By: Rosalind English
4 July 2013 by Rosalind English
Kirovogradoblenergo, Pat v Ukraine (Application no. 35088/07) 27 June 2013 – read judgment
Shortly after the break up of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine introduced an interesting piece of legislation called the Status of Judges Act.
Being a judge behind the Iron Curtain couldn’t have been much fun, and rendering the profession more attractive once society had opened up somewhat was probably one of the more pressing challenges facing the new regime. One of the chief provisions in the SoJA was to spare members of the judiciary from paying half their electricity bills. What this tells us about the status of judges before and shortly after the dissolution of communism is itself an interesting subject, but outside the scope of this post.
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1 July 2013 by Rosalind English
Case C-131/12: Google Spain SL & Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) & Mario Costeja González – read Opinion of AG Jääskinen
This reference to the European Court of Justice (CJEU) concerned the application of the 1995 Data Protection Directive to the operation of internet search engines. Apart from demonstrating the many complications thrown up by this convoluted and shortsighted piece of regulation, this case raises the fascinating question of the so-called right to be forgotten, and the issue of whether data subjects can request that some or all search results concerning them are no longer accessible through search engine.
All of these questions are new to the Court.
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27 June 2013 by Rosalind English
Salahuddin Amin v Director General of MI5, Chief of MI6, the FCO, the Home Office and the Attorney General- [2013] EWHC 1579 (QB) – read judgment
Do not be misled by the impressive cast list of defendants in this case. It means simply that the claimant was attempting to attack the integrity of his criminal conviction via the civil courts.
He framed his case against the defendants principally in vicarious liability for the alleged torts of individual SS or SIS officers committed in the performance of their duties, when he was arrested and detained in Pakistan and the UK. In a short judgment, Irwin J set out his reasons for allowing the Particulars of Claim to be struck out as an abuse of the process of court.
The somewhat complicated procedural history of this case can be briefly summarised. In 2008 the claimant was convicted of conspiracy to cause explosions likely to endanger life. His appeal failed. In 2009 he commenced these proceedings, claiming that the mistreatment he received at the hands of the Pakistani authorities and whilst in detention in the UK had rendered the evidence so unreliable that it should not have been admitted at the original trial.
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26 June 2013 by Rosalind English
CM v The Executor of the Estate of EJ (deceased) [2013] EWHC 1680 (Fam) – read judgment
You would have thought the law would be entirely behind a person who intervenes to help a stranger in distress. Indeed most civil law countries impose a positive duty to rescue, which means that if a person finds someone in need of medical help, he or she must take all reasonable steps to seek medical care and render best-effort first aid. A famous example of this was the investigation into the photographers at the scene of Lady Diana’s fatal car accident: they were suspected of violation of the French law of “non-assistance à personne en danger” (deliberately failing to provide assistance to a person in danger), which can be punished by up to 5 years imprisonment and a fine of up to 70,000 euros. But the position in common law countries like the UK and the United States is completely different: you can watch a child drown and not be held to account.
Of course no good citizen would do such a thing and in this case the claimant, a medical doctor, went out of her way to try to save the life of someone in extremis. She was driving home, off duty, in South East London, when she saw a body lying motionless on the pavement.
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20 June 2013 by Rosalind English
Smith and Others (Appellants) v The Ministry of Defence (Respondent) and other appeals – read judgment and our previous post for summary of the facts
So, the Supreme Court has refused to allow these claims to be struck out on the principle of combat immunity. It has also asserted that jurisdiction for the purpose of an Article 2 right to life claim can extend to non-Convention countries, and that the state can owe a positive duty to protect life, even in a situation of armed combat.
This ruling deserves close attention not least because it takes common law negligence and Article 2 into an area which is very largely uncharted by previous authority. Lord Mance does not mince his words in his dissent, predicting that yesterday’s ruling will lead, inevitably, to the “judicialisation of war”. Lord Carnwath is similarly minded; in this case, he says, the Court is being asked to authorise an extension of the law of negligence (as indeed of Article 2), into a new field, without guidance from “any authority in the higher courts, in this country or any comparable jurisdiction, in which the state has been held liable for injuries sustained by its own soldiers in the course of active hostilities.” Lord Wilson also dissented on this point.
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20 June 2013 by Rosalind English
In the matter of B (a child) (FC) [2013] UKSC 33 – read judgment
This appeal concerned whether a child of two years of age should be permanently removed from her parents and placed for adoption; and, in that regard, whether the child was likely to suffer “significant harm: within the meaning of s.31(2)(a) of the Children Act 1989; and a consideration of whether her permanent removal might interfere with the exercise of the right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the ECHR, and, if so, whether the order should be proportionate to its legitimate aim of protecting the child.
The following summary is based on the Supreme Court press report. References in square brackets are to paragraphs of the judgment.
Background facts
The child concerned had been removed from her parents at birth under an interim care order. The mother was for many years in an abusive relationship with her step-father. She also had criminal convictions for dishonesty and a history of making false allegations. She had been diagnosed with somatisation disorder, a condition which involves making multiple complaints to medical professionals of symptoms for which no adequate physical explanation can be found.
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19 June 2013 by Rosalind English
Smith and Others (Appellants) v The Ministry of Defence (Respondent); Ellis and another (FC) (Respondents) v Ministry of Defence (Appellant); Allbutt and others (FC) (Respondents) v The Ministry of Defence (Appellant) [2013] UKSC 41 – read judgment
The Court has ruled that the negligence claims taken by the families of servicemen injured or killed in Iraq should not be struck out on the ground of combat immunity, and that they were within the UK’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the Convention at the time of their deaths.
The effect of the Court’s decision is that all three sets of claims may proceed to trial. The following summary is based on the Supreme Court’s press report; a full analysis of the judgment will be posted shortly.
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13 June 2013 by Rosalind English
Association for Molecular Pathology et al v Myriad Genetics Inc, et al, United States Supreme Court 13 June 2013 – read judgment. The headlines are misleading. Myriad Genetics has lost some, but not all of its patent protection as a result of this final ruling in the long running litigation concerning the company’s BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 breast cancer gene patents. According to the American Council on Science and Health, the Court’s decision is
a groundbreaking moment in the history of biotechnology, and a case that will surely rank among the most noteworthy biomedical decisions of our time.
I have posted here, here and here on previous stages in the Myriad patent case, in the United States and Australia, so will not set out the facts again (although for anyone who is interested, the Supreme Court judgment provides a superbly clear explanation of the molecular biology underlying the issues).
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10 June 2013 by Rosalind English
Stephen McIntyre v Information Commissioner (Environmental Information Regulations 2004) [2013] UKFTT 156 (17 May 2013) – read judgment and [2013] UKFTT 51 (7 May 2013) read judgment
These are the latest in a series of freedom of information requests for disclosure of material from the UEA’s Climatic Research Unit (CRU). These requests arose following the ‘climategate’ affair where hacked university emails suggested that individuals within CRU might have attempted to abuse the process of peer review to prevent publication of opposing research papers and evidence. Hence the sensitivity of the data to both requester and CRU, and the passions engendered on these appeals.
Both cases turned on whether disclosure could be denied on the basis of the public interest exception to the default rule that information should be disclosed, in other words the chilling effect on sharing ideas and unpublished research, and the potential distortion of public debate by the disclosure of incomplete material.
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5 June 2013 by Rosalind English
Hill, R(on the application of) v Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales [2013] EWCA Civ 555 – read judgment
The concept of fairness embodied in the different strands of natural justice have to be seen as flexible and as not requiring the courts to lay down over rigid rules, so that where it had been agreed that a tribunal member could be temporarily absent for part of the hearing, there had been no breach of the rules of natural justice.
The appellant chartered accountant had been found guilty of unprofessional conduct by the respondent Institute. He appealed against the Administrative Court’s refusal of his application for judicial review of the Institute’s decision ([2012] EWHC 1731 (QB)). He maintained that there had been a breach of natural justice in the proceedings because one of the tribunal members had missed a large part of the hearing, and that all proceedings of that tribunal after one of its members left were therefore a nullity, including the decision of the tribunal that the charge was proved. Mr Hill contended in particular that the breach of natural justice that “he who decides must hear” had been so grave that the tribunal had acted without jurisdiction, and acting without jurisdiction could not be consented to, and that any consent had to be from the appellant personally.
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3 June 2013 by Rosalind English
M, R(on the application of) v The Parole Board and another [2013] EWHC 1360 (Admin) – read judgment
Reporting restrictions on proceedings concerning a life prisoner should be discharged since the public interest in allowing media organisations to publish reports outweighed the prisoner’s human rights.
The claimant had been convicted of the brutal murder of three infant children in 1973. Subsequent to his incarceration in open prison, his movements had come to the attention of the press. Inmates made threats and the claimant was moved to secure conditions. When he sought judicial review of a decision by the parole board in 2011 (declining his return to open conditions), the judge granted an order restricting reporting of the claimant’s identity, the details of his offences and his current location. In this hearing, various media organisations intervened to request the discharge this order.
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24 May 2013 by Rosalind English
Re SB (A patient; capacity to consent to termination) [2013] EWHC 1417 (COP) 21 May 2013 – read judgment

Sidney Chawatama of 1 Crown Office Row represented the husband of the patient in this case. He has nothing to do with the writing of this post.
The patient in this case was a 37 year old highly intelligent graduate who worked in IT. For the past 8 years she presented with symptoms which were diagnosed as those of bi-polar disorder. She had been detained under compulsory or similar powers at various times in Italy, in France and here in England.
These proceedings were issued in the Court of Protection because the mother concerned was “very strongly” requesting a termination and giving her consent to it. The issue related to her capacity. Section 1(2) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is very clear and provides as follows: “A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity.” Accordingly, unless it is established, on a balance of probability, that the mother does not have capacity to make the decision that she undoubtedly has made, her autonomy as an adult to request and consent to the proposed abortion procedure is preserved.
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21 May 2013 by Rosalind English
Waller v James [2013] NSWSC 497 (6 May 2013) – read judgment
So-called “wrongful birth” cases – where parents claim for the costs of bringing up a child that has been born as a result of the hospital’s alleged negligence – have long been the subject of heated debate.
Since 1999 (MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board) such damages have been refused on grounds of public policy – for the birth of a healthy baby, that is. As far as disabled children are concerned, parents can the additional costs attributable to the disability (Parkinson v St James and Seacroft NHS Trust). Now that so much more can be predicted with a high level of certainty from pre-birth, even pre-conception genetic tests, where do we stand on public policy in wrongful birth cases where the negligence not so much in failure to treat (failed vasectomies etc) but failure to inform? This Australian case gives some indication of the way the courts may approach such questions.
Background facts
Keeden Waller was conceived by IVF using the Wallers’ own gametes. There was a fifty percent chance that he would inherit from his father a blood disorder called antithrombin deficiency (ATD), a condition that affects the body’s normal blood clotting ability and leads to an increased risk of thrombosis. Keeden suffered a stroke a few days after his birth resulting in severe disabilities, which his parents, Lawrence and Deborah Waller, alleged was the result of ATD. They brought a claim in damages against their doctor for the care of their disabled son and psychological harm to themselves.
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17 May 2013 by Rosalind English
R (on the application of) Sir David Barclay and Sir Frederick Barclay v Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, The Committee for the Affairs of Jersey and Guernsey and Her Majesty’s Privy Council [2013] EWHC 1183 (Admin) – read judgment
The power of the ruling body to alter the remuneration of the judicial “Seneschal” was open to arbitrary use and therefore incompatible with Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention.
The claimants last challenged the independence of Sark’s governing and judicial bodies in successful judicial review proceedings in 2009.
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9 May 2013 by Rosalind English
PC (by her litigation friend the Official Solicitor)[1] and NC [2] v City of York Council [2013] EWCA Civ 478 – read judgment
It may seem strange that the same individual, with learning difficulties, can be considered to have capacity to marry, but not the capacity to decide whether to live with the person they have espoused. What, in essence, is marriage, that puts it on such a different footing to informal cohabitation?
The question arose because the woman in question (PC) had married NC after he had been convicted and sentenced for serious sexual offences. She had briefly cohabited with the him before he was convicted and married him in 2006 while he was in prison. He was due for release on licence in 2012. It was common ground that he posed a serious risk to PC in her capacity as a cohabiting wife. The local authority obtained a declaration from the Court of Protection ([2013] Med LR 26) that although PC had had capacity to marry and to understand the obligations of marriage, she did not have the capacity to decide whether to cohabit with NC upon his release. What Hedley J said was this:
She is undoubtedly within section 2(1) [of the Mental Capacity Act] requirements of impairment. Applying the section 3(1) test I am not satisfied that she is able to understand the potential risk that NC presents to her and that she is unable to weigh the information underpinning the potential risk so as to determine whether or not such a risk either exists or should be run, and should, therefore, be part of her decision to resume cohabitation.
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