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Broom v Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWHC 2695 (Admin) – Read Judgment
When he was transferred from Whitemoor prison to Wakefield Prison in May 2008, Mr. John Broom had 24 historical photos of his children and nieces confiscated. He had been in possession of those photographs for 18 years. He challenged the decision not to return the photos to him by way of judicial review, claiming that it breached his right to respect for his private or family life. Mr Justice Behrens concluded that there was no infringement of Article 8 of the ECHR in this case.
Mr. Broom is currently serving a discretionary life sentence following his conviction in 1992 for buggery and rape of a female. There were two females involved, one of whom was 16. The nature of this conviction was central to the decision to withhold Mr. Broom’s photographs. The Safeguarding Children Panel said that:
Criticism of the planned British bill of rights has been gathering momentum. Free speech campaigners have argued that it will undermine freedom of expression rather than support it. Labour’s shadow justice minister called it ‘a very dark day for victims of crime, for women, for people in care, for everyone in this country who rely on the state to protect them from harm’ . A cross-party amendment that would include the right to abortion has been proposed. While Dominic Raab stated that abortion is already ‘settled in UK law’, Labour MPs have argued that there should be a free vote for MPs on enshrining abortion in the bill as a fundamental right.
Nicola Sturgeon has announced that the Scottish government intends to hold an independence referendum on 19th October 2023. Her government has requested that the Supreme Court give a ruling on whether they can legally call such a referendum without authorisation from Westminster. Sturgeon commented that if the court’s response is negative, the next general election could provide a ‘de facto referendum’ on independence.
In other news
According to a recent analysis, the proportion of judicial reviews in England and Wales in which claimants have won has fallen by 50% since 2020. Last year, 31 judicial reviews (excluding immigration) found for the claimant in the High Court, the lowest number since 2001, when records began. Jolyon Maugham QC, director of the Good Law Project, responded with a warning that the rule of law ‘could easily become a relic for the history books’
The Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General’s Office have called on the Law Commission of England and Wales to review the law regarding contempt of court. This comes amidst concerns that the current system is ‘disordered and unclear’. The review will aim at simplification, clarification, consistency and greater effectiveness within the law regarding civil and criminal contempt of court. It will address, among other things, Article 10 ECHR in relation to publishing information about court proceedings, potential procedural issues, responsibility for adjudication, investigation and prosecution, and the appropriateness of current penalties.
The UK Information Commissioner has announced that public authorities will only be fined for data breaches in ‘the most egregious cases’. The effectiveness of fines as a deterrent was doubted by the Commissioner. Public reprimands will be used more frequently, alongside enforcement notices, as part of ‘a more proactive and targeted approach’.
The United States has formally determined that Russia has committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference on Saturday, US Vice-President Kamala Harris accused Russia of ‘gruesome acts of murder, torture, rape and deportation’ and said those who had committed crimes would be held to account. UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak also spoke at the event over the weekend, where he urged leaders to ‘double down’ on military support for Kyiv.
Syria and Turkey continue to face devastating consequences in the aftermath of last week’s earthquakes. The death toll caused by the 7.8 magnitude tremor has surpassed 46,000 and is expected to continue to rise. In Turkey, the scale of the damage has been partly attributed poor construction practices and President Erdogan’s government has been criticised for failing to implement stricter building regulations.
In Syria, the UN is facing backlash for failing to deliver humanitarian relief to the north-western, opposition-held regions of the country. The Syrian government has allowed two new border crossings to be opened from Turkey. The UN’s decision, however, to wait for President Assad’s permission to use these routes has been widely condemned. Meanwhile, the British government has pledged an additional funding package to support the earthquake recovery effort.
Finally, Boris Johnson has urged Prime Minister Rishi Sunak not to abandon the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill. Set in motion by Mr Johnson’s government, the bill gives the UK Government powers to dispense of parts of the Northern Ireland Protocol. An announcement on a prospective new agreement between Sunak’s government and the EU on Northern Ireland is expected this week.
… well there aren’t exactly fifty ways to leave the European Union, but from the vociferous debate in legal as well as political circles we might be excused for thinking there are a great deal more. Today’s Times reports that “1,000 people join legal fight against Brexit” to ensure that parliament votes before the government formally triggers the exit procedure from the EU. David Pannick will argue the challenge. But against such a legal heavyweight is former law lord Peter Millett, whose letter published in yesterday’s Times declares that the exercise of our treaty rights is a matter for the executive and the triggering of Article 50 does not require parliamentary approval. So whom are we to believe?
In her guest post Joelle Grogan has speculated upon the possible future for rights in the immediate aftermath of the referendum so I won’t cover the same ground. I will simply draw out some of the questions considered in two reports produced before the result of the referendum was known: 1. House of Lords EU Committee Report (HL138) and the more detailed analysis by Richard Gordon QC and Rowena Moffatt: 2 “Brexit: The Immediate Legal Consequences”.
States have an inherent right to withdraw. It would be inconceivable that the member states of such a close economic arrangement would force an unwilling state to continue to participate. The significance of Article 50 therefore lies not in establishing a right to withdraw but in defining the procedure for doing so. Continue reading →
These appeals – Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Dalston Projects Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport – were a test case for the operation of the UK’s sanctions regime introduced in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The Supreme Court confirmed that while the court’s task is to assess proportionality for itself, a wide margin of appreciation will be afforded to the executive in judging how best to respond to and restrain Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
Ilias v Hungary (Application no. 47287/15) was the first case in which the ECtHR considered a land border transit zone between two member states of the Council of Europe, where the host state, Hungary, was also a member of the EU and had applied the safe third country rule under the EU asylum regime. The Grand Chamber held that the applicants’ detention did not breach Article 5 (the right to liberty and security of the person).
The applicants, Mr Ilias and Mr Ahmed, were both Bangladeshi nationals who had left Bangladesh at different times and in differing circumstances. They met in Greece and then traveled together to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, then to Serbia, and then to Hungary. On 15 September 2015 they arrived in Hungary and entered the border transit zone at Röszke. They submitted asylum requests on the same day. Within several hours their requests were rejected as being inadmissible and they were ordered to be expelled from Hungary back to Serbia as a safe third country. The applicants then spent 23 days in the transit zone whilst they appealed this decision. On 8 October 2015, following a final decision of the Hungarian courts which rejected their applications for asylum and ordered the applicants’ expulsion, Mr Ilias and Mr Ahmed were escorted out of the transit zone and crossed the border back into Serbia.
Last week on this blog we published Francis Hoar’s article which argued that the Coronavirus Regulations passed by the Government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic involve breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly in relation to the interference they create in the rights to liberty, private and family life, freedom of worship, freedom of assembly, the prohibition on discrimination, the right to property and the right to education.
In this first of two response articles, Leo Davidson, a barrister at 11KBW, argues that the Regulations do not involve any breach of human rights law, as they fall within the executive’s margin of discretion for the management of this crisis, particularly given the serious potential implications of the pandemic and the reliance that the Government has placed on scientific and medical advice.
In the second article, Dominic Ruck Keene and Henry Tufnell, of 1 Crown Office Row, will argue that the interferences in rights created by the Regulations are proportionate when taken in the context of the pandemic.
Note: This article involves examination of thelegal provisions that accompany some of the restrictions on movement of individuals announced by the Government in order to protect life in the current crisis. The current Government guidance setting out these and other restrictions can be found here. Legal scrutiny is important but should not be taken to question the undeniable imperative to follow that guidance.
Introduction
With the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020, the Government has imposed a number of restrictive measures, colloquially referred to as the ‘lockdown’, in an effort to hamper the spread of the coronavirus.
These restrictions are controversial, and reasonable people disagree about whether they go too far, or not far enough. As a matter of human rights law, however, they are lawful. The Government has a positive obligation under human rights law to safeguard life and health; in balancing any conflict between this objective, and other rights, the Government has a significant margin of discretion, including in the assessment of scientific evidence.
Francis Hoar argues on this blog that the lockdown disproportionately interferes with various rights under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and is therefore unlawful. The analysis is wrong, primarily because:
It ignores the human rights implications of the pandemic itself, which must be balanced against the effects of the responsive measures.
In the circumstances, the Government has a wide margin of discretion when balancing competing rights and interests.
The margin is particularly wide given the complex scientific evidence underlying the decision.
Those charged with the task of protecting the public from harm resort to assertion similar to that here attributed to a GCHQ spokesperson:
Our work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework, which ensures that our activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate, and that there is rigorous oversight.
I was the Chief Surveillance Inspector at the Office of Surveillance Commissioners for eight years until August 2013. My own view is that the legal and policy framework is not strict and that oversight is not rigorous. Until they are, we should not blame public authorities for exploiting opportunities that enable them to meet their operational and investigative objectives.
Regardless of one’s views on the actions of Mr. Snowden, public knowledge of covert capabilities has encouraged those who engage in covert conduct to explain what it is they require and why. The reports published by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, the Intelligence and Security Committee and RUSI make important contributions but tend, in my view, to focus on the effect of technology and the impact of so-called mass surveillance. All agree that the law and oversight should be improved. Here’s my take on those two fundamentals. Continue reading →
Her Majesty’s Treasury (Respondent) v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (FC) (Appellants); Her Majesty’s Treasury (Respondent) v Mohammed al-Ghabra (FC) (Appellant); R (on the application of Hani El Sayed Sabaei Youssef) (Respondent) v Her Majesty’s Treasury (Appellant) [2010] UKSC 2
The Supreme Court has ruled that the Treasury cannot make orders to freeze the assets of terror suspects. The Terrorism (UN Measures) Order 2006 and the 2006 al-Qaeda and Taliban (UN Measures) Order were made under section 1 of the 1946 UN Act in order to implement resolutions of the UN Security Council, and were found by the Court to be unlawful.
As a preliminary point, the Court considered that a press report identifying M would engage article 8. In a separate judgment, the Court repealed all of the suspects’ anonymity orders, finding that these would not breach the suspects’ Article 8 rights to privacy.
In the UK there are at present no rights expressly cast in terms applicable to climate change, nor have our traditional human rights been extensively interpreted as covering climate change consequences. As David Hart QC identifies in his blog, Is climate change a human rights issue?, human rights principles, to be useful for climate change litigators, have to have some democratic backing somewhere. So is there any hope, in the near future at least, of formally or even informally establishing a link between climate change and human rights in the UK? Is human rights based climate change litigation as ‘radical’ as David Hart suggests?
Consider, for example, the situation where the avoidance of further climate change damage was possible through adequate mitigation and/or adaptation, but where adaptation measures were not implemented due to financial or technical constraints. Leaving aside the issue of whether the State would be liable for a moment, could existing human rights be engaged in this situation?
The Joint Committee on Human Rights has published a report which proposes that the Government must urgently consider the human rights implications of its Covid-19 measures.
The report drew attention to eight problem areas, claiming:
On Friday, the Guardian reported on the earlier Freemovement.org quantitative analysis relating to deprivations of British citizenship. While it has been known and reported upon for some time, the analysis demonstrates a continued trend of increased deprivations, with a significant peak in 2017, when the number of people whose citizenship was removed soared by 600%.
Protected by Article 15 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights following the Second World War, the right to a nationality was described by Hannah Arendt as the very ‘right to have rights’. Nationality underpins individuals’ belonging to states, which can be the only true guarantors of individual self-governance through the medium of inalienable rights.
Prior to 2006, the power to remove citizenship had not been used since 1973. Now, strengthened by the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, which allowed the UK government to order deprivation of citizenship against its citizens where it believes it is ‘conducive to the public good’, 175 people have had their citizenship removed on national security grounds, and 286 due to fraud (even though the latter power relating to fraud was already enshrined in s.40 of the British Nationality Act 1981). The additional power to render individuals stateless was introduced by the Immigration Act 2014, under which the Secretary of State may remove citizenship where she has reasonable grounds for believing that the person deprived ‘is able’ to become a national of another country. This was most visibly achieved in the case of Shamima Begum, considered extensively on the UK Human Rights Blog.
Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19 – read judgment
Angus McCullough Q.C. and Shaheen Rahman from 1COR acted as Special Advocates earlier in these proceedings. They had nothing to do with the writing of this post.
On first glance, this was not a judgment about human rights. It concerned the definition of statelessness under article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, and raised issues of competence and jurisdiction in relation to EU citizenship. Its specific interest for human rights lawyers lies primarily in the observations about the principle of proportionality; and in where the case, which most certainly does raise human rights issues, is likely to go next.
The CJEU has ruled, in a first for that regulation, that the use of “Zero Tariff” contracts are inconsistent with its “Open Internet” regulation (Regulation 2015/2120). The regulation “aims to establish common rules to safeguard equal and non-discriminatory treatment of traffic in the provision of internet access services and end users’ rights”. Its intention is to legally establish the principle of ‘Net Neutrality’, whereby internet access providers are prohibited from giving preferential treatment (for example, limiting access or increasing traffic speeds) to specific websites and users.
The issue in this case was whether zero tariff contracts offered by Telenor, an Hungarian internet access provider, contravened net neutrality regulation. Zero tariff contracts provide data allowances to their users, (1 GB, for instance), which the consumer is allowed to use as they please. On running out of data, typically internet access would be stopped. However, in its two zero tariff contracts, called MyChat and MyMusic, certain websites and applications did not run down the data allowance. Furthermore, even once the data allowance had been used up, the same websites and applications could still be accessed, although otherwise no internet access was provided.
This week has been dominated by Shamima Begum. On Tuesday last week, Home Secretary Sajid Javid issued an order depriving Ms Begum of citizenship under s.40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981. The act authorises the Secretary of State to deprive a person of citizenship where this is “conducive to the public good” – but s.40(4) states that the order must not make the person stateless.
The Home Office claimed compliance with s.40(4) on the basis that Ms Begum could claim citizenship from Bangladesh, in light of her Bangladeshi heritage, until the age of 21. However, on Wednesday, the Bangladesh Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement that Ms Begum was not a Bangladeshi citizen, and that there was ‘no question’ of her being allowed into the country. Ms Begum herself told the BBC, “I wasn’t born in Bangladesh, I’ve never seen Bangladesh and I don’t even speak Bengali properly, so how can they claim I have Bangladeshi citizenship?”
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Broom v Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWHC 2695 (Admin) – Read Judgment
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