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This was a very simple case that illustrates in a nutshell the courts’ approach to the principle of “ex turpi causa”: the notion that prevents a claimant from seeking a legal remedy if the claim arises in connection with their own illegal or immoral act. Even in a civil case, courts are reluctant to allow a party to benefit from their own wrongdoing, as it may be seen as contrary to the interests of justice and social morals. However, it cannot be a blanket rule, as we shall see from the case below. Proportionality has to to be applied.
This concerned an RTA leading to a claim for damages by the claimant for repair to his car after the defendant negligently drove his lorry into it whilst it was parked.
A small and mundane detail could have made all the difference to the outcome. The claimant had not renewed the MOT on his car for some months before the accident, so that the defendant pleaded that the the claimant’s argument that he needed to be reimbursed for the car he had to hire after his car had been damaged meant that he had had no insurance at the time of the accident, and that the claim should fall as being ex turpi causa (Agheampong v Allied Manufacturing (London) Ltd [2009] Lloyds Rep IR 379.)
Furthermore, and as the next logical step, the defendant asserted that, because there was no valid MOT certificate for the Volvo, the claimant had suffered no compensable loss when the Volvo was rendered unroadworthy by the defendant’s tort. This was called a “causation defence”.
This was an application by a father for a declaration that it should be lawful for him to use an embryo created using his sperm and his late wife’s eggs in treatment with a surrogate. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority opposed the application, on the basis that there was insufficient consent from his wife (AB).
The embryo was created in 2017 during the course of treatment being undertaken by EF and AB at a clinic licensed by the HFEA and remains stored by them. EF’s wife died unexpectedly along with the couple’s youngest daughter. It was against that background that this application was made.
EF argued that the HFEA’s decision preventing him from using the remaining embryo amounted to an interference (i) with his Article 8 rights, alone and as interpreted in light of Article 9, and (ii) with those rights when considered in the context of Article 14, which prohibits discrimination in the treatment of men and women. Such interference with those rights, in the circumstances of this case, was disproportionate. Therefore, argued the applicant, the Court was required by s 3 HRA 1998 to read and give effect to primary and subordinate legislation in a way which is compatible with Convention Rights.
Both EF and his late wife were adherents of what the court called the “J religion”, whose central doctrine is the sanctity of life and the divine purpose of all life forms. They believed that the divine soul enters the embryo at point of conception.
They both came from large families and wished to replicate that pattern for themselves. AB suffered a miscarriage in 2008. They went on to have a daughter (X) and they wanted a sibling for her. After IVF treatment AB gave birth to Y. Y subsequently died of neonatal complications. AB and EF wished to use their remaining embryo retrieved in that IVF treatment to have another child.
Justices: Lord Hodge, Lord Briggs, Lord Leggatt, Lord Burrows and Lady Simler
The Supreme Court has affirmed that there is no duty of care, and hence no liability in negligence, for failing to confer a benefit, which includes failing to protect a person from injury, as opposed to making matters worse. This applies equally to public authorities such as the police as it does to private individuals.
Brief Summary
On 4 March 2014, Mr Kendall’s car skidded on a patch of black ice on the A413 road, causing him to lose control and roll over into a ditch. Concerned by the state of the road, after making an emergency call, he stood by the road signalling cars to slow down.
Around 20 minutes later, police officers attended the scene. They started clearing up debris from the accident and put up a “Police Slow” sign up. After warning the police about the dangerous state of the road, Mr Kendall left to visit the hospital to tend for non-life-threatening injuries he had suffered. It was alleged that, but for the arrival of the police, Mr Kendall would have continued attempts to alert road users of the danger. Having cleared the debris, and after Mr Kendall had gone to hospital, the police officers removed the “Police Slow” sign and left the scene, with the road in the same condition as it had been previously. They did so in the belief that there was no hazard and having failed to discover or inspect the sheet ice.
Following our recent Law Pod UK episode on judicial review, this case contains some useful guidelines to the differences between the kinds of remedy available via judicial review versus statutory appeal, private civil actions, private prosecutions and other avenues for compensation.
It involved an application for judicial review of decision-making by the regulator of landfill maintenance, where the regulator argued that the claimant had an adequate alternative remedy such that judicial review should be refused.
The applicant, Noeleen McAleenon, had claimed that the regulator had not taken appropriate action to prevent harmful chemical gases and noxious smells escaping from a neighbouring landfill site. But the public bodies maintained that judicial review should be refused because Ms McAleenon had adequate alternative remedies, in that she could herself launch a private prosecution against the owner of the site: Section 70 of the Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 (“the 2011 Act”) provides that a person aggrieved by the existence of a statutory nuisance may make a complaint to the magistrates’ court for an order requiring abatement of the nuisance and prohibiting its recurrence and the imposition of a fine.) Alternatively, the defendants said, she could bring a nuisance claim against them in private law.
The first instance judge dismissed the alternative remedies defence. He observed (para 92) that the case concerned the public law issues of regulation and enforcement, whereas any private prosecution in the magistrates’ court under section 70 would centre on the issue of whether a nuisance had been caused. Whilst there is of course an overlap between the two questions, the two kinds of litigation have quite different purposes:
“a member of the public with sufficient interest is entitled to hold regulators to account by pursuing any public law wrongdoing. It would be an unfortunate and unattractive position if a regulator could effectively be immune from suit in this sphere by reference to alternative proceedings in the magistrates’ court”.
Over 30 years ago, the Pergau Dam affair, linking aid to trade with Malaysia burst into the papers as one of Britain’s biggest aid scandals. The government promised to supply aid to build a hydroelectric plant at Pergau in exchange for a major arms deal with Malaysia. The trouble was that the Pergau Dam project was deemed hopelessly uneconomic by officials in both Britain and Malaysia. In late 1994, the deal was declared unlawful in a landmark case in the High Court. In Episode 206 Liz Fisher, Professor of Environmental Law at Oxford University joins Sir Tim Lancaster, who was Permanent Secretary to the aid department at the time the Pergau Dam story broke. The case that followed – R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ex parte The World Development Movement Ltd [1995] marked a change in judges’ approach to government policy, and we’ll be discussing the much more interventionist role of judges as they participate in lawmaking today, including the recent climate change judgements in R (on the application of Finch on behalf of the Weald Action Group) (Appellant) v Surrey County Council and others (Respondents) – see my post on that case here – and more recently in Friends of the Earth v Secretary of State for Levelling Up.
These proceedings concerned the forfeiture rule under section 2(2) of the Forfeiture Act 1982 as it applies to the estates of people who travel to Switzerland for assisted dying (the 1982 Act). Mrs Myra Morris had ended her own life with the assistance of the staff at the Swiss clinic and the assistance of her husband Philip. She had been suffering from Multiple System Atrophy, a rare and degenerative neurological disorder with no known cure.
It was accepted between the parties that the role played by Philip engaged Section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961, which makes the assistance of suicide a criminal offence. The forfeiture rule under Section 1 of the 1982 Act precludes a person who has unlawful acted in the killing of another from acquiring a benefit from that killing. Section 2 of the 1982 Act allows for the modification of that rule if the justice of the case calls for such mercy.
Before Myra died, her solicitor assessed her as having the mental capacity to make an informed and voluntary decision to end her own life according to the Mental Capacity Act 2005. She said that she was satisfied that Myra was able to understand the decisions she was making and was under no undue influence, pressure or encouragement when she did so.
Her husband Philip sought advice from solicitors regarding his position should he accede to Myra’s wish for him to accompany her to Switzerland and he was reassured that, in the light of the DPP’s guidance on Section 2 of the Suicide Act, he would not be prosecuted, and indeed the Police Constable who interviewed Philip on his return from Switzerland told him that there was nothing to report and confirmed the position in writing.
Then there arose the question of the forfeiture rule. There are very few reported decisions on the approach the court should take on an application to modify the forfeiture rule, but the 1982 Act requires the court to have particular regard to the conduct of both the deceased and the person assisting the death when determining the justice of the case. In Dunbar v Plant [1998] Ch 412, Philips LJ explained that there were clear indications in the Act that there were circumstances in which the public interest did not require the imposition of any penal sanction, a consideration which he linked directly to the proper application of the forfeiture rule:
“Where the public interest required no penal sanction, it seems to me that strong grounds are likely to exist for relieving the person who has committed the offence from all effects of the forfeiture rule.” [para 437]
A tale of small win against airline leads to big Supreme Court ruling on pre- and post- Brexit compensation. In Episode 203, Rosalind English discusses with David Hart KC the veritable maze that must be navigated to establish legal rights between January 2020 when the UK left the EU and end of December 2020 when the various phases of disengaging from EU law were assimilated into the Withdrawal Acts.
A detailed summary of the issues and the facts in this case can be found in the Supreme Court’s Press Release. The report below gives a very short account of these followed by a focus on the majority and dissenting judgments. I quote Lord Sales in some detail as the concerns expressed in his dissent will only prevail if Parliament were to legislate for them to do so.
Legal and factual background
In December 2018, the second respondent, Horse Hill Developments Ltd, sought planning permission from the first respondent, Surrey County Council (“the Council”), to retain and expand an existing onshore oil well site and to drill for four new wells, enabling the production of hydrocarbons from six wells over a period of 25 years. The environmental impact assessment for the project had to be carried out under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 (which implemented the Directive 2011/92 EU).
The Council considered the environmental impacts of “the direct releases of greenhouse gases from with the well site boundary resulting from the site’s construction, production, decommissioning and subsequent restoration over the lifetime of the proposed development.” However, it did not assess the environmental impacts of the downstream greenhouse gas emissions that would inevitably result when the oil extracted from the development site was later refined and then used, for example, as fuel. The developer argued that, as regards the impact of the project on climate, the scope of the EIA should be confined to the direct releases of greenhouse gases from within the well site boundary during the lifetime of the project; and that the EIA need not include an assessment of the greenhouse gas emissions that would occur when the oil extracted from the wells was ultimately burnt elsewhere as fuel. The council accepted this approach and granted planning permission for the development on 27 September 2019. The appellant, acting on behalf of a local action group, applied for judicial review of the Council’s decision. Her claim was unsuccessful before the High Court and the Court of Appeal. This was her appeal to the Supreme Court
The question that the Court had to decide was this. Was it unlawful for the Council not to require the environmental impact assessment for a project of crude oil extraction for commercial purposes to include an assessment of the impacts of downstream greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the eventual use of the refined products of the extracted oil?
This article was first published in Edition 33 of the Journal of Environmental Law and Management. It is reproduced here with the kind permission of the editors at Lawtext Publishing Limited
On Monday 9 April 2024 the Strasbourg Court handed down judgment in three cases involving climate change: Carême v France (ECHR no 7189/21), Duarte Agostinho v Portugal and 32 others ( ECHR no 39371/20), and Verein Klimaseniorinnen v Switzerland [2024] ECHR 304, no 53600/20.
Interestingly, shortly before the Strasbourg judges had reached their decision in these three cases, the New Zealand Supreme Court considered an application for strike-out of a challenge to a number of carbon-emitting businesses based on the tort of public nuisance as well as a new form of action, that involved a duty to cease materially contributing damage to the climate system: Michael John Smith (appellant) v Fronterra Co-operative group Ltd and Others [2024] NZSC 5. I will come back to this judgment later in this article.
First, we turn to the more recent Strasbourg cases. Each of these cases was examined by the same composition of the Grand Chamber, and each raised unprecedented issues before the Court.The particular nature of the problems arising from climate change in terms of the Convention issues has not so far been addressed in the Court’s case law. I will concentrate on the one successful application, Verein Klimaseniorinnen v Switzerland. Both Carême and Duarte Agostinho failed with their applications on procedural grounds; most notably, the Duarte Agostinho application was dismissed due to a failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
In Verein Klimaseniorinnen, some female senior citizens and a representative organisation (Klimaseniorinnen) argued that the impact of global warming on their health breached a number of Articles of the ECHR. The Strasbourg Court was satisfied in this instance that they had exhausted their local remedies, although it found that the individual applicants had not satisfied ‘victim status’ for the purposes of Article 34 ECHR; they had failed to demonstrate the existence of a sufficient link between the harm they had allegedly suffered (or would suffer in the future) and climate change. But the Court held, by 16 votes to one, that the applicant association did have locus standi in the present proceedings and that its com- plaint should be examined under Article 8 of the Convention.
Having admitted the association’s complaint, the Grand Chamber found that states are under a positive obligation under Article 8 to provide effective protection from ‘serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life’. In order to achieve this, states must enforce regulations that are capable of mitigating current and future impacts of climate change by having in place a plan for the reduction of greenhouse gas (‘GHG’) emissions and achieving carbon neutrality over the decades leading to 2050. Switzerland had failed in this in that it had not quantified a carbon budget, nor had it set limits on greenhouse gas emissions. It had also exceeded its previous GHG emission reduction targets, which resulted in a violation of Article 8. There was ‘no doubt’, said the Court, that climate change-induced heatwaves had caused, were causing and would cause further deaths and illnesses to older people and particularly women (represented by the Klimaseniorinnen association).
There was one sole dissent from the majority’s findings on admissibility and the merits. Further on in this article I will explore the different opinion of the British representative on the panel, Judge Eicke. Before that, we will look at the main arguments before the Court.
The Swiss Government argued that global warming had not reached the necessary level to create a tangible effect on the private and family life of the individual applicants under Article 8, including on their mental well-being.
The respondent state party also maintained that the Court should not allow the applicant association to circumvent the mechanism established under the Paris Agreement by seeking to establish, under the Convention, an international judicial control mechanism to review the measures to limit GHG emissions.
Various other governments intervened in this application to say, in effect, that the response to climate change should be an effective global response and that the Court should not, indeed could not, engage in a form of law- making and regulation which would bypass the role of the democratic process and institutions in the response to climate change.
The Swiss Federation also had quite a forceful argument on the in limine question of jurisdiction: it submitted that GHG emissions generated abroad could not be considered as attracting the responsibility of Switzerland as those emissions could not be directly linked to any alleged omissions on the part of Switzerland, whose authorities did not have direct control over the sources of emissions. Moreover, the whole system established by the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement was based on the principle of territoriality and the responsibility of states for emissions on their territory.Thus, said the respondent, the applicants could not complain about certain imports containing ‘embedded emissions’ from other jurisdictions. The Court did not agree. Although ‘embedded emissions’ contained an extraterritorial aspect, it did not raise an issue of Switzerland’s jurisdiction in respect of the applicants, but rather one of Switzerland’s responsibility for the alleged effects of the ‘embedded emissions’ on the applicants’ Convention rights.
Following the Strasbourg Court’s dismissal of Kosher and Halal groups’ challenge to the ban on no-stun slaughter of food animals, Rosalind English talks to animal welfare campaignerPaula Sparks about the complex web of laws surrounding our treatment of farm animals in the abattoir. The welfare rules in the UK post Brexit require a level of “protection of animals at the time of killing” (known as PATOK), but there are many difficult areas where this protection is difficult and expensive to apply, such as the depopulation of intensively reared birds due to highly pathogenic avian flu, or the disposal of male chicks in hatcheries where only laying hens are commercially viable.
The cases and legislation referred to in the episode are as follows:
Yesterday (Tuesday 9th of April) the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg handed down three judgments from the Grand Chamber. Two of the applications were rejected on admissibility grounds. The third, a representative action by an NGO against the Swiss government, succeeded. It has caused something of a stir, to say the least.
The Strasbourg Court has broken new ground in finding that Switzerland has breached Article 8 of the ECHR, a provision which was drafted to protect the right to private and family life. In the case of Verein Klimaseniorinnen Schweiz and others v Switzerland, 16 of the 17 member panel concluded that Article 8 encompasses a right to effective protection by the state authorities from the serious adverse effects of climate change on lives, health, well-being and quality of life.
The case of Duarte Agostinho and five others v Portugal and 32 other states was one of the applications considered by the Grand Chamber. Emma Louise Fenelon advised Save the Children in its third party intervention in this case.
Michael John Smith (appellant) v Fronterra Co-operative group Ltd and others [2024] NZSC 5
This appeal to the New Zealand Supreme Court concerned strike out of a claim in tort (comprised of three causes of action) relating to damage caused by climate change. The question was whether the plaintiff’s claim should be allowed to proceed to trial, or whether, regardless of what might be proved at trial, it is bound to fail and should be struck out now.
The implications of this ruling could be enormous, particularly if the English courts decide to follow the New Zealand model. In its conclusion to this lengthy judgment, the New Zealand Court observed that “the principles governing public nuisance ought not to stand still in the face of massive environmental challenges attributable to human economic activity. The common law, where it is not clearly excluded, responds to challenge and change in a considered way, through trials involving the testing of evidence.”
The plaintiff was an elder of a Maori tribe and climate change spokesman for a national forum of tribal leaders. The defendants were all New Zealand companies involved in an industry that either emitted greenhouse gases or which released GHG when burned.
Legal news abounds these days with stories of fabricated decisions and authorities generated by ChatGPT and similar AI mechanisms. But there’s nothing like a bit of old-fashioned human plagiarism to tickle the palates, and the full force of a judge’s fury was unleashed on such an attempt recently in the High Court.
The facts appeared to be dry. The Claimant (an oil and gas company) commenced an arbitration claim against the Defendants, three companies in a banking group. It sought to enforce, under s. 66 of the 1996 Arbitration Act, what was said to be a Kuwaiti arbitration award dated 28 November 2022. This, in turn, was said to have been rendered in pursuance of an arbitration agreement between the claimants, Contax BVI, and the Defendants.
The Court was told that for a number of years Contax BVI had been attempting to liquidate an investment account held by the defendant banking company – to the tune of some €53 million. The Claimants then stated that this had been the subject of an arbitration under the auspices of the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry Commercial Arbitration Centre which had resulted in an award in its favour.
A number of documents were exhibited to the claimant’s witness statement, including the arbitration award, a decision by the Kuwaiti Commercial Court of Appeal and a document, said to be a statement by one of the claimant’s legal advisors, saying that attempts to enforce the award and Court of Appeal ruling in Kuwait had been unsuccessful. As Butcher J describes it,
“This application was put before me, in the ordinary way, on a without notice basis, for consideration on the papers, in early August 2023. Judges of this court have to consider very many paper applications of this type and others. I recall considering this one with some care, in that I did not find it all very easy to understand. I gave, I would say in retrospect, undue allowance for difficulties apparently arising from documents being prepared by people who were not native English speakers and/or whose grasp of English procedure was not perfect. It did not, however, occur to me that any of the documents might be fabrications. I was not on the lookout for fraud, and did not suspect it.”
Unsuspecting as he was, the judge made the order and gave the claimants leave to enforce it. But the defendants came back with a statement that there had never been any arbitration at all. As they put it in their skeleton argument supporting their application to have the order set aside:
“that the award is an out-and-out fabrication might seem at first blush unlikely – but substantial parts of it have been taken from Picken J’s judgment in Manoukian v Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL [2022] EWHC 669 (QB)”
Butcher J described this case as “unique” in his experience, and “of the utmost seriousness”, and held that “there was no arbitration agreement or arbitration, and that the award and the Kuwaiti judgment are fabrications. I do not consider that there is a triable issue in relation to this.”
Documents before the Court
AI is definitely better at the business of fakery; due to the “black box” nature of its processing, it is almost impossible to identify the sources of its data. For a human processor it is much more difficult to conceal the true author of the material he or she has copied. So it was that the judge was able to establish the “arbitration award” , supposedly translated from Arabic, had substantial passages which are taken, with some modifications, from the judgment of Picken J in Manoukian, concerning completely different parties. It is best to see [40]-[44] of Butcher J’s judgment to get the full flavour of the claimant’s efforts to mislead the court but here is an example:
Extract from so-called Arbitration Award
” [5] … As a result, his position is (or was heading into the trial) precarious: any delay in the resolution of the present proceedings could potentially deny Contax Partners Inc BVI an effective remedy. It was for this reason, indeed, that the trial which took place before me was expedited: Contax Partners Inc BVI issued the proceedings on 1 December 2021; pleadings closed on 4 April 2022, and expedition was ordered at a hearing which took place on 21 June 2022. [6] In further consequence of the need for expedition, I indicated at a hearing which took place on 7th December 2021 that Contax Partners Inc BVI claim was successful, specifically his primary case that the Banks are contractually obliged to effect the transfers to where he wish. I made an order, indeed, to that effect. In the circumstances, this judgment does not deal with other aspects at all or, at least, in any particular detail.”
Extract from Picken J’s decision in Manoukian:
” [3] … As a result, his position is (or was heading into the trial) precarious: any delay in the resolution of the present proceedings could potentially deny Mr Manoukian an effective remedy. It was for this reason, indeed, that the trial which took place before me was expedited: Mr Manoukian issued the proceedings on 19 December 2020; pleadings were closed on 6 April 2021, and expedition was ordered at a CMC which took place on 8 June 2021. [4] In further consequence of the need for expedition, I indicated at a short hearing which took place on 25 February 2022 that Mr Manoukian’s claim was successful, specifically his primary case that the Banks are contractually obliged to effect the transfers. I made an order, indeed, to that effect. In the circumstances, this judgment does not deal with other aspects either at all or, at least, in any particular detail.”
As Butcher J points out, these examples, which could be multiplied, largely speak for themselves. He considered the following features to be important:
“(1) The text of the Award, in significant measure, derives from the text of Picken J’s judgment. This is obvious inter alia from: (i) the use of exactly the same, far from standard, defined terms (eg ‘General Transfer Right Issue’); (ii) the use of English legal terms (eg ‘claim in debt’, ‘exclusion clause’, ‘specific performance’); (iii) exactly the same phraseology being used, including the argot of English judgments (‘be that as it may’, ‘the submission is not entirely without merit’, ‘that said’, ‘fall to be considered’); (iv) the use of the same punctuation, even when it was not obvious, and arguably incorrect (eg in paragraph 129 of Picken J’s judgment, ‘…in debt, in the event, that the Court…’, both commas also appearing in the Award).”
Given his conclusion that both the award and the Kuwaiti judgment were fabrications, Butcher J set aside the order entering judgment against the Defendants in the terms of the purported “award”. He concluded (at para 52) that
“The result of this decision is that there are a considerable number of unanswered, but serious, questions, and in particular as to who was responsible for the fabrications which I have found to have been made, and whether there is culpability (and if any whose) as to the way in which the application for permission to enforce the purported Award was presented to the court. Those are matters which are likely to require investigation hereafter.”
This is a rare case involving the welfare of non-human animals balanced against the rights in the Convention. In the Court’s own words, “this is the first time that the Court has had to rule on the question of whether the protection of animal welfare can be linked to one of the aims referred to in paragraph 2 of the Article 9 of the Convention.” Thank you to Joshua Rozenberg for alerting me to this important ruling.
In his Concurring Opinion Judge Yüksel gives a useful brief description of what was at stake here.
“The case concerns decrees promulgated under Belgian domestic law which require, in the interests of animal welfare, stunning prior to the slaughter of animals. The applicants, who are of Muslim or Jewish faith, claim that the prior stunning in question would prevent them from carrying out ritual slaughter in accordance with the precepts of their religion, which would constitute an interference and therefore a violation of their right to respect for their religion within the meaning of Article 9 of the Convention
… At the heart of the case are therefore two questions: i) whether considerations linked to animal welfare can constitute a legitimate aim for the purposes of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention and ii) whether the contested measure did not actually go beyond what is necessary in a democratic society.” [para 3 of the Opinion]
The full judgment is available only in French. A summary of the salient points follows.
The proposed laws under attack
The slaughter of food animals without prior stunning has been banned in a number of countries signatory to the Convention, in the interests of animal welfare. However, both Jewish and Islamic rituals require maximum bleeding of the animal for the resultant carcass to satisfy the requirements of religious laws. Moreover, both rituals require the animal to be healthy and in good condition at the time of slaughter, and to die as a result of blood loss. But scientific research has shown that the fear that stunning would have a negative impact on bleeding is unfounded. “Electronarcosis” (see image above) is a reversible (non-lethal) stunning method that is possible for some smaller species of food animals (pigs, sheep and goats). This means that if the throat is cut immediately after this stunning method, the animal has indeed died solely of blood loss.
For decades, close family members have been able to claim for psychiatric illness caused by witnessing the death or serious injury of their loved ones, whether it be on the scene of the accident, hospital or mortuary. The jury has been out on the recoverability of these claims when the “qualifying accident” has been the result of admitted clinical negligence. The Supreme Court has just ruled this out as a basis for compensation. In Episode 193 of Law Pod UK, Rosalind English discusses this judgment and its implications for damages following clinical negligence claims with Judith Rogerson of 1 Crown Office Row.
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