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Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission
Four and a half years after Britain voted to leave the EU, and 12 months after Boris Johnson was elected Prime Minister with his ‘oven-ready’ Brexit deal, the UK and European Union finally concluded a trade agreement on Christmas Eve. The deal, yet to be ratified by Parliament, is expected to gain approval without difficulty on 30th December, with the Leader of the Opposition, Keir Starmer, whipping his MPs to approve it. So did this deal supply the Christmas joy we’ve been missing in 2020? What does the deal contain?
The Christmas decorations at Middle Temple. Photo by the author.
This time last year I wrote that 2019 had been “perhaps the most tumultuous period in British politics for decades”. Little did I know what 2020 would have in store.
The Covid-19 pandemic has caused loss, suffering and anxiety across not only the UK but almost all of the globe. At the UK Human Rights Blog, we feel deep gratitude to the doctors, nurses, carers and essential workers who have kept society going in what has been a deeply difficult year for so many of us.
In light of this, it is perhaps harder to summon the usual festive spirit that graces the approach of the holiday period — particularly as so many of us will be separated from our loved ones. And yet, perhaps it makes holding onto some spirit of joy all the more necessary.
Writing the article summing up the legal developments of the year is one of the highlights for me as commissioning editor of this blog. Let us embark together on a tour of what the courts had to say over the last 12 months. As ever, it has been a very interesting year.
R (Finch) v. Surrey County Council et al [2020] EWHC 3559 (QB) – read judgment
Environmental Impact Assessment or EIA is the process by which a developer and a planning authority look at whether a particular project is likely to have significant direct or indirect effects on the environment. And an EIA must address a factors such as human health, biodiversity, land, water and climate as well as cultural heritage and landscape.
But how far does the enquiry have to go? This is the very stark question raised by this planning case.
The developer wanted to drill oil from the Horse Hill site in Surrey (see pic) for a production period of 20 years. The crude oil thus won would be tankered offsite for refining by others. The refined product would probably be used for transportation, but also for heat, manufacturing and in the petrochemical industry.
The issue was whether the local authority could stop its EIA lines of enquiry when it had considered the setting up works and the oil production processes, or whether it had to assess the wider climate change implications of long-term use of the oil so produced.
The judge, Holgate J was firmly of the view that the assessment process was limited to the first. Surrey’s EIA process was thus sufficient.
What’s a judge to do when the Magna Carta/Freeman on the Land crew threaten you with hanging and start menacing court clerks as well?
As Rosalind English noted in a previous post, Canada’s latest Freemen judicial decisions in AVI and MHVB and Jacqueline Robinson (I and II) have had to answer those pointed questions.
Rosalind’s note canvassed the first decision by Justice Robert Graesser of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench calling out the actions of Jacqueline Robinson who had inserted herself into a high-conflict child custody case with disastrous results for the mother she was ‘helping’. Robinson’s efforts included invoking Article 61 of the 1215 Magna Carta despite it having been repealed some 800 years previous and a demand for the return of the mother’s “property” (read ‘child’). With Robinson’s Magna Carta Lawful Rebellion help, the mother went from having shared child access to no access and being removed as a guardian.
R (o.t.a Friends of the Earth et al) v. Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52 – read judgment
In February 2020, the Court of Appeal decided that the Government policy on airport expansion at Heathrow was unlawful on climate change grounds. The Supreme Court has now reversed this decision.
The policy decision under challenge was an Airports National Policy Statement (ANPS). An NPS sets the fundamental framework within which further planning decisions will be taken. So, in traditional terms, it is not a planning permission; that would come later, via, in this case, the mechanism of a Development Consent Order (DCO), which examines the precise scheme that is proposed. The ANPS (like any NPS) narrows the debate at the DCO stage. Objectors cannot say, for example, that the increase in capacity could better be achieved at Gatwick. Government policy has already decided it shouldn’t be.
The ANPS was made in 2018 by the Secretary of State for Transport (Chris Grayling), after many years of commissions and debates about airport expansion.
The other major policy player in this litigation was the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. This was concluded in December 2015, and was ratified by the UK on 17 November 2016. The Paris Agreement commits parties to restrict temperature rise to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.
The UK’s domestic climate change legislation derives from the Climate Change Act 2008. The Planning Act 2008 (setting out the NPS system) required government in a given NPS (a) to explain how it takes account of its policy on climate change (s.5(8)) and (b) to exercise its NPS functions with regard to the desirability of mitigating and adapting to climate change (s.10).
The challenges debated in the Supreme Court revolved around (1) these two sections of the PA 2008, (2) a debate about the impact of the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (2011/92/EU), and (3) claims that the SoS has failed to take into account long-term (post-2050) and non-CO2 emissions.
One curious element of this appeal is that it was Hamlet without the Prince. After seeking to defend the case in the CA, the SoS did not appear in the SC, where Heathrow did all the running. Whether this non-appearance by the SoS was anything to do with the Honourable Member for Hillingdon’s undertaking (Boris Johnson MP) some years ago to lie in front of the bulldozers before the third runway was laid is of course unknowable. But as we shall see, this did not stop Heathrow’s arguments winning the day. So, possibly, central government’s policy objective achieved without political risk.
DPP v M [2020] EWHC 3422 (Admin) (15 December 2020) — judgment here
On 15 December 2020, the High Court ruled that a positive conclusive grounds decisions by the Single Competent Authority (“SCA”) that a defendant was a victim of trafficking and modern slavery was admissible evidence in a criminal trial where the defendant raises the defence in s.45 Modern Slavery Act 2015 (“MSA 2015”) that the act took place by reason of slavery or exploitation.
BACKGROUND
M was a 15-year-old boy with no history of offending. On 16 May 2019, he was at a KFC in Tooting, an area of London to which he had he had no connection, along with two other boys (MP and KM) who were known by police to be gang members and habitual knife carriers. When the group were searched by police officers, M had 5 wraps of cocaine, 2 wraps of diamorphine (heroin) and a hunting knife in his possession.
On 23 May 2019, M was referred to the National Referral Mechanism (“NRM”) by Lewisham Children’s Social Care. On 21 August 2019 the Single Competent Authority (“SCA”) made a positive conclusive grounds decision that, on a balance of probabilities, M had been recruited, harboured and transported for the purposes of criminal exploitation.
The Attorney General, Suella Braverman MP, appeared for the Crown in this appeal
R v Long, Bowers and Cole [2020] EWCA Crim 1729 (16 December 2020) — judgment here
The Court of Appeal held yesterday morning that the sentences of the three men responsible for the manslaughter of PC Harper in 2019 were neither ‘unduly lenient’ nor ‘manifestly excessive’. The Court rejected applications from both the Defendants and the Attorney General (AG), meaning there will be no substantive change to the manslaughter sentences passed at first instance. The Court also refused to grant permission to two of the co-defendants to appeal against their convictions.
BACKGROUND
The case concerned the killing of PC Andrew Harper which in August 2019. PC Harper was killed as he tried to apprehend the three defendants, all part of a group of thieves in the process of stealing a quad bike. As the defendants made off at speed in a car driven by the first Defendant (Henry Long), PC Harper was caught and dragged for more than a mile behind the car.
Long (18 at the time, now 19) alongside co-defendants Albert Bowers (17 now 18) and Jessie Cole (17 now 18), were jointly charged with conspiracy to steal, murder and manslaughter. In the lead-up to trial, all three pleaded guilty to the conspiracy to steal, and Long pleaded guilty to manslaughter. On 24 July 2020, after a 5-week trial at the Central Criminal Court, all three were acquitted of murder, but Bowers and Cole were found to be guilty of manslaughter.
The outcome means that, whilst the jury could be sure that PC Harper died as a consequence of the unlawful acts of the Defendants, they could not be sure that the Defendants actually intended to kill anyone, or to cause anyone really serious harm. In this instance, it means that the jury will have had at least some reasonable doubt as to whether the Defendants knew that they were dragging PC Harper behind them as they drove away.
On 31 July 2020, Long received an extended determinate sentence of 16 years with an extended licence period of 3 years. Bowers and Cole were sentenced to 13 years detention in a Young Offenders Institution. Concurrent sentences were imposed in respect of the conspiracy to steal (32 months for Long, and 38 months for Bowers and Cole).
THE COURT OF APPEAL
There were three applications before the Court of Appeal:
Bowers and Cole applied for leave to appeal against their convictions of the offence of manslaughter;
The Attorney-General (“AG”) applied for leave to refer the sentences arguing that all three were unduly lenient; and
All three defendants sought leave to appeal their respective sentences.
This is the second of two posts by David Gollancz, a barrister at Keating Chambers and donor-conceived adult, about the UK system of birth registration and certification. The first post concerned the treatment of transgender parents. This second post deals with the position of the offspring of gamete donation.
In two recent claims by trans parents, JK and TT/McConnell, the court determined that the law requiring trans people to be registered as parents in their native gender interfered with their Article 8 ECHR rights to respect for their private and family life, but that the interference was justified under Article 8(2). A significant, possibly decisive, reason for the court’s decision was the right of the children concerned to identify their biological ascendants. – described by the judge in JK [109] as “an important element of his or her fundamental identity”.
This is nothing new. The ECtHR has repeatedly emphasised that Article 8 includes the right to establish identity and, accordingly, the right to know the identity of one’s biological ascendants (Mikulić [53], Jäggi [37 – 38], Godelli [52]). The domestic court, in Rose [45] held (on the preliminary issue of whether Article 8 ECHR was engaged) that
Respect for private and family life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings. This includes their origins and the opportunity to understand them.
But where a person is conceived in a UK licensed fertility clinic (a “clinic”) — like Mr McConnell’s son — their birth registration does not record, and their birth certificate does not disclose, the fact that they are donor-conceived, let alone the identity of their donor parent. Their donor’s identity is recorded by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (“HFEA”) (s31 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990). Since 1 April 2005, under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) Regulations 2004 (the “disclosure regulations”), a person aged 18 or over can require the HFEA to disclose whether they are donor-conceived and the identity of their donor (if the donor provided the relevant information after 31 March 2005). But that right is unlikely to be exercised unless someone tells them the truth, or it is obvious because their legal parents are of the same sex.
Freddy McConnell, who was unsuccessful in the courts in his attempt to be registered as the father or parent of his child. Image: The Guardian
This is the first of two posts by David Gollancz, a barrister at Keating Chambers and donor-conceived adult, about the UK system of birth registration and certification. This first post concerns the treatment of trans parents. The second post will deal with the position of the offspring of gamete donation.
In two recent applications for judicial review by trans parents, JK, discussed on the UK Human Rights Blog here and TT (McConnell in the Court of Appeal), discussed on the blog here and here, it was held that the current UK rules on birth registration, interpreted in light of ss9 and 12 Gender Recognition Act 2004 (the “GRA”), require a woman (JK) to be or remain registered as her children’s father and a man (McConnell) to be registered as his son’s mother. The requirement interfered with the Article 8 ECHR rights of the parents. In an echo of the ECtHR in Goodwin (see in particular [77]) the Court of Appeal said (McConnell [55])
… requiring a trans person to declare in a formal document that their gender is not their current gender but the gender assigned at birth …represents a significant interference with their sense of identity, which is an integral aspect of their right to respect for private life.
The requirement also interfered with the children’s rights. The registration of parents as “father” and “mother”, when the children in question knew them respectively as a woman and a man, would be at odds with their family relations and might create anxiety and tension. However children also have a countervailing right, to know the identity of their biological parents.
The defendant Registrar General (the “RG”) admitted the interference but argued that it was justified in the interests of maintaining an “administratively coherent system” of birth registration and to protect the child’s right to identify its biological father. Absent an ECtHR judgment directly on point or a common approach among the signatory states, the UK enjoyed a margin of appreciation. The interference was held to be justified.
At a “rolled up” hearing on both permission and substantive merits, a challenge was considered by the High Court to the decision of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (“FCO”) that Anne Sacoolas, the wife of a member of the US Government’s Technical and Administrative staff stationed at RAF Croughton, was entitled to diplomatic immunity from prosecution.
The challenge to this decision was dismissed on all grounds. However, permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal has been granted.
This was a busy week. It saw the beginning of a nationwide vaccine roll-out and protracted negotiations in Brussels to stave off a no-deal Brexit (which remains a ‘high probability’ according to the Prime Minister). It also saw the Government announce the appointment of retired Court of Appeal judge Sir Peter Gross to lead the review of the application of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the UK Courts. This review will look at the relationship between UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg; the impact of the Human Rights Act on the relationship between judiciary, executive, and Parliament; and the application of the Human Rights Act to actions taken outside the UK.
Moving to Brexit, the House of Lords voted on Monday to approve a Labour amendment to the Government’s Trade Bill. The amendment requires that Ministers undertake a human rights impact assessment for any trade deal, and must revoke an agreement in any case where potential genocide is found in a UK High Court ruling. The measure has been proposed in response to allegations that China is committing genocide against the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang province.
One question David didn’t go into occupies only two pages of the 183 paragraphs but is worth a post on its own. The claimant insurers argued that the defendant Secretary of State had unlawfully omitted to make regulations under the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997 that would have limited the amount of the liability imposed on the insurer by that Act (Section 22(4)). This is because of subsequent developments in the law of tort which made unlimited liability unfair. They maintained that as Parliament had itself been prepared to delegate authority in this area to the Executive, the failure of the defendant to make secondary legislation led directly to their loss. Section 30(1) of the 1997 Act provides that any power under it to make regulations or an order is exercisable by statutory instrument.
The European Court of Human Rights has found that the deportation of a Nigerian man from the United Kingdom violated his right to respect for private and family life guaranteed by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicant in Unuane v United Kingdom successfully argued that his removal from the UK was a disproportionate interference with family life because it separated him from his children. Though finding for the applicant, the Court rejected his attack on the compatibility of the Immigration Rules – an issue that as recently as 2016 the Supreme Court had authoritatively settled. The decision is of interest for the Court’s approach to the necessary balancing exercise to be carried out in the sensitive area of human rights challenges to the deportation of foreign criminals.
The facts
The applicant, Mr Unuane, is a Nigerian national who came to the UK in 1998. He has three children with his Nigerian partner, all of whom are (now) British citizens and one who has a rare congenital heart defect. In 2005 the applicant was convicted of obtaining a money transfer by deception and in November 2009 he and and his partner were convicted of offences relating to the falsification of thirty applications for leave to remain in the UK. He was sentenced to a period of five years and six months’ imprisonment, while his partner was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment. Since the applicant was sentenced to more than twelve months, he was deemed to be a ‘foreign criminal’ and as such the Secretary of State was required to make a deportation order against him (s32(5) UK Borders Act 2007). An order was made against the applicant’s partner for the same reason and against two of his children as dependent family members (only one was a British citizen at the time).
Covid, clinical negligence, quarantine, lockdown, inquests, nerve agents, algorithms, child abuse, coercive and controlling behaviour and racism. What’s there not to like in our smorgasbord of favourites from the past eleven months?
Worry not: there are laughs to be had. A bee bothers a bureaucrat with solemn consequences for subordinate legislation in a motion of regret debate.
On Thursday, Harry Dunn’s family were granted permission to appeal against the High Court ruling handed down on 24 November, which held in no uncertain terms that Mrs Sacoolas did enjoy diplomatic immunity at the time she killed 19 year-old Harry Dunn while driving on the wrong side of the road in August of last year. The US state department has refused to waive her immunity under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, stating that to allow the waiver, and thereby the extradition request that would inevitably follow would set an “extraordinarily troubling precedent”. The arrests of diplomats Michael Kovrig in China and Rob Macaire in Iran over the last year highlight the continued importance of the inviolability of diplomatic agents serving abroad. However, where there has been an unlawful killing by a family member of an agent, natural inclinations of justice are upset by the failure of a longstanding diplomatic ally to simply do the right thing.
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