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UK Human Rights Blog - 1 Crown Office Row
Search Results for: prisoners/page/16/ministers have been procrastinating on the issue, fearing that it will prove unpopular with the electorate.
Ndiki Mutua and others v the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – read judgment
1 Crown Office Row’s Guy Mansfield QC acted for the Defendant, Henry Witcomb assisted by Maria Roche acted for the Claimants and Elizabeth-Ann Gumbel QC acted for intervener. None of them had anything to do with the writing of this post.
Although any claims regarding alleged acts of torture on Kenyan detainees during the 1950s state of emergency are technically time barred the High Court has allowed three of the claims to go ahead.
This was a trial of a preliminary issue in the Mau Mau detention camps case concerning the matter of limitation of claims for personal injury. In principle, the primary limitation periods in respect of the claims respectively ended in September 1960, 3 March 1962 and on dates in 1963 which are unclear. The period of delay was approximately fifty years in duration, i.e. from between 1960/1963 to the issue of these proceedings on 23 June 2009. The events to be investigated at any trial would extend back to 1952 at least, a period of 60 years or more by the likely date of trial.
R(on the application of Christopher Wilford) v The Financial Services Authority [2013] EWCA Civ 677 – Read judgment
This Court of Appeal judgment further reduces the scope for judicial review of a Decision Notice issued by the Financial Services Authority (“the FSA”, now the Financial Conduct Authority). Indeed it comes close to excluding judicial review of these Notices. This is because there is a statutory mechanism for challenging Decision Notices. This case sheds light on the very limited role of judicial review where there is such a statutory right.
The FSA regulates the financial services industry. Its Regulatory Decisions Committee (“the RDC”) decides whether or not a regulated person has breached the relevant rules and issues Decision Notices.
R (on the Application of the Counsel General for Wales) v Secretary of State for business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2022] EWCA Civ 118
The Court of Appeal decision handed down on 9th February 2022 is an important case concerning devolved powers.
The judgement concerns an application for permission to apply for judicial review made by the Counsel General for Wales to seek a declaration in the following terms:
The amendment of Schedule 7B of GoWA by section 54(2) of UKIMA, to add UKIMA to the list of protected enactments, does not amount to a reservation and does not operate so as to prevent the Senedd from legislating on devolved matters in a way that is inconsistent with the mutual recognition principle in UKIMA.
The application was dismissed, and the appellant appealed on the grounds that the Divisional Court was wrong to refuse permission on the grounds of prematurity.
It is undeniable that the Human Rights Act has had a significant impact on the work of the Supreme Court. Just under a quarter (14 of 61) of cases decided during the Court’s 2018-19 term featured a determination on at least one issue relating to the Act or the European Convention on Human Rights. The UK Supreme Court is soon to begin Hilary Term 2020, and whilst the docket of cases it is set to hear this term seems to largely steer clear of controversial human rights issues we can nonetheless be confident that 2020 will feature its usual share of big human rights cases. What follows is a short preview of some of the more interesting and controversial of those cases, all of which the Court is due to hand down at some point this year.
It is well established that, under Article 3 ECHR, the United Kingdom cannot deport an individual to a country where, there is a “real risk” of them being subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. This has been extended to include situations where the deportee would be placed in circumstances which might occasion a significant deterioration of health, including where they lack access to life-saving treatment.
The question in this case is whether Article 3 prohibits deportation in AM’s situation. He is an HIV-positive individual, whose condition for many years was being managed by anti-retroviral drugs in the UK. If deported to Zimbabwe, he would be very unlikely to have access to the same treatment. Although some medical options would be available to him, they would likely be significantly less effective for the management of his condition.
Previous authorities had restricted the application of Article 3 to ‘deathbed’ cases only, where the deportee would likely die quickly following their removal from the country.
SC (Lord Walker, Lady Hale, Lord Brown, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr) March 3 2010
The facts of this case are set out in the report of the Court of Appeal judgment below. In the Supreme Court the stepfather continued his submission that there should be no presumption against a child giving evidence, as that gave insufficient weight to the rights of all concerned under the European Convention on Human Rights 1950.
Updated, 1/9/10 | R (C) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2010] WLR (D) 193 – Read judgment
When faced with conflicting authorities from the European Court of Human Rights and the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court) on the indefinite retention of DNA profiles and fingerprints by the police, the Divisional Court held that they were bound to follow the House of Lords.
This was so despite clear indications from the previous and current governments that the law would be changed to take account of the Strasbourg decision. However, as leave to appeal was granted, the Supreme Court will now have the opportunity to revisit the issue and determine the law in this controversial area.
Kimathi & Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2018] EWHC 2066 (QB) read judgment
Stewart J has dismissed the first test case in this group litigation, in which over 40,000 Kenyans bring claims for damages against the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, alleging abuse during the Kenyan Emergency of the 1950s and early 1960s.
The mammoth hearing lasted 223 days, and the judgment accordingly runs to nearly 500 paragraphs. The decision turns on whether the judge should allow the claim to be heard over 50 years after the primary deadline expired.
In personal injury claims, section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 provides that in certain circumstances, a claim which would otherwise be out of time (“statute-barred”) can nevertheless be heard. The court has a discretion to disapply the usual three-year time limit where it is equitable. This involves balancing the prejudice to the defendant of facing a late claim against the prejudice the claimant will suffer if the claim is statute-barred.
In this test case, Stewart J determined that it would not be equitable to extend time in the claimant’s favour. The severe effects of the passage of time on the defendant’s ability to defend the claim was a crucial factor, particularly due to the depleted cogency of the evidence available, as were the lack of good reasons for the delay, and the very substantial length of the delay itself. This carefully reasoned judgment will provide detailed guidance for the trial of ‘stale’ claims. Continue reading →
Secretary of State for the Home Department v MSM (Somalia) and UNHCR (Intervener) [2016] EWCA Civ 715 – Read judgment
The Court of Appeal dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal challenging the Upper Tribunal’s decision that MSM would have been at risk on return to Somalia on the ground of political opinion. Exceptionally, the court went on to consider the modification of conduct issue in relation to imputed political opinion on an obiter basis, which gave rise to interesting analysis.
In R. (on the application of Conway) v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] EWCA Civ 1431 the Court of Appeal held that the blanket ban on assisted suicide in the Suicide Act 1961 s.2(1) was a necessary and proportionate interference with the ECHR art.8 rights of the appellant.
The appellant had proposed an alternative scheme for assisted suicide containing certain conditions and safeguards, including the approval of a High Court judge, for those who were terminally ill and had less than six months to live. However, it was held that the alternative scheme would not be effective and raised wide-ranging policy issues that would be better dealt with by Parliament.
The Court identified the origin of the case as being that the Claimant has a prognosis of six months or less to live and wishes to have the option of taking action to end his life peacefully and with dignity, with the assistance of a medical professional, at a time of his choosing, whilst remaining in control of the final act that may be required to bring about his death. However, Section 2(1) of the 1961 Suicide Act makes it a criminal offence to provide encouragement or assistance for a person to commit suicide.
Mr Conway therefore sought a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the HRA , on the basis that the ban on assisted suicide was a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for his private life under Article 8 of the Convention (“Article 8”).
R (Ferguson) v HM Assistant Coroner for Sefton, Knowlsey and St Helens [2025] EWHC 1901 (Admin) concerned a challenge by the next of kin of Joseph Farley, who died after jumping from the fourteenth floor of a carpark. The Coroner conducting mr Farley’s inquest has determined that Article 2, ECHR, did not apply and that the inquest could be heard without a jury. Mr Ferguson challenged both of these decisions by way of judicial review.
In a thorough and detailed judgment upholding Mr Ferguson’s challenge, Mrs Justice Hill gave a useful restatement of the law on Article 2, as well as a useful illustration of how it applies if difficult and complex fact patterns. The judgment also contains helpful clarification on the different sorts of causation tests that apply to parts of the Coronial process.
BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
In an exhaustive and detailed judgment coming to over 200 pages, the ECtHR held that both the bulk electronic communications interception regime operated by the UK’s intelligence agencies under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and its provisions for acquiring communications data from telecommunications operators violated Articles 8 and 10 of ECHR.
However, the ECtHR held that there was no violation of Article 8 through the UK’s receipt and use of similar information obtained from other countries.
The ECtHR’s judgment is as noteworthy for what it deemed to be incompatible with the ECHR as what it deemed to be incompatible. In contrast to the tenor of many of the headlines in the media about the judgment, it was not an unreserved endorsement of the criticisms that have been levelled at the intelligence services in light of the Snowden revelations. The ECtHR’s comments as to the proportionality and necessity of the bulk collection of electronic communications, as well as about the adequacy of the safeguards and oversight structures will be of some consolation to the government.
The real issue for the Government is whether the ‘checks and balances’ in the Investigatory Powers Act (which is not yet fully in force) will be sufficient to defeat the criticisms made by the ECtHR of the previous regime under RIPA; in particular over the selection criteria for material that would be seen by human eyes and whether there are sufficient ‘journalistic’ safeguards.
R v Gul (Appellant) [2013] UKSC 64, 23 October 2013 – read judgment
It is a platitude that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. It is for precisely this reason that the international community has not been able to agree on a definition of terrorism to be embedded in international law.
The issue in this appeal was whether the definition of ‘terrorism’ in the UK Terrorism Act 2000 includes military attacks by non-state armed groups against national or international armed forces in a non-international armed conflict.
The following is taken from the Supreme Court’s press summary. References in square brackets are to paragraphs in the judgment. Continue reading →
M.R. and D.R.(suing by their father and next friend O.R.) & ors -v- An t-Ard-Chláraitheoir & ors [2014] IESC 60 (7 November 2014) – read judgment
The definition of a mother, whether she is “genetic” or “gestational” for the purpose of registration laws was a matter for parliament, not the courts, the Irish Supreme Court has ruled.
At the core of the case was the question whether a mother whose donated ova had resulted in twin children born by a surrogacy arrangement should be registered as their parent, as opposed to the gestational mother who had borne the twins.
The genetic mother and father sought her registration as “mother” under the Civil Registration Act, 2004, along with a declaration that she was entitled to have the particulars of her maternity entered on the Certificate of Birth, and that the twins were entitled to have their relationship to the fourth named respondent recorded on their Certificates of Birth. Continue reading →
Jack Straw, the former New Labour Justice Secretary, has marked the 10th anniversary of the passing into law of the Human Rights Act with an article in the Guardian.
There are two points of interest from the article. The first is that, by my reading at least, the article runs close to an apology for the previous government’s much-criticised anti-terrorism policies. Straw, who amongst other front line roles was Home Secretary from 1997 to 2001 and Justice Secretary from 2007 to 2010, says “It is hard to exaggerate the pressures that those with responsibility encounter when a population, or part of it, is scared.” This meant that the government were under pressure and “sometimes the same people who might have been seeking greater controls on the intelligence services will want to know why we didn’t have more intelligence”.
Protesters outside the Marie Stopes clinic in Ealing have been told they must stay 100m from the building
In the News
Rumours of a coming parliamentary coup to avoid a no-deal outcome rumble on, prompting the usual range of responses.
Speaking at the G7 summit in Biarritz on Sunday, Boris Johnson stated that Britain can ‘easily cope’ with a no-deal Brexit. The Prime Minister ascribed sole responsibility for whether or not Britain crashed out of the European Union on 31 October to ‘our EU friends and partners’, while Brussels officials asserted that it was ‘squarely and firmly’ up to Britain to find a solution to the Irish border issue. His comments come after a week in which Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron indicated their unwillingness to countenance reopening the withdrawal agreement, while Donald Trump promised a ‘very big trade deal’ between the United Kingdom and the United States once the country had freed itself from the ‘anchor’ of the EU.
Writing in the Times, Cambridge historian Robert Tombs argues that those who consider parliamentary resistance a legitimate expression of its sovereignty would ‘do untold damage to the institution they claim to defend’ by preventing the government from ‘[carrying] out a policy approved by the electorate’. In the Guardian, Heather Stewart and Rowena Mason covered the opposing view, outlining the key points in the six-page document prepared for Jeremy Corbyn by the shadow attorney general, Shami Chakrabarti. The advice includes an assertion that Boris Johnson would be committing the ‘gravest abuse of power and attack on UK constitutional principle in living memory’ if he shuts down parliament to help force through a no-deal Brexit.
Earlier this week, the archbishop of Canterbury sparked criticism by Brexiteers, including former Conservative party leader Iain Duncan Smith, for reportedly meeting MPs with a view to chairing citizens’ assemblies to stop a no-deal departure from the EU. Today, Jeremy Corbyn met with the leaders of the SNP, the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru, the Green party and the Independent Group for Change and issued a joint statement agreeing to work together to avoid ‘a disastrous no-deal exit’.
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Ndiki Mutua and others v the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – read judgment
R(on the application of Christopher Wilford) v The Financial Services Authority [2013] EWCA Civ 677 – 
Kimathi & Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2018] EWHC 2066 (QB) 
In 
BIG BROTHER WATCH AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
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