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Round Up- Do trained lawyers have a human right to represent themselves in court?

Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law

The High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court are not sitting at present (Easter Term will begin on Tuesday 10th April). Accordingly, this week’s Round Up focuses largely on the ECHR.

Credit: The Guardian

Correia De Matos v. Portugal

This week, the ECHR held that requiring defendants to have legal representation does not violate Article 6. The vote was split by nine votes to eight.

The applicant, a lawyer by training, alleged a violation of Article 6 s.3(c) of the Convention. This was on the basis of a decision by Portuguese domestic courts which (i) refused him leave to conduct his own defence in criminal proceedings against him, and (ii) required that he be represented by a lawyer.

Majority view

The majority view was that a member state can adopt this mandatory requirement in order to ensure a fair trial and the proper administration of justice. This was partly because an applicant’s close connection to proceedings may prevent him from effectively defending himself. Such an argument was especially strong in this case, where the applicant had been suspended from the Bar. His previous conduct, namely swearing at a judge on two separate occasions and acting as defence counsel despite being suspended, formed reasonable grounds to consider he may have lacked the objectivity necessary under Portuguese law to conduct an effective defence. The Court also attached significant weight to the ability for judicial review of the measure concerned.

However, the Court noted the accused was given alternative ways of participating in proceedings. For example, he could make statements, submit observations, requests and could remain present for all parts of proceedings. He could also revoke any measure carried out on his behalf or request a change of counsel. In light of these factors, and the margin of appreciation granted to States, the Court rejected the claim.

Dissenting judgements

The dissenting judges argued that the Court’s case law on Article 6 states its primary concern is to evaluate the overall fairness of criminal proceedings. It should also assess the particular circumstances of the case, using a wide range of criteria. The minority also emphasised that 31 out of the 35 Contracting Parties to the Convention have established the right to conduct one’s own defence in criminal proceedings as a general rule (including the UK).

In this case, the minority view was that domestic courts exceeded their margin of appreciation in securing applicants’ rights, thereby violating Article 6 ss. 1 and 3(c) of the Convention. It noted the applicant had expressly requested not to be defended by the court-appointed lawyer, that a relationship of trust between them did not exist, and that the lawyer did not endorse any of the appeals lodged by the legally trained applicant. In view of the lack of sufficient reasons provided by the State, the trial as a whole cannot be considered to have been fair.

A number of judges expressed a concern about the “paternalistic” majority view. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque was particularly spirited, describing it as:

a return to the biases of the tormented black past of Europe, those biases that categorised defendants as objects in the hands of the almighty State, which could always dictate what was in their interests, even against their own will.

In Other News….

In the Courts…

 

On the UKHRB

Jake Richards has written an article on the Divisional Court’s decision to quash the release of John Worboys.

 

Events:

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