Article 8

Family life and extraterritorial jurisdiction: IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 

10 December 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Samuel Talalay

Introduction 

Court of Appeal clarifies judicial duties when making final care and placement orders at an IRH – Re D [2025] EWCA Civ 1362

10 November 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Emily Higlett

Introduction

The Court of Appeal in Re D has overturned final care and placement orders made at an Issues Resolution Hearing (“IRH”), stating that judges must give clear, reasoned findings on the threshold criteria under section 31(2) Children Act 1989 (“CA 1989”), even where proceedings are uncontested or parents are absent.

In delivering the judgment, Cobb LJ, with whom Baker LJ and Miles LJ agreed, criticised the short form reasoning used by the Family Court and stressed the need for transparent judicial decision-making when the State intervenes in family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).

Reliance on Article 8 in course of conduct of isolating children as disciplinary measure

25 August 2025 by Alice Kuzmenko

EBB and others v The Gorse Academies Trust [2025] EWHC 1983 (Admin)

In EBB and others v The Gorse Academies Trust [2025] EWHC 1983 (Admin), the Honourable Mrs Justice Collins Rice gave judgment in a multi-faceted, rolled-up permission and judicial review hearing concerning three high school students’ experiences of being disciplined within their school (“the School”).

Supreme Court upholds sanctions on Eugene Shvidler and Dalston Projects in test case for UK regime

18 August 2025 by Guest Contributor

Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Dalston Projects Ltd and others v Secretary of State for Transport [2025] UKSC 30

By Talia Zybutz

Introduction

These appeals – Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Dalston Projects Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport – were a test case for the operation of the UK’s sanctions regime introduced in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Supreme Court confirmed that while the court’s task is to assess proportionality for itself, a wide margin of appreciation will be afforded to the executive in judging how best to respond to and restrain Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Article 6 in International Sports Arbitration: More than procedural rights?

16 July 2025 by Allyna Ng

Case of Semenya v Switzerland (Application No.10934/21) (ECtHR Grand Chamber)

Introduction

On 10 July 2025, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in Semenya v Switzerland. The case arose from the legal challenge by Olympic champion Caster Semenya to World Athletics’ regulations (“the DSD Regulations”)requiring athletes with differences in sex developments, also known as ‘intersex’ athletes, to lower their testosterone levels in order to compete in the female category of certain events.

Importantly, the Applicant’s case in the ECtHR was not against World Athletics (since World Athletics is not an entity directly subject to the Convention) but against Switzerland for the role of its Federal Supreme Court (“SFSC”) in upholding the arbitral award of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”). The case therefore highlights the complexities involved in protecting human rights in the realm of international sports arbitration.

The Grand Chamber’s judgment, while ostensibly narrow in some respects, affirms the importance of Article 6 ECHR safeguards and arguably broadens the scope of its protection, particularly where fundamental rights are concerned in compulsory arbitration. 

The Begum Legacy: the Supreme Court further tightens the reins on citizenship deprivation appeals

27 June 2025 by Guest Contributor

By guest contributor Saira Turner

In U3 (AP) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] UKSC 19, the Supreme Court has unanimously dismissed an appeal against a decision taken by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”) relating to deprivation of citizenship and refusal of entry clearance on the basis of national security concerns.

Judicial Anonymity? Not this time.

17 February 2025 by Anogika Souresh

In Tickle & Anor v The BBC & Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 4, the Court of Appeal considered the High Court’s decision to anonymise the names of several judges who had made decisions in historic care proceedings and private family law proceedings (“the historic proceedings”).

The historic proceedings related to Sara Sharif, who was murdered by her father and stepmother in August 2023. On 18 August 2023, the Local Authority made an application for a wardship in respect of Sara Sharif’s five siblings. On 8 September 2023, the journalists requested disclosure of documents relating to the historic proceedings.

Mr Justice Williams made the following order, which was appealed by the claimant journalists:

… no person may publish any information arising from the disclosure of the documents from these proceedings to the public, or a section of it, which includes: …

g. The name of any third parties referred to in the historic proceedings for the avoidance of doubt including social worker, guardian other named professionals and experts instructed in the proceedings and any Judge who heard the historic proceedings (save for Mr Justice Williams). …

including not repeating such information by reference to the disclosed documents even if it is already in the public domain

[emphasis added]

Notably, when Mr Justice Williams pronounced the Order in court, no party had asked for the names of the three circuit judges who had been involved in the historic proceedings (“the historic judges”) to be anonymised. The judge had heard no submissions on the point. He had not mentioned to the parties that he had in mind to make the order he did [5].

The grounds of appeal were as follows:

i) It was a serious procedural irregularity for the judge not to have given reasons before anonymising the historic judges.

ii) The judge adopted an unfair, biased and inappropriate approach to the journalists and the media generally (including relying on his own erroneous analysis of alleged media irresponsibility), thereby unacceptably encroaching on their rights under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This ground was added by amendment and permission has not yet been granted to allow it to be pursued.

iii) The judge ought to have held that the demands of open justice meant that anonymity for a judge could not be justified within the framework of balancing article 8 and article 10 of the ECHR.

iv) The part of the Order anonymising the historic judges could not be justified in the absence of any specific application or evidential foundation, and was inimical to the proper administration of justice.

The Judgment

The Court of Appeal considered that there were three main issues to determine:

i) Whether the court had jurisdiction to prohibit the publication of the names of judges, and if so how and in what circumstances.

ii) Whether the part of the Order anonymising the historic judges was irregular for lack of submissions, evidence or reasons.

iii) Whether the judge’s comments in his judgment demonstrated inappropriate bias against or unfairness towards the media.

The Court of Appeal considered that the statutory limitations contained in section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 and section 97 of the Children Act 1989 do not displace the open justice principle or create any separate “shielded justice” environment. They provide a degree of privacy for certain proceedings relating to children according to their terms [45]. Further, section 12 of the Administration of Justice 1960 makes clear that its provisions do not apply to judges hearing the case: “Court orders always name the judge, so, in that way, section 12 of the AJA 1960 expressly excludes anonymity for the judge” [51].

The Court of Appeal notably stated that:

In accepting office, all judges will or should be aware that that is the expectation, because public scrutiny of judges and the justice process is essential to the rule of law [55].

Issue 1: Was there jurisdiction to prohibit the publication of the names of judges?

The Court of Appeal considered whether Mr Justice Williams had jurisdiction to order the anonymity of the historic judges. In resolving this question, the Court of Appeal considered that, notionally, the names of the historic judges had been in the public domain as (a) the name of the judges appeared on public documents and on each of the orders that they made and (b) the names of the judges would have appeared in the public listings as sitting on the days in question at the courts in question.

The Court of Appeal considered the relevant rights under Articles 2, 3, and 8, which apply as much to judges as to any other person. However, there was no evidential basis on which the threshold for the application of Articles 2, 3, or 8 had been reached [64]. There was no need to undertake any balancing exercise between Articles 8 and 10 as there was no evidence about the risks to the historic judges [69].

The Court of Appeal concluded that there was no jurisdictional foundation for making the anonymity order.

The following comment from the Court of Appeal (at [66] will have wider application beyond the facts of this case:

The authorities that I have cited demonstrate that judges are in a special position as regards open justice. The integrity of the justice system depends on the judge sitting in public and being named, even if they sit in private. The justice system cannot otherwise be fully transparent and open to appropriate scrutiny.

Issue 2: Was there irregularity for lack of submissions, evidence or reasons?

The appeal was allowed on this ground, on the basis that the Mr Justice Williams ought to have asked for submissions and evidence prior to making his decision.

In the absence of specific evidence about risks or threats to the ECHR rights of the historic judges, Mr Justice Williams ought not to have taken any steps to anonymise the names of the historic judges.

Issue 3: Was there inappropriate bias against or unfairness towards the media?

The Court of Appeal noted Mr Justice Williams’s language when discussing media reporting as well as his decision to adjourn the journalists’ application for permission to appeal being akin to dismissing the application.

The appeal was also allowed on this ground.

Comment

This decision will have wider application beyond the facts of this case, and beyond family law. The Court of Appeal reiterated the necessity for open justice, and confirmed that transparency requires judges to be named, even if they sit in private.

The Court of Appeal did caveat the decision by clarifying that judges are not obliged to tolerate any form of abuse or threats. The requirements to consider in such cases are:

1. Evidence about the risks to the judges;
2. The court being satisfied that those risks could not be adequately addressed by other security measures;
3. The court concluding that the risks were so grave that they provided a justification for overriding the fundamental principle of open justice.

The historic judges were given 7 days before their names are published, to allow HMCTS to put in place measures to protect them.

Anogika Souresh is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row, Brighton

Paterson v UK: Parliament and Human Rights in Strasbourg

8 October 2024 by Paula Kelly

The name ‘Chris Pincher’ has become synonymous with Boris Johnson’s downfall, but it was the case of Owen Paterson that precipitated the unrest in the Conservative Party that ultimately led to the former Prime Minister’s resignation.

Owen Paterson stepped down as an MP in November 2021, following a report by the House of Commons Select Committee on Standards that found he had breached the MPs’ Code of Conduct by engaging in paid advocacy and recommended that he be suspended from the House for thirty sitting days. After initially whipping MPs in an attempt to support Mr Paterson and to avoid a possible by-election in North Shropshire, Boris Johnson eventually conceded that the parliamentary party was not with him. Mr Paterson resigned before MPs could vote on the sanction.

The European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has dismissed a complaint by Mr Paterson (Patterson v UK App no. 23570 (ECtHR, 19 September 2024)) that the proceedings and/or the finding breached his rights under Article 8 of the Convention to respect for his private and family life.  

Karsai v Hungary: little new on assisted dying

11 July 2024 by Guest Contributor

Introduction

Article 8

Regarding the potential violation of the applicant’s right to privacy, his primary argument centres on his desire to control the timing of his death. Due to his medical condition, he is condemned to a life of physical incapacity, pain, and existential dread. The applicant dismisses palliative care as a viable option: “While palliative care could provide relief with respect to certain aspects of his physical suffering, it could not provide relief from the experience of existential dread” (§91). Instead, he focuses on the fact that he cannot avail himself of assisted suicide provisions either in Hungary or abroad. Hungarian law prohibits assisting a patient in procuring their death, and even those aiding with arrangements for this purpose can face prosecution (§§135; 159).

The Court observed that, due to the lack of a uniform consensus among member states on assisted dying practices, each state is granted a considerable margin of appreciation in implementing policies on such sensitive issues. The court also noted, as the recent case of Mortier v. Belgium held, that the right to life (art. 2 ECHR) does not inherently exclude the decriminalisation of assisted dying. However, this decriminalisation must be accompanied by safeguards to prevent abuses of the right to life (§§126-128; 145).

The Court, finding no violation of art. 8, held that Mr Kasai’s suffering could not dismissed lightly. It noted that the applicant’s complaint mainly focused on “existential suffering” that “although it amounts to genuine and severe anguish, existential suffering relates essentially to a personal experience, which may be susceptible to change and does not lend itself to a straightforward objective assessment” (§158). Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that “existential suffering may be refractory to medical treatment […] and that the use of sedation to alleviate it might be contested or unwarranted in certain situations […]” (§157).  Professor Aubry, one of the experts consulted by the Court, emphasised two key points. First, he noted that patients suffering from the same condition as the applicant often exhibit ambivalence about their desire to die as the disease progresses. Second, he underscored the importance of palliative care for individuals affected by ALS, particularly in advanced stages, when they are typically permitted to receive palliative deep sedation and can die peacefully (§46).

Article 14

Regarding the violation of art. 8 ECHR and art. 14 ECHR the Mr Karsai argued that “Hungarian law accorded different treatment to those terminally ill persons with mental capacity who suffered from refractory symptoms but could hasten their death only by means of PAD [physician assisted dying], and those who could do so by having recourse to RWI [refusal or withdrawal of life-sustaining interventions” (§170).

In this case the Court held that the applicant’s clinical picture could not be compared to that of terminally ill patients who depend on life-sustaining medical treatments (§174). In fact, Mr Kasai’s diagnosis might lead to invasive life-sustaining interventions only towards the latest stages of his degenerative illness. Furthermore, the withholding or withdrawing of unwanted medical treatments falls within the right to informed medical consent and it is subjected to specific guidelines and safeguards in order to protect the patient’s autonomy (§175).

According to Professor Sandor, who produced an expert opinion for the Court, the right to informed consent is paramount in bioethics. On the other hand, “patients could refuse care, but could not ask for something specific” (§56). For these reasons the Court held that there has been no violation of art. 14 in conjunction with art. 8 of the Convention.

Separate opinions

Two judges’ separate opinions provide an opportunity to delve deeper into the reasoning of the Court’s majority, as they both address the fundamental principles underlying the final decision. Judge Wojtyczek in his separate concurring opinion disagreed with the majority that the applicant’s request to have access to physician assisted dying would fall under his right to respect his private life. The judge emphasised how the right to life – as the practical and effective basis for the enjoyment of all other rights – may hardly “encompass decisions about one’s own life and death” and for this reason, the right to private life, should not extend to the choice of death (§4, Judge Wojtyczek partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion). He noted that the suffering stemming from a personal feeling in relation to the absence of meaning of life may be exacerbated (or not properly tackled) if people can choose their own death.

Judge Felici, dissenting on both accounts with the Court’s majority, firstly emphasised his impression that “the applicant’s legitimate concerns were not taken into account, and that his legitimate request for help fell on deaf ears” (§7, Judge Felici dissenting opinion). In fact, according to Judge Felici, palliative care could not be considered a feasible option to ease the applicant’s suffering since “the expert consulted have indicated that there is currently no medical treatment capable of alleviating existential suffering” (§9, Judge Felici dissenting opinion, my emphasis). In other words, the dissenting Judge stressed an evident reality: so far medicine has not been able to offer a cure to the sentiment that life has lost its meaning. And, for this reason, assisted dying is envisaged as the only possible answer to the applicant existential cry for help. Consequently, the dissenting judge finds that the impossibility for the applicant to avail himself of assisted dying provisions both in his country and abroad would breach his right to privacy enshrined by art. 8 of the Convention.

Specifically, Hungary – compared to other member states which permit assisted dying or are paying great attention on the matter – would have failed to address the severe suffering of the applicant (§5, Judge Felici dissenting opinion). Therefore, Judge Felici dissented that in this instance the margin of appreciation doctrine (which applies on sensitive matters where there is no uniform agreement) should not be invoked. Giving that, “there are no insurmountable legal obstacles to affirming a positive obligation on the part of the State, having regard to all the characteristics of this case, in relation to the application of Article 8 of the Convention” (§6, Judge Felici dissenting opinion).

Secondly, the Judge disagreed with the Court majority’s decision according to which the applicant’s medical condition should be considered similar to the one endured by terminally-ill patients subjected to invasive life-sustaining medical treatments since Mr Kasai’s condition has made him dependant on others for all his personal needs. Hence Judge Felici argued that “the subordination of the decision to take one’s life to whether one is dependent on life-saving treatment represents an unnecessary reduction of the protection of the right to life and an interference in private life, understood as the individual’s capacity for self-determination” (§13, Judge Felici dissenting opinion).

Dr Ilaria Bertini is a Research Fellow at BIOS Centre

Termination of pregnancy and wishes and feelings in the Court of Protection

25 April 2024 by Esme Cairns

Introduction

The decision of the Court of Protection in Rotherham and Doncaster and South Humber NHS Foundation Trust and NR [2024] EWCOP 17 is the latest in a line of cases where the Court has been asked to determine whether a termination of pregnancy is in a woman’s best interests. Any case about a termination engages the pregnant woman’s Article 8 rights. But where the woman also lacks capacity to decide for herself whether to have a termination, there must be a particularly careful analysis to ensure that her rights are respected. While previous decisions have frequently accorded weight to the wishes and feelings of the pregnant woman at the heart of the case, Mr Justice Hayden’s decision goes further in handing the decision over to the pregnant woman herself.

A newcomer to the world of injunctions

19 December 2023 by Guest Contributor

Factual background

The appeal in Wolverhampton City Council and others v London Gypsies and Travellers and others [2023] UKSC 47 concerned injunctions obtained by over 38 different local authorities between 2015 and 2020 to prevent unauthorised encampments by Gypsies and Travellers. These “newcomer injunctions” as they are known, are a wholly new form of injunction, granted without prior notice, against persons unidentified at time of the grant of the injunction and who have not yet performed, or even threatened to perform the acts which the injunction prohibits. They therefore apply “to potentially anyone in the world” [143(i)].

Local authorities sought to use such injunctions, due to the inefficacy of obtaining an injunction against named Gypsies or Travellers who, by the time proceedings have commenced, have left, and been replaced by another group, against whom the injunction has no effect.

Surrogacy, IVF and equality: JR176(2)’s application for judicial review

28 February 2023 by anuragdeb

Introduction

Two men are in a relationship and want to have a child. They approach a female friend who is happy to be their surrogate. She has previously had a voluntary sterilisation procedure, so she would need in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) using a donor egg (a procedure known as gestational surrogacy), to help her friends realise their wishes. This is where they all encounter a problem: voluntary sterilisation makes the woman ineligible for publicly funded IVF.

In JR176(2)’s application for judicial review [2022] NIKB 21, the two men challenged the eligibility criteria for publicly funded IVF on a number of grounds, among which this post will focus on two: a breach of the right to private and family life under Article 8 ECHR and Article 8 taken with the right not to be discriminated against contrary to Article 14 ECHR.

Drelon v France: Collection and retention of personal data concerning presumed sexual orientation was a violation of Article 8

20 September 2022 by Guest Contributor

On 8 September 2022, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) handed down its decision in Drelon v France (application nos. 3153/16 and 27758/18).[1] The Court unanimously found a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights in relation to the collection by the French Blood Donation Service, the Établissement Français du Sang (EFS), of personal data relating to a potential blood donor’s presumed sexual orientation and the excessive length of time the data was kept in a public institution.

Non-Binary Passports: R (on the application of Elan-Cane) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) [2021] UKSC 56

4 July 2022 by Natasha Isaac

Background

The Appellant in R (on the application of Elan-Cane) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) [2021] UKSC 56 was assigned female at birth, however during and after puberty they felt revulsion at their body and underwent surgery in 1989 and 1990 to alleviate those feelings. The Appellant who identifies as non-gendered, is a campaigner for the legal and social recognition of this category. The provision of “X passports” are a focal point of the Appellant’s campaign.

The “unduly harsh” test considered further by Court of Appeal

13 April 2022 by casparlatham

The question of how to determine whether or not the deportation of a foreign national convicted of criminal offending is a disproportionate interference in the family life that they may share with their partner or child has been explored in a series of cases, including the leading decisions of KO (Nigeria) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 53 and HA (Iraq) [2020] EWCA Civ 1176 and has been discussed in detail on this blog here, here and here.