Chief Constable in contempt: Buzzard-Quashie v CC of Northamptonshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 1397
8 December 2025
By Kian Leong Tan
INTRODUCTION
In Buzzard-Quashie v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 1397, the Court of Appeal has helpfully restated the law on (civil) contempt of court. The decision – arising out of a longstanding refusal by the Northamptonshire police force (“the police force”) to comply with orders from the Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”) and the courts to release footage from officers’ body-worn cameras (“BWV”) – also affirms the liability of a chief constable for the acts and omissions of their subordinates.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND THE LAW
On 3 September 2021, Ms Buzzard-Quashie (“the Claimant”) was arrested by three officers from the police force. She alleged that she was physically assaulted during the arrest, having been thrown to the ground and having had her face pushed into stinging nettles. She complained of the assault in a phone call on 6 September 2021 to a police officer, who accessed and narrated video footage of the incident over the phone to her. The Claimant asked for the footage to be preserved and took various steps to obtain it.
The Claimant originally made data access and subject matter requests directly to the police force, who refused her requests. Dissatisfied, she made a data protection complaint to the ICO, who issued a decision on 1 April 2022 upholding her complaint and requiring the police force to disclose all her personal data as soon as possible. Some piecemeal disclosure of BWV was then made, but these clips did not fully reflect the Claimant’s recollection of the arrest.
On 30 August 2022, the Claimant brought a claim against the Defendant Chief Constable for breach of statutory duty under the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”). In April 2023, the Defendant was ordered to (i) disclose any and all relevant footage of the arrest within 28 days, and if applicable, (ii) provide a statement from an officer of Inspector rank or above, explaining what footage (if any) was not available or undisclosable. The Defendant failed to comply at all with the judgment order. A DVD was produced for the Claimant which contained five further video clips, but in a format she could not access.
On 2 June 2023, the Claimant, representing herself, made an application for contempt against the Defendant for non-compliance with the April 2023 order. At a case management hearing, counsel for the Defendant (responding to a question from the judge) indicated that it was their position that all relevant video footage had been disclosed to the Claimant. In a subsequent witness statement by an in-house solicitor for the police force (filed some two months late), the Defendant stated that a full search of the police force archives had already been carried out, and all footage had been already disclosed to the Claimant.
The Claimant’s contempt application was dismissed after a hearing on the basis that (i) she had failed to establish that the Defendant was in contempt; and (ii) there were various “impediments” to the application, such as the lack of penal notice on the April 2023 order, the fact that the Defendant was not personally responsible for the acts/omissions of the police force, and there had been no deliberate intention on his part not to comply with the order.
Undeterred, the Claimant appealed to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the judge had failed to distinguish between what was needed to make a finding of contempt versus the sanction to be imposed. It was at this stage that the Claimant also obtained pro bono representation. Permission to appeal was granted in January 2025. In June 2025, the Defendant unsuccessfully applied to adduce a witness statement purporting to explain that the unavailable footage had been “automatically deleted”.
The Claimant’s tireless pursuit would eventually be vindicated on the eve of trial. On 10 and 15 October 2025, the Defendant applied to adduce two further witness statements from the same in-house solicitor, showing that the position taken up until this point was factually wrong. Prompted by enquiries by the Claimant’s lawyers, the police force had finally carried out a search which identified the existence of video clips which had never been disclosed to the Claimant. By the morning of the hearing – under the supervision of counsel for the Defendant – the police force conceded that there were at least three clips, and possibly more, which were undisclosed. As the Court of Appeal excoriatingly noted, “the type of search and explanation ordered [in April 2023] was finally being done” ([38]). In light of this, the Defendant finally admitted contempt.
DECISION
Notwithstanding that the changed factual scenario meant the Claimant’s appeal would have succeeded in any event, the Court of Appeal chose to address the legal issues arising out of it.
At the outset, the Court of Appeal noted the crucial role played by BWV for both protecting police officers and citizens: “in terms of accountability, transparency and recording what has in fact occurred on any particular occasion”: [10]. It followed that matters relating to the retention and production (or deletion and refusal thereof) of such footage was of great importance.
Turning to the contempt jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal held that the judge had been wrong to find that specific intent to commit contempt was required for a finding of liability: [56]. As established in earlier authorities, there is a crucial distinction between (i) a finding of contempt (which merely requires a deliberate act/omission of non-compliance with a court order), and (ii) the imposition of a sanction (to which specific intent may be relevant): [58]. At that earlier stage, the court need only consider whether the alleged contemnor did something which they were prohibited from doing, or failed to do something which they were required to do; that they did so intentionally; and that they did so knowing that it would be in breach of a court order: [66]. There is no need for the breach to be “contumelious”, “deliberately insolent”, “wilful”, “rebellious” or otherwise to establish a finding of contempt: [74].
The judge had also erred by holding the Defendant was not responsible for acts/omissions of their subordinates. That liability arises a consequence of s 2(3) and Sch. 2, para. 2 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011: [76]-[77]. There is therefore no distinction between what the Chief Constable (personally) does, versus the acts of members of his police force. The contrary decision of Julian Knowles J in Paul Bush v CC of Northamptonshire [2024] EWHC 690 (KB) was therefore wrongly decided: [83].
Finally, the judge was also wrong to conclude that the absence of a penal notice in the April 2023 order precluded her from making a finding of contempt. The contempt jurisdiction is a cornerstone of the courts’ ability to safeguard the administration of justice: [95]. The judge’s reasoning would lead to the impermissible outcome that there are two types of orders: those with penal notices attached which must be complied with; and those without, where the court would have no power to sanction non-compliance: [84]. The inclusion of a penal notice is relevant only to sanction, not to any finding of contempt: [87].
CONCLUSION AND COMMENTARY
Since the handing down of the judgment, the police force has referred itself to the Independent Office of Police Conduct and has been fined £50,000. The Defendant has also apologised to the Claimant.
Ms Buzzard-Quashie’s remarkable determination and persistence have been rightly lauded by the Court of Appeal and commentators. It is all too easy to see, however, how a less well-informed or motivated individual (say, someone who was unaware of their rights under the DPA 2018; or who, intimidated by the prospect of long-running litigation, does not even issue proceedings at the County Court) might have given up well before taking the matter to the Court of Appeal. Indeed, had it not been for the Claimant’s pro bono representatives writing to retrieve audit logs from the police force leading to the discovery of the undisclosed BWV, the Court of Appeal would have been none the wiser as to the true state of affairs.
Stepping back, the temptation may be to treat Buzzard-Quashie as a shocking but isolated case of wrongdoing which has now been addressed. The better course of action, I venture, would be to confront the uncomfortable questions it poses for access to justice and accountability. How many others may exist in the Claimant’s position? Are they aware of their legal rights and remedies? How many of these claims end up being pursued in the absence of legal representation (pro bono or otherwise)? And – perhaps most importantly – how can the administrative justice system be improved to ensure that what has transpired in this case can be avoided?
Kian Leong Tan is a future pupil barrister at 5 Essex Chambers.
