The Weekly Round Up: Abortion Convictions, Jury Trial, Persecution, and Modern Slavery
21 April 2026
In the news
Historic abortion convictions to be expunged
On Tuesday, the House of Commons approved an amendment to the Crime and Policing Bill under which women convicted of historic abortion offences will be pardoned and have their criminal records expunged. The amendment was originally proposed in the House of Lords to complement the bill’s provision to decriminalise abortions by women acting in relation to their own pregnancies.
Bar Council publishes paper criticising jury curtailment proposals
As the Courts and Tribunals Bill continues its committee stage, the Bar Council has published a 31-page polemic by Geoffrey Robertson KC attacking the government’s proposals to limit jury trials.
Robertson argues that the proposals will not clear the criminal courts backlog and may worsen delays. He points to time being taken up on novel pre-trial allocation proceedings and on judges retiring to produce reasoned judgments.
Robertson also contends that the proposals overlook the constitutional significance of a jury’s power to show mercy and acquit on conscientious grounds. He positions this as a crucial safeguard against injustice and draconianism – a ‘proud boast of British justice’.
Concluding, he writes:
‘The proposed reforms take the axe to a substantial proportion of jury trials (half at a rough estimate), disadvantaging not only defendants but all who are proud of the way in which justice has been delivered, through majority deliberation of a dozen community representatives, more in touch with current values than judges or magistrates and able, in their own way, to show mercy when the law does not allow for it.’
In the courts
Assessing persecution under the Refugee Convention
Dismissing an appeal against refusal of a protection claim, the Court of Appeal has reiterated that the question whether an asylum-seeker has a well-founded fear of persecution is ‘acutely fact-sensitive’. The court also echoed previous cautions against overly ‘forensic’ reasons challenges. The case is MN (Vietnam) v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 485.
The appellant (MN) was a Vietnamese national. In 2014, he attended a demonstration in Ho Chi Minh. On his account, he was arrested by police, beaten, charged with attending an illegal demonstration, and returned to his home area. Once there, the authorities told him that he was on a blacklist and would be watched.
Later that year, MN entered the UK using a business visa and overstayed. He sought to avoid removal by claiming entitlement to refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention on the basis that he had a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ if returned to Vietnam. The Secretary of State rejected his claim. The First Tier Tribunal (FTT) and the Upper Tribunal (UT) rejected his appeals.
On his further appeal to the Court of Appeal, MN argued that the FTT judge, whose reasoning and conclusions were adopted by the UT, had: (i) failed to make proper findings about, and failed properly to assess, MN’s ill-treatment in 2014; and (ii) operated on the mistaken basis that ill-treatment must be ‘systematic’ to constitute persecution.
The court rejected both arguments. As to the first, the judge had clearly accepted all aspects of MN’s evidence about what happened to him in Vietnam and was not required to repeat every detail in his conclusions ([38]). The judge had also accepted evidence of intolerance of protests and action taken by the Vietnamese authorities to suppress state opposition ([41]).
As to the second argument, the court rejected the contention that, by using the word ‘systematic’, the judge had been applying an erroneous threshold test. This was an ‘overly forensic scrutiny or dissection’ of the judge’s language ([46]). Stating that MN would not be subjected to ‘persistent or systematic’ ill-treatment was simply a way of reiterating that MN was not likely to face adverse interest from the authorities upon his return.
Although it was true in law that a single episode of ill-treatment could amount to persecution, this was an ‘acutely fact-sensitive’ evaluation ([47]). Thus, despite the acknowledged possibility that MN might face a further beating, the judge was not prevented from concluding that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution, taking the circumstances in the round.
Determining whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking
In R (CGW) v SSHD [2026] EWHC 858 (Admin), the High Court has criticised an apparent understanding among Home Office officials about the level of detail required to meet the standard of proof as to whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking.
The claimant for judicial review (CGW) arrived in the UK on a small boat in 2021. His account was that, while in asylum accommodation, he was approached by some men who purported to offer him work. He was then transported to a series of indoor cannabis farms where he was held against his will, beaten, and forced to tend the cannabis plants. He was eventually found by police, who referred him to the Home Office to assess whether he was a victim of human trafficking.
The Home Office’s Immigration Enforcement Competent Authority eventually took a negative ‘conclusive grounds’ decision to the effect that CGW was not a victim of human trafficking. CGW challenged this decision from multiple angles, including that the decision-maker had failed to give legally adequate reasons.
The Deputy Judge accepted this ground of challenge, holding that the purported reasons were ‘plainly deficient’ ([24]) and simply did ‘not provide rational justification for the conclusions reached’ ([25]). There were two fatal problems:
- the reasons were ultimately bare conclusions because they stated that there was ‘insufficient’ information for a positive decision but did not explain why; and
- the reasons were non sequiturs because CGW’s account of what happened to him appeared sufficient and the decision did not say that his account was not credible.
The Deputy Judge also responded to his impression that Home Office officials were taking ‘conclusive grounds’ decisions on the understanding that a person will not meet the required standard of proof unless they have provided ‘detailed’ information about their exploitation.
This approach was ‘legally wrong’. The decision-maker was simply required to determine on the balance of probabilities whether the individual was a victim of human trafficking or slavery, basing that decision on the totality of the evidence available, including any circumstantial evidence. There was no minimum requirement as to the level of detail that an individual had to provide ([30(2)-(3)]).
Upcoming ICLQ Annual Lecture, 12th May 2026
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly Annual Lecture will be taking place on Tuesday 12th May, at 17:30 to 19:30, followed by a reception or online via Zoom.
The lecture will be delivered by Dr Sofia Galani on ‘Human Rights Obligations in Maritime Search and Rescue’, based on her article which was recently published in ICLQ vol. 74(1).
More information on the event can be found here.
