18 September 2018 by Rajkiran Barhey
In a landmark judgment on 6 September 2018, the Supreme Court of India decriminalised homosexuality.
The decision in Navtej Johar v Union of India was the culmination of years of tireless campaigning by LGBT rights activists in India. This article seeks to provide an overview of the road to that led to this judgment, alongside some interesting themes emerging from the decision of the Supreme Court.
Background: The Indian Penal Code of 1860
There is a widely-held view that, prior to the colonisation of India, same-sex relationships were not frowned upon. The source of the prohibition on homosexuality is the Indian Penal Code, enacted in the 1860s by the government of the British Raj. It is thought that the ban enacted by the British represented an attempt to ‘civilise’ the Indian population through the imposition of Victorian standards of morality
The provision in question, section 377, simply states:
Unnatural offences: Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
The Indian Constitution
Following independence in 1947, the Constitution of India became effective in 1950. It created a system in which laws deemed to be incompatible with the Constitution could be struck down by the Supreme Court. In this sense, the Indian Constitution is similar to the US Constitution, and differs from the UK constitutional model.
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17 September 2018 by Conor Monighan
Credit: The Guardian
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
In the News:
The CPS has said there is enough evidence to charge two Russian men with conspiracy to murder Sergei and Yulia Skripal. Although the Skripals survived, another lady called Dawn Sturgess later died of exposure to Novichok.
The two men visited Salisbury last March, at the same time the nerve agent attack took place. It is believed the two men, Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov, are military intelligence officers for GRU, the Russian security service. The CPS has not applied for their extradition because of Russia’s longstanding policy that it does not extradite its own nationals. A European Arrest Warrant has been obtained in case they travel to the EU.
In response, the two men have claimed they were merely tourists. In an appearance on Russia Today (RT), they said the purpose of their visit to Salisbury was to see its cathedral. Arguing that their presence was entirely innocent, the two men said they were following recommendations of friends. Petrov and Boshirov went on to say that, whilst they had wanted to see Stonehenge, they couldn’t because of “there was muddy slush everywhere”. The men insisted they were businessmen and that, whilst they might have been seen on the same street as the Skripals’ house, they did not know the ex-spy lived there. The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, has said they are “civilians” and that “there is nothing criminal about them”.
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13 September 2018 by Conor Monighan
Conor Monighan reviews the Administrative Law Bar Association (ALBA) Summer Conference 2018
This year’s ALBA conference featured an impressive list of speakers and they did not disappoint. Delegates heard from a Supreme Court judge, an Attorney General, top silks, and some of the best legal academics working in public law.
The conference dedicated much of its time to public international law, a discipline which is often thought to have little relevance for most public lawyers. In fact, the conference showed that domestic public law is heavily intertwined with international law. This post summarises the key points from the conference, with a particular focus on human rights.
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10 September 2018 by Guest Contributor
The Director of the SFO v ENRC [2018] EWCA Civ 2006 – read judgment
Eurasian Natural Resources Corp, the defendant to the Serious Fraud Office’s application to enforce notices seeking to compel the production of documents, has had a chequered history in the last 10 years since it came to the London market (in January 2014 it delisted and went private). In December 2010, a whistleblower alerted the company by email to serious allegations of corruption, fraud and bribery within its group.
After substantial internal enquiries and investigations on the part of ENRC and professionals instructed by it, accompanied by correspondence and meetings between the SFO and lawyers instructed by ENRC, in February 2016 the SFO issued a Part 8 claim against ENRC. This sought a declaration that documents in for specific categories were not “information or… Any document which ENRC would be entitled to refuse to disclose or produce on grounds of legal professional privilege in proceedings in the High Court” within the meaning of section 2 (9) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987. The SFO’s pleaded case was that neither litigation privilege nor legal professional privilege attached to the documents in the first place, not that any privilege had been waived.
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10 September 2018 by Eleanor Leydon
Image Credit: Guardian
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR & ORS VS. UNION OF INDIA, THR. SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE: India’s supreme court has unanimously ruled that section 377 of the penal code, which criminalises consensual sex acts between same sex adults, is unconstitutional.
The judgment accordingly decriminalises gay sex, in a landmark ruling for gay rights. Chief Justice Dipak Misra said in his decision that “Criminalising carnal intercourse under section 377 Indian penal code is irrational, indefensible and manifestly arbitrary.”
The 160-year-old law was imposed on India by the British empire as part of a package of laws against public vice. Thursday’s judgment follows 24 years of legal challenges: most recently, the Delhi high court ruled against section 377 in 2009, but was overturned by the supreme court in 2013.
The breakthrough for lawyers came in August 2017, when the supreme court held that there was a fundamental right to privacy. In an unprecedented move, five judges commented in that judgment that the 2013 section 377 decision was wrong.
Trinidad & Tobago’s high court will also rule this month on whether to decriminalise sex between men, and similar rulings on decriminalising gay sex are awaited in Kenya and Botswana.
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31 August 2018 by Rosalind English
In the matter of an application by Siobhan McLaughlin for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2018] UKSC 48- read judgment
An unmarried mother has won a landmark Supreme Court case which could allow cohabitees to claim Widowed Parent’s Allowance, a benefit previously only applicable to married parents.
Background
Widowed Parent’s Allowance (“WPA”) is a contributory non-means-tested, social security benefit payable to men and women with dependent children, who were widowed before March 2017. The widowed parent’s entitlement depends upon the contribution record of the deceased partner. Under the relevant law (“s39A”) the widowed parent can only claim the allowance if he or she was married to or the civil partner of the deceased.
The issue before the court was whether this requirement was an unjustifiable discrimination against the survivor and/or the children on the basis of their marital or birth status, contrary to Article 14 of the Convention on Human Rights together with the right to respect for family life under Article 8, or the protection of property rights in Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR.
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12 August 2018 by Guest Contributor
R (AR) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2018] UKSC 47 – read judgment
The Supreme Court has given important guidance on the correct approach of the appellate courts to assessing proportionality under the ECHR. The main issue before the court was whether an Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate (“ECRC”) issued in respect of the appellant, AR, under s.113B of the Police Act 1997 is compatible with Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights.
Background
AR was a married man with children, of good character, and a qualified teacher, and worked for a time as a taxi driver. It had been alleged that, in the early hours of 4 November 2009, he raped a 17 year old woman, who was a passenger in his taxi. AR’s defence was that there had never been sexual contact with the alleged victim. In January 2011 he was acquitted of rape by the Crown Court.
AR subsequently applied for an ECRC in connection with an application for a job as a lecturer. The police duly issued the ECRC which contained details of the rape charge for which AR had been acquitted. A second ECRC which also contained this information was later issued in respect of an application by AR to work as a private hire driver.
Having exhausted the various internal appeal mechanisms available to him, AR issued a claim for judicial review. Amongst other matters he argued that the inclusion in the ECRC of information concerning the rape charge and acquittal was procedurally unfair because it had been disclosed without consulting him. It was also said that the disclosure amounted to a substantive breach of Article 8.
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9 August 2018 by Rosalind English
In our ongoing reposts of Professor Catherine Barnard’s series 2903 CB, Catherine discusses her reaction to the publication of the government’s White Paper, the Cabinet resignations of David Davis and Boris Johnson, and the negotiating positions of the EU since the UK triggered Article 50 in March 2017.
Listen to Episode 41 of Law Pod UK Brexit – The White Paper now.
Available for free download from iTunes, Audioboom, Stitcher or wherever you get your podcasts. If you like what you hear, please subscribe, rate and leave a review to support our podcast.
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7 August 2018 by Matt Donmall
Kimathi & Ors v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2018] EWHC 1305 (QB) – read judgment.
Stewart J has recently dismissed the first test case in this group litigation, in which over 40,000 Kenyans bring claims for damages against the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, alleging abuse during the Kenyan Emergency of the 1950s and early 1960s, in Kimathi & Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2018] EWHC 2066 (QB). Jo Moore discusses this in her blog post of 6 August 2018.
Earlier this year however he considered, as a preliminary matter, whether fear, caused either by the tort of negligence or trespass, amounts to personal injury so that the Court has the discretionary power to exclude the 3-year limitation period which arises under section 11 of the 1980 Act. Stewart J concluded that “despite the comprehensive and innovative submissions of the Claimants” (para 37), which included arguments on human rights grounds, fear did not amount to a personal injury.
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6 August 2018 by Jo Moore
Kimathi & Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2018] EWHC 2066 (QB) read judgment
Stewart J has dismissed the first test case in this group litigation, in which over 40,000 Kenyans bring claims for damages against the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, alleging abuse during the Kenyan Emergency of the 1950s and early 1960s.
The mammoth hearing lasted 223 days, and the judgment accordingly runs to nearly 500 paragraphs. The decision turns on whether the judge should allow the claim to be heard over 50 years after the primary deadline expired.
In personal injury claims, section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 provides that in certain circumstances, a claim which would otherwise be out of time (“statute-barred”) can nevertheless be heard. The court has a discretion to disapply the usual three-year time limit where it is equitable. This involves balancing the prejudice to the defendant of facing a late claim against the prejudice the claimant will suffer if the claim is statute-barred.
In this test case, Stewart J determined that it would not be equitable to extend time in the claimant’s favour. The severe effects of the passage of time on the defendant’s ability to defend the claim was a crucial factor, particularly due to the depleted cogency of the evidence available, as were the lack of good reasons for the delay, and the very substantial length of the delay itself. This carefully reasoned judgment will provide detailed guidance for the trial of ‘stale’ claims.
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2 August 2018 by Rajkiran Barhey
NHS Trust v Y (by his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) and Others, Supreme Court 30 July 2018 – read judgment
The question for the Court was a simple but important one: whether the permission of a court was always required by law before doctors could withdraw feeding from a person in a persistent vegetative state.
Background
The patient at the heart of this case, known only as Y, had been an active man in his 50s before suffering a cardiac arrest which led to severe brain damage. He never regained consciousness and needed to be fed through a tube (known technically as “clinically assisted nutrition and hydration” or “CANH”) to stay alive.
Doctors had determined that Y was suffering from a “prolonged disorder of consciousness”known as “PDOC”.PDOC covers those who are in a persistent vegetative state and also those in a minimally conscious state, what we might informally call a coma.
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31 July 2018 by Rosalind English
JT v First Tier Tribunal [2018] EWCA Civ 1735 – read judgment
Between 1968 and 1975 the appellant JT was repeatedly assaulted and raped by her stepfather in her family home. Many years later, her assailant was prosecuted for those crimes and convicted on all counts in 2012. As a victim of violent sexual crime, JT applied for compensation under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. Her application was refused on the basis of the “same roof” rule, which stated that an award would not be made in respect of a criminal injury sustained before 1 October 1979
if, at the time of the incident giving rise to that injury, the applicant and the assailant were living together as members of the same family
This criterion may sound odd to anyone with a professional or even mild interest in crime stories, where the prime suspect is considered to be a member of the family of the victim, whether of rape, abuse, or even murder. But the thinking behind the rules – and there has to be a bright line for eligibility – was that there should be a requirement that the victim and the assailant no longer live together. This would at least suffice to ensure that the rapist or abuser would not benefit from the award accruing to his victim, and, if possible, is brought to justice.
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28 July 2018 by Guest Contributor
R (Maughan) v HM Senior Coroner Oxfordshire and others 26 July 2018
The received wisdom, supported by all leading texts on coroner’s law is that in order for a Coroner or jury to return a verdict of suicide in an inquest, the fact that the deceased deliberately took his own life must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, or in other words, to the criminal standard of proof.
Jervis states:
At least since 1984 it has been consistently held in England that the standard of proof in suicide cases should be the same as in criminal prosecutions… although there is no crime involved and an inquest is not a criminal trial. The comparative difficulty in obtaining a conclusion of suicide may well mean that official statistics significantly underestimate the occurrence of suicide.
The Form 2 prescribed by the Rules for the purposes of recording the conclusion of the inquest itself specifies that the criminal standard of proof applies for unlawful killing and suicide conclusions. The Guidance issued by the Chief Coroner (at paragraph 56) says the same thing.
Maughan
In an important judgment of the Divisional Court in R (Maughan) v HM Senior Coroner Oxfordshire and others [2018] EWHC 1955 (Admin) that position has now changed. The Court, Leggatt LJ and Nicol J, has found that the standard of proof is the civil standard of proof, i.e. the balance of probabilities. There case may go as the Court gave permission to appeal.
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27 July 2018 by Rosalind English
In our latest podcast, Rosalind English talks to University of Pennsylvania professor of regulation Cary Coglianese and Yale researcher David Lehr about the future of rule making with machine-learning algorithms at our side. Regulation by robot; adjudication by algorithm: a different, but fairer world?
Episode 40 available for free download from iTunes, Audioboom or wherever you get your podcasts.
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27 July 2018 by Guest Contributor
This article was originally published by the UK Constitutional Law Association, and can be found here.
There is an old joke, in which a man is driving through the countryside, lost. He stops his car in a small village to ask a local for directions. The local responds by saying: ‘you want to get where? Oh, to get there, I wouldn’t start from here.’
It’s a joke my children wouldn’t get, from another era, from an age before satnav and Google maps. Perhaps it should be retired. But it remains of contemporary relevance at least as a way of understanding the recent judgment of Richard v BBC. This is because it highlights the issue of framing: the way one perceives an issue dictates, to some extent, the way one attempts to deal with it. Framing is well known in journalism, as the way a journalist perceives an event – frames it – influences the way she will report on it. It also can be helpful in law. The way an advocate persuades a tribunal to perceive an event – frames it – dictates, to some extent, the conclusion the tribunal will reach. Every advocate knows that to get to a particular destination, it’s important to get the judge or jury to start from the right place.
Reading the 454 paragraphs of Mann J’s clear prose in Richard v BBC, we are left with little doubt how he framed the case. A well-beloved celebrity, Sir Cliff Richard, was unfairly accused of a horrendous crime, and was investigated, as was only right, by the police. But the police told the BBC this private information, which they shouldn’t have done, because they were pressurised into doing so by the BBC. The BBC prepared a report, dispatched a helicopter to shoot video through Sir Cliff’s windows of policemen searching his flat, and then published this to the world. This harmed Sir Cliff, who sued the police for informing the BBC, and the BBC for informing the world. Justice was done to Sir Cliff when Mann J resolved the dilemmas with which he was presented in favour of Sir Cliff.
Indeed, Mann J seems to have resolved all the dilemmas with which he was faced in favour of Sir Cliff. Many of these findings might be challenged, and some are supported by stronger reasoning than others. The BBC has indicated that it is considering appealing. This blog concentrates on one finding that can be challenged, as it is one that potentially has the most impact on public interest journalism. This is Mann J’s conclusion in paragraph 248 that a person under police investigation has a prima faciereasonable expectation of privacy in respect of that fact. The blog argues that, while an understandable conclusion given Mann J’s framing of Sir Cliff’s case, this finding erects a significant and substantial hurdle for those undertaking public interest journalism. That is a problem.
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