Rethinking fatherhood and parental responsibility: Re J, Re M and Re P (Parental Responsibility) [2026] EWCA Civ 344
9 April 2026
By Emily Higlett and Sophia Pascoe
Introduction
The Court of Appeal in Re J, Re M and Re P (Parental Responsibility) [2026] EWCA Civ 344 has provided authoritative guidance on a fundamental question in family law: whether a person who is not a child’s biological father can acquire parental responsibility by being named on the birth certificate. The court firmly answered that question in the negative, clarifying the meaning of “father” under the Children Act 1989 and resolving a line of inconsistent first instance decisions.
Definitions
Parental responsibility: the ability and duty to make decisions about a child, including medical and educational decisions.
Psychological/social parent: a parent who has behaved as a father (i.e. undertaking the duties and responsibilities of one) but is not the biological father.
Declaration of parentage: an order under s55A of the Family Law Act 1986 declaring whether someone is a parent.
Background
The court heard three linked appeals concerning men who had been registered as “father” on a child’s birth certificate but were either shown not to be the biological father (Re J and Re M) or could not be proven to be so (Re P). In each case, the individual had acted as a psychological or social parent and had assumed that they held parental responsibility.
The central issue across the appeals was whether registration as “father” under section 4(1)(a) Children Act 1989 is sufficient to confer parental responsibility, even where the individual is not, the child’s biological father.
The statutory framework
Section 4(1) Children Act 1989 provides that an unmarried father acquires parental responsibility if, among other routes, he is registered as the child’s father on the birth certificate. However, the Act does not define “father.” The question for the court was whether this term should be interpreted broadly, to include social and psychological fathers, or in accordance with its common law meaning.
The decision
The Court of Appeal (Sir Andrew McFarlane P, King LJ, and Stuart-Smith LJ) held that the term “father” in the Children Act 1989 bears its common law meaning, namely the child’s biological or genetic father. It does not extend to a social or psychological parent.
Critically, the court held that registration on a birth certificate does not create legal fatherhood, nor does it itself confer parental responsibility. Rather, it is merely evidence of parentage, which may later be displaced. As Peter Jackson LJ had previously observed in P v Q and F [2024] EWCA Civ 878, legal parentage “does not spring from registration”.
On this basis, the court concluded that a person acquires parental responsibility under section 4(1)(a) only if two conditions are met (i) they are the child’s biological father; and (ii) they are registered as such. Where an individual is not the biological father, to be registered alone is insufficient. In such circumstances, parental responsibility is not acquired at all.
The court rejected the argument that parental responsibility could arise upon registration and later be “lost” following a declaration of non-paternity. Instead, it held that where the individual is not the father, parental responsibility had never legally been in place. As such, there is no need for a court order to terminate it.
Application to the appeals
In Re J, the appellant had believed himself to the child’s father at the time of registration, but DNA testing later proved otherwise. The court held that he had never acquired parental responsibility, notwithstanding the genuine mistake.
In Re M, the appellant had been registered as the father following conception using donor sperm. Again, the court held that he was not the biological father and therefore had never acquired parental responsibility, even though the parties had intended him to be treated as such.
Re P presented a more complex scenario. The child’s father was known to be one of two identical twins, but it was impossible to establish which. One twin had been registered as the father. The court held that neither twin could be legally recognised as the father on the evidence provided. However, because it could not be proved that the registered twin was not the father, his name could not be removed from the birth certificate. To resolve the resulting uncertainty, the court exercised its powers under section 4(2A) Children Act 1989 to discharge any parental responsibility that he may have held.
Human Rights – Article 8
At [52], arguments were made on behalf of the applicant in Re J that not giving the ‘father’ parental responsibility would interfere with his right to family life, as he’d been acting as the social father. Arguments on behalf of the Secretary of State, ultimately adopted in the judgment, held that because one can gain parental responsibility through a child arrangements order, this was not the case [72].
Significance
The decision establishes a clear rule: biological fatherhood is a prerequisite for acquiring parental responsibility under section 4 Children Act 1989. Registration on a birth certificate, while practically important, does not create legal status.
The judgment also underscores the importance of legal certainty and truth in matters of parentage. As the court emphasised, the statutory scheme is designed to provide clarity as to who holds parental responsibility and expanding the definition of “father” to include social or psychological parents would introduce uncertainty.
At the same time, the court acknowledged that individuals who have acted as a child’s parent are not without remedy. Such persons may obtain parental responsibility through alternative routes, most notably via child arrangements orders under section 8 and section 12 Children Act 1989.
Conclusion
Re J, Re M and Re P provides clarity on the relationship between biological parentage, birth registration and parental responsibility. The Court of Appeal has confirmed that, absent specific statutory provision, legal fatherhood remains rooted in biology. Registration may evidence intention to be a social father, but it does not create parental responsibility without a biological connection. Therefore, parental responsibility under section 4 does not arise.
Emily Higlett and Sophia Pascoe are pupil barristers at 1 Crown Office Row, Brighton.
