human rights

Family life and extraterritorial jurisdiction: IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 

10 December 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Samuel Talalay

Introduction 

Weekly Round-up: Nature’s rights bill, deprivation of liberty safeguards at the Supreme Court.

27 October 2025 by Catherine Berus

In the news

A private member’s bill to enshrine the rights of nature was introduced in the House of Lords on October 23, 2025. The bill is supported by former Green Party Leader Baroness Natalie Bennett, and drafting was led by the organization Nature’s Rights. The objective of the nature’s bill of rights is to change the legal status of nature to that of a recognized legal entity with inherent, enforceable rights. The bill would create a duty of care for the government to protect nature. The proposal includes a governance structure, monitoring, and the creation of a nature’s rights tribunal for enforcement and dispute resolution.

According to Nature’s Rights, the purpose of the bill is to establish a legal framework for a more regenerative and sustainable society while aligning with realities of climate change science. If the bill passes, the UK will join a number of other states which recognize some degree of rights for nature in their constitutions, laws or regulations, including Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia, Mexico, New Zealand, Uganda, Canada and the US.

In the courts

The Supreme Court heard arguments last week in relation to the 2014 decision known as Cheshire West. The 2014 ruling established the ‘acid test’ for determining whether an individual has been deprived of their liberty. According to the test, if a person (1) is subject to continuous supervision and control and (2) is not free to leave, then they are deprived of their liberty. The ruling had implications for persons with disabilities where it had been concluded that where a person with a disability cannot consent to their care arrangements that involve confinement, they are being deprived of their liberty. Where a person cannot consent to their care, an independent individual is required to determine that the confinement is justified, lawful and in the person’s best interests. The ruling has resulted in a significant increase in deprivation of liberty safeguards (“DoLS”) applications: for 2023-24, 332K applications were made (an increase of 300K over 10 years), with a backlog of 124K.

The Attorney-General of Northern Ireland (“AGNI”) is asking the seven-judge panel to reconsider Cheshire West in order to change the current DoLS established in response to the Cheshire judgement. The AGNI is seeking for consent for care arrangements to be obtained through an expression of a person’s feelings and wishes where they lack capacity to consent.

The Department of Health and Social Care (“DHSC”), an intervener, argued Cheshire West was “wrongly decided” and created an unsustainable system. DHSC argued that the focus of safeguards should be on identifying a person’s wishes and feelings and avoid intruding upon individuals’ lives. Three charities, Mencap, Mind and the National Autistic Society, intervened in the case. They jointly expressed a serious concerns about the arguments put before the Supreme Court and argued that the current test applies to “highly restrictive settings” and is there to ensure individuals have advocates in the care process; changes would jeopardize the safety, freedom and rights of disabled persons.

The judgment date is yet to be announced.

The Weekly Round Up: Report condemns French, German, UK and US protest crackdown; Council of Europe concerns over UK policing and trans rights; Palestine Action in the Court of Appeal

20 October 2025 by Benjamin Savill

In the news

The International Federation for Human Rights (Féderation Internationale pour les droits humains, FIDH) has published a report sharply critical of French, German, UK and US state and media responses to pro-Palestine movements between October 2023 and September 2025, in what it calls “a profound crisis”, “not only under authoritarian regimes, but also in liberal democracies that have long claimed to uphold human rights.” Co-signed by the Ligue des droits de l’Homme (France), the Center for Constitutional Rights (US) and the Committee on the Administration of Justice (Northern Ireland), the report compares “violations to the rights of freedom of opinion and expression” across the four jurisdictions, particularly through what it perceives as direct and indirect media censorship and “systematic bias in reporting”; “violations against activists, NGOs, and civil society”; “violations against academic freedom”; and restrictions to “freedoms of peaceful assembly and association” (with blanket bans on protests in France and Germany coming under particular criticism for failing to meet tests of necessity and proportionality). FIDH claims that diverse measures “directly violat[ing] international human rights obligations… have created a widespread chilling effect on freedom of expression and public debate” in the countries concerned, “further undermining democratic participation and the voices of minority groups.” Among the report’s recommendations directed at the UK are a review of public nuisance orders, and the creation of an independent body to oversee police practices during demonstrations, based on the model of the Police Ombudsman in Northern Ireland.

            Michael O’Flaherty, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, has published two separate letters on human rights concerns in the UK: one regarding protest policing, the other the “situation of trans people”. The first letter, addressed to the Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood, notes the “ever more prominent” policing of protests in the UK since the Commissioner’s visit in July. It urges a “comprehensive review of the current legislation on the policing of protests within the United Kingdom’s human rights obligations” (referring specifically to the Terrorism Act 2000, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, and the Public Order Act 2023). Further concerns are expressed about the prohibitions of assemblies “in the vicinity of a place of worship” and of the wearing of masks in the Crime and Policing Bill, currently before the House of Lords. In the second letter, addressed to the Chairs of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Women and Equalities Committee, O’Flaherty draws attention to the guidance provided by Strasbourg case law on the rights of trans people: “this is particularly important as the Supreme Court [in For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16] did not engage with these human rights issues.” Speaking of the fallout of the Supreme Court case, the Commissioner warns against “a tendency to see the human rights of different groups of people as a zero-sum game. This has contributed to narratives which build on prejudice against trans people and portray upholding their human rights as a de facto threat to the rights of others.”

In the courts

The Home Secretary has lost her appeal against the decision to grant one of the founders of Palestine Action permission for judicial review of the group’s proscription under the Terrorism Act. In R (Huda Ammori) v Secretary of State for Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1311, Lady Carr CJ held that the fact there was a route open for Palestine Action to seek “deproscription” through the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission did not rule out a challenge to the original proscription by way of judicial review. “We consider that the fact that judicial review would be a more expeditious means of challenging the Order, given the public importance of issues raised, and, in particular, the fact that persons were facing convictions for acting in ways that were made criminal as a consequence of the Order, justified using judicial review” ([59]). The Court of Appeal also granted Ms Ammori permission to apply for two further grounds of review: that the Home Secretary failed to have regard to relevant considerations, and that she did not follow her published policy. These are in addition to the two grounds already permitted by the High Court on 30 July: that the Home Secretary’s Order was unlawful as a disproportionate interference with Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention (freedom of expression and assembly), and that the Home Secretary should have consulted Palestine Action before making the Order, and by failing to do so was in breach of natural justice and Article 6 of the Convention (right to fair trial). The judicial review hearing is due to commence at the High Court on 25 November.

Reliance on Article 8 in course of conduct of isolating children as disciplinary measure

25 August 2025 by Alice Kuzmenko

EBB and others v The Gorse Academies Trust [2025] EWHC 1983 (Admin)

In EBB and others v The Gorse Academies Trust [2025] EWHC 1983 (Admin), the Honourable Mrs Justice Collins Rice gave judgment in a multi-faceted, rolled-up permission and judicial review hearing concerning three high school students’ experiences of being disciplined within their school (“the School”).

Supreme Court upholds sanctions on Eugene Shvidler and Dalston Projects in test case for UK regime

18 August 2025 by Guest Contributor

Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Dalston Projects Ltd and others v Secretary of State for Transport [2025] UKSC 30

By Talia Zybutz

Introduction

These appeals – Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Dalston Projects Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport – were a test case for the operation of the UK’s sanctions regime introduced in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Supreme Court confirmed that while the court’s task is to assess proportionality for itself, a wide margin of appreciation will be afforded to the executive in judging how best to respond to and restrain Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Keeping PACE: Searson and Searson v CC of Nottinghamshire Constabulary

11 August 2025 by Guest Contributor

Searson and Another v Chief Constable of Nottingham Constabulary [2025] EWHC 1982 (KB)

By Kian Leong Tan

In Searson v Chief Constable of Nottingham Constabulary [2025] EWHC 1982 (KB), the Appellants successfully appealed against the dismissal of their claim for damages against the Respondent’s police force. The claim arose out of the circumstances of the Second Appellant’s unlawful detention contrary to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE”). Wall J’s judgment emphasises the need for strict compliance with the spirit of the procedural safeguard of regular reviews of detention in s 40 PACE, which serves to protect the fundamental right of freedom of movement.

Rejoinder to Deb and Graham: Yes, the ECHR prohibits States from euthanising people by Rajiv Shah

19 November 2024 by Guest Contributor

Deb and Graham characterise my argument as follows: “the right to life under Article 2 is absolute and allows no exception; there is a negative obligation upon the UK not to take life; any euthanasia laws would necessarily involve the taking of life; therefore euthanasia laws would breach Article 2.” They then point out that this argument has been rejected in Mortier v Belgium.

The problem is that this completely mischaracterises my argument and as result Deb and Graham dedicate several paragraphs to attacking a strawman. My argument was much narrower than they claim. As I explained in my blog post the “negative obligation prohibits the State from conducting euthanasia and assisted suicide itself, even as part of a well-regulated scheme with appropriate safeguards. This means that, under the Convention, States may allow/tolerate private parties from conducting euthanasia/assisted suicide with appropriate safeguards but the State itself cannot conduct them.” (emphasis added)

Guest Post: Assisted Suicide on the NHS would breach the ECHR 

1 November 2024 by Guest Contributor

In this guest post, Rajiv Shah argues that the provision of assisted suicide in the England and Wales via the NHS would constitute a substantive breach of the negative obligation imposed on the State under Article 2 of the ECHR.

Introduction

Article 2 of the ECHR protects the right to life. That article contains two distinct substantive obligations: “the general obligation to protect by law the right to life, and the prohibition of intentional deprivation of life, delimited by a list of exceptions.” (Boso v Italy, at [1])

That first obligation is a positive one and requires States to take steps to protect life from third parties and even from individuals themselves. The precise content of that obligation is necessarily nebulous and the Court affords States a margin of appreciation in deciding what that obligation requires, and how it is to be fulfilled. So, in two recent Chamber decisions – Mortier v Belgium and Karsai v Hungary – the Strasbourg Court held that this positive obligation does not require States to forbid assisted suicide and euthanasia, but that if it does want to allow it, it must create legal safeguards to ensure that the decision of individuals to end their own life/or be killed by third parties is freely taken. 

Nursing home held not to be a public authority for the purposes of an Article 2 claim

24 September 2024 by Dominic Ruck Keene

Court of Appeal finds the National Crime Agency’s refusal to investigate human rights abuse-linked cotton imports from the Uyghur region unlawful

23 July 2024 by Shaheen Rahman

R (World Uyghur Congress) v National Crime Agency [2024] EWCA Civ 715

This landmark decision was a successful appeal from the judgment of Dove J ([2023] EWHC 88 (Admin)) on the single issue of whether the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) misdirected itself when reaching the decision (i) not to investigate alleged offences under Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”) and (ii) not to commence a civil recovery investigation under Part 5, in respect of certain cotton products brought into the UK alleged to be the product of forced labour and other human rights abuses.

The Appellant contended that when taking those decisions the Defendant had laboured under two fundamental misapprehensions, namely (i) that it is necessary to identify specific product as criminal property before commencing an investigation; and (ii) that the presence within the supply chain of a person who can rely on the exemption under section 329(2)(c) of POCA has the effect of “cleansing” criminal property so as to preclude its recovery, or the recovery of the proceeds of sale.

The court noted that it was well established that the decisions of an independent prosecutor or investigator would only be disturbed in highly exceptional circumstances: see R (Corner House Research) v Serious Fraud Office (2008) UKHL 60 at paragraphs 30-32. However, the discretion of decision makers was not unfettered; they must direct themselves correctly in law.

The challenge in this case was not advanced on Wednesbury principals. Rather, it was based on the alleged errors and misdirection in law. The Appellant contended that the Judge had nonetheless proceeded to deal with the matter on the basis that it was a rationality challenge. It was also contended that the Judge had reached the wrong conclusions insofar as he did address the substance of the challenge.

The NCA contended that it did not make the first error of law alleged, on a proper reading of the decision letter. It accepted the second error had been made but contended that it was immaterial and did not affect the substance or validity of its reasoning, namely that there was insufficient evidence from which to develop an investigation which had any prospect of bearing fruit. The Appellant accepted if that was the NCA’s reasoning, they would have been entitled to take that view.

Accordingly, this appeal turned on close analysis and the correct interpretation of the decision letter.

Sir James Eadie KC on behalf of the NCA frankly accepted that as a matter of law it would be wrong to refuse to commence an investigation under POCA because criminal property could not be identified at that time. Indeed, he contended that it would have been so obviously absurd to approach matters on the basis that that you needed to know the outcome of the investigation before taking a decision to commence it, it was highly improbable that the NCA had taken that approach.

Whilst recognising this as a powerful forensic point, the Court nonetheless concluded that, on the face of the decision letter, that was indeed the approach that was taken, and it was a clear misdirection in law.

Moreover, the Court did not agree that the second error within the decision letter was immaterial. That was the identification of a hypothetical individual within the supply chain who could rely on the exemption under section 329(2)(c) of POCA, which provides that a person will not commit an offence under section 329(1) “if he acquired or used or had possession of the property for adequate consideration”. In their view, this error appeared to play an important part in the decision-maker’s line of reasoning.

The judgment also noted that it was common ground there was a “diverse, substantial and growing body of evidence that serious human rights abuses are occurring in the XUAR cotton industry on a large scale”. Further that products derived from forced labour of the proceeds of sale could amount to “criminal property” for the purposes of Part 5 of POCA and “recoverable property” for the purposes of Part 7.

The Court agreed, and it seemed to be accepted by the parties, that the Judge had never directly identified the question whether the position expressed by the NCA in correspondence amount to an error of law.

It held that there was legitimate concern that the judgment endorsed the proposition that there is a need to establish criminal conduct or criminal property before an investigation under POCA can begin. In particular, the Court noted the submissions of the Intervenor “Spotlight on Corruption” that the judgment, if left undisturbed, would discourage the NCA, the police and other UK investigative bodies from commencing investigations into corruption, particularly where it occurs overseas, in the absence of concrete evidence of particular crimes carried out by particular persons.  Spotlight also raised concerns at the suggestion that criminal liability or civil recovery was precluded where the proceeds of crime passed through several hands where adequate consideration was paid.

The Court confirmed that the proposition that, where the importer pays market value, they will not be tainted, was wrong in law. To the extent that the Judge accepted that at any point in a supply chain stretching many thousands of miles, the chain could be broken merely by using adequate consideration in any of the transactions involved, he was wrong to do so.

The Court held that there was force in the Appellant’s submission that the Judge had treated the challenge as if it were on the grounds of irrationality.  More importantly, it was clear that the NCA had misdirected itself based on the two errors of law identified by the Appellant. The question of whether to carry out an investigation under Part 7 or part 5 of POCA was accordingly remitted to the NCA for reconsideration.  

This judgment has significant implications for those trading in goods known or suspected to have been produced using forced labour or other human rights abuses, who may face investigation and prosecution even where adequate consideration has been paid. It has been hailed as a victory for those subjected to forced labour and human rights abuses.

Shaheen Rahman KC is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row Chambers

Double Feature: Article 6 and extradition in Bertino and Merticariu

4 April 2024 by Benjamin Seifert

Introduction

On 6 March 2024 the Supreme Court handed down two separate judgments in the cases of Bertino v Public Prosecutor’s Office, Italy [2024] UKSC 9 and Merticariu v Judecatoria Arad, Romania [2024] UKSC 10. The constitution of the Court for both cases was the same with the judgments written by Lord Stephens and Lord Burnett. Lords Hodge, Sales and Burrows completed the panel.

These two appeals both concern Section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the Act”) which deals with convicted individuals who are subject to convictions in their absence. Trials in absentia are extremely common in civil law jurisdictions and it is sometimes said that there is the possibility of unfairness arising from a trial with an absent defendant

Section 20(3) requires an extradition judge to decide whether or not a person has deliberately absented themselves from their trial. In those circumstances they can be extradited to serve a sentence without an entitlement to a retrial.

If the Court determines that the person was not deliberately absent Section 20(5) must be addressed and it is necessary to decide if they would be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) a review amounting to a retrial. The case of Bertino considered deliberate absence within Section 20(3) and Merticariu the right to a retrial within Section 20(5).

These issues are integral to the protection of Article 6 of the ECHR. It is plain that deliberately absenting oneself from a trial would not subject someone to a violation of Article 6 but the two basic principles of that Article are the right to be present and the right to be represented (Bertino §27).

Bertino: the facts

The Appellant’s extradition was sought pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”) issued for his extradition to serve a year’s imprisonment after trial in his absence at the Italian Court of Pordenone. He was convicted for the offence of sexual activity with an under-age person.

The Appellant signed a document confirming that he was under investigation and he “elected domicile” in Italy. The document stipulated that he was obliged to notify the authorities of any change of address. Without such a notification service of any document would be executed by delivery to his lawyer. Mr Bertino elected his domicile by giving an address in Venetico, Messina and also indicated that he would be assisted by a court-appointed lawyer.

However he then left the country in November 2015 and came to the UK where he began to work. Meanwhile the prosecution in Italy commenced on 8 June 2017, a writ of summons for the court hearing was issued on 12 June 2017 and he was summoned to appeal at the Pordenone Court on 28 September 2017. The summons included a warning that his non-attendance without “lawful impediment” would lead to judgment in his absence. However he had never received the summons and by then the judicial authority knew that he was no longer at the address in Venetico. He had also failed to notify the authorities of any change of address.

There were then many unsuccessful attempts to trace him in Italy between 2016 and 2019. The Appellant did tell Westminster Magistrates’ Court that he had informed the authorities of his departure to the UK for family law purposes because, by then, his marriage was failing and arrangements were to be made for the children, but not the police in connection with the investigation.

The Council Framework Decision

EAWs must be drafted in a prescribed form according to the Council Framework Decision of 26 February 2009 2009/299/JHA, and there are various options which the issuing judicial authority is required to tick. In this case the EAW indicated that he was absent from his trial. There are a range of boxes for indicating, roughly, why this was; in Mr Bertino’s case none of those boxes was ticked and the evidence was that he was unaware of the date and place of his trial and even that there had been a decision to prosecute him.

The Deputy Senior District Judge ordering extradition found that, because the Appellant left his address without notifying a forwarding address and then came to the UK he had demonstrated a “manifest lack of diligence” [§10], a phrase echoing Court of Justice of the European Union case law.

On appeal Swift J found that there was no reason in principle to distinguish between a requested person’s awareness of the date and place of trial and the knowledge that if he does not attend trial he could be tried in absentia. This, he observed, is in accordance with Article 6 ECHR which guarantees a person’s right to be present at trial but that right, so he said, could be waived expressly or by inference.

Swift J certified the following point of law of general public importance:

For a requested person to have deliberately absented himself from trial for the purpose of Section 20(3) of the Extradition Act 2003 must the requesting authority prove that he has actual knowledge that he could be convicted and sentenced in absentia?

The Court’s conclusions on the law

If the EAW is used to convey information which demonstrates that one of the criteria from the 2009 Framework Decision is met that is normally determinative of whether or not the extraditee can be considered deliberately absent (§44). However the Framework Decision (§45) acknowledges that the question of whether or not to extradite is a matter of domestic law when none of the criteria has been satisfied. Consequently Section 20 falls to be analysed.

The phrase “deliberately absented himself from his trial” is the same, under Strasbourg jurisprudence, as the suggestion that an accused has unequivocally waived his right to be present at trial. If those circumstances lead to a finding of a breach of Article 6 then the judge must be required to consider retrial rights under Section 20(5).  However if the trial in absentia did not lead to a breach of Article 6 then the person will have deliberately absented himself from his trial.

It is also for the requesting judicial authority to prove to the criminal standard that an appellant has unequivocally waived his right to be present at his trial.

Application of the facts to the law

The Appellant was never arrested, charged or questioned. He was never informed that he was to be prosecuted and was never notified of the time and place of his trial (§50). He knew that he was suspected of a crime which was being investigated but there was no certainty that he would subsequently be prosecuted. When he left Italy, without giving the judicial police a new address, there were no criminal proceedings of which he could have been aware and definitely no trial from which he could have deliberately absented himself. This was the basis upon which the Supreme Court ruled that the Courts below had erred in finding that he had deliberately absented himself.

At paragraph 52 the Court stated that the Magistrates’ Court and the High Court had inferred that he had unequivocally and intentionally waived his right to be present at his trial by finding that he could reasonably foresee that the trial would proceed in his absence. The Supreme Court noted that the concepts of waiver and reasonable foreseeability were from Strasbourg case law and were not synonymous with the same concepts in English private law. The Strasbourg standard is that, in order for a waiver to be unequivocal and effective, knowing and intelligent, the accused must ordinarily be shown to have appreciated the consequences of their own behaviour and will usually require them to have been warned (§54).

The District Judge had described the Appellant’s “manifest lack of diligence” but the Supreme Court concluded (§55) that this would not have been a waiver by the fact that he could have avoided the situation which led to an impairment of his rights. It was on that basis that the Supreme Court found that the courts had previously overly broadened the definition by finding that deliberate absence is found where the person’s conduct led to him becoming unaware of the date and time of trial. However (§58) these cases are clearly to be considered on their individual facts and there may be circumstances where accused people knowingly and intelligently place themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the prosecuting and judicial authorities  so that a trial in their presence is impossible and they could be considered to appreciate that a trial in absentia is the only option.

The Court therefore ruled that Mr Bertino did not unequivocally waive his right to be present at his trial and was not deliberately absent. The appeal was therefore allowed.

Merticariu: the facts

The EAW was issued in 2019. District Judge Ezzat gave judgment on 26 August 2020 and found that Mr Merticariu had not deliberately absented himself from his trial but did have a right to a retrial in Romania and therefore, with this apparent guarantee, extradition was ordered.

On appeal (§6) to the High Court Chamberlain J dismissed the appeal, having found that he was bound by the authority of BP v Romania [2015] EWHC 3417 where the Divisional Court held that Section 20(5) of the Act will be satisfied even if the right to a retrial is conditional on a finding in the requesting state that the person was not deliberately absent from their trial.

The certified question

Chamberlain J certified the following question of general public importance arising from his decision. He refused leave to appeal.

In a case where the appropriate judge has decided the questions in section 20(1) and (3) of the Extradition Act 2003 in the negative, can the appropriate judge answer the question in section 20(5) in the affirmative if (a) the law of the requesting state confers a right to retrial which depends on a finding by a judicial authority of that state as to whether the requested person was deliberately absent from his trial; and (b) it is not possible to say that a finding of deliberate absence is ‘theoretical’ or ‘so remote that it can be discounted’? If so, in what circumstances?

The decision

As a Romanian extradition case the High Court considered Article 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provided that the person has a “right to ask for a retrial of the case”(§34). However this was not sufficient for the Supreme Court. The “natural and ordinary” meaning of the words in Section 20(5) were clear. It is not solely a question of being entitled to apply for a retrial. The answer to the question in Section 20(5) should not be “perhaps” or “in certain circumstances” (§51). The entitlement to a retrial therefore cannot be contingent on the court making a factual finding that the person was not present at or was not deliberately absent from their trial. The question is clear: are they entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial?

The decision in BP was therefore wrong at paragraph 44 where it stated that an application for a retrial was a procedural step contingent on the court determining whether the person had or had not instructed a lawyer to represent her at her trial (§52). The 2009 Framework Decision replaced “an opportunity to apply for a retrial” with “a right to a retrial.”

The Supreme Court also agreed that the right to a retrial was consistent with Strasbourg principles where there is a “duty to guarantee the right of a criminal defendant to be present in the courtroom” (§54). It is consistent with Article 6 obligations.

Furthermore the principle of mutual trust and confidence, which pervades extradition arrangements between the UK and EU (§60) runs both ways because the issuing judicial authority takes part and is represented in the proceedings in the UK court and it would be entirely in accordance with this principle that courts in requesting states respect the executing courts’ decisions in this country.

The answers to the certified questions

The Supreme Court found that an appropriate judge cannot answer Section 20(5) in the affirmative if the law confers a right to a retrial which depends on a finding by a judicial authority as to whether the person was deliberately absent from their trial.

In relation to (b) of the question the Court found that it is for the issuing judicial authority to provide information in the EAW or in response to a request for further information. The executing court should not take part in a “mini trial” as to whether, on the facts and law of the requesting state, a finding is theoretical or so remote that it can be discounted. The evidence should be clear. (§64)

The application to the case

Given that the judicial authority in this case was unable to confirm whether or not the Appellant had a right to a retrial and Article 466 of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure demonstrated that he would not be regarded as having been tried in absentia he had no right to a retrial (§67).

Comments

In Bertino, This decision represents a pendulum swing from the past ten years of High Court authority where the concept of “manifest lack of diligence” had imposed a significant level of responsibility on a person who may not have fully understood the consequences of their decision to leave the country after they may have only been partly aware of a criminal prosecution. It provides a greater protection to those lay persons who assume that the authorities will contact them. It also now requires District Judges to exercise greater inquiry into the circumstances of an individuals departure from the country which requests their extradition.

In Merticariu, the Supreme Court has finally resolved what is a very short point. If the Court is required to consider Section 20(5) there can be no assumptions in these cases, in the absence of any clear evidence, that a right to a retrial exists. There was always a doubt that the requesting state’s s findings about deliberate absence would chime with those of the executing state and now they need to be considered together. These questions are fundamental to the fair carriage of extradition cases between the UK and EU. Whilst the earlier cases assumed compliance with Article 6 on the basis of mutual trust and confidence the UK courts now do not need to be so quick to reach the same conclusions and they will also offer greater protections to those who find themselves in our extradition courts.

Benjamin Seifert is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row Chambers.

Top Cases of 2023: the good, the bad and the legally complicated

29 January 2024 by Jasper Gold

As the dust settles on another year, it is (just about still) time to look back over the year gone to review some of the most dramatic, legally interesting or impactful cases of the year gone by. As ever, this is only a selection of the top cases of the year, but as a whole they reveal yet another year in which the courts have been drawn into the centre of the most important social and political debates of the society in which they find themselves.

Financial Sanction and Free Speech in the High Court

25 January 2024 by Marina Wheeler QC

Background

Graham Phillips, the Claimant, is a British national and video blogger who posts content from the Donbass dressed in Russian military fatigues. He says he is a journalist who provides a “counterbalance” to widespread western misunderstanding of the true situation in Ukraine but the Administrative Court disagrees.  On 12 January 2024, it handed down judgment in R (Phillips) v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2024] EWHC 32 (Admin), in which it upheld the Government’s view that the Claimant is a propagandist for Russia who is lawfully subject to a sanctions regime which allows the state to freeze his assets.

The mirror crack’d from side to side: Dalton’s application for judicial review [2023] UKSC 36

5 January 2024 by anuragdeb

In Lord Tennyson’s Arthurian ballad ‘The Lady of Shalott’, the eponymous heroine is stranded in her island castle. Continually weaving a web in her loom of the reflections of the outside world she sees in her mirror, she knows she will be cursed if she stops and looks out to nearby Camelot. But one day, Sir Lancelot rides by her castle and she abandons her loom and looks outside. Her mirror cracks “from side to side” and she is cursed. She leaves her castle and floats down to Camelot in a boat, dying before she reaches it.

Victorian poetry scholar Erik Gray analyses the Lady of Shalott as Tennyson’s exploration of the role of an artist: knowing what is better (staying inside and looking at reflections of the real world) and choosing to do what is worse (going outside into the real world). Just as the Lady of Shalott’s mirror cracked, the Supreme Court in Dalton’s application for judicial review marked possibly one of the largest cracks yet in the mirror principle: that the rights provided under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) should mirror those under the ECHR. But this analogy with the Lady of Shalott raises two important questions: was the jurisprudence flowing from the mirror principle better and is the turn away from it worse?

At the outset, I acknowledge my involvement in the Dalton litigation. This post is not an exploration of that litigation. Instead, I look at the possible impact of the Supreme Court’s judgment on the mirror principle and what it may tell us more broadly about the HRA.

Let’s talk about sex: case note on For Women Scotland Limited v The Scottish Ministers [2023] CSIH 37

5 December 2023 by Lance Baynham

In For Women Scotland Limited v The Scottish Ministers [2023] CSIH 37 (“For Women Scotland 2”), the Inner House of the Court of Session has confirmed (for Scotland, at least) the relationship between the Gender Recognition Act 2004(“GRA”) and Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”). In summary, it was held that the meaning of sex in s.11 EqA incorporated the GRA framework. The upshot is that, for transgender people, sex under the EqA is determined by possession of a GRC. Thus, for EqA purposes, the sex of a transgender person without a GRC is their natal sex. On the other hand, the sex of a transgender person with a GRC is their “acquired” (to use the language of the GRA) gender.

This case note briefly sets out some of the relevant law, explores the background to the case and the judgment, and then offers some brief comments by way of conclusion. References in square brackets are to paragraphs of the judgment.