress the argument that the target of the judicial review, HMRC’s technical consultation, could not be said to be a proceeding in Parliament. As such, the Court was not precluded by Article IX from adjudicating on its lawfulness.
They argued that the courts had taken a wrong turn in a key line of caselaw – beginning with R (Adiatu) v HM Treasury [2020] EWHC 1554 (Admin) – which decided in unequivocal terms, but without reference to Chaytor, that parliamentary privilege could, and in those cases did, attach to government decisions taken en route to subsequent parliamentary proceedings.
The Speaker conceded that Chaytor was indeed authority for the meaning of ‘proceedings in Parliament’ in the context of Article IX, but argued that the Claimants were mistaken in identifying the scope of that term as the key issue in this case.
This case turned, instead, on two separate questions, corresponding to the periods of time before and after the introduction of the Finance Bill, respectively.
Until 2 December 2025 at the very latest, when the Finance Bill was introduced to Parliament, the question was whether a challenge to the technical consultation, which led to measures included in the Finance Bill, would be non-justiciable for wider (i.e. non-Article IX) reasons of parliamentary privilege.
At the time of the hearings, when the Finance Bill was awaiting Royal Assent, the question was whether the Court, in considering the lawfulness of the technical consultation which led to measures included in the Finance Bill – itself undoubtedly a proceeding in Parliament – could be said to be impeaching or questioning those proceedings.
As to the first question, the Speaker’s submission was that the Claimant’s challenge was non-justiciable because, if successful, it would necessarily delay the laying of the Finance Bill, which would constitute an impermissible interference with Parliament. This was the clear position from the impugned line of case law that the Claimants sought to persuade the court to overturn. Those cases were not decided incorrectly and did not err in failing to cite Chaytor. Whereas Chaytor was authority for the scope of ‘proceedings in Parliament’, that question was not in issue in the impugned line of authorities beginning with Adiatu, which instead dealt with the question, entirely pertinent in this case, of when judicial proceedings could be said to encroach impermissibly on territory that was the constitutional preserve of Parliament.
As to the second question, the Speaker argued that the Court undoubtedly would be impeaching or questioning proceedings in Parliament by accepting jurisdiction in this case. The Speaker relied in particular on the case of R (A and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWHC 360 (Admin), in which Fordham J had previously concluded, at [26], that:
[a] declaration from a judicial review court, declaring that the consultation which preceded the Bill and informed its design was unlawful would—even if the court bent over backwards to make very clear that that was the scope and extent of its judgment and its declaration—clearly raise questions about whether some step ought to be taken in light of that conclusion of law by the court.
Even if the Court’s conclusion did not involve the government taking “some step”:
the court’s judgment [would] instead cast a legal ‘shadow’ over the product of the consultation. That shadow would, in my judgment, itself stand – in the circumstances of the present case – as an interference in the parliamentary process. The court would, unmistakably, have concluded that the ‘product’ of the consultation was legally ‘tainted’.
The Speaker argued that the Court’s consideration of HMRC’s technical consultation would similarly cast a legal shadow over the Finance Bill and thereby fall foul of Article IX.
The decision of the divisional court
The merits, the timing, and the political character of the decision under challenge
The Court refused the Claimants permission to apply for judicial review, finding that their substantive claim was unarguable: there never was any legitimate expectation to a consultation of the sort claimed by the Claimants (see [10]). It also held, at [71]-[79], that the claim was brought out of time.
The Court declined to rule on the second Defendant’s contention that the subject matter of the claim was – in Whipple LJ’s words at [47(i)]) – “quintessentially political” and therefore outside its jurisdiction. In R (Wheeler) v Office of the Prime Minister [2008] EWHC 1409 (Admin), the Court was prepared to say that a government promise to hold a referendum on the UK’s accession to the Treaty of Lisbon was precisely the sort of question on which the judiciary was ill-suited to adjudicate. Whipple LJ limited herself to the observation, at [113], that “it is an open question whether a similar analysis [to the one in Wheeler] would apply in the context of a promise of consultation relating to a tax policy change.”
Parliamentary privilege
The Court did, however, explore the question of parliamentary privilege in some detail, devoting almost a quarter of the judgment, from [80]-[110], to the subject.
The Court declined the Claimants’ invitation to overhaul the authorities on the question of parliamentary privilege generally, instead accepting the Speaker’s submissions.
The Court also agreed with the Speaker, at [110], that the Finance Bill was incontrovertibly a proceeding in Parliament at the time of the hearings and that to hear the Claimant’s challenge to the technical consultation would plainly impeach or question that proceeding in Parliament. As such, Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689 prohibited the Court from considering the claim.
Samuel Talalay is a pupil barrister at 1 Crown Office Row.
The Speaker was represented by David Manknell KC and Rajkiran Arhestey of 1 Crown Office Row, neither of whom were involved in the writing of this post.
The Court of Appeal in Re J, Re M and Re P (Parental Responsibility) [2026] EWCA Civ 344 has provided authoritative guidance on a fundamental question in family law: whether a person who is not a child’s biological father can acquire parental responsibility by being named on the birth certificate. The court firmly answered that question in the negative, clarifying the meaning of “father” under the Children Act 1989 and resolving a line of inconsistent first instance decisions.
In addition to undertaking a comprehensive review of the AF-disclosure case law, Chamberlain J also rejected the notion of some form of an intermediate level of disclosure in closed material proceedings, where the AF-disclosure threshold is not met. The decision offers some much-needed clarity in this area of law.
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR” or “the Convention”) provides qualified protection for speech. Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”) criminalises certain speech acts relating to proscribed organisations. In the case of R v ABJ; R v BDN[2026] UKSC 8 the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether these two things could be reconciled: is s 12(1A) of the 2000 Act compatible with the Convention?
In its judgment, given on 26 February 2026, the Court answered this question with an unequivocal ‘yes’. The offence introduced by s 12(1A) was prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Crucially, conviction would always represent a proportionate interference with the defendant’s Article 10 right to free speech where the elements of the offence, properly understood, were made out.
In providing such a resounding answer, however, the Court risks setting the bar too high for legislative provisions to be compatible with the Convention.
In Medmoune v France App no 55026/22 (ECHR, 5 February 2026), the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights considered the extent of a Member State’s obligation under Art. 2 ECHR (the right to life) when deciding to withdraw life support, in circumstances where the patient had explicitly asked for it to be continued.[1] The judgment helpfully illustrates the contentious boundary at which informed patient consent must give way to the expert opinion of medical professionals.
In a recent judgment, the High Court in AAA v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority [2026] EWHC 317 (Fam) (Morgan J) heard 15 applications from fertility clinic patients for declaratory relief. Those patients (the “Applicants”) had embryos or gametes which were stored at various fertility clinics. They sought declarations that it was lawful for those gametes or embryos to continue to be stored and used in circumstances where their written consent to storage had expired and had not been renewed (within the timeframes provided by legislation for renewal of consent).
Morgan J found that there were relevant administrative failures and oversights on behalf of the fertility clinics, and relief was granted in relation to 14 out of the 15 applications.
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (“HFEA”), the fertility clinics, and the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (“SSHSC”) were Interested Parties to the applications.
How should the Legal Aid Agency (LAA) respond when a person with anorexia, which has had a “severe and debilitating impact on her physical and mental health” for a long time, applies for legal aid to assist her with making an application to the Home Office for permission for her medical team to treat her with psilocybin (the main psychoactive component in various mushrooms commonly referred to as magic mushrooms)?
In R (EB) v Director of Legal Aid Casework [2026] EWHC 402, the High Court considered a challenge to the LAA’s refusal of legal aid for exactly that purpose. The Claimant had been a participant in a clinical trial at Imperial College London (a global leader in psychedelic research, and had found the treatment highly effective with no side effects ([4]). Psilocybin, though, is a controlled drug, and cannot be used even medically without authorisation from the Home Secretary under Section 5 of the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001 (the Regulations), which is far from straightforward.
The Divisional Court in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2026] EWHC 292 (Admin)(Dame Victoria Sharp P and Swift and Steyn JJ) has held that the proscription of Palestine Action should be quashed on the basis that the Home Secretary had failed to follow relevant policy guidance and had not struck a fair balance in respect of relevant rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.
This ‘extended look’ article will examine the grounds on which the claim succeeded and evaluate the Home Secretary’s potential prospects on appeal (permission for which has been granted).
The post below was originally published on the Administrative Court Blog, of which its author, Dr Lewis Graham, is an editor. It is republished here with the Dr Graham’s permission.
The First-tier Tribunal had delivered a ruling in which it has allowed a claimant to challenge the imposition of a liability order on public law grounds, despite the jurisdiction for this not being set out explicitly in the relevant statute. The decision does not set a precedent, and strictly involves a narrow point of construction relating to the Finance Act. However, its reasoning, if approved or adopted on appeal, may have significant ramifications for claimants wishing to rely on public law grounds before tribunal appeals more generally. The case is Hall v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 124 (TC) (13 January 2026).
The claimant, Hall, was issued a Joint and Several Liability Notice (JSLN) and sought to appeal it before the First-tier Tribunal (FTT). He wished to challenge the notice on five grounds. It was undisputed that the tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the first two grounds (whether the prerequisite conditions were met, and whether the notice was necessary for the protection of revenue, respectively). However, HMRC disputed the tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider Grounds 3 to 5 (relating to the proportionality of the measure, the rationality of the measure, and a failure to follow relevant guidance) and applied for these grounds to be struck out, under rule 8(2) Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The question for the tribunal was, therefore, whether it did have the jurisdiction to consider these – public law – grounds.
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