By: Rosalind English

Azelle Rodney Inquiry lawyers can see surveillance film footage

16 October 2012 by Rosalind English

R (on the application of the Metropolitan Police Service) v the Chairman of the Inquiry into the Death of Azelle Rodney and Interested Parties [2012] EWHA 2783 (Admin) – read judgment

The public inquiry into the death of Azelle Rodney, which commenced in 2010, was still under way when it was interrupted by the present dispute. It concerned the issue whether police surveillance footage taken from the air, showing Azelle Rodney’s movements in the two hours before his death, should be disclosed to the legal team representing his mother at the Inquiry.

The Chairman of the Inquiry decided to permit disclosure and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) took these proceedings to challenge the decision.

The footage was shot during a 2005 drug heist operation involving Mr Rodney, 25, who was shot six times at point-blank range after a car chase. One of the issues of importance to the deceased’s mother (Ms Alexander, the First Interested Party)  was whether there had been a better opportunity to stop the car and its occupants at any time before the hard-stop which resulted in Mr Rodney’s death. This issue involved consideration by the Inquiry of the management of the surveillance/stop operation by senior officers. The officer in charge of the operation is due to give his evidence and to be questioned by Ms Alexander’s counsel. 
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Dignity, Death and Deprivation of Liberty: Human Rights in the Court of Protection

12 October 2012 by Rosalind English

Wednesday’s debate on current key topics in the Court of Protection was a hard-hitting discussion on matters which elicit strong views, such as voluntary euthanasia, assisted suicide, the role of “dignity” and “sanctity of life”, and whether the latter two principles can ever be reconciled.

The fact that these are not essentially legal issues was underscored by the inclusion of ethics philosopher on the interventionist panel, Professor Anthony Grayling, who fielded the questions put to him alongside Philip Havers QC and Leigh Day solicitor Richard Stein. A video of the event will shortly be available on the 1 Crown Office Row website so I shall try to refrain from any spoilers, but here is a brief trailer to whet the appetite for a full recapitulation.

The evening started with a consideration of the Nicklinson and Martin cases, on voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide respectively. There were a number of questions put to the panel which essentially rolled up into this:

Should voluntary euthanasia be a possible defence to murder, or can we justify action with a primary purpose of killing a person on the grounds of preventing that person’s harm or suffering?

The panel was broadly in agreement that it should. Richard Stein observed that the argument that there can never be adequate safeguards to protect the vulnerable  is being used as a “smokescreen”, and, equally, the notion that disabled people cannot exercise their free will to die because it reduces the value of disabled lives is a “hugely patronising” one.
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Autonomy and the role of the Official Solicitor – whose interests are really being represented?

10 October 2012 by Rosalind English

R.P. and others v United Kingdom (9 October 2012) – read judgment

The day before our seminar on the Court of Protection and the right to autonomy, the Strasbourg Court has ruled on a closely related issue in a fascinating challenge to the role of the Official Solicitor in making decisions on behalf of individuals who are for one reason or another unable to act for themselves.

The Official Solicitor acts for people who, because they lack mental capacity and cannot properly manage their own affairs, are unable to represent themselves and no other suitable person or agency is able and willing to act. This particular case involved child care proceedings, but the question before the Court was the vital one that arises out of any situation where an individual is deemed to have lost capacity to represent his or her own interests in court. What the parties asked the Court to consider was whether

the appointment of the Official Solicitor in the present case was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued or whether it impaired the very essence of R.P.’s right of access to a court.
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South African Constitutional Court flexes its muscles on prior restraint

8 October 2012 by Rosalind English

Print Media South Africa v Minister of Home Affairs  ([2012] ZACC 22) – read judgment.

In a “momentous”  ruling on freedom of speech, the Constitutional Court has struck down a legislative provision on prior restraint,  “based on vague and overly broad criteria”, as offensive to the right to freedom of expression.

As the attorney for the amicus curiae Dario Milo explains in the Weekly Mail and Guardian (reposted on Inforrm), the court went even further than the relief contended for by the applicants, by striking down the entire provision as unconstitutional, rather than allowing certain criteria to be clarified  in accordance with the Bill of Rights.

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Mau mau torture claims against Foreign Office not time barred rules High Court

5 October 2012 by Rosalind English

Ndiki Mutua and others v the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – read judgment

1 Crown Office Row’s Guy Mansfield QC acted for the Defendant, Henry Witcomb  assisted by Maria Roche acted for the Claimants and Elizabeth-Ann Gumbel QC acted for intervener. None of them had anything to do with the writing of this post.

Although any claims regarding alleged acts of torture on Kenyan detainees during the 1950s state of emergency are technically time barred the High Court has allowed three of the claims to go ahead. 

This was a trial of a preliminary issue in the Mau Mau detention camps case concerning the matter of limitation of claims for personal injury. In principle,  the primary limitation periods in respect of the claims respectively ended in September 1960, 3 March 1962 and on dates in 1963 which are unclear. The period of delay was approximately fifty years in duration, i.e. from between 1960/1963 to the issue of these proceedings on 23 June 2009. The events to be investigated at any trial would extend back to 1952 at least, a period of 60 years or more by the likely date of trial.

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Government should have consulted Child Poverty Commission on welfare strategy

2 October 2012 by Rosalind English

Child Poverty Action Group, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2012] EWHC 2579 (Admin) (17 July 2012) – read judgment

The High Court has ruled that the government acted unlawfully by removing the Child Poverty Commission, an advisory body set up under the Child Poverty Act 2010 . They had also acted beyond their powers by preparing a child poverty strategy without having requested and having regard to the advice of that Commission. But government is free to formulate new policy and as such there was nothing irrational about the strategy itself.

There is of necessity a great deal of statutory construction in this judgment which makes for dry reading. But the ruling is an important reassessment of the principles of judicial review that have taken root since the power of the courts to intervene in government decision making was reinforced in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147. This ruling, as every law student knows, established that a public body acts unlawfully, both in the narrow sense of acting outside its jurisdiction, and where such jurisdiction was wrongly exercised. This means that courts may intervene not just where a governmental act is unlawful under an express provision of the statute but also where the decision or policy, although authorised by statute, has been made in breach of a rule of public law.
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US Supreme Court to rule on affirmative action

1 October 2012 by Rosalind English

The US Supreme Court’s term begins today, and race relations is at the top of the court’s agenda. The US press hails Fisher v University of Texas as the most important case the Court has agreed to hear thus far. Word is out that it could sound the death knell for affirmative action in the United States.

The justices are being asked to decide whether race-based affirmative action in college admissions is still constitutional.  The petitioner is a white student who was turned down by the University of Texas in 2008. She claims she was a victim of illegal race discrimination under their policy of affirmative action.

In 1997 the Texas legislature enacted a law requiring the University of Texas to admit all Texas high school seniors ranking in the top ten percent of their classes.   Whilst this measure improved access to tertiary education for many, the colleges protested at having their hands tied with regard to highly talented students who showed promise in certain subjects but did not come in to the top ten percent (including minority students in highly integrated high schools).  To redress this balance the Supreme Court ruled in 2003 that universities could consider a minority student’s race as a “plus factor” in admissions. The Court based its ruling on the need for colleges to ensure a diverse student body. Following this judgment, the University of Texas added a new affirmative action policy to go along with the automatic admission rule  with race being a “plus factor” in admission.
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Interfering with electricity meters is a matter of EU law – although not in the way you think

25 September 2012 by Rosalind English

   Valeri Hariev Belov [2012] EUECJ Case C-394/11 20 September 2012 – read opinion

For the first time the European Court of Justice (CJEU) has been asked to address the issue of indirect discrimination based on ethnic origin and the possible justifications for such discrimination.

The question, put before it as a reference on a preliminary issue from the Bulgarian Commission for Protection against Discrimination (the “KZD”), is this:

 Is it discriminatory if, in districts which are inhabited predominantly by a people belonging to a certain ethnic minority, electricity meters are suspended much higher than elsewhere?

The Court has thus been given an opportunity to refine its case-law on the ‘anti-discrimination directives’ – in the present case the Directive 2000/43/EC (the “race directive”).

Background facts

What led to this dispute was the practice in two districts of the Bulgarian city of Montana, of attaching electricity meters to electricity poles at a height of 7 m, whilst elsewhere electricity meters are installed at a maximum height of 1.70 m, such that they are accessible for consumers. The districts in question are inhabited primarily by people belonging to the Roma community, and the question therefore arises whether this practice constitutes discrimination based on ethnic origin.

As the electricity authority’s written observations to the court explained, the measure was taken because of the increasing incidence of unpaid bills in the two urban districts and the frequent offences committed by consumers which impair or threaten the safety, quality and continuous and secure operation of the electrical installations. The AG  succinctly  describes of the problem, and the solution to it:

Manipulation and unauthorised electricity extraction are undoubtedly made more difficult if electricity meters and distribution boxes are placed at a height of 7 m, which is normally inaccessible for consumers

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Can an individual claim ownership of “life’s instructions” – a human gene?

20 September 2012 by Rosalind English

Yes, says the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, upholding the validity of human gene patents related to breast and ovarian cancer (Association for Molecular Pathology and others v the Patent Office and Myriad Genetics – read judgment) UPDATED

The three judge panel ruled in a 2-1 decision that the biotechnology company Myriad was entitled to its patents on the molecules because each of them represented “a non-naturally occurring composition of matter”. The court also upheld Myriad’s patent on a technique for identifying potential cancer therapies by monitoring effects on cell growth, but denied their claim on assessing cancer risk by comparing DNA sequences because the method is based on “abstract, mental steps” of logic that are not “transformative”.

This fascinating judgment is a model of clarity and fluency in this difficult area. But what does this intellectual property tussle have to do with human rights? Well, there is nothing unfamiliar to human rights lawyers in litigation over the availability of life-saving treatment  (patient B, the Herceptin case and the antiretroviral litigation in South Africa are three examples that spring to mind). And much of it begins in the laboratory, with the critical allocation of exclusivity rights.
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Strasbourg applications: some aspects of the “six months” rule

18 September 2012 by Rosalind English

Another brief guide to the admissibility conditions to the Strasbourg Court. This one is on the “six months rule” laid down in paragraph 1 of Article 35.

The Court may only deal with the matter … within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.

Easy enough to state; the difficulty lies in identifying the “final decision”, in other words the point at which the six months starts to run. Here are the broad guidelines to be identified from the case law (and for this I am indebted to Karen Reid’s excellent and detailed Practitioner’s Guide (Third Edition 2008 Sweet & Maxwell).

1. No waiver

It is worth mentioning at the outset that the six month rule is imposed irrespective of the wishes of the parties or court; the rule cannot be waived (X v France (1982):

The Contracting States cannot, on their own authority, put aside the rule of compliance with the six-months time limit. The deposit bv a State of a declaration made under Article 25[now 35] of the Convention does not affect the running of this delay
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How do you “exhaust local remedies” for the purpose of applying to Strasbourg?

17 September 2012 by Rosalind English

Following David Hart’s guide to taking a human rights point in local and regional courts, here is an attempt to explain what is meant by the requirement set out in Article 35 of the Convention, that any petitioner before the court has to “exhaust” their local remedies before their complaint will be considered.

The rule of exhaustion of local remedies started as an international law principle relating to diplomatic protection.  The idea was that a measure of respect should be accorded to the respondent state and its legal rules. In human rights law, the rule of local remedies is based on the principle that states should be primary enforcers of Convention rights.  But very soon after the Convention went into operation,  certain limitations grew up around the rule as a result of the consideration of the interests of the individual. It was felt that unlike diplomatic procedures, the application of the rule should conform to fairness and not cause the individual undue hardship in securing a reasonably quick resolution in Strasbourg.  In effect, petitioners are not prevented from bringing cases straight to the Strasbourg Court without first going through the national authorities, it is simply that if they do so, it is open to the respondent state to assert inadmissibility based on non-exhaustion. In practice this means that when the respondent state is formally informed of the petition and requested to submit observations, it must satisfy the court that remedies have been available and sufficient at the relevant time. Once this is established the burden passes to the petitioner to prove that local remedies have been exhausted.

Of course if the government fails to assert non-exhaustion under Article 35 prior to the Court’s decision on admissibility the matter will proceed to an examination on the merits by default; the government is effectively estopped by its own delay from protesting the point.
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Can morality be explained by science? Do human rights = echr1(hra − 1) + echr2(hra − 2)

14 September 2012 by Rosalind English

As scientists gather more and more information about the very large and the very small, where will they stop? Put another way, if ethics and religion can’t deliver, do we look to science for an answer?

The novelist Ian McEwan has no hesitation in incorporating the latest discoveries in physics and neuroscience in the messy psychological drama that constitutes a novel; in his latest bestseller  he investigates the possibility of embedding a mathematical problem within an ethical one which drives along the story within the story. And last week the Guardian hosted a debate between physicist Lawrence Krauss and Julian Baggini on whether science can provide better answers to the big questions of morality than any of the canons of philosophy; now we have a report from the USA in which a Georgia Tech professor has hypothesized lethal weapons systems that are ethically superior to human soldiers on the battlefield (by substituting for the unreliable human hairbreadth trigger robots that are programmed to comply with international rules of war).

 our understanding of neurobiology and evolutionary biology and psychology will reduce our understanding of morality to some well-defined biological constructs.
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Mere faults in prison investigation does not breach Article 3 rules Court of Appeal

14 September 2012 by Rosalind English

R (NM) Secretary v of State for Justice [2012] EWCA Civ 1182 – read judgment

The Court of Appeal has ruled that a prison had conducted an adequate investigation into a sexual assault on a prisoner with learning disabilities and this complied with the prison’s investigative obligation under Article 3  of the European Convention on Human Rights. See our post on the decision below here for the background facts.

Briefly, instead of a formal investigation, the matter was investigated by prison officers under the prison’s violence reduction strategy. The other prisoner (F) admitted assaulting the appellant. But the Secretary of State refused a PSO 1300 formal investigation, asserting that a sufficient investigation had taken place. Judicial review of this refusal was dismissed, although the judge noted that the appellant’s disability had been overlooked as the investigating officers were unaware of it and that the prison’s disability policy should have led to the appointment of an appropriate adult for him. Nevertheless HHJ Mackie QC concluded that the investigation had been reasonable and did not breach Article 3 or PSO 1300.

In this appeal it was submitted that the judge erred in concluding that the prison’s investigation complied with Article 3.
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Are Christians really marginalised in this country?

7 September 2012 by Rosalind English

We will have to wait some time before Strasbourg hands down its judgment in the religious discrimination cases it heard earlier this week.

Whatever the outcome – which is perhaps predictable – the Court’s ruling will have a significant influence on the place of religion in public life and on how the relationship between religion and the state should be structured to reflect the aims of fairness and mutual respect envisaged in the Convention.

The Equality and Human Rights Commission argues in its intervention submission that Strasbourg – and the UK courts – should move on from their “restrictive” interpretation of Article 9, summed up by Lord Bingham’s oft-cited description of the Court’s position in R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15

The Strasbourg institutions have not been at all ready to find an interference with the right to manifest a religious belief in practice or observance where a person has voluntarily accepted an employment or role which does not accommodate that practice or observance and there are other means open to the person to practise or observe his or her religion without undue hardship or inconvenience.[para 23]

(This is a revised intervention after the EHRC responded to widespread criticism of its proposed argument in support of “reasonable accommodation” of employees’ beliefs – see Alasdair Henderson’s post on this dust-up “Leap of Faith” and our following post on the reversal of the EHRC’s position.)
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Religious freedom in UK to be considered by Strasbourg Court

3 September 2012 by Rosalind English

Macfarlane and others v United Kingdom (ECHR 329 (2012) – read press release

Tomorrow the Strasbourg Court will hear complaints in four applications that UK law has failed adequately to protect the applicants’ right to manifest their religion, contrary to Articles 9 (freedom of religion) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination). See our posts on these cases here and here, and in the related Preddy case here.

All four applicants are practising Christians who complain that UK law did not sufficiently protect their rights to freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination at work. Ms Eweida, a British Airways employee, and Ms Chaplin, a geriatrics nurse, complain that their employers placed restrictions on their visibly wearing Christian crosses around their necks while at work. Ms Ladele, a Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages, and Mr McFarlane, a Relate counsellor, complain about their dismissal for refusing to carry out certain of their duties which they considered would condone homosexuality.  Their challenges to their consequent dismissal were rejected by the UK courts on the basis that their employers were entitled to refuse to accommodate views which contradicted their fundamental declared principles – and, all the more so, where these principles were required by law, notably under the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007.

The judgment is awaited with considerable anticipation: the National Secular Society and the Equality and Human Rights Commission have both filed  intervening submissions under Rule 44 §3 of the Rules of the Court.