19 October 2026
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13 October 2026
The UK Human Rights Blog is moving to Substack.
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In the news
Proposed tightening of Article 8 under Immigration and Asylum Bill
On Thursday 8 October, the government published factsheets on the Immigration and Asylum Bill. The Bill is currently at the committee stage in the Commons. The factsheets set out the government’s view that the current immigration and asylum system is not fit to deal with “the sheer number of individuals that it is seeing today”, noting that over 460,000 people have claimed asylum in the UK since 2021.
The factsheet on Article 8 reform states that the government remains “committed to the ECHR” but believes that a “fundamental reset of the balance between Article 8 rights and the public interest” is needed. The factsheet explains the broad ways in which the Bill seeks to “reform” the application of Article 8 in immigration cases.
However, if passed into law, the proposed changes will take effect through amendments to Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and will thus merely be matters to which courts must “have regard” (section 117A(2) of the 2002 Act). On current authority, this means that the new provisions will have no effect to the extent that they require decision-makers and courts to determine Article 8 claims inconsistently with Article 8 itself (Rhuppiah v SSHD [2018] UKSC 58 at [49]).
Record terrorism arrests reported
New Home Office statistics also published on Tuesday 8 October show record numbers of terrorism-related arrests in the year to June 2026. The total number of such arrests was 3,867 up from 234 in the previous year – a rise of 1,553%. The increase can be attributed to the proscription of Palestine Action on 5 July 2025 and the large numbers of people who publicly declared their support for the group in the wake of that decision. 94% of all terrorism arrests in the year were linked to support for Palestine Action. At the date of reporting, only 704 arrests (18%) had resulted in a charge, including 634 linked to Palestine Action support.
In the courts
Honours forfeiture recommendation is justiciable
In R (Baron Ranger) v Prime Minister [2026] EWHC 2466 (Admin), the High Court held that a recommendation that an honour be forfeit is open to challenge by way of judicial review.
Proceedings and background
The Claimant’s CBE was revoked by HM The King in October 2024. This step was taken on the advice of the Prime Minister after a recommendation by the Honours Forfeiture Committee. The Claimant challenges that decision on common law grounds and grounds under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). In her judgment handed down on Tuesday 6 October, Lieven J dealt with the preliminary issue of whether, in principle, judicial review may lie in respect of a decision to recommend forfeiture of an honour. The sole question for the court at this stage was whether such decisions were “entirely non-justiciable”, i.e. whether or not they could be challenged on any grounds ([3]-[4] and [50])
In the GCHQ case [1985] 1 AC 374, Lord Roskill identified “the grant of honours”, among other exercises of prerogative power, as non-justiciable on the basis of having a “nature and subject matter … such as not to be amenable to the judicial process” (p 417). However, this reference to honours was obiter and it was not argued that the court was bound by it (see [24] and [79]). R v SSHD, Ex p Bentley [1994] QB 349 confirmed the point. In that case, the Divisional Court allowed a challenge to an exercise of the prerogative of mercy, another area of non-justiciability previously identified by Lord Roskill.
It followed that the question for the High Court was res integra, although Lord Roskill’s view had recently been approved by the Scottish Court of Session, Inner House. That court held in Senior-Milne v AG for Scotland [2020] CSIH 39 that a decision to grant or withhold an honour could not be subjected to judicial review, using an analogy with a decision whether or not to make a gift to illustrate that no legal rights or legitimate expectations arose (see [19]).
Decision and reasoning
Notwithstanding the persuasive authority of Senior-Milne, the judge concluded that the decision to recommend forfeiture was, in principle, open to judicial review. The case law since GCHQ revealed the continuing existence of a principle of non-justiciability in respect of: (i) matters falling beyond the “constitutional competence” of the courts under the separation of powers (paradigmatically, transactions of foreign states and proceedings in Parliament); and (ii) decisions that do not affect private legal rights or duties, do not raise reviewable matters of public law, and on which no other justiciable issues turn (Shergill v Khaira [2014] UKSC 33 at [41]-[43]).
The judge held that neither category applied in the present case. The decision to recommend forfeiture of an honour did not fall within the paradigm examples of the first category ([69]). As for the second category, a justiciable issue did turn on the decision. Public guidance assured that the decision would be taken in accordance with a clearly defined procedure. This pointed towards an apparent procedural legitimate expectation that the publicised process would be followed ([71]). Also relevant to the principle of legitimate expectations was the judge’s view that revoking an honour was different from not granting one. Revocation had “significant detrimental consequences for the individual”, being “a highly public decision, which by its nature is likely to attract wide-ranging comment”, unlike the private decision not to confer an honour in the first place ([76]).
On the face of it, this reasoning was sufficient to deal with the preliminary issue. If a justiciable claim could be brought on the basis of a procedural legitimate expectation, that showed a decision to recommend forfeiture of an honour was not entirely insulated from judicial review. However, the judge went further in her reasoning, indicating that a more substantive challenge might also lie based on the application of the forfeiture criteria and the exercise of judgment involved in doing so. Crucially, the judge explains that the forfeiture decision is made by “applying criteria, which are capable of largely objective analysis … The decision is not one of purely discretionary judgment, but rather the application of criteria of a nature which courts are very familiar with considering” ([72]). And in addition:
“There are moral and ethical judgments to be made in the decision whether to revoke an honour, but these are no different to many decisions that are amenable to judicial review. It may well be that a court would find that the Defendant has a broad margin of appreciation in making such determinations. But that is a matter for a subsequent stage … Further, those moral and ethical considerations are outlined in the guidance and therefore are now made in a structured context” ([75]).
This further line of reasoning suggests that the decision to recommend forfeiture has been sufficiently codified that it may in itself raise reviewable matters of public law, rather than being a decision that can be brought within the cognisance of the court only so far as a legitimate expectation, or other secondary justiciable issue, attaches to it.
Justiciability under the HRA
As for the question of justiciability under the HRA, the judge concluded that there was no barrier to bringing the human rights claim in light of the common law challenge being justiciable ([90]). The judge declined to assess whether the HRA challenge could be independently justiciable, as this would require an impossible counter-factual assessment on the premise that the common law position were not as she had found it to be ([92]-[93]).
On Law Pod UK and the UKHRB
12 October 2026
In Episode 245, Environmental expert David Hart KC talks to Sir Richard Macrory, author and editor of the recent book “EU Environmental Policy and Law: Reflections at 50.” They discuss the role of the Office of Environmental Protection, the difficulties of enforcement, issues of standing here and in the EU, and to what extent the role of the EU Commission as an environmental enforcement body could be reinforced by something like the OEP in member states of the EU.
The UK Human Rights Blog is moving to Substack.
From 19th October, all new articles will be published exclusively on our Substack, and no new content will appear on our current website.
To stay up to date with our latest articles and insights, please subscribe here: https://substack.com/@ukhumanrightsblog
9 October 2026
The UK Human Rights Blog is moving to Substack.
From 19th October, all new articles will be published exclusively on our Substack, and no new content will appear on our current website.
To stay up to date with our latest articles and insights, please subscribe here: https://substack.com/@ukhumanrightsblog
The following piece was also posted here on 1 Crown Office Row’s Quarterly Medical Law Review
Birmingham Community Healthcare NHS Trust v Ibrahim [2026] EWHC 2468 (KB)
In Ibrahim, Mr Justice Soole upheld a Judge’s decision that the Defendant Trust had breached the Claimant’s rights under Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) when it failed to adopt an alternative procedure for dispensing Codeine outside of daylight hours during Ramadan in 2019. In reality, the Trust’s arguments were completely undermined by the fact that no one had actually thought about the issue at the time.
Background
The Claimant was a Muslim prisoner. The Trust was responsible for providing primary healthcare at the prison. The Claimant was prescribed Codeine. This was provided each day under supervision at a medicine hatch. The hatch operated during fixed hours each morning and afternoon. Generally, there was no system for providing medication under supervision outside those hours. There were, however, separate arrangements in certain other circumstances, such as prisoners arriving at the prison late in the evening.
Unless exempt, Muslims are required to fast during daylight hours throughout the month of Ramadan. This includes not consuming oral medication. In 2019, the hatch opening times were during daylight hours. The arrangements ultimately put in place by the Trust were that the Claimant was temporarily prescribed alternative painkillers during Ramadan which he was permitted to take in his cell, rather than under supervision at the hatch. The Judge found as fact that the temporary use of these alternative painkillers had no adverse impact on the Claimant.
The claims were for an unlawful interference with the right to respect for private life under Article 8 ECHR; an unlawful interference with the right to manifest religious beliefs under Article 9 ECHR; and unlawful discrimination on the grounds of religion in violation of Article 14 ECHR, when read with Articles 8 and 9 ECHR. It is unclear why no discrimination claim was brought under the Equality Act 2010.
Judgment below
His Honour Judge Najib held that Articles 8 and 9 ECHR were engaged but not violated. The Claimant was able to and in fact did fast throughout Ramadan. He was provided with alternative medication which, ultimately, had no adverse effect. There was no challenge to these findings on appeal.
However, the Judge also held that there was a breach of Article 14 ECHR. He identified the questions to be asked as set out by Baroness Hale in R (Stott) v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] UKSC 59 at [207]:
Question two was not disputed: the ground was religion. On the other issues, the Judge held that: i) the treatment complained of fell within the ambit of Articles 8 and 9 ECHR – there was a “more than merely tenuous connection” [39]; ii) the Claimant’s situation was analogous to other prisoners who had been prescribed medication which could only be taken under supervision [51]; and iii) the failure to put in place alternative arrangements was not in pursuit of the legitimate aim of ensuring security and preventing the proliferation of opiate based and other controlled substances [68], but was instead due to an ‘apparent’ lack of resources and/or a need to prioritise limited resources [69] which was not made out on the facts [76]. As such, the Article 14 ECHR claim succeeded.
Appeal
The Trust’s appeal challenged the Judge’s conclusions on ‘ambit’ and ‘objective justification’ – i.e., the first and fourth of the Stott questions.
As to the ambit issue, the challenge “centred on the Judge’s finding of fact that Mr Ibrahim had not suffered withdrawal or any other adverse symptoms in consequence of not taking Codeine” [80]. Soole J rejected this argument for the following three reasons: firstly, ‘ambit’ and ‘interference’ are separate concepts – treatment can come within the ambit of an ECHR right even if that right is not violated [89]; secondly, the appropriate test is “whether the criticised measure or treatment has a more than merely tenuous connection to the core value(s) of a substantive Article” (emphasis added) [90]; and, thirdly, it is not necessary, for ‘ambit’ purposes, to establish that the relevant treatment had an adverse effect and the Judge was right to focus on the connection between the treatment complained of and the substantive ECHR rights [91]-[92].
The more substantial challenge was to the conclusion on objective justification. The Trust’s arguments all centred on the allocation of resources – that the Judge “failed to identify the allocation of scarce resources as a legitimate aim; and thus failed to take resources into account when considering proportionality” [105]. Moreover, to the extent that the Judge did consider the allocation of resources, he wrongly held that the Trust’s evidence that alternative procedures would have been impractical amounted to no more than a ‘bare assertion’ [97].
In rejecting these arguments, Soole J first sounded a warning against “the dangers of undue textual criticism” in the context of a necessarily lengthy judgment [106]. Giving a fair reading to the judgment as a whole, Soole J held that the Judge had indeed considered the allocation of resources. His rejection of this issue was based not on principle, but on the facts.
The reality was that no one had in fact turned their mind to the possibility of providing the Claimant with his medication by some alternative procedure. The evidence of Trust witnesses on resources and practicality “did not reflect the actual reasoning of anyone at the time”, but simply their beliefs that it would have been difficult if anyone had thought about it. This belief was itself “undermined” by the fact that alternative arrangements were made in other situations, e.g., for prisoners arriving at the prison late. In such circumstances, the Judge was entitled to conclude that the Trust’s evidence amounted to a ‘bare assertion’ and, in fact, it was “difficult to see how the Judge could have reached any other conclusion” [114].
It followed from this central finding that the resources had not formed any part of the Trust’s aim in not making alternative arrangements for the Claimant. As such, it was not necessary to consider proportionality but, had it been, the same finding of fact “would or should equally have compelled the conclusion that the test of proportionality was not met” [125].
Comment
There are some useful illustrations of principle in Soole J’s judgment, particularly on the ‘ambit’ issue. Firstly, that the appropriate test is whether the criticised measure or treatment has a “more than merely tenuous connection” to the core value(s) of a substantive ECHR Article. Secondly, that it is not necessary to establish that the relevant treatment had any adverse effect.
However, this was a case where “the very particular facts and circumstances” [126] carried the day. In some ways, this counted against the Claimant. The Article 8 and 9 ECHR claims were dismissed on the basis that the Claimant had been able to fast and did not experience any real issues as a result of temporarily not taking Codeine or having to take an alternative painkiller. The position would inevitably be very different if a Muslim prisoner was receiving some other medication such that this would have been a problem – i.e., so that they would effectively need to choose between their religion and their health.
The central finding of fact though was the “overall failure by anyone to apply their mind to [the issue]” [118]. The practical lesson for institutions is that it will be very difficult to justify discriminatory treatment as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, if the legitimate aim has been retrospectively manufactured. Before the question of whether issues of practicality and resources might amount to a legitimate aim in principle, there is the preliminary question of whether such issues were in fact the reason for the discriminatory treatment. If, in reality, the reason was simply that no one thought about it, then evidence of hypothetical impracticality or resource constraints is unlikely to carry much weight. Had the Trust taken even some perfunctory steps to investigate whether alternative arrangements would have been feasible, it seems likely that it would have been given a reasonably wide margin of appreciation. However, having taken none, it was “in an inherently weak position on its margin of appreciation” [121]. A further practical point is that, where a claim relates to a failure to make an exception, then other exceptions – such as for late-arriving prisoners in this case – are likely to carry significant weight and will need to be carefully explained.
Lance Baynham is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row.
3 October 2026
The UK Human Rights Blog is moving to Substack.
From 19th October, all new articles will be published exclusively on our Substack, and no new content will appear on our current website.
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In the news
At the Labour Party conference, ministers affirmed their support for the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Chris Bryant, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, promised to “stand by” the ECHR, contrasting the Labour Party’s position with that of Nigel Farage and Kemi Badenoch, whom he warned would “bin” the ECHR if elected. Meanwhile, justice minister Jake Richards told Labour members that the party was “absolutely committed” to the ECHR, as reported by the Law Society Gazette. He went on to describe the ECHR as a “living instrument”, noting that the Government should continue to play a role in reforming the treaty.
Speaking at the Labour party conference on Monday, Shabana Mahmood, Home Secretary, announced that the UK Resettlement Route would reopen, in partnership with the United Nations Refugee Agency and the International Refugee Assistance Project. The Home Secretary said that around one in four referrals will be for Afghan women and girls and Palestinian refugees.
On Thursday, the Home Office confirmed the closure of the ‘one in, one out’ pilot scheme with France. Under the ‘Agreement on the Prevention of Dangeround Journeys’, ratified in August 2025, any asylum seeker who had crossed the Channel unlawfully could be returned back to France. There was also a provision for “reciprocal admittance”, whereby an asylum seeker in France who had a genuine family link to someone in the UK and had not attempted to enter the UK unlawfully, would be allowed to enter the UK.
In other news
In the courts
Coelho, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 1219
On Monday, the Court of Appeal unanimously ruled that procedural fairness does not require that a person who is the subject of competing requests for extradition should have the right to make representations to the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“the SSHD”) before a priority decision is taken. While Andrews LJ acknowledged that fairness usually dictates that a person should be afforded the opportunity to make representations before a decision that will affect them is taken by a public body, she held that s. 179 of the Extradition Act 2003 displaced that right by necessary implication [68].
The case concerned Diogo Santos Coelho, a 26-year-old Portuguese national, who was the subject of competing extradition requests from the USA and Portugal relating to his alleged control and administration of RaidForums, a website which distributed hacked personal data to facilitate fraudulent activity [2-3].
The central issue before the Court was whether Mr Coelho was entitled to raise the potential human rights implications of extradition to the USA before the SSHD took the priority decision. Mr Coelho had been assessed as being at ‘extremely high risk’ of suicide should he be extradited to the USA [8]. The Court also heard that he would not have access to the same support in the USA as a victim of modern slavery as there is in Portugal, because the USA is not a party to the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings [73].
Mr Coelho’s conviction in Portugal shortly after the appeal hearing constituted a material change in circumstances, requiring the SSHD to take a fresh decision. Nevertheless, Andrews LJ handed down judgment, noting that the appeal “raises important issues of principle which are likely to arise in other cases” [12].
The Court found that the SSHD is under no legal obligation to receive or to take into account representations from the subject of the extradition requests, before making a priority decision under s. 179 of the Extradition Act 2003 [105].
Instead, the SSHD is concerned to ensure that the decision best reflects the UK’s obligations under the two rival Treaties and the policy of seeking to ensure that requested persons face justice with minimum delay [83].
AndrewsLJ noted that “the interests of the individual are conspicuous by their absence” in s. 179 of the Extradition Act 2003, and are “catered for elsewhere within the extradition process” [83].
On the UKHRB, Dr Lewis Graham discusses the latest Supreme Court ruling on the compatibility of child sentencing with the European Convention on human rights
On Law Pod UK, Rosalind English discusses the application of AI to medical devices with Robert Kellar KC and Marcus Coates-Walker of 1 Crown Office Row: AI in healthcare: who will be liable when things go wrong?
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