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Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
Credit: The Guardian
In the News:
Chelsea Manning, the ex-US intelligence analyst, was released from prison last week.
Manning was found guilty of a variety of charges in 2013, including espionage. She was subsequently given the longest sentence for a security leak in US history. After serving an initial period in jail, the remainder of her sentence was commuted by President Obama in 2017 on the basis that it was “disproportionate” to her crimes.
Ms. Manning has since refused to testify to a grand jury about her connections to WikiLeaks and Julian Assange (its founder). She claims that she has already given testimony as part of her trial in 2013, and objects to the grand jury system in principle. However, prosecutors have suggested that her evidence may have been inaccurate. A judge in Virginia ordered her to be taken into custody for 62 days.
She was released last week after the 62 day period elapsed. In the meantime, however, Ms. Manning was served with another subpoena which requires her to appear before a grand jury on May 16th in order to testify about the same issues. It seems likely, therefore, that she will be imprisoned again for contempt of court. Continue reading →
How can someone who suffers from severely limited sight avail herself of the process for making a mark on a paper ballot under the Representation of the People Act 1983?
In R (on the application of Rachel Andrews v Minister for the Cabinet Office [2019] EWHC 1126 (Admin) Swift J was presented with this very question, as the claimant, a sufferer from myopic macular degeneration who has been registered blind since 2000, was unable to vote without assistance, “either from the Presiding Officer at a Polling Station or a companion”
The main basis for her claim was that the regulations under the 1983 RPA have failed to achieve the purpose of prescribing the use of a device that enables blind and partially sighted voters to vote without assistance.
In the judgment, Swift J refers as short hand to “blind voters”, rather than “blind and partially sighted voters”.
Under challenge were the provisions for voting for blind voters. Rule 37 sets out the procedure thus:
The voter, on receiving the ballot paper, shall forthwith proceed into one of the compartments in the polling station and there secretly mark his paper and fold it up so as to conceal his vote, and shall then show to the presiding officer the back of the paper, so as to disclose the number and other unique identifying mark, and put the ballot paper so folded up into the ballot box in the presiding officer’s presence.
The provision for blind voters is limited to “at least one large version of the ballot paper” to be displayed at the polling station and
A device of such description which may be prescribed for enabling voters who are blind or partially-sighted to vote without the need for assistance from the presiding officer or any companion.
The device prescribed is a “tactile voting device” made from a sheet of plastic with a number of tabs, printed in Braille, corresponding to the number of candidates standing in the constituency. However there are a number of shortcomings with the TVD, including the fact that a blind person has no way of knowing the name of the candidate or the name of the party the candidate represents. The TVD only permits a blind person to vote without assistance if she or he has memorised the order of candidates on the ballot paper.
The claimant contended that this was unsatisfactory. Without the assistance of the poll officer or a companion there was no way that she could mark her ballot paper against the name of the candidate she wished to vote for. It was not realistic, she contended, to expect her to memorise not only all the names of the candidates but the order in which they appeared on the ballot paper. In the 2009 by-election in her constituency for example there were twelve candidates. The position becomes even more complicated if more than one election takes place on the same day.>
This effectively denied her the opportunity to cast her ballot in secret.
The question before the court was the precise meaning of the words in Rule 29(3A) making provision for blind voters:
…a device … for enabling voters who are blind or partially-sighted to vote without any need for assistance from the presiding officer or any companion …
The judge concluded that a device that enabled a blind voter to vote without the need for the assistance that could be provided by a Presiding Officer or companion would need to do more than the present TVD.
It would, at the least, have to comprise a fuller TVD of the sort suggested by the Claimant, which in addition to the numbered tabs has the name of each candidate and/or the party she stands for, either in raised lettering, or Braille, or both.
This was because of what it means to vote, which extends beyond the dictionary definition of the word. The respondent claimed that it meant the mere marking of one of the areas indicated on the ballot paper. But, in Swift J’s view, there was more to it, as indicated by the rules on spoilt ballot papers, which reflect
the clear (and to my mind obvious) connection between marking the ballot paper and choice. Voting under the rules means marking a ballot paper so as to indicate an intention to vote for one or other candidate….A device that does no more than enable blind voters to identify where on a ballot paper the cross can be marked, without being able to distinguish one candidate from another, does not in any realistic sense enable that person to vote. Enabling a blind voter to mark ballot papers without being able to know which candidate she is voting for, is a parody of the electoral process established under the Rules. [paras 21 – 22]
His conclusion was that the present TVD did not represent the fullest possible use of the power at Rule 29(3A). In order to enable a blind person to vote, a device must allow the blind voter to mark the ballot paper against the name of her candidate of choice. Declaratory relief was ordered to that effect.
Matthew Fisher is a doctor and aspiring barrister with an interest and experience in MedTech.
Josef. K the protagonist of Kafka’s novel ‘The Trial’ was an ambitious and successful banker prior to his unexpected arrest. The criminal charges brought against him were never explained because they were beyond the comprehension of all but the most senior judges. Attempting to understand his guilt, consumed K’s every thought – he was distracted at work, subservient to his lawyer and ultimately docile when led to his execution. ‘The Trial’ eloquently argued that transparency is a prerequisite of accountability. In the Age of the Algorithm, Kafka’s novel is now more relevant than ever.
Machine learning algorithms increasingly regulate our lives making decisions about us in finance, education, employment and justice. Ultimately, it will become pervasive in most, if not all aspects of decision making in the foreseeable future. But what is a machine learning algorithm? How does it decide? What rights do data subjects have? This article aims to answer all three of these questions.
Usually when a court in the UK is asked to consider a question of foreign law, the contents of that law are treated as a question of fact that must be pleaded and proved by the parties, usually by expert opinion. This is the case too in the United States, and in Hong Kong.
If the parties do not adduce factual evidence on the contents of the foreign law concerned, the English court will assume that the foreign law is exactly the same as the relevant English law – this is the common law notion of “presumption of identity”. This means, in effect, that where there is no foreign precedent on the point in question, or where the authorities are in conflict, the court must decide the matter for itself.
In an interesting briefing published by Links Law Office as part of their Dispute Resolution Bulletin, authors Patrick Zheng and Charles Qin explain that in China it is not clear whether foreign law constitutes a question of law or fact, as the Chinese court retains the power to investigate and clarify the applicable foreign law of its own motion.
Chinese law provides a number of ways for the parties and the court to “investigate and clarify” the applicable foreign law, including submissions by the parties, or the relevant foreign embassy, Chinese or foreign legal experts or “any other reasonable way to find foreign law, for example through the internet”.
TM (Kenya) concerned a 40 year old Kenyan woman who faced deportation after her applications for leave to remain and asylum were rejected by the Home Office. She had been detained at Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in advance of proceedings to remove her from the country, during which time she had been uncooperative with staff. In light of her behaviour and in advance of her removal to Kenya, she was removed from free association with other detainees. Such detention was authorised by the Home Office Immigration Enforcement Manager at Yarl’s Wood, who was also the appointed “contract monitor” at the centre for the purposes of section 49 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.
She sought judicial review of the decision to deprive her of free association. The initial application was refused. She appealed to the Court of Appeal where she advanced three grounds, including that her detention was not properly authorised.
The court found no conflict in the dual positions held by the manager at Yarl’s Wood. The Home Secretary had legitimately authorised her detention under the principles described in Carltona Limited v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560. In addition, there was no obligation to develop a formal policy concerning removal from free association, as Rule 40 of the Detention Centre Rules 2001 was sufficiently clear to meet the needs of transparency. Continue reading →
Angus McCullough QC is a barrister at One Crown Office Row. Read Part 1 about Anonymity orders in Personal Injury proceedings here.
In Part 1 we looked at the circumstances in which a court may be prepared to grant anonymity in personal injury proceedings, and the applicable principles. In Part 2 I consider practical issues in the drafting of these orders, and problems encountered in this.
In particular, I will suggest that the standard Court Form PF10, that is now frequently being adopted, is generally inappropriate for anonymity orders in personal injury proceedings.
Law Pod UK is available on Spotify, iTunes,Audioboom, Podbean or wherever you listen to our podcasts. Please remember to rate and review us if you like what you hear.
Amendments to CPR r.39.2; new Guidance issued by the Master of the Rolls; and a recent High Court decision refusing anonymity to a claimant prompt this review of anonymity orders in personal injury proceedings.
You act for someone who is vulnerable as a result of a serious brain injury. Her claim has been settled, and as a result your client is due to receive a large award of compensation, of several million pounds. The Court’s approval of the settlement is required (under the Civil Procedure Rules r.21.10). There is a concern that if there is publicity about the award your vulnerable client will be targeted and exploited by unscrupulous individuals. However, principles of open justice, and rights under Article 10 (freedom of speech), are engaged and favour unrestricted reporting of court proceedings.
Mourners including Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar, Sinn Fein leader Mary Lou McDonald, DUP leader Arlene Foster and SNP leader Ian Blackford give a standing ovation after Fr Martin Magill’s speech at the funeral of journalist Lyra McKee in Belfast – April 24th 2019. Credit: The Guardian.
This week saw the senior courts continue their Easter vacation between the Hilary and Easter Terms. Consequently, neither the Supreme Court, Civil Division of the Court of Appeal or Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court recorded any new decisions in the week commencing April 22nd.
Luckily for the writer of this Blog, the European Court of Human Rights does not share the relaxed attitude of the domestic courts towards Easter working, and on the April 25th gave judgement in the case of VM v United Kingdom (No 2).
The case concerned a Nigerian woman who entered the United Kingdom illegally in 2003. She subsequently pleaded guilty to cruelty to her son and was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment with a recommendation she be deported at the end of her sentence. Pursuant to this, upon her release, she was detained under immigration powers for two years and ten months.
In the 1980s the European Commission embarked upon an ambitious scheme to cultivate, on the basis of free movement, the idea of EU citizenship in higher education. Universities have long been seen as places of national citizenship formation. The Erasmus scheme was designed to further the notion of citizenship untethered to the nation state by funding and therefore encouraging student mobility.
Law Pod UK is available on Audioboom, iTunes, Spotify, Podbean or wherever you listen to our podcasts. Please remember to rate and review us if you like what you hear.
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law
Credit: The Guardian
In the News:
Lord Sumption, the recently retired Supreme Court judge, has suggested that the law on assisted suicide ought to be broken.
Lord Sumption said that whilst assisted suicide should continue to be criminalised, relatives of terminally ill patients should follow their conscience and not always abide by it. As he put it, “the law should be broken from time to time”.
The former judge argued that the law’s current position helps prevent abuse, and that any change to it could only be produced by a political process.
His comments were made as part of the Reith Lectures, a series of annual radio lectures on BBC Radio 4. Lord Sumption’s lectures ask whether the legal process has begun to usurp the legislative function of Parliament. His first lecture will be made available on the 21st May.
In Other News….
Research has revealed that 55,000 pupils have changed schools for no clear reason during the past five years. A report from the Education Policy Institute suggests some schools have been unofficially excluding students with challenging behaviour or poor academic results, as part of a practice known as “off-rolling”. One in 12 pupils who began education in 2012 and finished in 2017 were removed at some stage for an unknown reason. Just 330 secondary schools account for almost a quarter of unexplained moves. The Department for Education said it was looking into the issue, and that it had written to all schools to remind them of the rules on exclusions. More from The Week here.
Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) has warned that the rights of detained children are being repeatedly breached. In a report published last Thursday, it recommended that Young Offenders’ Institutions should be banned from deliberately inflicting pain on young offenders and from putting them in solitary confinement. It found that hospitals and jails are restraining children too frequently, and that such techniques are being used disproportionately against ethnic minorities. Around 2,500 young people are in detention at present. More from the Guardian here.
The activities of Extension Rebellion, the climate change group, sparked discussion and controversy this week. The organisation has three core demands: greater transparency about climate change, a legally binding commitment to zero carbon emissions by 2025, and the creation of a citizens’ assembly to oversee the issue. The group has staged protests in London for the past week, which has included shutting down a large portion of Oxford Street. Over 800 people have been arrested. The group has been criticised for adding pressure on already overburdened police force, and for the disruption caused to people’s lives and businesses. Extinction Rebellion has announced that it will pause its protests for the duration of next week. More from the BBC here.
Codified constitutions are most commonly adopted following a major schism with the previous order. For example, following an armed uprising such as the American War of Independence or the French Revolution. The sweeping away of the old regime, of necessity, demands the creation of new fundamental principles and rules to organise the State. A codified constitution also presents an opportunity to set out the core values on which the nation can rally around. It is commonly asserted that the lack of such a critical break in UK history since the 17th century explains the absence of a codified constitution.
On Monday last week, the government published its long-awaited white paper on online harms. The paper states that the the government will establish a new statutory duty of care on these companies to ‘take reasonable steps to keep their users safe and tackle illegal and harmful activity on their services’. A new regulator will have formidable powers and sanctions at its disposal to oversee and enforce the fulfilment of this duty.
The document was praised by John Naughton in the Guardian as a global first: the first time the government of a major country has attempted to regulate social media companies. He celebrates the paper’s ‘flexible and, at least to some extent, future-proof’ approach as a savvy first step on the road to online regulation.
Conversely, writing in The Times, Greg Hurst criticised the paper for ducking key questions and deferring decision on controversial decisions, characterising it as ‘an important tactical victory’ for social media platforms eager to evade tighter control. In particular, he noted the paper’s insistence that the regulator’s focus should be on ‘on protecting users from harm, not judging what is true or not’, a distinction he called ‘at best hard to maintain and, at worst, unsustainable.’
Commentators across the political spectrum noted that the paper’s implications for free speech were a source of tension and alarm. The paper identifies disinformation or ‘fake news’ as one of many online harms, and says that social media platforms will be expected to use fact-checking services and take action against disseminators of misinformation. The Spectator’s Toby Young states that the proposals pose ‘an unprecedented threat to free speech and could easily be used to impose a censorious code of conduct on newspapers and magazines’; in The Guardian, Alex Hern warned that the measures might prove ‘dangerous’ by ‘creating a regulator without the power to prevent the worst abuse, but with just enough power to scare away the best innovations.’
The intersection of online activity with freedom of expression was also brought into focus by the expulsion of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange from the Ecuadorean embassy on Thursday. Mr Assange faces charges of sexual assault and criminal theft of US state secrets, and the possibility of a US prison sentence, after Ecuador revoked his asylum and allowed officers from Scotland Yard to remove him from the premises.
A leading article in the Sunday Times argued that Mr Assange’s fate should be left to the courts. Elsewhere, however, Ed Pilkington focused on the indictment’s ‘potentially devastating effect on the basic acts of journalism’. The attitude of many commentators and advocacy groups can be summed up in these words, from a statement by the Freedom of the Press Foundation: ‘Whether or not you like Assange, the charge against him is a serious press freedom threat and should be vigorously protested.’
In Other News
On Thursday, Omar al-Bashir, the military officer who took power in Sudan in 1989, was overthrown. Mr Bashir is the subject of an international arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC), which accuses him of organising war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sudan’s western Darfur region. While the Sudanese people have celebrated the toppling of a regime that has overseen decades of brutal repression and a desperate economic crisis, it remains unclear whether the generals behind the military coup intend to hand power over to civilian rule.
In a decision described as a ‘devastating blow for victims’, the ICC has rejected a request to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity in Afghanistan, citing a lack of cooperation from the US, Afghan authorities and the Taliban.
In the Courts
Miller and Others v The United Kingdom [2019] ECHR 285 (11 April 2019): The applicants complained that under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that as convicted prisoners in detention they had been subject to a blanket ban on voting in elections. The ECHR unanimously declared the applications admissible, and held that the finding of a violation alone was sufficient satisfaction for the applicants.
Vedanta Resources PLC and another (Appellants) v Lungowe and others (Respondents) [2019] UKSC 20: The Supreme Court heard a procedural appeal about the jurisdiction of the English courts in relation to a group tort claim. The claimants (the respondents to this appeal) are approximately 1,826 Zambian citizens who allege their health and farming activities have been damaged by toxic emissions from the Nchanga Copper Mine into the waterways upon which they rely for drinking water and crop irrigation. The United Nations has recognised access to clean drinking water as an essential human right; this case also engages Article 6 (the right to a fair trial), Article 1 (the right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s own property) and potentially Article 2 (the right to life). The court found that England was not the ‘proper place’ for the proceedings. However, since there was a real risk that substantial justice would not be obtainable in a more appropriate foreign jurisdiction, namely Zambia, this finding was academic.
Secretary of State for the Home Department v AB (Jamaica) & Anor [2019] EWCA Civ 661: The Court of Appeal heard two separate appeals brought by the Secretary of State against decisions of the Upper Tribunal, which found that the public interest did not require the removal of either Respondent, on the ground of Article 8 (the right to respect for family life). The court found that AB, a father who saw his son three times a week to assist with homework, had a ‘genuine and subsisting relationship’. AO, a father who was only permitted ‘indirect contact’ with his son, did not. The Secretary of State’s appeal was dismissed in the case of AB and allowed in the case of AO.
On the UKHRB:
Jeremy Hyam QC encourages the GMC and the medical profession to reflect as Dr Bawa Garba, a paediatrician convicted of gross negligence manslaughter in November 2015, returns to work.
It was fitting but tinged with irony, that the GMC itself, in its submissions to recent the MPTS review of Dr Bawa-Garba’s suspension maintained that the ‘appropriate and proportionate sanction’ to reflect her continuing ‘impairment’ of fitness to practice was now a period of conditional registration having regard to Dr Bawa-Garba’s ‘absence from active clinical practice’, and also taking into account the evidence of ‘Dr Bawa-Garba’s positive and continuing remediation to date’.
This after all is the ST6 (a specialist registrar in her 6th
year of post-graduate training) paediatrician who was convicted by a jury on 4
November 2015 of gross negligence manslaughter, and given a suspended sentence
of imprisonment by the Judge trying her case. The doctor who – given her
suspended sentence, her undisputed insight and reflective learning from past
events, and the support of her employing Trust was initially suspended rather
than erased by the MPTS in November 2017 for the maximum 12 month period but
with a review at the end of her suspension.
It is most likely that, had that decision been left undisputed by the GMC, then Dr Bawa Garba who continued then, as now, to have the fulsome support of her employer and colleagues, would have returned to work under supervision at the end of her suspended sentence. That would have been in or about November 2017. But that was not what happened.
In Boyd & Anor v Ineos Upstream Ltd & Ors [2019] EWCA Civ 515, the Court of Appeal handed down a fascinating judgment exploring the tension between the exercise of the rights to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression and the protection of property rights.
The case concerned injunctions ordered against “persons unknown”. In the High Court, the Ineos Group of companies (known for their prominence in the UK shale gas exploration market) had obtained interim injunctions against a collection of as yet unidentifiable defendants. The applications were made to guard against the perceived risk of fracking demonstrations becoming unlawful protests at several sites owned or operated by Ineos.
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