We use cookies to enhance your browsing experience. If you continue to use our website we will take this to mean that you agree to our use of cookies. If you want to find out more, please view our cookie policy. Accept and Hide [x]
(Jeremy Hyam KC and Alasdair Henderson of 1 Crown Office Row represented the mother in this case)
This was an appeal from a decision in the Divisional Court by Judd J in April 2024. The case raises a question at the core of the transgender debate involving young people: consent.
The young person at the centre of this litigation is now 16 years old. He was born female and started to identify as male in 2020 at the age of about 12.
His parents were estranged. In these circumstances his mother appealed against the refusal of her request for an adjournment of proceedings in which she sought a prohibited steps order and a best interests declaration in relation to her child, pending an assessment being undertaken by a private gender dysphoria clinic (Gender Plus), the first private gender dysphoria hormone clinic in the UK.
It was accepted that, now the young person was by now 16, no Gillick competence question arose (see Sir James Munby at [55] in An NHS Trust v. X [2021] EWHC 65 (Fam), [2021] 4 WLR 11, and MacDonald J at [48]-[49] in GK and LK v. EE [2023] EWCOP 49). It was also accepted that the young person was “impressive, hardworking and intelligent” and had no mental health problems.
Puberty Blockers and Cross-Sex Hormones: Policy Background
As Vos MR noted, a number of events coalesced to make this case a particularly sensitive one at the time of this appeal.
(i) the Cass Interim Review in 2022 led to the closure of the Tavistock clinic that had been in issue in Bell v. Tavistock;
(ii) on 12 March 2024, NHS England published a clinical policy concluding that there was not enough evidence to support the safety or clinical effectiveness of puberty blockers to make the treatment routinely available (outside a research protocol);
(iii) as the first instance judge recorded at [58], NHS Scotland had announced before the hearing that persons under 18 would not be prescribed cross-sex hormones;
(iv) on 21 March 2023, NHS England published a clinical commissioning policy laying down stringent eligibility and readiness requirements to be met before cross-sex hormones could be administered to those over 16;
(v) on 9 April 2024, NHS England wrote to all NHS gender dysphoria clinics asking them to defer offering first appointments to those under 18 “as an immediate response to Dr Cass’s advice that ‘extreme caution’ should be exercised before making a recommendation for [cross-sex hormones] in [children]”;
(vi) on 10 April 2024, the Cass Review was published*; and
(vii) on 11 December 2024 (the day before the hearing before the Court of Appeal), the government announced that the temporary embargo on the use of puberty blockers would be made indefinite (subject to a review in 2027).
* For the purposes of this case, the mother highlighted that the Cass Review had called into question the quality of the evidence on which hormone treatments for adolescents are based. Dr Cass says at page 13, for example, that “[t]he reality is that we have no good evidence on the long-term outcomes of interventions to manage gender-related distress”. Moreover, Dr Cass highlights new evidence about brain maturation continuing into the mid-20s, whilst it was originally thought to finish in adolescence. Dr Cass recommended that puberty blockers should only be available within a research protocol, and that recommendation has now been implemented.
The judge at first instance had said first that, whilst the findings of the Cass Review might turn out to be very significant, she did not think they justified her departure from Bell v. Tavistock and from Lieven J’s decision in AB v. CD and Tavistock [2021] EWHC 741 (Fam) (AB v. CD), which the Court of Appeal approved in Bell v. Tavistock.
Arguments before the Court
The father sought to terminate the proceedings begun by the mother on the ground that they were causing the young person significant distress. The mother contended that the proceedings should be adjourned because the legal and regulatory landscape for gender dysphoria treatment was changing rapidly; the Cass review had only been published a week before the hearing before the judge; and Gender Plus was a private provider whose practices and procedures were diverging from the NHS approach. In these circumstances, it behoved the court to keep an eye on a case of this kind in a time of flux. The mother also argued, though not strenuously, that cases concerning treatment for gender dysphoria should be regarded as being in in a special category requiring judicial oversight wherever there was less than complete unanimity. If necessary, the mother submitted that the Court of Appeal should depart from its recent decision in R (Bell) v. Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust [2021] EWCA Civ 1363, [2022] 1 All ER 416.
The judge below had concluded that, while the Cass review might be significant, it did not justify a departure from the decision in Bell v Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust [2021] EWCA Civ 1363, [2022] 1 All E.R. 416, [2021] 9 WLUK 157, in which it was held that treatment with puberty blockers should not be distinguished from the consideration of contraception in Gillick, and that questions of Gillick competence were for doctors, not the courts. Judd J held there was no realistic basis upon which to override the young person’s consent to treatment by a regulated provider and that there was no legitimate purpose in adjourning the case.
Join Rosalind English in Episode 211 as she discusses with Lucy McCann and Jonathan Metzer of 1 Crown Office Row the cases that have been decided at all levels in the courts in 2024 that have had, or will have, important implications for practitioners and litigants in fields ranging from children in care through anonymity in medical negligence to the forfeiture of property under the Suicide Act 1961 in the light of the passage of the Assisted Dying Bill. The cases we talk about include the following:
HXA v Surrey County Council [2023] UKSC 52 (abuse, failure to remove and Article 3)
AB (by the Official Solicitor) v Worcestershire County Council and Anor [2023] EWCA Civ 529 (local authority liability under Article 3)
Sammut v Next Steps Mental Healthcare Ltd [2024] EWHC 2265 (KB) (inquests, Article 2 and private care homes)
PMC v A Local Health Board [2024] EWHC 2969 (KB) (anonymisation in clinical negligence cases)
Abbasi and Haastrup (conjoined cases) [2023] EWCA Civ 331 (reporting restriction orders, anonymisation of professionals in medical treatment cases)
Paul v Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2022] EWCA Civ 12 (psychiatric injury or “nervous shock)
Tindall & Anor v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2024] UKSC 33 (23 October 2024) (police Liability)
N v Poole Borough Council [2019] UKSC 25 (duty of care of public authorities)
Philip Morris v James Morris, Kate Shmuel and Gregory White [2024] EWHC 2554 (Ch) (assisted dying and the Forfeiture Act)
McKleenon, re Application for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) 2024 UKSC 31 (judicial review and remedies)AB
By the end of 2024, Law Pod UK has gained 940K listens. We aim to inform and enlighten our audience on important developments in civil and public law with a range of guests from 1 Crown Office Row and other legal experts. Law Pod UK is available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Audioboom, Player FM, ListenNotes, Podbean, iHeart, Radio Public, Deezer or wherever you listen to your podcasts.
Please remember to rate and review us if you like what you hear.
This was not a class action but a representative action, pursuant to what is now Civil Procedure Rule (CPR) 19.8, for the tort of misuse of private information against the respondents Google UK Limited (Google) and DeepMind Technologies Limited (DeepMind). The action was on behalf of Mr Prismall and a class of persons said to number approximately 1.6 million.
The appeal was against the striking out of his representative claim for misuse of private information in the court below. In a representative action like this the task before the judge is to establish whether the “lowest common denominator” claimant in the class would fail to make their claim. The judge found that the lowest common denominator claimant in the group of persons represented did not have a realistic prospect of success.
Details of the Case
The claim was for damages in respect of both the one-off transfer by the Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust (the Royal Free Trust) of data in October 2015, and the continuing transfer of data thereafter until 29 September 2017 pursuant to a live data feed. The data which was transferred took the form of patient-identifiable medical records held by the Royal Free Trust of patients, including Mr Prismall, who had attended hospitals in the Royal Free Trust or had blood tests processed by laboratories operated by the Royal Free Trust between 29 September 2010 and 29 September 2015. Google and DeepMind used the data for the purposes of developing an app called “Streams” which was intended to be used to identify and treat patients suffering from Acute Kidney Injury. Google and DeepMind also had, however, a contractual entitlement to use the data for purposes wider than direct patient care and to develop and prove capabilities to enhance future commercial prospects.
At first instance the judge found that each member of the class did not have a realistic prospect of establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of their medical records or of crossing the de minimis threshold in relation to such an expectation such that there was no realistic prospect of establishing misuse of private information of each member of the class, or a realistic prospect of establishing an entitlement to damages for loss of control. The lowest common denominator was a notional claimant in the class whose claim represented the “irreducible minimum scenario” for a claimant in the class of persons. The judge’s lowest common denominator claimant was premised on the basis that there was one attendance at a trust hospital, which was an attendance not concerning “a medical condition involving any particular sensitivity or stigma” and there being “no specific reference to the medical condition that had prompted the attendance”. The judge had identified for the irreducible minimum scenario for the lowest denominator claimant that “no upset or concern was caused by the data transfer”. The judge found that the lowest common denominator claimant’s claim would fail.
Grounds of claim
Mr Prismall’s claim related to the wrongful use of private patient information by Google and DeepMind in: (1) obtaining patient-identifiable medical records with a contractual entitlement under the Information Sharing Agreement which was wider than direct patient care and the Streams project;
(2) storing the medical records prior to Streams becoming operational;
(3) using the medical records in the research and development of Streams; and
(4) developing and providing their general capabilities by the use of the medical records for the purposes of future commercial prospects. Damages were claimed for loss of control of the private information only.
The judge said that it was “also well-established that not every disclosure of medical information will give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy and/or involve an unlawful interference.” If anodyne or trivial information about a brief hospital visit was made public by a patient, the judge saw no reason why that information would attract a reasonable expectation of privacy by dint of it being recorded in a medical record.
This was a very simple case that illustrates in a nutshell the courts’ approach to the principle of “ex turpi causa”: the notion that prevents a claimant from seeking a legal remedy if the claim arises in connection with their own illegal or immoral act. Even in a civil case, courts are reluctant to allow a party to benefit from their own wrongdoing, as it may be seen as contrary to the interests of justice and social morals. However, it cannot be a blanket rule, as we shall see from the case below. Proportionality has to to be applied.
This concerned an RTA leading to a claim for damages by the claimant for repair to his car after the defendant negligently drove his lorry into it whilst it was parked.
A small and mundane detail could have made all the difference to the outcome. The claimant had not renewed the MOT on his car for some months before the accident, so that the defendant pleaded that the the claimant’s argument that he needed to be reimbursed for the car he had to hire after his car had been damaged meant that he had had no insurance at the time of the accident, and that the claim should fall as being ex turpi causa (Agheampong v Allied Manufacturing (London) Ltd [2009] Lloyds Rep IR 379.)
Furthermore, and as the next logical step, the defendant asserted that, because there was no valid MOT certificate for the Volvo, the claimant had suffered no compensable loss when the Volvo was rendered unroadworthy by the defendant’s tort. This was called a “causation defence”.
This was an application by a father for a declaration that it should be lawful for him to use an embryo created using his sperm and his late wife’s eggs in treatment with a surrogate. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority opposed the application, on the basis that there was insufficient consent from his wife (AB).
The embryo was created in 2017 during the course of treatment being undertaken by EF and AB at a clinic licensed by the HFEA and remains stored by them. EF’s wife died unexpectedly along with the couple’s youngest daughter. It was against that background that this application was made.
EF argued that the HFEA’s decision preventing him from using the remaining embryo amounted to an interference (i) with his Article 8 rights, alone and as interpreted in light of Article 9, and (ii) with those rights when considered in the context of Article 14, which prohibits discrimination in the treatment of men and women. Such interference with those rights, in the circumstances of this case, was disproportionate. Therefore, argued the applicant, the Court was required by s 3 HRA 1998 to read and give effect to primary and subordinate legislation in a way which is compatible with Convention Rights.
Both EF and his late wife were adherents of what the court called the “J religion”, whose central doctrine is the sanctity of life and the divine purpose of all life forms. They believed that the divine soul enters the embryo at point of conception.
They both came from large families and wished to replicate that pattern for themselves. AB suffered a miscarriage in 2008. They went on to have a daughter (X) and they wanted a sibling for her. After IVF treatment AB gave birth to Y. Y subsequently died of neonatal complications. AB and EF wished to use their remaining embryo retrieved in that IVF treatment to have another child.
Justices: Lord Hodge, Lord Briggs, Lord Leggatt, Lord Burrows and Lady Simler
The Supreme Court has affirmed that there is no duty of care, and hence no liability in negligence, for failing to confer a benefit, which includes failing to protect a person from injury, as opposed to making matters worse. This applies equally to public authorities such as the police as it does to private individuals.
Brief Summary
On 4 March 2014, Mr Kendall’s car skidded on a patch of black ice on the A413 road, causing him to lose control and roll over into a ditch. Concerned by the state of the road, after making an emergency call, he stood by the road signalling cars to slow down.
Around 20 minutes later, police officers attended the scene. They started clearing up debris from the accident and put up a “Police Slow” sign up. After warning the police about the dangerous state of the road, Mr Kendall left to visit the hospital to tend for non-life-threatening injuries he had suffered. It was alleged that, but for the arrival of the police, Mr Kendall would have continued attempts to alert road users of the danger. Having cleared the debris, and after Mr Kendall had gone to hospital, the police officers removed the “Police Slow” sign and left the scene, with the road in the same condition as it had been previously. They did so in the belief that there was no hazard and having failed to discover or inspect the sheet ice.
Following our recent Law Pod UK episode on judicial review, this case contains some useful guidelines to the differences between the kinds of remedy available via judicial review versus statutory appeal, private civil actions, private prosecutions and other avenues for compensation.
It involved an application for judicial review of decision-making by the regulator of landfill maintenance, where the regulator argued that the claimant had an adequate alternative remedy such that judicial review should be refused.
The applicant, Noeleen McAleenon, had claimed that the regulator had not taken appropriate action to prevent harmful chemical gases and noxious smells escaping from a neighbouring landfill site. But the public bodies maintained that judicial review should be refused because Ms McAleenon had adequate alternative remedies, in that she could herself launch a private prosecution against the owner of the site: Section 70 of the Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 (“the 2011 Act”) provides that a person aggrieved by the existence of a statutory nuisance may make a complaint to the magistrates’ court for an order requiring abatement of the nuisance and prohibiting its recurrence and the imposition of a fine.) Alternatively, the defendants said, she could bring a nuisance claim against them in private law.
The first instance judge dismissed the alternative remedies defence. He observed (para 92) that the case concerned the public law issues of regulation and enforcement, whereas any private prosecution in the magistrates’ court under section 70 would centre on the issue of whether a nuisance had been caused. Whilst there is of course an overlap between the two questions, the two kinds of litigation have quite different purposes:
“a member of the public with sufficient interest is entitled to hold regulators to account by pursuing any public law wrongdoing. It would be an unfortunate and unattractive position if a regulator could effectively be immune from suit in this sphere by reference to alternative proceedings in the magistrates’ court”.
Over 30 years ago, the Pergau Dam affair, linking aid to trade with Malaysia burst into the papers as one of Britain’s biggest aid scandals. The government promised to supply aid to build a hydroelectric plant at Pergau in exchange for a major arms deal with Malaysia. The trouble was that the Pergau Dam project was deemed hopelessly uneconomic by officials in both Britain and Malaysia. In late 1994, the deal was declared unlawful in a landmark case in the High Court. In Episode 206 Liz Fisher, Professor of Environmental Law at Oxford University joins Sir Tim Lancaster, who was Permanent Secretary to the aid department at the time the Pergau Dam story broke. The case that followed – R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ex parte The World Development Movement Ltd [1995] marked a change in judges’ approach to government policy, and we’ll be discussing the much more interventionist role of judges as they participate in lawmaking today, including the recent climate change judgements in R (on the application of Finch on behalf of the Weald Action Group) (Appellant) v Surrey County Council and others (Respondents) – see my post on that case here – and more recently in Friends of the Earth v Secretary of State for Levelling Up.
These proceedings concerned the forfeiture rule under section 2(2) of the Forfeiture Act 1982 as it applies to the estates of people who travel to Switzerland for assisted dying (the 1982 Act). Mrs Myra Morris had ended her own life with the assistance of the staff at the Swiss clinic and the assistance of her husband Philip. She had been suffering from Multiple System Atrophy, a rare and degenerative neurological disorder with no known cure.
It was accepted between the parties that the role played by Philip engaged Section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961, which makes the assistance of suicide a criminal offence. The forfeiture rule under Section 1 of the 1982 Act precludes a person who has unlawful acted in the killing of another from acquiring a benefit from that killing. Section 2 of the 1982 Act allows for the modification of that rule if the justice of the case calls for such mercy.
Before Myra died, her solicitor assessed her as having the mental capacity to make an informed and voluntary decision to end her own life according to the Mental Capacity Act 2005. She said that she was satisfied that Myra was able to understand the decisions she was making and was under no undue influence, pressure or encouragement when she did so.
Her husband Philip sought advice from solicitors regarding his position should he accede to Myra’s wish for him to accompany her to Switzerland and he was reassured that, in the light of the DPP’s guidance on Section 2 of the Suicide Act, he would not be prosecuted, and indeed the Police Constable who interviewed Philip on his return from Switzerland told him that there was nothing to report and confirmed the position in writing.
Then there arose the question of the forfeiture rule. There are very few reported decisions on the approach the court should take on an application to modify the forfeiture rule, but the 1982 Act requires the court to have particular regard to the conduct of both the deceased and the person assisting the death when determining the justice of the case. In Dunbar v Plant [1998] Ch 412, Philips LJ explained that there were clear indications in the Act that there were circumstances in which the public interest did not require the imposition of any penal sanction, a consideration which he linked directly to the proper application of the forfeiture rule:
“Where the public interest required no penal sanction, it seems to me that strong grounds are likely to exist for relieving the person who has committed the offence from all effects of the forfeiture rule.” [para 437]
A tale of small win against airline leads to big Supreme Court ruling on pre- and post- Brexit compensation. In Episode 203, Rosalind English discusses with David Hart KC the veritable maze that must be navigated to establish legal rights between January 2020 when the UK left the EU and end of December 2020 when the various phases of disengaging from EU law were assimilated into the Withdrawal Acts.
A detailed summary of the issues and the facts in this case can be found in the Supreme Court’s Press Release. The report below gives a very short account of these followed by a focus on the majority and dissenting judgments. I quote Lord Sales in some detail as the concerns expressed in his dissent will only prevail if Parliament were to legislate for them to do so.
Legal and factual background
In December 2018, the second respondent, Horse Hill Developments Ltd, sought planning permission from the first respondent, Surrey County Council (“the Council”), to retain and expand an existing onshore oil well site and to drill for four new wells, enabling the production of hydrocarbons from six wells over a period of 25 years. The environmental impact assessment for the project had to be carried out under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 (which implemented the Directive 2011/92 EU).
The Council considered the environmental impacts of “the direct releases of greenhouse gases from with the well site boundary resulting from the site’s construction, production, decommissioning and subsequent restoration over the lifetime of the proposed development.” However, it did not assess the environmental impacts of the downstream greenhouse gas emissions that would inevitably result when the oil extracted from the development site was later refined and then used, for example, as fuel. The developer argued that, as regards the impact of the project on climate, the scope of the EIA should be confined to the direct releases of greenhouse gases from within the well site boundary during the lifetime of the project; and that the EIA need not include an assessment of the greenhouse gas emissions that would occur when the oil extracted from the wells was ultimately burnt elsewhere as fuel. The council accepted this approach and granted planning permission for the development on 27 September 2019. The appellant, acting on behalf of a local action group, applied for judicial review of the Council’s decision. Her claim was unsuccessful before the High Court and the Court of Appeal. This was her appeal to the Supreme Court
The question that the Court had to decide was this. Was it unlawful for the Council not to require the environmental impact assessment for a project of crude oil extraction for commercial purposes to include an assessment of the impacts of downstream greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the eventual use of the refined products of the extracted oil?
This article was first published in Edition 33 of the Journal of Environmental Law and Management. It is reproduced here with the kind permission of the editors at Lawtext Publishing Limited
On Monday 9 April 2024 the Strasbourg Court handed down judgment in three cases involving climate change: Carême v France (ECHR no 7189/21), Duarte Agostinho v Portugal and 32 others ( ECHR no 39371/20), and Verein Klimaseniorinnen v Switzerland [2024] ECHR 304, no 53600/20.
Interestingly, shortly before the Strasbourg judges had reached their decision in these three cases, the New Zealand Supreme Court considered an application for strike-out of a challenge to a number of carbon-emitting businesses based on the tort of public nuisance as well as a new form of action, that involved a duty to cease materially contributing damage to the climate system: Michael John Smith (appellant) v Fronterra Co-operative group Ltd and Others [2024] NZSC 5. I will come back to this judgment later in this article.
First, we turn to the more recent Strasbourg cases. Each of these cases was examined by the same composition of the Grand Chamber, and each raised unprecedented issues before the Court.The particular nature of the problems arising from climate change in terms of the Convention issues has not so far been addressed in the Court’s case law. I will concentrate on the one successful application, Verein Klimaseniorinnen v Switzerland. Both Carême and Duarte Agostinho failed with their applications on procedural grounds; most notably, the Duarte Agostinho application was dismissed due to a failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
In Verein Klimaseniorinnen, some female senior citizens and a representative organisation (Klimaseniorinnen) argued that the impact of global warming on their health breached a number of Articles of the ECHR. The Strasbourg Court was satisfied in this instance that they had exhausted their local remedies, although it found that the individual applicants had not satisfied ‘victim status’ for the purposes of Article 34 ECHR; they had failed to demonstrate the existence of a sufficient link between the harm they had allegedly suffered (or would suffer in the future) and climate change. But the Court held, by 16 votes to one, that the applicant association did have locus standi in the present proceedings and that its com- plaint should be examined under Article 8 of the Convention.
Having admitted the association’s complaint, the Grand Chamber found that states are under a positive obligation under Article 8 to provide effective protection from ‘serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life’. In order to achieve this, states must enforce regulations that are capable of mitigating current and future impacts of climate change by having in place a plan for the reduction of greenhouse gas (‘GHG’) emissions and achieving carbon neutrality over the decades leading to 2050. Switzerland had failed in this in that it had not quantified a carbon budget, nor had it set limits on greenhouse gas emissions. It had also exceeded its previous GHG emission reduction targets, which resulted in a violation of Article 8. There was ‘no doubt’, said the Court, that climate change-induced heatwaves had caused, were causing and would cause further deaths and illnesses to older people and particularly women (represented by the Klimaseniorinnen association).
There was one sole dissent from the majority’s findings on admissibility and the merits. Further on in this article I will explore the different opinion of the British representative on the panel, Judge Eicke. Before that, we will look at the main arguments before the Court.
The Swiss Government argued that global warming had not reached the necessary level to create a tangible effect on the private and family life of the individual applicants under Article 8, including on their mental well-being.
The respondent state party also maintained that the Court should not allow the applicant association to circumvent the mechanism established under the Paris Agreement by seeking to establish, under the Convention, an international judicial control mechanism to review the measures to limit GHG emissions.
Various other governments intervened in this application to say, in effect, that the response to climate change should be an effective global response and that the Court should not, indeed could not, engage in a form of law- making and regulation which would bypass the role of the democratic process and institutions in the response to climate change.
The Swiss Federation also had quite a forceful argument on the in limine question of jurisdiction: it submitted that GHG emissions generated abroad could not be considered as attracting the responsibility of Switzerland as those emissions could not be directly linked to any alleged omissions on the part of Switzerland, whose authorities did not have direct control over the sources of emissions. Moreover, the whole system established by the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement was based on the principle of territoriality and the responsibility of states for emissions on their territory.Thus, said the respondent, the applicants could not complain about certain imports containing ‘embedded emissions’ from other jurisdictions. The Court did not agree. Although ‘embedded emissions’ contained an extraterritorial aspect, it did not raise an issue of Switzerland’s jurisdiction in respect of the applicants, but rather one of Switzerland’s responsibility for the alleged effects of the ‘embedded emissions’ on the applicants’ Convention rights.
Following the Strasbourg Court’s dismissal of Kosher and Halal groups’ challenge to the ban on no-stun slaughter of food animals, Rosalind English talks to animal welfare campaignerPaula Sparks about the complex web of laws surrounding our treatment of farm animals in the abattoir. The welfare rules in the UK post Brexit require a level of “protection of animals at the time of killing” (known as PATOK), but there are many difficult areas where this protection is difficult and expensive to apply, such as the depopulation of intensively reared birds due to highly pathogenic avian flu, or the disposal of male chicks in hatcheries where only laying hens are commercially viable.
The cases and legislation referred to in the episode are as follows:
Yesterday (Tuesday 9th of April) the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg handed down three judgments from the Grand Chamber. Two of the applications were rejected on admissibility grounds. The third, a representative action by an NGO against the Swiss government, succeeded. It has caused something of a stir, to say the least.
The Strasbourg Court has broken new ground in finding that Switzerland has breached Article 8 of the ECHR, a provision which was drafted to protect the right to private and family life. In the case of Verein Klimaseniorinnen Schweiz and others v Switzerland, 16 of the 17 member panel concluded that Article 8 encompasses a right to effective protection by the state authorities from the serious adverse effects of climate change on lives, health, well-being and quality of life.
The case of Duarte Agostinho and five others v Portugal and 32 other states was one of the applications considered by the Grand Chamber. Emma Louise Fenelon advised Save the Children in its third party intervention in this case.
Michael John Smith (appellant) v Fronterra Co-operative group Ltd and others [2024] NZSC 5
This appeal to the New Zealand Supreme Court concerned strike out of a claim in tort (comprised of three causes of action) relating to damage caused by climate change. The question was whether the plaintiff’s claim should be allowed to proceed to trial, or whether, regardless of what might be proved at trial, it is bound to fail and should be struck out now.
The implications of this ruling could be enormous, particularly if the English courts decide to follow the New Zealand model. In its conclusion to this lengthy judgment, the New Zealand Court observed that “the principles governing public nuisance ought not to stand still in the face of massive environmental challenges attributable to human economic activity. The common law, where it is not clearly excluded, responds to challenge and change in a considered way, through trials involving the testing of evidence.”
The plaintiff was an elder of a Maori tribe and climate change spokesman for a national forum of tribal leaders. The defendants were all New Zealand companies involved in an industry that either emitted greenhouse gases or which released GHG when burned.
This blog is maintained for information purposes only. It is not intended to be a source of legal advice and must not be relied upon as such. Blog posts reflect the views and opinions of their individual authors, not of chambers as a whole.
Our privacy policy can be found on our ‘subscribe’ page or by clicking here.
Recent comments