By: Guest Contributor

Are tribunals required to consider public law challenges?

13 February 2026 by Guest Contributor

The post below was originally published on the Administrative Court Blog, of which its author, Dr Lewis Graham, is an editor. It is republished here with the Dr Graham’s permission.

The First-tier Tribunal had delivered a ruling in which it has allowed a claimant to challenge the imposition of a liability order on public law grounds, despite the jurisdiction for this not being set out explicitly in the relevant statute. The decision does not set a precedent, and strictly involves a narrow point of construction relating to the Finance Act. However, its reasoning, if approved or adopted on appeal, may have significant ramifications for claimants wishing to rely on public law grounds before tribunal appeals more generally. The case is Hall v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 124 (TC) (13 January 2026).

The claimant, Hall, was issued a Joint and Several Liability Notice (JSLN) and sought to appeal it before the First-tier Tribunal (FTT). He wished to challenge the notice on five grounds. It was undisputed that the tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the first two grounds (whether the prerequisite conditions were met, and whether the notice was necessary for the protection of revenue, respectively). However, HMRC disputed the tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider Grounds 3 to 5 (relating to the proportionality of the measure, the rationality of the measure, and a failure to follow relevant guidance) and applied for these grounds to be struck out, under rule 8(2) Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The question for the tribunal was, therefore, whether it did have the jurisdiction to consider these – public law – grounds.

Because the tribunal has no inherent public law jurisdiction, it can only be granted the ability to review such grounds by statute: see [65]. This in turn raises an issue of statutory construction. In this case, the jurisdiction of the tribunal when considering appeals to the issuing of a JSLN is set out in paragraph 14(1) of Schedule 13 to the Finance Act 2020. That section says that on appeal, the tribunal “must set aside the notice” if “any of the relevant conditions were not met when the notice was given” (para 4(1)(a)(i)), “it is not necessary for the protection of the revenue for the notice to continue to have effect” (para 4(1)(a)(ii)) or “the amount specified is incorrect” (para 4(1)(b)). If these grounds are not made out, “the tribunal must uphold the notice” (para 4(1)(c)). HMRC argued that the effect of these provisions was to exclude any public law challenge: [32], and that public law grounds could only be argued in a judicial review, rather than statutory appeal: [33].

The tribunal judge was unconvinced by this argument. She said that she could “see no language” in the statute “which precludes an assessment of proportionality or rationality when determining whether the Appellant has made out its defensive case”: [81]. Thus, the third and fourth ground of appeal could be considered by the tribunal. Although it was not confirmed, this, presumably, also meant that the statute did not preclude consideration of the fifth ground – whether HMRC failed to comply with its policies.

At first blush, it seems that the judge arrived at this interpretation via ordinary methods of construction. But the judge preceded her analysis with an overview of the interpretive powers available to her under section 3 of the HRA (see [60]):

“Where a Convention right is impermissibly limited by the terms of the statutory language chosen by Parliament the relevant provision should be construed so far as is possible to ensure a Convention compliant outcome… the line between a section 4 HRA declaration of incompatibility… and conforming interpretation [is] the “grain of the legislation”. Legislation need not be ambiguous in order for it to be interpreted expansively so as to protect Convention rights, an interpreting court or tribunal can read words in and change the meaning of the language used but cannot cross the constitutional line of legislating, in particular when choosing between alternative means of achieving a Convention-compliant meaning.”

The judge also followed her conclusion with the observation that the wider construction she adopted “also meets the Article 6 requirement that there be a forum with full jurisdiction on all matters of fact and law when considering the issue of the JSLN” and that “separating the issues between the administrative court and the Tribunal would run the risk of facts being evaluated differently and thereby inhibiting a fair trial”: [83]. Therefore, it appears that the judge’s conclusion was either made pursuant to, or reinforced by, the need to adopt a Convention-compliant interpretation under section 3 HRA.

Comment

With respect to the tribunal judge, her reasoning on the construction issue is a little thin and a number of issues in the judgment remain open to debate.

First, it is, as above, unclear whether section 3 was even applied in the first place. In some other cases, a similar result has been achieved by applying a presumption that a claimant “should be entitled to defend himself by challenging the validity of… the decision… on public law grounds” in order to uphold “the rule of law” (see KSM Henryk Zeman SP ZOO v HMRC [2021] UKUT 182 (TCC) at [34]). This was not the case here; as noted above, the interpretation appears to be based on section 3 HRA. But notably absent from the judgment is any discussion as to whether a Convention-compliant interpretation would fall foul of what is “possible” – whether recognising the jurisdiction of the tribunal to consider public law grounds would go “against the grain” of the legislation.

Second, it is not immediately clear that Article 6 requires that the tribunal act as a forum for the determination of Convention rights (as opposed to, say, the Administrative Court). All we are told is that there is an “Article 6 requirement that there be a forum with full jurisdiction on all matters of fact and law” ([83]). It is true that the Article 6 authorities (see e.g. Schmautzer v Austria (1995), paras 34-37) speak of the need for a “judicial body that has full jurisdiction” in the context of determining the validity of a criminal charge (the tribunal had already determined that the issuing of a JSLN was a criminal charge: [75]). However, in a number of different areas the Strasbourg Court has accepted that a tribunal or court exercising more limited powers of appeal or review has satisfied the requirements of Article 6 (see e.g. Stefan v UK (1997); Ali v UK (2016)). The Strasbourg case law in this area is hardly straightforward and it was surprising to see that the judgment didn’t feature any engagement with the key authorities on this matter.

Third, it is unclear why the judge insisted that the First-tier Tribunal ought to be imbued with full jurisdiction (see, mutatis mutandis, Mattu v the University Hospitals of Coventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust [2012] EWCA Civ 641 at [120]-[122]) Firstly, the claimant can appeal to a court which itself holds full jurisdiction (something which the Strasbourg Court has found to be relevant when assessing compliance with Article 6: see McMichael v UK (1995)). Secondly, the claimant can lodge a judicial review before the Administrative Court, which also holds full jurisdiction: see Runa Begum v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [2003] UKHL 5.

Fourth, Article 6 is – it seems – invoked in order to justify the recognition of the tribunal’s jurisdiction in relation to not only the consideration of Convention grounds, but two further public law grounds. Does the Convention really operate so as to require the tribunal – rather than another court – to determine rationality (and consistency with policy) alongside the determination of Convention rights?

As suggested above, the decision, being one of the First-tier Tribunal, does not formally set a precedent and does not bind other tribunal judges. Further, the case is, strictly speaking, concerned only with the interpretation of paragraph 14 of Schedule 13 to the Finance Act 2020, and not with wider issues relating to the jurisdiction of tribunals more generally. Nevertheless, the wide interpretation of both the requirements of Article 6 ECHR and the scope of section 3 HRA will no doubt make it more likely that similar challenges will arise in the future, in relation to other tribunal actions limited by statute. Whether the decision will survive appeal, and review by later judges, is less certain.

Dr Lewis Graham is a Lecturer in Human Rights Law at the University of Manchester

Scrutiny of judicial safeguards for detention: Cameron v Secretary of State for Justice and Anor [2025] EWCA Civ 1574

23 January 2026 by Guest Contributor

By Josephine Lunnon

INTRODUCTION

The crux of the issue in this appeal is both narrow and, to some degree, exceptionally broad. It is narrow in that the central issue before the Court of Appeal was “whether an application made under s.75(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983 by a mental health patient to the First-tier Tribunal  while subject to a conditional discharge is extinguished by the recall to hospital of that patient by the Secretary of State for Justice under s42(3) of the Act” [1]; a pithy, glamorous summary.

However, the appeal has simultaneously broad implications; the Court considered whether certain mechanisms of judicial oversight were effective as judicial safeguards and in providing speedy consideration of a person’s deprivation of liberty as required by Article 5(4) ECHR. In what was ultimately an academic discussion which was somewhat removed from the generative facts, the Court of Appeal examined whether there was indeed a “lacuna” in the FtT’s oversight of offenders who have been conditionally discharged with a restriction order.

Challenge to the registration of a private gender healthcare clinic fails- Court of Appeal

19 December 2025 by Guest Contributor

Alice Grant

In Evans v Care Quality Commission [2025] EWCA Civ 1556, the Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Lewis) refused to grant permission to appeal against the High Court’s dismissal of a judicial review challenging two decisions by the Care Quality Commission (“CQC”). The Appellants, Ms Evans and a mother who wished to remain anonymous, contested (1) the CQC’s January 2024 decision to register Gender Plus Healthcare Ltd (“GPH”) pursuant to section 12 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (“the 2008 Act”), and (2) the December 2024 review of GPH’s services under section 46 of the same Act.

The case has attracted substantial public interest, engaging broader debates over the regulation of cross-sex hormone treatment for minors. The  widely-reported Cass Review, led by the British paediatrician Hilary Cass, together with concerns over the prevalence of ideological influences in this medical field, were raised. 

Background

In the High Court, acknowledging the “strongly held views about this treatment”, Mrs Justice Eady observed (R (OAO Evans and another) v Care Quality Commission [2025] EWHC 2015 (Admin) at [2]): 

“The hormone treatment in issue involves the prescription of masculinising or feminising hormones (oestrogen; testosterone), introducing irreversible changes to the patient’s body. There are strongly held views about this treatment and an expert panel is due to report to the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care on its use for those under 18. At present, however, the treatment provided by [GPH] to 16 and 17 year olds is permitted by law, and the issue I am required to determine is not whether that is correct, but whether specific decisions made by the CQC are irrational and/or unlawful.”

Despite agreeing with the Claimants (at [97]), who contended a higher standard of review applies to the irrationality challenge in this case since “hormone treatment is often sought by vulnerable and emotionally distressed individuals” and “can have significant, irreversible, long-term physical and psychological consequences,” the claim was dismissed at first instance. 

Family life and extraterritorial jurisdiction: IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 

10 December 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Samuel Talalay

Introduction 

Chief Constable in contempt: Buzzard-Quashie v CC of Northamptonshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 1397

8 December 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Kian Leong Tan

INTRODUCTION

In Buzzard-Quashie v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 1397, the Court of Appeal has helpfully restated the law on (civil) contempt of court. The decision – arising out of a longstanding refusal by the Northamptonshire police force (“the police force”) to comply with orders from the Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”) and the courts to release footage from officers’ body-worn cameras (“BWV”) – also affirms the liability of a chief constable for the acts and omissions of their subordinates.

Manifestation of religious belief: Smith v Manchester City Council [2025] EWHC 2987 (KB)

4 December 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Georgina Pein

To what extent does the law afford protection to couples looking to foster children, in circumstances where that couple possesses (and vocalises) strong religious beliefs? This was the issue for consideration before Turner J, who heard this appeal in the King’s Bench Division of the High Court. Judgment was handed down on 18 November 2025.

Court of Appeal clarifies judicial duties when making final care and placement orders at an IRH – Re D [2025] EWCA Civ 1362

10 November 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Emily Higlett

Introduction

The Court of Appeal in Re D has overturned final care and placement orders made at an Issues Resolution Hearing (“IRH”), stating that judges must give clear, reasoned findings on the threshold criteria under section 31(2) Children Act 1989 (“CA 1989”), even where proceedings are uncontested or parents are absent.

In delivering the judgment, Cobb LJ, with whom Baker LJ and Miles LJ agreed, criticised the short form reasoning used by the Family Court and stressed the need for transparent judicial decision-making when the State intervenes in family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).

The scope of advocates’ immunity: CC of Sussex Police and the CPS v XGY

5 November 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Kian Leong Tan

INTRODUCTION

Do advocates retain an absolute immunity for things and said and done in court, or must the invocation of the immunity be scrutinised on a case-by-case basis? A heavyweight panel of the Court of Appeal – including the Lady Chief Justice and the President of the King’s Bench Division – in Chief Constable of Sussex Police and the Crown Prosecution Service v XGY (Bar Council intervening) [2025] EWCA Civ 1230 (“XGY”) has come down decisively in favour of the former proposition, offering some much-needed clarity on this area of law.

The problem of ritual slaughter

28 October 2025 by Guest Contributor

Anna Sergeant and Julia Hartley

This is an extract from an article published in the latest edition of The Critic, 17th October 2025. We post it here by kind permission of its authors and editors of The Critic.

In 2024, approximately 220 million animals were ritually slaughtered in England and Wales. Of these, roughly 30 million had their throats slit whilst fully conscious, and 190 million were stunned unconscious before being killed.

The Welfare at the Time of Killing (England) Regulations 2015 (“WATOK”) require that animals be effectively stunned before slaughter, in order to spare them “avoidable pain, distress or suffering” when they are killed. In its next breath, however, WATOK authorises the very practice it condemns (non-stun slaughter) where it is “in accordance with religious rites”.

Non-stun slaughter entails atrocious violence which all major animal welfare bodies, including the British Veterinary Association and RSPCA, agree should be prohibited. The failure of Parliament to make a decision about the normative value of animal welfare has left a gaping statutory hole that defers the fate of animals’ final moments to the whim of religious authority.

Hora v the United Kingdom: Strasbourg’s New Ruling on UK’s Prisoner Voting Ban

1 October 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Lewis Graham

In 2005, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights handed down its landmark decision in Hirst v the United Kingdom, finding that the effect of section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, bringing into effect a blanket ban on the ability of prisoners in the UK to vote in elections, constituted a breach of Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the Convention (the right to free elections).

To say the case was controversial is an understatement, with the judgment becoming something of a bête noire for Strasbourg sceptics. Murray suggests that the judgment was pivotal in the “monstering” of the European Court. It is often presented as a case which epitomises Strasbourg overreach, taking the number 1 spot in the Judicial Power Project’s buffet of unfavourable, “problematic” legal cases. David Cameron, of course, famously remarked that the idea of complying with the judgment and giving (some) prisoners the vote made him feel “physically sick”.

Physician and Anaesthesia Associates: Delegation, Informed Consent, and Montgomery in the Administrative Court

26 September 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Kian Leong Tan

INTRODUCTION

In R (Anaesthetists United Ltd and Others) v General Medical Council [2025] EWHC 2270 (Admin) (“Anaesthetists United”), Mrs Justice Lambert dismissed a judicial review claim brought by the claimants against the defendant regulator for Physician Associates (“PAs”) and Anaesthesia Associates (“AAs”) – collectively referred to hereafter as “Associates” – in the UK.

The claim is the most recent instalment in a brewing saga over the continued use and regulation of Associates in the UK’s healthcare system:

• In April 2025, Lambert J dismissed the British Medical Association (“BMA”)’s judicial review challenge (R (British Medical Association v General Medical Council [2025] EWHC 960 (Admin)) to the GMC’s decisions to (i) apply the same basic professional standards to doctors and Associates, and (ii) refer to all three professions collectively as ‘medical professionals’.
• Just prior to the handing down of Anaesthetists United, Professor Gillian Leng released her final report following the conclusion of her independent review into the Associate professions.

Developer’s judicial review challenge rejected by High Court

9 September 2025 by Guest Contributor

Guest Contributor Alice Grant

Rydon Group Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities [2025] EWHC 2182 (Admin)

Introduction

In Rydon Group Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities [2025] EWHC 2182 (Admin), the High Court dismissed a judicial review challenge brought by Rydon, a developer criticised in the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report. The Court held that the government’s decisions, principally the designation of the Claimant as ‘unfit’ to carry out remediation works, were contractual in nature. As such, they were governed by private law and not amenable to judicial review, save under allegations of fraud, corruption, or bad faith. Rydon remains excluded from carrying out the remediation works and is liable to reimburse costs through the Building Safety Fund (BSF).

Factual Background

In the wake of the Grenfell Tower fire, the government established the BSF to finance remediation of unsafe cladding and a contractual framework for developers, the Self-Remediation Terms (SRTs). Developers were required to sign the SRTs in order to join the Responsible Actors Scheme (RAS), thereby avoiding statutory restrictions imposed under the Building Safety Act 2022 (BSA 2022) and the Building Safety (Responsible Actors Scheme and Prohibitions) Regulations 2023 (RAS Regulations 2023).

By August 2023, three high-rise blocks developed by Rydon, known as the Cable Street Buildings, had reached the funding approval stage under the BSF. In September 2023, Rydon signed the SRTs and joined the Responsible Actors Scheme (RAS). Rydon requested that the Cable Street Buildings be withdrawn from the BSF so that it could undertake the remediation itself. On 28 February 2024, however, the Secretary of State designated Rydon as a ‘Designated Participant Developer’ under the SRTs, thereby deeming it ‘unfit’ to carry out the remediation works.

Rydon Maintenance, a subsidiary of the Claimant, had been the principal contractor of the Grenfell Tower refurbishment. In the Grenfell Inquiry Phase 2 Report, Rydon was considered to have had “considerable responsibility for the fire” through “inadequate thought to fire safety” and poor oversight of subcontractors (at [4]).

Supreme Court upholds sanctions on Eugene Shvidler and Dalston Projects in test case for UK regime

18 August 2025 by Guest Contributor

Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Dalston Projects Ltd and others v Secretary of State for Transport [2025] UKSC 30

By Talia Zybutz

Introduction

These appeals – Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Dalston Projects Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport – were a test case for the operation of the UK’s sanctions regime introduced in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Supreme Court confirmed that while the court’s task is to assess proportionality for itself, a wide margin of appreciation will be afforded to the executive in judging how best to respond to and restrain Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Keeping PACE: Searson and Searson v CC of Nottinghamshire Constabulary

11 August 2025 by Guest Contributor

Searson and Another v Chief Constable of Nottingham Constabulary [2025] EWHC 1982 (KB)

By Kian Leong Tan

In Searson v Chief Constable of Nottingham Constabulary [2025] EWHC 1982 (KB), the Appellants successfully appealed against the dismissal of their claim for damages against the Respondent’s police force. The claim arose out of the circumstances of the Second Appellant’s unlawful detention contrary to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE”). Wall J’s judgment emphasises the need for strict compliance with the spirit of the procedural safeguard of regular reviews of detention in s 40 PACE, which serves to protect the fundamental right of freedom of movement.

The Begum Legacy: the Supreme Court further tightens the reins on citizenship deprivation appeals

27 June 2025 by Guest Contributor

By guest contributor Saira Turner

In U3 (AP) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] UKSC 19, the Supreme Court has unanimously dismissed an appeal against a decision taken by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”) relating to deprivation of citizenship and refusal of entry clearance on the basis of national security concerns.