We use cookies to enhance your browsing experience. If you continue to use our website we will take this to mean that you agree to our use of cookies. If you want to find out more, please view our cookie policy. Accept and Hide [x]
In Cherrington v University of Derby [2026] EAT 107, the Mr Justice Cavanagh in the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) held that an Employment Tribunal (“ET”) was not obliged to consider the Appellant’s Article 10 ECHR right to freedom of expression of its own motion when deciding whether or not his dismissal was fair. His right to freedom of expression did not “shout out” from his case, and nor was the ET obliged to consider the ECHR “as a matter of course” in unfair dismissal complaints, or even particular species of unfair dismissal complaints.
This case note briefly sets out the background to the case and the judgment, and then offers some brief comments by way of conclusion. References in square brackets are to paragraphs of the judgment.
This decision, arising from the long running Under Cover Policing Inquiry (“UCPI”), was the first time a Court has heard full argument about the extra-territoriality of a notice issued under section 21 Inquiries Act 2005 (the “IA”). Simply put, the Court decided that an Inquiry Chair does have the power to issue a s21 notice to a person residing overseas. This represents a departure from the approach of previous public inquiries.
A Court of Appeal panel of five Judges, including the Lady Chief Justice, Lady Carr LCJ, the Master of the Rolls, Sir Geoffrey Vos, the Vice President of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), Edis LJ, and Lewis and Whipple LJJ has overturned the Divisional Court’s decision quashing the proscription of Palestine Action, holding that it erred in its approach both to the challenge brought under the Home Secretary’s relevant policy and to whether a fair balance had been struck with reference to the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
This article takes an extended look at the reasoning in this decision.
The Court of Appeal in Re J, Re M and Re P (Parental Responsibility) [2026] EWCA Civ 344 has provided authoritative guidance on a fundamental question in family law: whether a person who is not a child’s biological father can acquire parental responsibility by being named on the birth certificate. The court firmly answered that question in the negative, clarifying the meaning of “father” under the Children Act 1989 and resolving a line of inconsistent first instance decisions.
In addition to undertaking a comprehensive review of the AF-disclosure case law, Chamberlain J also rejected the notion of some form of an intermediate level of disclosure in closed material proceedings, where the AF-disclosure threshold is not met. The decision offers some much-needed clarity in this area of law.
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR” or “the Convention”) provides qualified protection for speech. Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”) criminalises certain speech acts relating to proscribed organisations. In the case of R v ABJ; R v BDN[2026] UKSC 8 the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether these two things could be reconciled: is s 12(1A) of the 2000 Act compatible with the Convention?
In its judgment, given on 26 February 2026, the Court answered this question with an unequivocal ‘yes’. The offence introduced by s 12(1A) was prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Crucially, conviction would always represent a proportionate interference with the defendant’s Article 10 right to free speech where the elements of the offence, properly understood, were made out.
In providing such a resounding answer, however, the Court risks setting the bar too high for legislative provisions to be compatible with the Convention.
In Medmoune v France App no 55026/22 (ECHR, 5 February 2026), the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights considered the extent of a Member State’s obligation under Art. 2 ECHR (the right to life) when deciding to withdraw life support, in circumstances where the patient had explicitly asked for it to be continued.[1] The judgment helpfully illustrates the contentious boundary at which informed patient consent must give way to the expert opinion of medical professionals.
In a recent judgment, the High Court in AAA v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority [2026] EWHC 317 (Fam) (Morgan J) heard 15 applications from fertility clinic patients for declaratory relief. Those patients (the “Applicants”) had embryos or gametes which were stored at various fertility clinics. They sought declarations that it was lawful for those gametes or embryos to continue to be stored and used in circumstances where their written consent to storage had expired and had not been renewed (within the timeframes provided by legislation for renewal of consent).
Morgan J found that there were relevant administrative failures and oversights on behalf of the fertility clinics, and relief was granted in relation to 14 out of the 15 applications.
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (“HFEA”), the fertility clinics, and the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (“SSHSC”) were Interested Parties to the applications.
The Applicant, a national of St Lucia, made an application on 2 December 2022 for ILR under Category 4 of the Windrush Scheme. Her father was a member of the Windrush generation and entered the UK in 1956. He was granted British citizenship in 2018 [4]-[19].
To fall within Category 4, an applicant should satisfy the following criteria [7]:
A person in the UK,
who is a child of a Commonwealth citizen parent,
where the child was born in the UK or arrived in the UK before the age of 18,
and has been continuously resident in the UK since their birth or arrival,
and the parent was settled before 1 January 1973 or has the right of abode (or met these criteria but is now a British citizen).
Although the Applicant satisfied the other criteria, because of her repeated travel to St Lucia since arriving in the UK in August 2000, the Respondent refused her application on the basis that she failed to satisfy criterion (d) above [18]-[19].
In this case, the High Court considered the appropriate legal test for leaving findings of fact to juries in Article 2 inquests. Is it that such findings are arguable? Or is it that there is sufficient evidence to support them? The answer, quite firmly, is the latter.
In its judgment in the case of IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, handed down on 26 November 2025, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the correct test for establishing the existence of family life between non-core family members under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human rights (“ECHR”). It also clarified the proper conceptual framework for considering the subtle interaction between the rights of non-claimant family members and the UK’s Convention obligations to individuals outside its territory. Finally, it emphasised the centrality of the Government’s immigration policy to any exercise considering the proportionality of an interference with an individual’s Article 8 rights in the immigration context.
In Buzzard-Quashie v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 1397, the Court of Appeal has helpfully restated the law on (civil) contempt of court. The decision – arising out of a longstanding refusal by the Northamptonshire police force (“the police force”) to comply with orders from the Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”) and the courts to release footage from officers’ body-worn cameras (“BWV”) – also affirms the liability of a chief constable for the acts and omissions of their subordinates.
To what extent does the law afford protection to couples looking to foster children, in circumstances where that couple possesses (and vocalises) strong religious beliefs? This was the issue for consideration before Turner J, who heard this appeal in the King’s Bench Division of the High Court. Judgment was handed down on 18 November 2025.
Put simply, intended parents should avoid embarking on a surrogacy arrangement where they do not meet, have any knowledge of or means of contacting the surrogate who carries their much wanted child. (Mrs Justice Theis DBE)
This case concerned an application by intended parents for a parental order in respect of an 18-month-old child following a surrogacy arrangement with a surrogate in Nigeria whom neither of the intended parents had met and about whom they had no information.
The Court of Appeal in Re D has overturned final care and placement orders made at an Issues Resolution Hearing (“IRH”), stating that judges must give clear, reasoned findings on the threshold criteria under section 31(2) Children Act 1989 (“CA 1989”), even where proceedings are uncontested or parents are absent.
In delivering the judgment, Cobb LJ, with whom Baker LJ and Miles LJ agreed, criticised the short form reasoning used by the Family Court and stressed the need for transparent judicial decision-making when the State intervenes in family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).
This blog is maintained for information purposes only. It is not intended to be a source of legal advice and must not be relied upon as such. Blog posts reflect the views and opinions of their individual authors, not of chambers as a whole.
Our privacy policy can be found on our ‘subscribe’ page or by clicking here.
Recent comments