10 September 2024 by Edward Waldegrave
In The Commissioner for the British Indian Ocean Territory v. The King (on the application of VT and Others), the UK Government has lost the latest round in long-running litigation concerning a group of individuals accommodated in basic facilities on the remote British Indian Ocean Territory (the “BIOT”).
Background
The BIOT is an archipelago consisting of over 50 islands located roughly half way between East Africa and Indonesia. It is a British Overseas Territory and is formally administered from London by a Commissioner, who performs both legislative and executive functions.
Diego Garcia is the largest island in the archipelago. It has no settled population but accommodates a substantial US/UK military facility. The facility employs a transient population of about 4,000.
In 2021 a group of individuals of Tamil ethnicity left India by boat, apparently with the goal of reaching Canada. On 3 October 2021 their vessel encountered difficulties in the Indian Ocean and was escorted by the Royal Navy to Diego Garcia. Following their arrival in the BIOT, the individuals made claims for asylum. These claims remain un-determined, and some 61 individuals (including children) have now been living on Diego Garcia for nearly three years. There they have been housed in what have been described as “hellish” conditions. The majority live in tents in Thunder Cove (referred to as the “Camp”). Initially they were confined to the Camp itself, but as a result of an order made on 21 December 2023 they gained access to a nearby beach. They also have limited access to buildings outside the Camp for the purposes of consultations with lawyers, medical treatment and, for children, education. A few individuals who with medical complaints which could not be addressed on Diego Garcia have been flown to Rwanda for treatment.
In May 2024 eleven individuals were granted “bail” on terms which allowed them (in summary) to leave the Camp and walk along highway DG1, and to access beaches from the road. These arrangements appear to have been uncontroversial. When they were put in place, it was envisaged that the limited freedoms granted to the eleven individuals would be extended to the other migrants on Diego Garcia. In any event, it was also expected that the position of all of the individuals would be finally resolved at a hearing scheduled for July 2024. This substantive hearing has, however, been indefinitely adjourned.
The July 2024 Bail Application
In July 2024 a number of the individuals applied for extended bail. Specifically, they sought access to a “nature trail”, and also sought changes to the terms on which their bail could be exercised.
In response to this application (the “July Application”) the Commissioner sought the views of the US authorities responsible for the operation of the military facilities on Diego Garcia. The US authorities provided their views on the July Application a few hours before it was due to be heard (on 23 July 2024). The US position was stark: it opposed any extension of bail on the basis that the proposals posed “operational, security, health and safety risks [to the military facilities on Diego Garcia]… which cannot be mitigated or would be unduly burdensome to mitigate”.
The Commissioner applied for an adjournment of the hearing of the July Application to give him more time to consider the response of the US. This was rejected.
Very shortly after the hearing on 23 July, the Commissioner received letters from (i) the Director General for Africa and the Americas at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; and (ii) the Minister of State for Europe, North America and the UK Overseas Territories. Both emphasised the respect which should be accorded to the US’ concerns. These letters were provided to the Court.
On 26 July Judge Obi of the Supreme Court of the BIOT granted the July Application, subject to some relatively minor caveats. In particular, she extended bail to all the relevant individuals and permitted access to the Nature Trail.
The Commissioner appealed, and the Court of Appeal of the BIOT heard the appeal on 9 August. It handed down its decision, dismissing the appeal, on 20 August.
The Commissioner’s Grounds of Appeal
The Commissioner appealed against the Judge’s order on four grounds:
- It was procedurally unfair for the Judge to have proceeded with the hearing of the July Application on 23 July (i.e. not to have granted the Commissioner’s application for an adjournment to allow more time to consider the US response).
- The Judge exercised her discretion unreasonably because she failed properly to consider the impact of extending bail on US/UK relations.
- The Judge exercised her discretion unreasonably because she failed to attribute due weight to the assessment by the US authorities of the security implications of extending bail.
- The Judge exercised her discretion unreasonably because the July Order necessarily impacted upon decisions by the Commissioner concerning the allocation of resources.
The Court of Appeal’s Determination
The Court of Appeal dismissed the Commissioner’s appeal on all grounds.
Ground 1: Procedural Unfairness
The Court rejected the Commissioner’s contention that it was procedurally unfair for the Judge to refuse to adjourn the hearing of the July Application for two reasons.
First, the Court agreed with the Respondents that there was nothing “new” in the US’ response to the July Application. In summary it took the view that the US’ position had long been clear, and had amounted to “consistent and unvarying opposition” to any bail arrangements. Its response to the July Application was wholly consistent with this. Accordingly the Judge had been entitled to take the view that it was not necessary for the hearing to be adjourned for the Commissioner to have a fair opportunity to present his case.
Secondly, the Court noted that the Judge permitted oral submissions to be made on the two letters which the Commissioner received just after the hearing of the July Application. That further oral hearing constituted an obvious opportunity for the Commissioner to make any additional submissions on the US’ response to the July Application. The fact that he had not sought to make any such submissions undermined the contention that it had been unfair for the Judge not to adjourn the first hearing.
Ground 2: US/UK Relations
The Commissioner’s next ground of appeal relied on a contention that the Judge had failed to attach due significance to the impact that extending bail would have on US/UK relations.
The Commissioner’s case on this ground seems to have been somewhat confused. It appears to have been uncontroversial that “questions relating to international relations… are not generally justiciable”. However, it was also common ground that international relations considerations could not necessarily “dictate the outcome of the court’s enquiry”. The Commissioner’s argument before the Court of Appeal on this ground (at least in part) was that, because the grant of bail “had the potential to have a profound impact on international relations between the UK and [the US]”, the Judge should have exercised extreme caution before granting the July Application. As the Court of Appeal recognised, however, this was inconsistent with the Commissioner’s acceptance that the impact on the UK’s international relationships was just one factor to be considered in the overall balancing exercise. On that basis, the only question was whether the Judge had in fact properly evaluated the security concerns raised by the US. The Court of Appeal concluded that she had, and that there was no warrant for interfering in the evaluative conclusion which she had reached.
Ground 3: US Security Assessment
The Commissioner next argued that the Judge had failed, in summary, to accord sufficient respect to the US’ assessment that the grant of the July Application would interfere with security considerations.
Again, the Court dismissed this Ground. It accepted that it was for the relevant US authorities, rather than the Judge, to take a view on whether the grant of the July Application would have adverse security implications. However, this is not what the Judge had done. She had not questioned the US view of the relevant security implications but had, quite properly, taken that into account as a factor to be weighed alongside other relevant considerations. Her overall evaluation was that the July Application should (broadly) be granted. There was no warrant for interfering with that evaluation. In deciding that the Judge had accorded due respect to the US assessment of the security implications, the Court of Appeal seems to have relied in part on the fact that the Judge rejected aspects of the July Application (such as permitting the individuals to access a social club on Diego Garcia) because of the burdens those aspects would give rise to for the Commissioner.
Ground 4: Resource Allocation
Finally, the Commissioner argued that the Judge had strayed into another non-justiciable area because granting the July Application necessarily had implications for the allocation of resources by the Commissioner (in that there would be costs for the Commissioner associated with the extended bail arrangements).
Again, the Court found little difficulty in rejecting this Ground. It concluded that the Judge had not purported “to tell the Commissioner how to spend the funds available to the BIOT”. Rather she had explicitly recognised that this was a matter for the Commissioner. As was pointed out in argument, decisions as to bail conditions regularly have cost implications for the authorities; it would be surprising indeed if judges making such decisions were unlawfully straying into non-justiciable resource allocation territory.
Comment
It has been suggested (in particular by Joshua Rozenberg: see https://rozenberg.substack.com/p/uk-loses-diego-garcia-appeal) that the Commissioner must have recognised that he was likely to lose the appeal to the Court of Appeal, and that the appeal was only pursued in an attempt to show others (such as the US Government) that the UK was exhausting all its options in seeking to prevent bail being extended. On this view, the Court of Appeal’s decision was, from a legal perspective, “obvious”.
It is true that aspects of the Commissioner’s case before the Court of Appeal seem to have been very weak. In particular, it is difficult to see how the Commissioner could reasonably have hoped to succeed on Grounds 1 or 4.
However, the Court of Appeal’s decision does give rise to some points of genuine legal interest. In discussing Ground 2, the Court of Appeal accepted that the conduct of the UK’s foreign relations is non-justiciable in itself, but that the Crown’s foreign policy priorities can be weighed in the balance against other factors in determining a bail application. Presumably the same is true in other contexts. Similarly, in relation to Ground 3, the Court accepted that it is for the executive (in this case, in effect, the US Government) to form a view as to the state’s security interests, but that its view can be weighed among other factors in an appropriate case. This distinction is one which surely merits further academic, legal and political scrutiny. Put briefly, it is difficult to see how judges can on the one hand be expected to “keep out” of foreign policy and national security questions if the executive’s views on such matters are susceptible to being balanced against other factors (such as, in this case, the interests of individuals in being able to move more freely than has hitherto been the case). The Court’s approach to this issue seems to have been largely a result of the Commissioner’s acceptance that foreign policy and national security considerations did not constitute “trump cards” but were merely factors to be weighed in the balance. The Commissioner might have stood a better chance of success, and his case would certainly have been more intellectually coherent, had that concession not been made.
The second point arising from the Court’s judgment which is of significant interest concerns the way in which the parties and the Court all viewed the July Application through the prism of “bail”. As the Court itself recognised, this case falls far from the ordinary context in which bail principles are applied. One might see this case as demonstrating the admirable ability of English legal principles to address novel factual circumstances. Others might regret that such a unique set of facts could only be addressed by an analytical framework developed in very different cases.
Edward Waldegrave is a barrsiter at 1 Crown Office Row.
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14 December 2021 by Angus McCullough KC
The Special Advocates have responded to the Government’s submission to the statutory Review of closed proceedings being conducted by Sir Duncan Ouseley — but HMG’s submission remains unpublished.
The delayed statutory review into closed proceedings under the Justice and Security Act 2013 (JSA) is reaching its conclusion. According to the Government’s website, it is estimated that the report “should be laid before Parliament early in 2022”.
A very brief recap:
- Closed material procedures (CMPs) enable the Government to rely on secret evidence in legal proceedings, without showing that evidence to the other party. To reduce the unfairness inherent in that, a special advocate is appointed to review the secret material and represent the interests of the party excluded from access to it, including in hearings held in secret.
- The JSA came into force in June 2013. Controversially, it included provisions making secret procedures (CMPs) available across the full range of civil proceedings.
- One of the safeguards required by Parliament during the Bill’s bumpy passage was a review of the operation of CMPs under the Act after it had been in force for 5 years.
- The 5 year anniversary came and went in June 2018, with no sign of the review being commissioned. This was highlighted in my post on this blog on 28 January 2020: “Secret Justice”: An Oxymoron and the Overdue Review.
- Another year (with further enquiries as to the position from various quarters in the meantime – summarised here) was to pass before the Government announced that a Reviewer had been appointed: Sir Duncan Ouseley, a retired High Court Judge and former President of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC – the body responsible for hearing CMPs in statutory immigration appeals), so with wide experience of CMPs from his judicial career. The call for evidence took place earlier this year, closing just over 3 years beyond the date that the review should have taken place.
- The Special Advocates (of whom I am one) made a detailed submission to the Reviewer based on our collective experience of CMPs under the JSA. This was published on this blog here: Secret Justice – The Insiders’ View. We highlighted some serious concerns that we had encountered with the practical operation of CMPs under the JSA. We also drew attention to commitments that the Government had made when the Bill was passing, to improve the effectiveness of the system, which had not been honoured.
- We have seen no response from the Government to the detailed critique that we set out in our paper, and we do not know whether any attempt at a comprehensive reply by HMG has been submitted to the Reviewer.
What of the Government’s submission to the Review? In publishing our paper for the Review, in the interests of openness and promoting public debate, the SAs had expressed the hope that HMG’s response (and that of any other Government bodies or agencies) would do likewise:
In a corresponding spirit of transparency, it is hoped that any submissions to this review on behalf of Government bodies or agencies will be published in full, and so made available for wider review and comment. [para 5 of SAs’ submission of 8.6.21]
That has not been done. What did happen was that on 29 July 2021 the SAs were sent the Government’s Response by the Reviewer (not HMG) and told that this response was shared in confidence, and was not for onward transmission.
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11 December 2014 by Rosalind English
Liberty v Government Communications Headquarters ( IPT/13/77/H); Privacy International v FCO and others (IPT/13/92/CH); American Civil Liberties Union v Government Communications Headquarters (IPT/13/168-173/H); Amnesty International Ltd v The Security Service and others (IPT/13/194/CH); Bytes for All v FCO (IPT/13/204/CH), The Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2014] UKIPTrib 13_77-, 5 December 2014 – read judgment
Robert Seabrook QC is on the panel of the IPT and David Manknell of 1 Crown Office acted as Counsel to the Tribunal in this case. They have nothing to do with the writing of this post.
This is a fascinating case, not just on the facts or merits but because it is generated by two of the major catalysts of public law litigation: the government’s duty to look after the security of its citizens, and the rapid outpacing of surveillance law by communications technology. Anyone who has seen The Imitation Game, a film loosely based on the biography of Alan Turing, will appreciate the conflicting currents at the core of this case: the rights of an individual to know, and foresee, what the limits of his freedom are, and the necessity to conceal from the enemy how much we know about their methods. Except the Turing film takes place in official wartime, whereas now the state of being at “war” has taken on a wholly different character.
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Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs v Assistant Deputy Coroner for Inner North London [2013] EWHC 3724 (Admin) 
This coming Wednesday sees the end of the first stage of the 
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