By: Guest Contributor

Policing Disclosure: R (Ansari) v Chief Constable of North Wales Police

24 March 2026 by Guest Contributor

By Kian Leong Tan

INTRODUCTION

In R (Ansari) v Chief Constable of North Wales Police [2026] EWHC 472 (Admin), the High Court (Chamberlain J) held that the heightened level of disclosure required under Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No. 3) [2009] UKHL 28 (“AF-disclosure”) does not apply in a challenge to the seizure, download, retention and inspection of the contents of a person’s mobile phone by an  examining officer pursuant to Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (“TA 2000“).

In addition to undertaking a comprehensive review of the AF-disclosure case law, Chamberlain J also rejected the notion of some form of an intermediate level of disclosure in closed material proceedings, where the AF-disclosure threshold is not met. The decision offers some much-needed clarity in this area of law.

Terrorism and free speech: the criminal law and the Convention

17 March 2026 by Guest Contributor

By Samuel Talalay

Introduction

Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR” or “the Convention”) provides qualified protection for speech. Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”) criminalises certain speech acts relating to proscribed organisations. In the case of R v ABJ; R v BDN [2026] UKSC 8 the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether these two things could be reconciled: is s 12(1A) of the 2000 Act compatible with the Convention?

In its judgment, given on 26 February 2026, the Court answered this question with an unequivocal ‘yes’. The offence introduced by s 12(1A) was prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Crucially, conviction would always represent a proportionate interference with the defendant’s Article 10 right to free speech where the elements of the offence, properly understood, were made out.

In providing such a resounding answer, however, the Court risks setting the bar too high for legislative provisions to be compatible with the Convention.

Medmoune v France: To Live and Let Die

5 March 2026 by Guest Contributor

By Kian Leong Tan

INTRODUCTION

In Medmoune v France App no 55026/22 (ECHR, 5 February 2026), the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights considered the extent of a Member State’s obligation under Art. 2 ECHR (the right to life) when deciding to withdraw life support, in circumstances where the patient had explicitly asked for it to be continued.[1] The judgment helpfully illustrates the contentious boundary at which informed patient consent must give way to the expert opinion of medical professionals.

Embryos & “expired” consent: fettered rights to reproductive freedom?

3 March 2026 by Guest Contributor

By Georgina Pein

In a recent judgment, the High Court in AAA v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority  [2026] EWHC 317 (Fam) (Morgan J) heard 15 applications from fertility clinic patients for declaratory relief. Those patients (the “Applicants”) had embryos or gametes which were stored at various fertility clinics. They sought declarations that it was lawful for those gametes or embryos to continue to be stored and used in circumstances where their written consent to storage had expired and had not been renewed (within the timeframes provided by legislation for renewal of consent).

Morgan J found that there were relevant administrative failures and oversights on behalf of the fertility clinics, and relief was granted in relation to 14 out of the 15 applications.

The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (“HFEA”), the fertility clinics, and the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (“SSHSC”) were Interested Parties to the applications.

Are tribunals required to consider public law challenges?

13 February 2026 by Guest Contributor

The post below was originally published on the Administrative Court Blog, of which its author, Dr Lewis Graham, is an editor. It is republished here with the Dr Graham’s permission.

The First-tier Tribunal had delivered a ruling in which it has allowed a claimant to challenge the imposition of a liability order on public law grounds, despite the jurisdiction for this not being set out explicitly in the relevant statute. The decision does not set a precedent, and strictly involves a narrow point of construction relating to the Finance Act. However, its reasoning, if approved or adopted on appeal, may have significant ramifications for claimants wishing to rely on public law grounds before tribunal appeals more generally. The case is Hall v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 124 (TC) (13 January 2026).

The claimant, Hall, was issued a Joint and Several Liability Notice (JSLN) and sought to appeal it before the First-tier Tribunal (FTT). He wished to challenge the notice on five grounds. It was undisputed that the tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the first two grounds (whether the prerequisite conditions were met, and whether the notice was necessary for the protection of revenue, respectively). However, HMRC disputed the tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider Grounds 3 to 5 (relating to the proportionality of the measure, the rationality of the measure, and a failure to follow relevant guidance) and applied for these grounds to be struck out, under rule 8(2) Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The question for the tribunal was, therefore, whether it did have the jurisdiction to consider these – public law – grounds.

Scrutiny of judicial safeguards for detention: Cameron v Secretary of State for Justice and Anor [2025] EWCA Civ 1574

23 January 2026 by Guest Contributor

By Josephine Lunnon

INTRODUCTION

The crux of the issue in this appeal is both narrow and, to some degree, exceptionally broad. It is narrow in that the central issue before the Court of Appeal was “whether an application made under s.75(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983 by a mental health patient to the First-tier Tribunal  while subject to a conditional discharge is extinguished by the recall to hospital of that patient by the Secretary of State for Justice under s42(3) of the Act” [1]; a pithy, glamorous summary.

However, the appeal has simultaneously broad implications; the Court considered whether certain mechanisms of judicial oversight were effective as judicial safeguards and in providing speedy consideration of a person’s deprivation of liberty as required by Article 5(4) ECHR. In what was ultimately an academic discussion which was somewhat removed from the generative facts, the Court of Appeal examined whether there was indeed a “lacuna” in the FtT’s oversight of offenders who have been conditionally discharged with a restriction order.

Challenge to the registration of a private gender healthcare clinic fails- Court of Appeal

19 December 2025 by Guest Contributor

Alice Grant

In Evans v Care Quality Commission [2025] EWCA Civ 1556, the Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Lewis) refused to grant permission to appeal against the High Court’s dismissal of a judicial review challenging two decisions by the Care Quality Commission (“CQC”). The Appellants, Ms Evans and a mother who wished to remain anonymous, contested (1) the CQC’s January 2024 decision to register Gender Plus Healthcare Ltd (“GPH”) pursuant to section 12 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (“the 2008 Act”), and (2) the December 2024 review of GPH’s services under section 46 of the same Act.

The case has attracted substantial public interest, engaging broader debates over the regulation of cross-sex hormone treatment for minors. The  widely-reported Cass Review, led by the British paediatrician Hilary Cass, together with concerns over the prevalence of ideological influences in this medical field, were raised. 

Background

In the High Court, acknowledging the “strongly held views about this treatment”, Mrs Justice Eady observed (R (OAO Evans and another) v Care Quality Commission [2025] EWHC 2015 (Admin) at [2]): 

“The hormone treatment in issue involves the prescription of masculinising or feminising hormones (oestrogen; testosterone), introducing irreversible changes to the patient’s body. There are strongly held views about this treatment and an expert panel is due to report to the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care on its use for those under 18. At present, however, the treatment provided by [GPH] to 16 and 17 year olds is permitted by law, and the issue I am required to determine is not whether that is correct, but whether specific decisions made by the CQC are irrational and/or unlawful.”

Despite agreeing with the Claimants (at [97]), who contended a higher standard of review applies to the irrationality challenge in this case since “hormone treatment is often sought by vulnerable and emotionally distressed individuals” and “can have significant, irreversible, long-term physical and psychological consequences,” the claim was dismissed at first instance. 

Family life and extraterritorial jurisdiction: IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 

10 December 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Samuel Talalay

Introduction 

Chief Constable in contempt: Buzzard-Quashie v CC of Northamptonshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 1397

8 December 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Kian Leong Tan

INTRODUCTION

In Buzzard-Quashie v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 1397, the Court of Appeal has helpfully restated the law on (civil) contempt of court. The decision – arising out of a longstanding refusal by the Northamptonshire police force (“the police force”) to comply with orders from the Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”) and the courts to release footage from officers’ body-worn cameras (“BWV”) – also affirms the liability of a chief constable for the acts and omissions of their subordinates.

Manifestation of religious belief: Smith v Manchester City Council [2025] EWHC 2987 (KB)

4 December 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Georgina Pein

To what extent does the law afford protection to couples looking to foster children, in circumstances where that couple possesses (and vocalises) strong religious beliefs? This was the issue for consideration before Turner J, who heard this appeal in the King’s Bench Division of the High Court. Judgment was handed down on 18 November 2025.

Court of Appeal clarifies judicial duties when making final care and placement orders at an IRH – Re D [2025] EWCA Civ 1362

10 November 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Emily Higlett

Introduction

The Court of Appeal in Re D has overturned final care and placement orders made at an Issues Resolution Hearing (“IRH”), stating that judges must give clear, reasoned findings on the threshold criteria under section 31(2) Children Act 1989 (“CA 1989”), even where proceedings are uncontested or parents are absent.

In delivering the judgment, Cobb LJ, with whom Baker LJ and Miles LJ agreed, criticised the short form reasoning used by the Family Court and stressed the need for transparent judicial decision-making when the State intervenes in family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).

The scope of advocates’ immunity: CC of Sussex Police and the CPS v XGY

5 November 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Kian Leong Tan

INTRODUCTION

Do advocates retain an absolute immunity for things and said and done in court, or must the invocation of the immunity be scrutinised on a case-by-case basis? A heavyweight panel of the Court of Appeal – including the Lady Chief Justice and the President of the King’s Bench Division – in Chief Constable of Sussex Police and the Crown Prosecution Service v XGY (Bar Council intervening) [2025] EWCA Civ 1230 (“XGY”) has come down decisively in favour of the former proposition, offering some much-needed clarity on this area of law.

The problem of ritual slaughter

28 October 2025 by Guest Contributor

Anna Sergeant and Julia Hartley

This is an extract from an article published in the latest edition of The Critic, 17th October 2025. We post it here by kind permission of its authors and editors of The Critic.

In 2024, approximately 220 million animals were ritually slaughtered in England and Wales. Of these, roughly 30 million had their throats slit whilst fully conscious, and 190 million were stunned unconscious before being killed.

The Welfare at the Time of Killing (England) Regulations 2015 (“WATOK”) require that animals be effectively stunned before slaughter, in order to spare them “avoidable pain, distress or suffering” when they are killed. In its next breath, however, WATOK authorises the very practice it condemns (non-stun slaughter) where it is “in accordance with religious rites”.

Non-stun slaughter entails atrocious violence which all major animal welfare bodies, including the British Veterinary Association and RSPCA, agree should be prohibited. The failure of Parliament to make a decision about the normative value of animal welfare has left a gaping statutory hole that defers the fate of animals’ final moments to the whim of religious authority.

Hora v the United Kingdom: Strasbourg’s New Ruling on UK’s Prisoner Voting Ban

1 October 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Lewis Graham

In 2005, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights handed down its landmark decision in Hirst v the United Kingdom, finding that the effect of section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, bringing into effect a blanket ban on the ability of prisoners in the UK to vote in elections, constituted a breach of Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the Convention (the right to free elections).

To say the case was controversial is an understatement, with the judgment becoming something of a bête noire for Strasbourg sceptics. Murray suggests that the judgment was pivotal in the “monstering” of the European Court. It is often presented as a case which epitomises Strasbourg overreach, taking the number 1 spot in the Judicial Power Project’s buffet of unfavourable, “problematic” legal cases. David Cameron, of course, famously remarked that the idea of complying with the judgment and giving (some) prisoners the vote made him feel “physically sick”.

Physician and Anaesthesia Associates: Delegation, Informed Consent, and Montgomery in the Administrative Court

26 September 2025 by Guest Contributor

By Kian Leong Tan

INTRODUCTION

In R (Anaesthetists United Ltd and Others) v General Medical Council [2025] EWHC 2270 (Admin) (“Anaesthetists United”), Mrs Justice Lambert dismissed a judicial review claim brought by the claimants against the defendant regulator for Physician Associates (“PAs”) and Anaesthesia Associates (“AAs”) – collectively referred to hereafter as “Associates” – in the UK.

The claim is the most recent instalment in a brewing saga over the continued use and regulation of Associates in the UK’s healthcare system:

• In April 2025, Lambert J dismissed the British Medical Association (“BMA”)’s judicial review challenge (R (British Medical Association v General Medical Council [2025] EWHC 960 (Admin)) to the GMC’s decisions to (i) apply the same basic professional standards to doctors and Associates, and (ii) refer to all three professions collectively as ‘medical professionals’.
• Just prior to the handing down of Anaesthetists United, Professor Gillian Leng released her final report following the conclusion of her independent review into the Associate professions.