By: Rosalind English
30 October 2012 by Rosalind English
R (on the application of J) v the Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall [2012] EWHC 2996, 26 October 2012 – read judgment
Close on the heels of last week’s decision regarding disclosure of information from the Child Sex Offenders Register comes this ruling on the police decision to disclose certain information from a nurse’s enhanced criminal records certificates without affording her an opportunity to make representations before the information was released.
The Legal Framework
Section 113B of the Police Act 1997 provides for enhanced criminal record checks to be carried out in various specified circumstances, such as where people are applying to work with children or vulnerable adults. The check is enhanced in the sense that it will involve a check with local police records as well as the centralised computer records held by the Criminal Records Bureau. As well as information about minor convictions and cautions, it will reveal allegations held on local police records about the applicant’s criminal or other behaviour which have not been tested at trial or led to a conviction.If the information satisfies certain threshold tests in the relevant statute, it must be given to the Secretary of State who must include it in the relevant individual’s Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate or “ECRC.”
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29 October 2012 by Rosalind English
X (South Yorkshire) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Chief Constable of Yorkshire [2012] EWHC 2954 (Admin)- read judgment
The High Court has made an important ruling about the disclosure of information under the Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme (CSOD).
This non statutory arrangement has been in place since March 2010. It allows members of the public to seek details from the police of a person who has some form of contact with children with a view to ascertaining whether that person has had convictions for sexual offences against children or whether there is other “relevant information” about them which ought to be made available. This request could come from any third party such as a grandparent, neighbour or friend. The aim of the scheme is described thus:
This is to ensure any safeguarding concerns are thoroughly investigated. A third party making an application would not necessarily receive disclosure as a more appropriate person to receive disclosure may be a parent, guardian or carer. In the event that the subject has convictions for sexual offences against children, poses a risk of causing harm to the child concerned and disclosure is necessary to protect the child, there is a presumption that this information will be disclosed.
Anya Proops’ post on the Panopticon blog sets out a clear summary and analysis of the ruling by the President of the Queen’s Bench Division and Hickinbottom J. Here are a few more details about the judgment.
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25 October 2012 by Rosalind English
Whiston, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice – read judgment
When a prisoner is recalled from home detention curfew he does not suffer a fresh deprivation of liberty so as to engage Article 5(4)of the Convention.
Since this part of Article 5 confers a right on any person who is detained to challenge the legality of the detention determined by a body sufficiently judicial in character, the lack of review would render the decision unlawful. As Lord Elias says in his opening remarks,
This is one of a growing number of cases which have bedevilled the appellate courts on the question whether and when decisions affecting prison detention engage that Article. Problems arise because of the combination of general and imprecise Strasbourg principles and the complexity of English sentencing practices.
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23 October 2012 by Rosalind English
Chabauty v France 4 October 2012 – read judgment
I have posted previously on cases involving the ethical objection of landowners to being forced to allow hunting over their property.
These objections have generally found favour with the Strasbourg Court in the balancing of private and public interests under the right to property. Mr Chabauty puts the issue into another perspective. He also complained that he was unable to have his land removed from the control of an approved municipal hunters’ association. The difference was – and this proved to be critical to the outcome of the case – Mr Chabauty is not himself against hunting on ethical grounds. Since no conscience was underlying his Convention complaint, the Court found it not to be disproportionate for the French state to require small landowners to pool their hunting grounds. As such, there had been no violation of Article 1 Protocol 1 or Article 14.
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22 October 2012 by Rosalind English
The recognition of a right to life, liberty, and the autonomy of the individual and the mandate of government to secure these rights is being threatened by an increasingly illiberal notion of “human dignity”, says evolutionary psychologist Stephen Pinker.
His 2008 broadside in The New Republic took to task a now defunct body, the US President’s Council on Bioethics whose publication Human Dignity and Bioethics is shot through with disquiet about advances in biotechnology. It could not be more different from the enlightened report issued earlier this year by the Council’s successor calling on the current administration not to stifle biomedical research with over-restrictive regulation (see my post). Does the contrast between the present advisory body’s recommendations and the report put before the previous President signal a fundamental change in the way we approach progress in this field? Probably not. Only two weeks ago, Sir John Gurdon (the Nobel physiologist whom schoolteachers had written off as a scientist) bemoaned the regulatory restrictions that make important therapies too costly to pursue. Pinker’s dismay at the “scientific illiteracy” of society rings true today:
Ever since the cloning of Dolly the sheep a decade ago, the panic sown by conservative bioethicists, amplified by a sensationalist press, has turned the public discussion of bioethics into a miasma of scientific illiteracy. Brave New World, a work of fiction, is treated as inerrant prophesy. Cloning is confused with resurrecting the dead or mass-producing babies. Longevity becomes “immortality,” improvement becomes “perfection,” the screening for disease genes becomes “designer babies” or even “reshaping the species.” The reality is that biomedical research is a Sisyphean struggle to eke small increments in health from a staggeringly complex, entropy-beset human body. It is not, and probably never will be, a runaway train.
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19 October 2012 by Rosalind English
EM (Eritrea) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department – read judgment
A member state was entitled to return a refugee to the EU state of first embarkation unless it is proved that there are “systematic deficiencies” in the asylum procedures of the receiving state.
These four cases raised one central question: was it arguable that to return any of the claimants to Italy, either as an asylum-seeker pursuant to the Dublin II Regulation or as a person already granted asylum there, would entail a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR? In determining that question, the evidence provided by the UN Refugee Agency was decisive for the court.
The Dublin II Regulation provides for a system whereby asylum claims are processed and acted on by the first member-state in which the asylum-seeker arrives. Under this Regulation asylum-seekers and refugees may be returned to that state if they then seek asylum or take refuge elsewhere in the EU. The assumption underlying this system is that every member state will comply with its international obligations under not only the 1951 Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights but also the Qualification Directive and the EU Charter.
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18 October 2012 by Rosalind English
I have posted previously on the logistical difficulties in legislating against genetic discrimination.
The prospect that genetic information not only affects insurance and employment opportunities is alarming enough. But it has many other implications: it could be used to deny financial backing or loan approval, educational opportunities, sports eligibility, military accession, or adoption eligibility. At the moment, the number of documented cases of discrimination on the basis of genetic test results is small. This is probably due to the relatively few conditions for which there are currently definitive genetic tests, coupled with the expense and difficulty of conducting these tests. But genetic discrimination is a time bomb waiting to be triggered and the implications of whole genome sequencing (WGS) are considered in a very interesting and readable report by the US Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues Privacy and Progress in Whole Genome Sequencing.
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16 October 2012 by Rosalind English
R (on the application of the Metropolitan Police Service) v the Chairman of the Inquiry into the Death of Azelle Rodney and Interested Parties [2012] EWHA 2783 (Admin) – read judgment
The public inquiry into the death of Azelle Rodney, which commenced in 2010, was still under way when it was interrupted by the present dispute. It concerned the issue whether police surveillance footage taken from the air, showing Azelle Rodney’s movements in the two hours before his death, should be disclosed to the legal team representing his mother at the Inquiry.
The Chairman of the Inquiry decided to permit disclosure and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) took these proceedings to challenge the decision.
The footage was shot during a 2005 drug heist operation involving Mr Rodney, 25, who was shot six times at point-blank range after a car chase. One of the issues of importance to the deceased’s mother (Ms Alexander, the First Interested Party) was whether there had been a better opportunity to stop the car and its occupants at any time before the hard-stop which resulted in Mr Rodney’s death. This issue involved consideration by the Inquiry of the management of the surveillance/stop operation by senior officers. The officer in charge of the operation is due to give his evidence and to be questioned by Ms Alexander’s counsel.
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12 October 2012 by Rosalind English
Wednesday’s debate on current key topics in the Court of Protection was a hard-hitting discussion on matters which elicit strong views, such as voluntary euthanasia, assisted suicide, the role of “dignity” and “sanctity of life”, and whether the latter two principles can ever be reconciled.
The fact that these are not essentially legal issues was underscored by the inclusion of ethics philosopher on the interventionist panel, Professor Anthony Grayling, who fielded the questions put to him alongside Philip Havers QC and Leigh Day solicitor Richard Stein. A video of the event will shortly be available on the 1 Crown Office Row website so I shall try to refrain from any spoilers, but here is a brief trailer to whet the appetite for a full recapitulation.
The evening started with a consideration of the Nicklinson and Martin cases, on voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide respectively. There were a number of questions put to the panel which essentially rolled up into this:
Should voluntary euthanasia be a possible defence to murder, or can we justify action with a primary purpose of killing a person on the grounds of preventing that person’s harm or suffering?
The panel was broadly in agreement that it should. Richard Stein observed that the argument that there can never be adequate safeguards to protect the vulnerable is being used as a “smokescreen”, and, equally, the notion that disabled people cannot exercise their free will to die because it reduces the value of disabled lives is a “hugely patronising” one.
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10 October 2012 by Rosalind English
R.P. and others v United Kingdom (9 October 2012) – read judgment
The day before our seminar on the Court of Protection and the right to autonomy, the Strasbourg Court has ruled on a closely related issue in a fascinating challenge to the role of the Official Solicitor in making decisions on behalf of individuals who are for one reason or another unable to act for themselves.
The Official Solicitor acts for people who, because they lack mental capacity and cannot properly manage their own affairs, are unable to represent themselves and no other suitable person or agency is able and willing to act. This particular case involved child care proceedings, but the question before the Court was the vital one that arises out of any situation where an individual is deemed to have lost capacity to represent his or her own interests in court. What the parties asked the Court to consider was whether
the appointment of the Official Solicitor in the present case was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued or whether it impaired the very essence of R.P.’s right of access to a court.
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8 October 2012 by Rosalind English
Print Media South Africa v Minister of Home Affairs ([2012] ZACC 22) – read judgment.
In a “momentous” ruling on freedom of speech, the Constitutional Court has struck down a legislative provision on prior restraint, “based on vague and overly broad criteria”, as offensive to the right to freedom of expression.
As the attorney for the amicus curiae Dario Milo explains in the Weekly Mail and Guardian (reposted on Inforrm), the court went even further than the relief contended for by the applicants, by striking down the entire provision as unconstitutional, rather than allowing certain criteria to be clarified in accordance with the Bill of Rights.
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5 October 2012 by Rosalind English
Ndiki Mutua and others v the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – read judgment
1 Crown Office Row’s Guy Mansfield QC acted for the Defendant, Henry Witcomb assisted by Maria Roche acted for the Claimants and Elizabeth-Ann Gumbel QC acted for intervener. None of them had anything to do with the writing of this post.
Although any claims regarding alleged acts of torture on Kenyan detainees during the 1950s state of emergency are technically time barred the High Court has allowed three of the claims to go ahead.
This was a trial of a preliminary issue in the Mau Mau detention camps case concerning the matter of limitation of claims for personal injury. In principle, the primary limitation periods in respect of the claims respectively ended in September 1960, 3 March 1962 and on dates in 1963 which are unclear. The period of delay was approximately fifty years in duration, i.e. from between 1960/1963 to the issue of these proceedings on 23 June 2009. The events to be investigated at any trial would extend back to 1952 at least, a period of 60 years or more by the likely date of trial.
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2 October 2012 by Rosalind English
Child Poverty Action Group, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2012] EWHC 2579 (Admin) (17 July 2012) – read judgment
The High Court has ruled that the government acted unlawfully by removing the Child Poverty Commission, an advisory body set up under the Child Poverty Act 2010 . They had also acted beyond their powers by preparing a child poverty strategy without having requested and having regard to the advice of that Commission. But government is free to formulate new policy and as such there was nothing irrational about the strategy itself.
There is of necessity a great deal of statutory construction in this judgment which makes for dry reading. But the ruling is an important reassessment of the principles of judicial review that have taken root since the power of the courts to intervene in government decision making was reinforced in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147. This ruling, as every law student knows, established that a public body acts unlawfully, both in the narrow sense of acting outside its jurisdiction, and where such jurisdiction was wrongly exercised. This means that courts may intervene not just where a governmental act is unlawful under an express provision of the statute but also where the decision or policy, although authorised by statute, has been made in breach of a rule of public law.
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1 October 2012 by Rosalind English
The US Supreme Court’s term begins today, and race relations is at the top of the court’s agenda. The US press hails Fisher v University of Texas as the most important case the Court has agreed to hear thus far. Word is out that it could sound the death knell for affirmative action in the United States.
The justices are being asked to decide whether race-based affirmative action in college admissions is still constitutional. The petitioner is a white student who was turned down by the University of Texas in 2008. She claims she was a victim of illegal race discrimination under their policy of affirmative action.
In 1997 the Texas legislature enacted a law requiring the University of Texas to admit all Texas high school seniors ranking in the top ten percent of their classes. Whilst this measure improved access to tertiary education for many, the colleges protested at having their hands tied with regard to highly talented students who showed promise in certain subjects but did not come in to the top ten percent (including minority students in highly integrated high schools). To redress this balance the Supreme Court ruled in 2003 that universities could consider a minority student’s race as a “plus factor” in admissions. The Court based its ruling on the need for colleges to ensure a diverse student body. Following this judgment, the University of Texas added a new affirmative action policy to go along with the automatic admission rule with race being a “plus factor” in admission.
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25 September 2012 by Rosalind English
Valeri Hariev Belov [2012] EUECJ Case C-394/11 20 September 2012 – read opinion
For the first time the European Court of Justice (CJEU) has been asked to address the issue of indirect discrimination based on ethnic origin and the possible justifications for such discrimination.
The question, put before it as a reference on a preliminary issue from the Bulgarian Commission for Protection against Discrimination (the “KZD”), is this:
Is it discriminatory if, in districts which are inhabited predominantly by a people belonging to a certain ethnic minority, electricity meters are suspended much higher than elsewhere?
The Court has thus been given an opportunity to refine its case-law on the ‘anti-discrimination directives’ – in the present case the Directive 2000/43/EC (the “race directive”).
Background facts
What led to this dispute was the practice in two districts of the Bulgarian city of Montana, of attaching electricity meters to electricity poles at a height of 7 m, whilst elsewhere electricity meters are installed at a maximum height of 1.70 m, such that they are accessible for consumers. The districts in question are inhabited primarily by people belonging to the Roma community, and the question therefore arises whether this practice constitutes discrimination based on ethnic origin.
As the electricity authority’s written observations to the court explained, the measure was taken because of the increasing incidence of unpaid bills in the two urban districts and the frequent offences committed by consumers which impair or threaten the safety, quality and continuous and secure operation of the electrical installations. The AG succinctly describes of the problem, and the solution to it:
Manipulation and unauthorised electricity extraction are undoubtedly made more difficult if electricity meters and distribution boxes are placed at a height of 7 m, which is normally inaccessible for consumers
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R (on the application of J) v the Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall [2012] EWHC 2996, 26 October 2012 – read judgment
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