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A Court of Appeal panel of five Judges, including the Lady Chief Justice, Lady Carr LCJ, the Master of the Rolls, Sir Geoffrey Vos, the Vice President of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), Edis LJ, and Lewis and Whipple LJJ has overturned the Divisional Court’s decision quashing the proscription of Palestine Action, holding that it erred in its approach both to the challenge brought under the Home Secretary’s relevant policy and to whether a fair balance had been struck with reference to the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
This article takes an extended look at the reasoning in this decision.
Australian court rules against government in indefinite detention case
The Australian High Court has unanimously ruled against the federal government in a case concerning indefinite immigration detention. The case was a damages claim brought by an Austrian citizen, Safwat Abdel-Hady, who was detained for 18 months despite having no realistic prospect of removal due to health issues.
The government sought to rely on a previous ruling of the High Court (Al-Kateb) which was overturned in 2023. Commentators have suggested that the decision may lead to other compensation claims, leading to a bill which could “run into the tens of millions of dollars”.
Sara v Gheorgheni Court, Romania [2026] EWHC 1402 (Admin)
In Sara v Gheorgheni Court, Romania [2026] EWHC 1402 (Admin), the High Court has allowed an appeal against extradition on grounds relating to human rights law. The case concerns the definition of “conviction” and “trial” under s 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 (EA 2003) and the impact of delay on the balancing exercise required under Article 8 ECHR.
Facts and background
The appellant was convicted and sentenced in respect of two driving offences in Romania in June 2016. He received a suspended sentence of two years and ten months imprisonment. On his own case, the appellant left Romania shortly afterwards. Following a complaint by the Probation Service, the suspended sentence was then activated in December 2016. In early 2017, the appellant arrived in the UK where he has settled.
Further proceedings in Romania ensued in which the appellant’s sentence was changed multiple times. The net result was reached in April 2022. The appellant’s original sentence (now activated and not yet served) was split into two sentences totalling two years and six months and then merged with sentences for a number of other offences. The appellant was not present for any proceedings following the initial sentencing in 2016.
Decision
The court allowed the appeal on two grounds.
First, the court held that the appellant could not be considered to have “deliberately absented himself from his trial” under s 20(3) of EA 2003 and therefore, since no right to a retrial or appeal was endorsed on the arrest warrant, he fell to be discharged under s 20(7) [113].
Second, the court held the district judge (DJ) was wrong to conclude that extradition was not a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s rights under Article 8 ECHR [118].
Reasoning on section 20
Where a person is subject to an extradition request on the basis that they are unlawfully at large after conviction, the court must decide whether the person was “convicted in his presence”: s 20(1). If the person was not present, then the court must decide whether the person “deliberately absented himself from his trial”: s 20(3). If the person was not deliberately absent, the court must make an order for discharge unless the person would be entitled to a retrial or appeal following extradition: s 20(5) and (7). These provisions are intended to ensure that a person is not extradited in breach of their right to be present at their trial under Article 6 ECHR: see [13] and Bertino v Italy [2024] UKSC 9 at [45].
The court accepted that the term “trial” (s 20(3)) means “the trial resulting in the decision” in respect of which extradition is sought and that this definition encompasses post-conviction sentencing proceedings where the court decides on a cumulative sentence, if the decision involves an exercise of discretion: [109]-[110] and see Case C271/17 PPU Zdziaszek [2017] 4 WLR 189.
The court acknowledged that the relationship between that definition (“trial”) and the definition of “conviction” (s 20(1)) is difficult to discern. That was important in this case because the appellant was present at his conviction and initial sentencing in June 2016 but not at the hearing in April 2022 where the Romanian court decided to impose a modified sentence. On its face, the structure of s 20 is that a person’s opportunity to be present at subsequent sentencing proceedings is irrelevant if they were present at conviction, even if the latter proceedings do (or at least could) lead to a different sentencing outcome.
Contrary to the decision of the DJ, the court ultimately held that the appellant’s case could not be determined purely on the basis of s 20(1) as that would be inconsistent with the approach in Zdziaszek and the fact that the Romanian arrest warrant expressly sought the appellant’s extradition in relation to the “decision” taken in April 2022. It was therefore relevant to consider whether the appellant deliberately absented himself from the hearing in April 2022. On that question of fact, the court was not satisfied that the appellant was summoned to the hearing or even knew about it. Therefore, in the absence of any right to a retrial or appeal, he was not liable to extradition.
Reasoning on Article 8
In the court’s view, the only question which it had to determine under this ground was whether the DJ adequately took account of the period of delay between the commission of the offences by the appellant and the extradition request. It concluded that the DJ had not done so and that this was another basis on which the appeal should be allowed ([118]).
The DJ did not directly address the overall length of the delay (nearly 10 years from the commission of the offences) and failed to give adequate weight to the requesting state’s culpability in respect of the delay ([117]). Based on its review of the case law, the court directed itself that long culpable delay by the requesting state diminishes the public interest in extradition, in particular because it can be taken to indicate the state’s own subjective view of the public interest in obtaining extradition ([21]). This was a “crucial factor” which should have weighed in the balance “significantly differently” when considering Article 8, so as to make the DJ’s conclusion wrong.
This decision has wide-ranging implications for people in care settings across the UK, public bodies, and practitioners, and reframes the approach to deprivation of liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”).
The decision originated with a reference brought by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland on the meaning of deprivation of liberty for adults (defined as those aged 16 and above) assessed as lacking mental capacity to make decisions about their residence and care arrangements, and living in community settings. The Minister of Health for Northern Ireland (“the Minister”) sought to revise a code of practice in Northern Ireland to provide that even where an adult had been assessed as lacking the relevant mental capacity, they could nevertheless provide valid consent to their care arrangements through the expression of wishes and feelings which go beyond mere acquiescence to their confinement. The Minister sought to issue the revised code of practice under section 288(4) of the MCA 2016 to replace the existing Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards Code of Practice issued under section 288(1) of the MCA 2016.
The issue for the Supreme Court to determine was whether this revised code would be incompatible with Article 5 of the ECHR. If so, the revised code would be unlawful.
On Friday, the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC) published a report which found that government departments “still do not have a grip” on how to manage the asylum system [1], and that the Home Office has yet to demonstrate that it has learned from previous attempts to reform the asylum system.
The publication of the report follows the Government announcement in November 2025 of an “entirely new asylum model”, alongside plans to reduce costs by £1 billion a year by 2028-29 [4].
An analysis of the asylum system report identified a pattern of shifting, rather than reducing, backlogs. The PAC highlighted that increases in the speed of processing asylum claims led to a decline of decision quality, which contributed to backlogs in the appeals system. There was an increase from 27,000 people waiting for an appeal decision in April 2024 to currently “around 70,000” — an increase of over 150% [11].
The PAC also raised concerns about the Home Office approach to the Northeye site, which was deemed unsuitable for asylum accommodation but subsequently transferred to Homes for England to increase the UK’s housing stock [13]. PAC chair, Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, asked: “if it is not fit for asylum seekers, why is it fit for our homeless population?”.
In other news
On Wednesday, Labour MP Jess Asato launched a test case against xAI concerning the creation of non-consensual sexual deepfakes by its AI platform, Grok. Filed in the High Court, the claim alleges breaches of data protection law and misuse of her private information. The claim seeks a declaration of illegality, an order requiring xAI to stop all further illegality and damages.
The House of Lords Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee launched an inquiry on Tuesday into Article 2 of the Windsor Framework, which provides that there is no diminution of rights, safeguards or equality of opportunity in Northern Ireland as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The inquiry follows the Supreme Court’s judgment in Dillon v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2026] UKSC 15, handed down last month, which held that the Northern Ireland (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023 did not breach Article 2 of the Windsor Framework.
On Tuesday, the Supreme Court overruled the decision in Surrey County Council v P; Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] UKSC 19 (“Cheshire West“)on what counts as “deprivation of liberty” under Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it applies to individualswith impaired mental capacity and living in health or social care settings [207].
The Supreme Court replaced the “acid test” for determining a deprivation of liberty established in Cheshire West — whether an individual is subject to “continuous supervision and control” and is “not free to leave” [11] — with a multifactorial approach, taking account of factors including the “relative normality” of the placement, the purpose of the confinement and the individual’s compliance [53].
The Supreme Court unanimously held that an adult who does not have mental capacity to make their own decision about their residence and care arrangements can “validly consent” to their confinement and no deprivation of liberty arises [53] — a decision which departs from “the conventional understanding” of Cheshire West [12].
Mencap, Mind and the National Autistic Society submitted to the Court that narrowing the scope of Article 5 ECHR would “remove vital safeguards” from disabled people [29], including access to independent representation and access to a court to challenge the lawfulness of detention [31].
The case stemmed from a reference brought by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland regarding whether a revised code of practice would be incompatible with Article 5 ECHR. The draft revised code provides that even where a person lacks mental capacity to make decisions about their residence and care arrangements, they can give valid consent “through the expression of current wishes and feelings that go beyond mere acquiescence to the confinement” [15], including evidence of a “positive attitude to the care arrangements” [55].
The Supreme Court held that the Minister would not be acting incompatibly with Article 5 ECHR in issuing the revised code [53].
In Strasbourg
José Mourinho has filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) against Türkiye regarding the disciplinary sanctions that were handed down by the country’s football federation while he was in charge of Fenerbahce.
The complaint, lodged in March 2025 while he was still coach of Fenerbahce and published earlier this week, claimed Mourinho’s right to freedom of expression was infringed when in November 2024 when he was given a one-match ban and fined 900,000 Turkish lira ($26,200) by the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) for questioning the impartiality of referees and other match officials.
On the UKHRB
Rosalind English considers the judgment in Cork and another v Smith [2026] EWHC 1199 as a cautionary case on the use of AI in legal practice, highlighting lawyers’ duty to verify AI-generated information.
This was an unfortunate case of delegation, where the ultimate outsourcing ended up with an AI system. It started as a simple block transfer application to the Chancery Division. Such applications are almost invariably determined without a hearing but the judge gave directions for the matter to be listed as a result of concerns about “misleading statements” made by the applicants’ former solicitors, Pinsent Masons LLP in two letters to the court in connection with the application,
A junior associate solicitor (“Lawyer A”) at the firm had used AI to research a point of insolvency law. The AI generated false text purporting to be Insolvency Rule 12.37(5), suggesting that the court had an express power to grant release to outgoing liquidators. The problem is that this text did not exist.
Lawyer A had asked the AI what the relevant statutory provisions said, rather than checking the legislation directly. The AI itself apparently flagged that the answer might be inaccurate, but that warning was not properly acted upon., and the AI-generated material was not checked against an authoritative source.
There was a further problem; when the court identified the false wording, the response did not simply acknowledge what had happened. A second letter to the court attempted to explain the earlier error as a “summary conclusion” rather than squarely accepting that AI had generated wording which had not been verified. The judge considered that this had made matters worse, because it suggested not just an initial mistake but a continued failure to correct the record promptly and frankly:
“The Purported Text in the 30th March Letter had caused me to be concerned that a cavalier attitude was being taken as to the accuracy of the material that Pinsent Masons were putting before the court. As I say, it struck me as likely to be an AI hallucination, which had not been checked. The attempt to explain it away in what appeared to be an untruthful manner in the 14th April Letter only heightened my concerns.” [para 25]
“it is concerning”, the judge continued,
“that Lawyer A appears to have asked the AI what these sections said, rather than reading an authoritative online resource or book, and does not appear to have checked the AI’s response. Had Lawyer A done so, it would have been readily apparent that the AI was producing nonsense and was unreliable. It perhaps betrays a misguided faith in the AI on Lawyer A’s part but, if that is so, I cannot understand why Lawyer A did not heed the AI’s later warnings about the need to check the provisions to which it referred.” [para 38]
The judge concluded that the conduct looked more like serious lack of care and judgment than deliberate dishonesty, but it was still troubling because the material was presented in a misleading way.
The case reinforces a basic professional rule: AI may assist drafting, but it does not displace the lawyer’s duty to verify accuracy. That is particularly important where the output is used in correspondence or submissions to court and may be read as an authoritative statement of the law. It also sits in the same developing line of authority as earlier AI-related judicial warnings, especially Ayinde v London Borough of Haringey EWHC 1383 (Admin), which had already highlighted the risk of misleading courts with unverified AI-generated citations:
“Freely available generative artificial intelligence tools, trained on a large language model such as ChatGPT are not capable of conducting reliable legal research. Such tools can produce apparently coherent and plausible responses to prompts, but those coherent and plausible responses may turn out to be entirely incorrect. The responses may make confident assertions that are simply untrue. They may cite sources that do not exist. They may purport to quote passages from a genuine source that do not appear in that source.” [para 6 of Haringey]
For practitioners, the case is less about AI itself than about process. The key failures were the absence of source-checking, the failure to heed the tool’s own caution, and the failure to escalate or correct the problem once it was identified. The practical lesson is that any AI-assisted legal document should be treated as a draft only. A competent lawyer must still verify quotations, authorities, and propositions against primary sources before anything goes out under their name or the firm’s name.
The judgment is a strong reminder that courts expect lawyers to remain personally accountable for what they file or send. Even if the error arises from carelessness rather than bad faith, the consequences can still be serious because the justice system depends on reliability and honesty from legal professionals.
In short, Cork v Smith is now an important cautionary case on AI use in legal practice: it shows that generative tools can increase efficiency, but only if they are controlled by careful human checking rather than treated as a substitute for legal judgment.
Reform UK reported to the Equality and Human Rights Commission
On Wednesday, a group of 27 MPs wrote to the Chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, Dr Mary-Ann Stephenson, calling for a formal investigation into Reform UK over alleged Islamophobia. The signatories – 26 Labour backbenchers, co-ordinated by Afzal Khan (Manchester Rusholme) – contend that the party has breached its obligations under the Equality Act 2010, and that it has no adequate internal process by which members can raise concerns. The letter points, among other things, to Nigel Farage’s criticism of a Ramadan event in Trafalgar Square. Reform UK rejects the complaint.
The referral is the latest test of the Commission’s appetite to deploy its enforcement powers against a political party. Dr Stephenson succeeded Baroness Falkner of Margravine as Chair at the end of November 2025.
Record drug-related deaths in prisons
On Monday, The Independent reported that drug-related deaths in prisons in England and Wales have reached a record high. Charlie Taylor, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, has warned that dealers are “operating with impunity” and that drones are used to deliver large consignments into prison estates. The figures sharpen the focus on the state’s positive obligations under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR towards those whom it detains, and on the increase of Prevention of Future Deaths reports concerning the availability of novel psychoactive substances in custody.
UN High Commissioner warns of escalation in Ukraine
On Thursday, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, warned against a dangerous escalation in Ukraine amid Russian threats to intensify its attacks, urging both sides back to the negotiating table: “I strongly urge restraint. Resume negotiations and end the suffering.” His Office recorded 815 civilians killed and 4,174 injured in the first four months of 2026: a 21% increase on the same period in 2025.
The High Commissioner reiterated that international humanitarian law obliges the parties to a conflict to take all feasible precautions to spare the civilian population.
In the Courts
Mavrakis and Kasapoğlu v. Türkiye: religious-minority foundations in Strasbourg
On Tuesday, the ECtHR considered the position of two Greek Orthodox priests, both Turkish nationals: the late Father Gennaidos (born Nikolaos) Mavrakis, who died during the proceedings in August 2025, and Father Georgios Kasapoğlu.
Mavrakis and Kasapoğlu had been removed by Türkiye’s General Directorate of Foundations from the boards of three Greek Orthodox community foundations: the Beşiktaş Cihannüma foundation; the Aya Konstantin foundation in Samatya; and the foundation of the Phanar Greek Orthodox College, the historic ‘Great School of the Nation’.
The sole ground for their removal was that they were members of the clergy. The applicants relied on Articles 9 (freedom of religion), 11 (freedom of association) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination), together with Articles 6(1) and 13. The case is Mavrakis and Kasapoğlu v. Türkiye (apps. nos. 12549/23, 71/24 and 2023/24).
The Chamber found a violation of Article 11 read in light of Article 9. The case falls within the established Strasbourg jurisprudence on the institutional autonomy of religious communities. Although Türkiye had in 2008 introduced elections to the boards of non-Muslim foundations, the Directorate continued in practice to bar serving clergy from standing, permitting only the election of lay members of a community whose numbers are in decline. The Court awarded €2,000 in non-pecuniary damages to each applicant (the late Father Mavrakis’s award being payable to his widow and two sons).
The decisive point was that the exclusion had no basis in domestic law. No statute or regulation barred clergy from foundation boards: the eligibility criteria turned on matters such as citizenship, age, residence and education, rather than lay status. The General Directorate had no power to remove a duly elected member on account of his clerical status. The interference was accordingly not ‘prescribed by law’. The Court awarded €2,000 in non-pecuniary damages to each applicant (the late Father Mavrakis’s award being payable to his widow and two sons).
These modest damages belie the practical significance of this ruling for the Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul – as well as a fifteen-year battle through the Turkish courts and then to Strasbourg to secure it. Community foundations administer churches, schools, cemeteries and property around which Greek Orthodox life in the city is organised.
The decision has been welcomed by minority-rights observers as dismantling a long-standing administrative doctrine, said to be derived from the Treaty of Lausanne, that members of the clergy could not exercise administrative functions within minority foundations. The judgment affirms that a state cannot invoke religious identity as an administrative pretext for paring back a minority’s right to run its own institutions.
Tožičková v. the Czech Republic: the arrest of a journalist at an environmental protest
On Thursday, Strasbourg returned to freedom of expression in Tožičková v. the Czech Republic (app. no. 21512/23). The applicant, a journalist, was covering a September 2020 environmental demonstration at a coal mine, wearing a visible press badge. When some demonstrators entered the mine’s restricted operating area, she followed them. Police ordered those present to leave and, on her refusal, arrested her, releasing her some two hours later. The domestic courts found that the order to vacate and a ban on filming during her arrest had both been unlawful, but nonetheless upheld the arrest, and the Constitutional Court dismissed her complaint.
The Chamber unanimously found a violation of Article 10. A refusal to obey a police order did not, in and of itself, justify arrest: before detaining a journalist, the police had to weigh the alternatives open to them against her press status and the effect on her Article 10 rights, which they had not done. By treating her non-compliance with an order later acknowledged to be unlawful as automatic justification, and giving no adequate reasons, the domestic courts had sanctioned an arrest that was not necessary in a democratic society: the more so given the press’s watchdog role over the policing of protest and the correspondingly narrow margin of appreciation where a matter of public interest is in play.
The Court awarded €3,000 in respect of costs and expenses.
Kakar v London Borough of Harrow: access to justice and statutory time limits
Ms Kakar had sought council-tax discounts on two grounds: first, that her son, who had been suspended from his studies on medical grounds, should have been treated as a qualifying full-time student; second, that Ms Kakar was her son’s carer. The Valuation Tribunal for England held that time to appeal ran from a council email of 5 February 2024, rendering her October 2024 appeal some seven months out of time.
Before David Pievsky KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge), counsel for Ms Kakar argued that to refuse an extension of time for a near-miss — the appeal having been filed only minutes after the deadline — was disproportionate. Counsel invoked the right of access to justice by analogy with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and also relied on the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Eskander v General Medical Council [2026] EWCA Civ 372.
The Deputy Judge distinguished Eskander, in which the appellant had adduced detailed evidence of the steps personally taken to comply, and observed that the council-tax context differed materially from the professional-regulatory appeals in which the Adesina line of authority had developed.
The appeal was dismissed. The case is a useful reminder of the limits of the discretion to relieve against rigid statutory time limits outside the regulatory sphere.
The former Philippine President is charged with three counts of crimes against humanity (murder and attempted murder) arising from the ‘war on drugs’. Duterte has been in the Court’s custody since March 2025, and was committed for trial following confirmation of the charges in April 2026.
Mr Duterte did not attend the first status conference, having waived his right to be present. He is now represented by a new defence team led by Peter Haynes.
The Chamber indicated that it was prepared to accede to the Prosecution’s application for the trial to open on 30 November 2026, sitting on a daily basis until the judicial recess. That date should, however, be treated as provisional: Judge Korner, citing Mr Duterte’s age and reported ill-health, directed that the three medical experts who had assessed his fitness at the confirmation stage be re-instructed to examine him afresh, a separate finding on fitness being required before trial can begin.
The Prosecution indicated that it intends to call between 60 and 70 witnesses.
Also this week, Rosalind English examines Rodoy v Optical Express Ltd[2026] EWHC 1219 (KB) (judgment available here), in which Griffiths J dismissed a libel claim over letters describing the claimant as a “self-confessed and known fraudster” who trolled the defendant’s staff online: the words had caused serious harm, but were substantially true and protected by qualified privilege.
This is a substantial defamation judgment – at over four hundred paragraphs, quite a long read – but worth it.
In short, Griffiths J held that the claimant’s allegations about the defendant caused serious harm, but were substantially true and protected by qualified privilege, so the claim failed.
The case does not create any precedent in libel law but will be of general interest because the court engaged in unusually detailed factual findings about both the claimant Ms Rodoy’s long-running anti-refractive-surgery campaigning and the defendant Optical Express’s internal complaint-handling practices.
Apart from his findings on defamation law, those of a certain age might be grateful to Griffiths J for providing us with with a very clear understanding of what that much over-used word “trolling” means. Read on.
Short summary
The dispute arose from four materially identical letters sent by Optical Express to dissatisfied former patients in 2020 and 2021, each including a paragraph describing Ms Rodoy as “a vexatious individual”, “a self-confessed and known fraudster”, and someone who trolls Optical Express and its staff online, with police involvement said to have been required for employee safety. Prior to trial, Lewis HHJhad determined the ordinary and natural meanings of the words and ruled that they were defamatory statements of fact. The issues at trial were therefore serious harm, truth, qualified privilege, malice, and relief.
Background facts
Ms Rodoy had become a campaigner against refractive eye surgery after her own adverse experience with Optimax in 2011, following which she created the “Optimax Ruined My Life” website and later, after settling with Optimax, the “Optical Express Ruined My Life” site and related social media channels. Optical Express is a major private provider of refractive eye surgery, and after settlement the claimant turned her attention to them. The evidence showed a long-running conflict between Ms Rodoy and the company, including public criticism, site visits, social media posts, and communications with patients and staff. The judge found that she was not a conventional neutral commentator: she ran a campaign, but also repeatedly engaged in personalised online abuse, baiting and humiliation of individual staff members.
A central factual strand was an episode from the 1990s, in which the court found that Ms Rodoy had sold false stories to the media for money about a fictitious detective agency, recruiting others to support the deception and knowingly creating an elaborate hoax for payment. The judge treated that history as highly material to the issue whether she was accurately described as a fraudster [see the “Decoy Dolls” story in paras 144 et seq.]
In Episode 239 Emma-Louise Fenelon speaks to John Whitting KC about expert evidence at trial, which will be of interest to first-time and seasoned experts alike. This episode is the third in our series on expert evidence, following Episode 177 with Margaret Bowron KC and Episode 100 with Neil Sheldon KC.
Any comments or feedback on this episode can be sent to LawPodUK@1cor.com Law Pod UK is published by 1 Crown Office Row. Supporting articles are published on the UK Human Rights Blog. Follow and interact with the podcast team on Twitter.
On Wednesday May 20, the Ministry of Justice published a white paper regarding the reform of the youth justice system. It states the government will “carefully consider” whether the age of criminal responsibility (10) remains appropriate, and promises more effective early intervention in children’s lives. In particular, the government plans to reform the “youth out-of-court resolution framework”, including potentially changes to the requirement of admission of guilt for various outcomes (i.e., youth cautions). The government also plans to pilot Youth Intervention Courts, which will focus on child rehabilitation (likely through community-based sentences).
Anti-SLAPP Legislation to be brought forward
On Tuesday 19 May, Lord Chancellor David Lammy announced the government’s intention to “bring forward” anti-SLAPP legislation, after being pressed about its omission from the King’s Speech the previous week. Concerns over the absence of anti-SLAPP measures intensified following a report by Democracy for Sale on Friday 15 May, which alleged that the Society of Media Lawyers had persuaded the government not to proceed with the proposed legislation. The Society denied the allegations, stating that none of its committee members had met with ministers or MPs to discuss anti-SLAPP proposals. It also reiterated its position that any legislative reform should be preceded by a review by the Law Commission and, where necessary, followed by the development of workable proposals.
This application was made by prosecuting counsel in criminal proceedings against 24 Palestine Action protestors, arising out of their protest at the premises of Elbit Systems UK ([6], [14]). The proposed order sought, inter alia, to prevent the reporting of information concerning that protest, as well as any conclusion reached by Ministers, advisers, or officials that this protest satisfied the statutory definition of “terrorism”, until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings ([14]).
The Court declined to grant this order, finding that information about the incident had already been disclosed in the judgment of the court below, and that no application was made to postpone publication of that information to the first instance court ([23]). Moreover, with regard to the Secretary of State’s conclusion that this incident (and other protests by Palestine Action) satisfied the definition of terrorism, the Court found that this conclusion was “apparent from [the Secretary’s] statement to Parliament” and the Divisional Court’s judgment ([24]).
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the proposed order would not eliminate any risk of prejudice. Instead, the ordinary safeguards inherent in the criminal process should be relied upon to protect the fairness of the proceedings ([25]).
Rosalind English analyses the Advertising Standards Authority decision in favour of Chris Packham against the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board’s “Let’s Eat Balanced” campaign.
On its face, R (on the application of Martin) v the Chancellor of the Exchequer [2026] EWHC 1123 (Admin) was a garden variety public law challenge to a government consultation on two technical forms of tax relief for agricultural property. It features on this blog, however, because of its contribution to the caselaw on the proper constitutional limits on the jurisdiction of the courts vis-à-vis the two other branches of the state, especially Parliament.
Case overview
The three Claimants – two farmers, a father and son, and an unincorporated association set up in 2025 to advance agriculture and farming through good governance practices and tax policy – sought permission to apply for judicial review of a technical consultation conducted by HMRC designed to elicit views on a specific aspect of the government’s proposals for reforming tax relief on agricultural property. Those proposals were eventually incorporated as legislative measures into what is now the Finance Act 2026. At the time of the hearings, on 17-18 March 2026, the legislation was in the form of the Finance (No 2) Bill 2025-26 and was still awaiting Royal Assent.
At its core, the Claimants’ case was that the government had promised to consult on changes to Agricultural Property Relief (“APR”) and Business Property Relief (“BPR”) but had failed adequately to do so (see [5]). The consultation process, they claimed, was therefore unlawful. They sought a declaration to that effect by way of relief.
Both the first and second Defendants – the Chancellor of the Exchequer and HMRC – denied that the Claimants had a legitimate expectation of consultation, and resisted the three other grounds of review advanced (see [32]). They also denied that the third Claimant had standing to bring judicial review proceedings and argued that, in any case, the claim was brought out of time.
More interestingly, for our purposes, they also argued that the issues raised by the claim were non-justiciable both because of their essentially political character and for reasons of parliamentary privilege. The Office of the Speaker of the House of Commons took the lead on making submissions that the claim trespassed on parliamentary privilege and was therefore non-justiciable.
Whipple LJ and Fordham J sat as a divisional court for a rolled-up hearing to consider both permission and substantive judicial review proceedings, handing down judgment on 12 May 2026.
Parliamentary privilege
The law
A decision might benefit from parliamentary privilege, such that it falls outwith the Court’s jurisdiction, because of Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689, which provides that “the Freedome of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parlyament.”
The sort of thing which Article IX precludes from being ‘impeached or questioned’ by the courts was examined by the Supreme Court in the case of R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 51 at [47]:
[T]he principal matter to which article 9 is directed is freedom of speech and debate in the Houses of Parliament and in parliamentary committees. This is where the core or essential business of Parliament takes place. In considering whether actions outside the Houses and committees fall within parliamentary proceedings because of their connection to them, it is necessary to consider the nature of that connection and whether, if such actions do not enjoy privilege, this is likely to impact adversely on the core or essential business of Parliament.
While the idea of ‘speech and debate’ in Parliament is self-explanatory, then, Chaytor sets out two questions which must be answered in order to determine whether something outside the Houses and committees – something which, in Whipple LJ’s words at [83], is “incidental to the core or essential business of Parliament” – counts as a ‘proceeding in Parliament’ and therefore attracts parliamentary privilege:
What is the nature of the connection between the matter in question, on the one hand, and the core and essential parliamentary business within the Houses and committees, on the other?
Given that connection, would a failure to extend privilege to that matter adversely impact on the core and essential business of Parliament?
A matter might nonetheless be protected by parliamentary privilege, and therefore be non-justiciable, even if it is not protected by Article IX: R (SC) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions at [164]-[165]; Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 AC 321.
In her judgment, Whipple LJ put it this way, at [105(i)]:
Parliamentary privilege goes wider than merely protecting proceedings once they are initiated in Parliament. It encompasses the comity between Parliament and the courts, based on mutual respect and the separation of constitutional powers.
The parties’ submissions
The Claimants relied heavily on Chaytor to support the contention that parliamentary privilege should not be accorded overly liberally and to buttress the argument that the target of the judicial review, HMRC’s technical consultation, could not be said to be a proceeding in Parliament. As such, the Court was not precluded by Article IX from adjudicating on its lawfulness.
They argued that the courts had taken a wrong turn in a key line of caselaw – beginning with R (Adiatu) v HM Treasury [2020] EWHC 1554 (Admin) – which decided in unequivocal terms, but without reference to Chaytor, that parliamentary privilege could, and in those cases did, attach to government decisions taken en route to subsequent parliamentary proceedings.
The Speaker conceded that Chaytor was indeed authority for the meaning of ‘proceedings in Parliament’ in the context of Article IX, but argued that the Claimants were mistaken in identifying the scope of that term as the key issue in this case.
This case turned, instead, on two separate questions, corresponding to the periods of time before and after the introduction of the Finance Bill, respectively.
Until 2 December 2025 at the very latest, when the Finance Bill was introduced to Parliament, the question was whether a challenge to the technical consultation, which led to measures included in the Finance Bill, would be non-justiciable for wider (i.e. non-Article IX) reasons of parliamentary privilege.
At the time of the hearings, when the Finance Bill was awaiting Royal Assent, the question was whether the Court, in considering the lawfulness of the technical consultation which led to measures included in the Finance Bill – itself undoubtedly a proceeding in Parliament – could be said to be impeaching or questioning those proceedings.
As to the first question, the Speaker’s submission was that the Claimant’s challenge was non-justiciable because, if successful, it would necessarily delay the laying of the Finance Bill, which would constitute an impermissible interference with Parliament. This was the clear position from the impugned line of case law that the Claimants sought to persuade the court to overturn. Those cases were not decided incorrectly and did not err in failing to cite Chaytor. Whereas Chaytor was authority for the scope of ‘proceedings in Parliament’, that question was not in issue in the impugned line of authorities beginning with Adiatu, which instead dealt with the question, entirely pertinent in this case, of when judicial proceedings could be said to encroach impermissibly on territory that was the constitutional preserve of Parliament.
As to the second question, the Speaker argued that the Court undoubtedly would be impeaching or questioning proceedings in Parliament by accepting jurisdiction in this case. The Speaker relied in particular on the case of R (A and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWHC 360 (Admin), in which Fordham J had previously concluded, at [26], that:
[a] declaration from a judicial review court, declaring that the consultation which preceded the Bill and informed its design was unlawful would—even if the court bent over backwards to make very clear that that was the scope and extent of its judgment and its declaration—clearly raise questions about whether some step ought to be taken in light of that conclusion of law by the court.
Even if the Court’s conclusion did not involve the government taking “some step”:
the court’s judgment [would] instead cast a legal ‘shadow’ over the product of the consultation. That shadow would, in my judgment, itself stand – in the circumstances of the present case – as an interference in the parliamentary process. The court would, unmistakably, have concluded that the ‘product’ of the consultation was legally ‘tainted’.
The Speaker argued that the Court’s consideration of HMRC’s technical consultation would similarly cast a legal shadow over the Finance Bill and thereby fall foul of Article IX.
The decision of the divisional court
The merits, the timing, and the political character of the decision under challenge
The Court refused the Claimants permission to apply for judicial review, finding that their substantive claim was unarguable: there never was any legitimate expectation to a consultation of the sort claimed by the Claimants (see [10]). It also held, at [71]-[79], that the claim was brought out of time.
The Court declined to rule on the second Defendant’s contention that the subject matter of the claim was – in Whipple LJ’s words at [47(i)]) – “quintessentially political” and therefore outside its jurisdiction. In R (Wheeler) v Office of the Prime Minister [2008] EWHC 1409 (Admin), the Court was prepared to say that a government promise to hold a referendum on the UK’s accession to the Treaty of Lisbon was precisely the sort of question on which the judiciary was ill-suited to adjudicate. Whipple LJ limited herself to the observation, at [113], that “it is an open question whether a similar analysis [to the one in Wheeler] would apply in the context of a promise of consultation relating to a tax policy change.”
Parliamentary privilege
The Court did, however, explore the question of parliamentary privilege in some detail, devoting almost a quarter of the judgment, from [80]-[110], to the subject.
The Court declined the Claimants’ invitation to overhaul the authorities on the question of parliamentary privilege generally, instead accepting the Speaker’s submissions.
The Court also agreed with the Speaker, at [110], that the Finance Bill was incontrovertibly a proceeding in Parliament at the time of the hearings and that to hear the Claimant’s challenge to the technical consultation would plainly impeach or question that proceeding in Parliament. As such, Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689 prohibited the Court from considering the claim.
Samuel Talalay is a pupil barrister at 1 Crown Office Row.
The Speaker was represented by David Manknell KC and Rajkiran Arhestey of 1 Crown Office Row, neither of whom were involved in the writing of this post.
Hard on the heels of our podcast about “humane-washing” – the false portrayal of UK’s livestock in bucolic conditions, green pastures and freedom – comes broadcaster and environmental campaigner Chris Packham’s (partial) victory over the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board’s “Let’s Eat Balanced” Campaign before the Advertising Standards Authority.
On 13 May 2026, the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) published its ruling on a complaint brought by Packham against the AHDB’s campaign. The complaint concerned national press advertisements promoting British beef, lamb, and dairy products. The ASA partially upheld the complaint, ruling that two specific carbon footprint claims breached advertising rules on substantiation and misleading advertising, while rejecting five of Packham’s six substantive allegations.
The Advertisements at Issue
The complaint focused on a series of television, print, and social media advertisements put out by the AHDB. These involved TV ads, an Instagram post, national press ads, and a page from a website, http://www.letseatbalanced.com, for the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board’s (AHDB) “Let’s Eat Balanced” campaign, seen between September 2024 and February 2025. The British beef advertisement stated: “British beef not only tastes great, but has a carbon footprint that’s half the global average*,” with an asterisk referring to: “Full lifecycle emissions of CO2 eq (carbon dioxide equivalent) per kg of beef”. The British milk advertisement similarly claimed: “British milk not only tastes good, but is also produced to world-class standards, and has a carbon footprint a third lower than the global average”. The page on the “Let’s Eat Balanced” website featured images of a sheep being fed in a grass field, cows standing in a grass field, the Red Tractor and RSPCA Assured logos, and pigs outside on a churned-up field. (The reality is that 85% of pigs and poultry in this country are reared in intense factory conditions). The page featured a number of different sections, subheadings included “WE CAN BE PROUD OF THE QUALITY FOOD PRODUCTION IN THE UK”, “FOOD AND SAFETY QUALITY”, “HORMONES AND ANTIBIOTICS”, “ANIMAL HEALTH”, “FARMING STANDARDS” and “FROM THE LAND, NOT THE LAB”.
Packham’s Complaint
Chris Packham complained to the ASA that the advertisements were misleading because they did not reflect the full environmental impact of British meat and dairy production. His complaint encompassed six distinct allegations: (1) that the carbon footprint claims were misleading as they excluded post-retail emissions; (2) that imagery of grazing livestock misrepresented British farming practices; (3) that the advertisements implied all UK beef and dairy cattle were permanently outdoor-grazed; (4) that environmental claims were not substantiated; (5) that the campaign failed to reflect the overall environmental impact compared to alternative foods; and (6) that the advertisements breached environmental advertising guidelines requiring full lifecycle analysis.
The claim of a lack of “legality” as part of a public law challenge is often advanced in a rather free-floating way. The judge, Saini J, does some very useful clearing up of terminology in this case about a challenge to economic sanctions. The case also contains a crisp summary of other public law principles, with an application well beyond the sanctions context.
The case
Here’s a brief account of the facts and the Russian economic sanctions regime in dispute.
Sarvar Ismailov is the nephew of Alisher Usmanov. Usmanov is said to be closely associated with Vladimir Putin; in sanctions legal terminology, he is an “involved person” who may be subject to sanctions. But what about his nephew?
Ismailov had lived in the UK from the age of 13, but he and his family left the UK in March 2022 (shortly after the invasion of Ukraine) and now appears to live in Dubai. He is now 31.
Shortly after his departure, in July 2022, the UK sanctions regime (via the enabling Sanctions and Anti-Laundering Act 2018 – SAMLA – and underlying Russia Regulations) was modified so that you could be potentially designated as subject to sanctions if you were an “immediate family member” of an involved person– unsurprisingly defined as including nieces and nephews: [20] of the judgment for a summary of the modified regime.
This brought Ismailov into the frame, because of his uncle.
But despite being in the frame, a person is not designated yet. The Foreign Office (FO) then considers whether there are good reasons for the individual to be designated – and it found these in respect of Ismailov.
This designation was the overall target for this challenge.
One of the incidental interests of the case is seeing why the FO thought that Ismailov should be designated: [65] of the judgment, setting out his business ties, including Usmanov/Usmanov companies’ past common involvement with Everton Football Club. So they were not just nephew and uncle. It was thought by the FO that Usmanov might use Ismailov (wittingly or unwittingly) as a vehicle for sanctions-busting, if Ismailov was not sanctioned; and, in reverse, Ismailov, if sanctioned, might put pressure on his uncle to distance himself from investments of strategic significance to Russia.
In legal terms, Ismailov’s challenge was to
the July 2022 change in the law about family members via the new regulations, and
the maintenance of Ismailov’s designated status after an administrative review in 2023-2024.
Council of Europe adopts political declaration on migration
All 46 member states of the Council of Europe have adopted the Chișinău Declaration on migration and the ECHR.
The declaration reaffirms the signatories’ commitment to the ECHR, while stressing the need for member states to be able to tackle “significant, complex, migration-related challenges … which were either unforeseen at the time the Convention was drafted or have evolved significantly since then”.
The declaration states that it is “an obligation and a necessity” for member states to protect their borders in compliance with the ECHR. A desire is expressed for further guidance from the ECtHR on a number of points, including the use of Article 3 to avoid expulsion or extradition.
The “living instrument” doctrine is pointedly highlighted twice, with emphasis on the ECtHR’s practice of interpreting the Convention in view of “present-day realities” and “novel challenges”.
The declaration also asserts that member states must be allowed to adopt new approaches to address irregular migration. Particular mention is made of the fact that several member states are currently envisaging the use of third countries as processing and return hubs.
Written ministerial statement on responding to antisemitism
In the wake of the Golders Green attack, the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government has issued a statement setting out the Government’s strategy on tackling antisemitism in the UK.
The statement refers to the Government’s recent command paper on improving social cohesion (published in March 2026) and announces additional measures, stating that “we all need to do more”.
The statement also commits the Government to fast-tracking legislation to introduce “new proscription-like powers to clamp down on individuals and groups carrying out hostile activity for foreign states”.
In the courts
Barrister contempt proceedings dismissed
The Court of Appeal has held that the Crown Court does not have jurisdiction to refer an alleged contempt of court directly to the High Court. Accordingly, the court dismissed High Court proceedings against the barrister Rajiv Menon KC, leaving the matter back in the hands of the Crown Court judge. The case is Re Contempt Proceedings against Rajiv Menon KC [2026] EWCA Civ 573.
In January 2026, Mr Menon was held by a Crown Court judge to have breached, in his closing speech to the jury, the terms of a directions ruling which prohibited counsel from inviting the jury to disregard the court’s rulings of law, to disregard their juror oaths, or to apply the principle of jury equity. The judge then referred the matter to the High Court for consideration.
According to a statement by Mr Menon’s chambers, this was the first time in English legal history that a barrister had been prosecuted for contempt in respect of a closing speech at a criminal trial. The Chair of the Bar Council, Kirsty Brimelow KC, has also referred to the proceedings as “exceptional” and “troubling” and highlighted the risk of a chilling effect on the profession.
On Mr Menon’s appeal against a preliminary directions ruling, the Court of Appeal accepted the submission that the Crown Court exceeded its jurisdiction in making a direct reference to the High Court. The High Court would only have jurisdiction to deal with the case on an application by the Attorney-General ([62]).
In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeal followed “the overwhelming weight of authority”, which indicated that the Crown Court has only two options when confronted with an alleged contempt in the face of the court ([55]). These are: (a) it can deal with the matter itself in summary proceedings; or (b) it can make a reference to the A-G, who may make an application to the High Court if doing so would serve the public interest.
The court’s conclusion affirms the A-G’s role as a necessary filter in the majority of contempt cases. This is consistent with the guidance given in the leading case of Balogh v St Albans Crown Court [1975] 1 QB 73, which is that the Crown Court judge should leave the matter to the A-G’s discretion unless it is imperative to act immediately ([57]).
In Episode 238 of LawPod UK, Lucy McCann is joined by Jasper Gold and Paula Kelly of 1 Crown Office Row to explore the concept of consent. The discussion ranges from philosophical theories of consent to informed consent in medical law after Montgomery, the limits of consent to harm in criminal law, and the role of deception in sexual offences. Along the way, the episode considers broader questions of autonomy, paternalism, and the different functions consent performs across modern law.
The report noted that the Government had failed to provide legal assistance during the identification process and prior to entering the NRM, and to ensure that free legal aid is available for the procedure before the Criminal Injuries Compensation Schemes — despite the fact that these recommendations had been “made repeatedly” by GRETA in previous reports [287].
GRETA also warned that victims of trafficking continue to be prosecuted and convicted for offences that they were compelled to commit as part of their exploitation, despite the revised guidance on the non-prosecution of victims of human trafficking [236-253] — produced in response to the V.C.L. and A.N. v the United Kingdom (App nos 77587/12 and 74603/12) [2021] ECHR. In that case, the European Court of Human Rights held that the UK had breached the rights to freedom from slavery and to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Articles 4 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, by prosecuting two potential victims of child trafficking.
GRETA recommends providing further training and guidance to law enforcement officers and legal professionals on the application of the non-punishment provision in order to “address the subtle ways by which victims can be compelled to commit offences” [253].
The publication of the report comes on the same day as the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, Eleanor Lyons, warned that the Government’s current response to modern slavery is “no longer sufficient”.
According to the Commissioner’s report, referrals into the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) reached 23,411 in 2025 — the highest number on record and a 22% increase from 2024. The report also highlights a 54% rise in the sexual exploitation of British girls in the last five years, with children accounting for almost a third of NRM referrals in 2025.
The report warned that technology — including AI, cryptocurrencies, and online platforms — is accelerating and obscuring exploitation.
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