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The Weekly Round Up — Scrutiny of the Immigration and Asylum Bill, 62nd Session of the UNHRC, eVisas and the ICO, Facial Recognition, and Rulings on Deportation, Extradition and Modern Slavery Guidance

Max Thomas

In the news

JCHR to scrutinise Immigration and Asylum Bill

The Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) has this week launched its legislative scrutiny of the Immigration and Asylum Bill.

Described by the government as “a framework of new, enhanced powers and offences to improve UK border security and to strengthen the asylum and immigration system”, the Bill contemplates a raft of reforms which have been summarised in a previous post on this blog.

Launching the JCHR’s inquiry into the Bill, Lord David Alton said:

We need to make sure that, as the Government sets out to deal with long-term issues such as the asylum backlog, costly asylum accommodation and low public confidence in the asylum and immigration processes, it does not come at the cost of the human rights of those engaging with the system.

The JCHR invites written submissions until 1st September 2026 on a number of issues relating to the Bill’s compatibility with domestic and international human rights obligations.

UNHRC concludes 62nd regular session

The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) concluded its 62nd regular session on 8th July, having adopted 28 resolutions on a range of country-specific and thematic issues.

The UNHRC adopted resolutions relating to the current human rights situations in Sudan, Myanmar and Eritrea and on a variety of thematic issues, including:

Calls for ICO to be investigated for eVisa oversight failures

The Science, Innovation and Technology Select Committee has been asked to open an investigation into the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) for alleged failures in upholding data protection law in relation to the Home Office’s eVisa scheme.

In a letter to the Committee’s chair, a group of 20 immigration, data protection and human rights organisations assert that the eVisa scheme has been affected – since its rollout – by systemic data protection and accessibility issues.

The signatories note that these issues have had a “high and unjustifiable” price, preventing individuals from proving their immigration status, applying for jobs, enrolling in education, and claiming benefits.

Against this background, the signatories criticise the ICO’s failure to take any action as part of its oversight responsibilities, despite being approached in November 2025. They ask the Select Committee to consider whether institutional changes are needed at the ICO, as well as investigating the specific eVisa issues.

Concerns over facial recognition technology in UK shops

Civil liberties groups have described a “dangerous escalation” in the use of facial recognition technology in UK shops – such as Sainsbury’s, B&M and Spar – to monitor shoplifting.

The technology, known as Facewatch, is expected to alert police in real time to the presence of known offenders based on live facial recognition matching.

Critics say this raises proportionality issues given the risks of misidentification, as well as threatening infringements of data and privacy rights as people’s faces will be scanned and their features stored without meaningful consent.

In defence of the technology, Facewatch’s CEO has said:

This is about the people who commit dozens and, in some cases, hundreds of offences, not the millions of people who simply want to do their shopping. If technology can help protect retail workers, prevent further crime and support policing, we believe it has a responsible role to play.

In the courts

Deportation cases in the Court of Appeal

The Court of Appeal has this week handed down judgment in two deportation cases raising issues connected with the ECHR.

The cases are:

  1. SSHD v Lewis [2026] EWCA Civ 879 (08 July 2026)
  2. SSHD v CP [2026] EWCA Civ 892 (10 July 2026)

Lewis

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the FTT erred in applying the statutory approach to Article 8 under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, ss 117B and 117C.

The Respondent, Mr Lewis, was a Dominican national who had been in the UK unlawfully since October 2015. In that time, he had been convicted of a series of escalating drugs offences and sentenced to 5 years and 4 months’ imprisonment. Accordingly, the SSHD decided to deport him. He appealed, relying on Article 8 grounds, chiefly focused around his desire to establish a close relationship with his young son. The FTT allowed his appeal. The SSHD appealed to the UT, which upheld the FTT’s decision, and then to the Court of Appeal.

In a judgment written by Lewis LJ, with which Moylan and Stuart-Smith LJJ agreed, the Court of Appeal found that the FTT — and by extension the UT — had, in allowing Mr Lewis’s appeal, failed properly to apply the statutory approach under the 2002 Act. The FTT had failed to take into account the considerations contained in s 117B, particularly failing to consider Mr Lewis’s lack of financial independence ([61]).

More fundamentally, the FTT had not identified “very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2” as required under s 117C(6), given Mr Lewis’s serious offending. In focusing on Mr Lewis’s wish to establish a relationship with his son in the future, the FTT had taken into account an irrelevant factor ([56]). It had actually identified “something less than … the circumstances set out in exception 2”, which requires a “genuine and subsisting relationship” and therefore cannot be satisfied by the prospect or intention of a future relationship ([55] and see s 117C(5)).

CP

In this case, the Court of Appeal clarified the correct application of the standard of proof where an individual seeks to resist deportation on Article 3 grounds in relation to a prospect of persecution by criminal gangs where adequate witness protection may or may not be available.

The Respondent, CP, was a Jamaican national. While in Jamaica, his mother witnessed a murder committed by the leader of a gang and subsequently gave evidence at the trial leading to his conviction. She entered a witness protection programme in Jamaica before coming to the UK in 1999.

CP’s own leave to remain in the UK expired in 2002 and was never renewed. He claimed asylum in 2006 and, while his application was being considered, committed offences of unlawful wounding and burglary. He was later convicted of two counts of rape. The SSHD accordingly gave CP notice of her intention to deport him. CP appealed on the ground that he was at risk of persecution contrary to Article 3 if he returned to Jamaica.

In dismissing CP’s appeal, the FTT relied on the governing Country Guidance in AB (Protection, criminal gangs, internal relocation) Jamaica CG [2007] UKAIT 00018 which provides in the headnote:

The authorities in Jamaica are in general willing and able to provide effective protection. However, unless reasonably likely to be admitted into the Witness Protection programme, a person targeted by a criminal gang will not normally receive effective protection in his home area.

And, to the same effect, at [155]:

Nevertheless, we recognise that apart from the safety-net of this programme, there does appear to be a protection gap. For persons targeted by gangs who are not reasonably likely to be admitted into [the Witness Protection] programme, we think the evidence adduced by Mr Sobers and others strongly points to them not being able to secure protection …

On this basis, the FTT held that the question it had to answer was whether it was reasonably likely that CP would be admitted into witness protection, should he be deported to Jamaica ([13]). Applying that test, it concluded that deportation would not breach CP’s Article 3 rights ([17]). On appeal, the UT reversed the FTT’s decision. It held that, by interpreting the country guidance in AB literally, the FTT had misdirected itself as to the required standard of proof ([21]-[22]).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the SSHD’s appeal for essentially the same reason. It held that the UT had correctly identified that the central question raised by CP’s appeal — applying the proper Article 3 standard of proof — was whether there was “a real risk or reasonable possibility” that CP would not be able to access reasonable protection in Jamaica, not whether there was a real likelihood that he would ([68]). At least on a literal reading, AB misstated the law and should not be applied as the FTT had done ([71]-[72]).

Further, asking itself the correct question which it had identified, the Court was satisfied that CP met the required standard to resist deportation on Article 3 grounds ([70]). A crucial piece of evidence in this regard was a letter from the Jamaican Ministry of National Security dated September 2023, in which the Ministry had assessed the probability of harm against CP’s family as “HIGH” and further noted that there was “no guarantee” that CP would be placed in witness protection ([7]).

Article 8 and extradition in the High Court

The High Court has handed down judgment in three extradition appeals where it considered, inter alia, whether extradition would be compatible with Article 8 ECHR.

The cases are:

  1. Rolbiecka-Platta v Poland [2026] EWHC 1658 (Admin) (06 July 2025)
  2. Romania v Preda [2026] EWHC 1657 (Admin) (07 July 2026)
  3. Tobosaru v Romania and Tofan v Romania [2026] EWHC 1720 (Admin) (08 July 2026)

In all three cases, the High Court held that extradition would not amount to an unlawful interference with Article 8, emphasising the high bar that must be met before extradition can successfully be resisted on Article 8 grounds.

In each case, the Court reiterated that the authorities established that it would only be in exceptional circumstances that Article 8 interferences would outweigh the very strong public interest in extradition. As held by the Supreme Court in Andrysiewicz v Poland [2025] UKSC 23 at [47]: “it will only be in cases of exceptionally severe impact on family life that an Article 8 ECHR defence will have any prospect of success”.

High Court holds SSHD acted unlawfully in altering modern slavery guidance

In R (AYA & Ors) v SSHD [2026] EWHC 1742 (Admin), the High Court has held that the SSHD acted unlawfully by altering modern slavery guidance to remove the right to request reconsideration of a negative trafficking/modern slavery decision from individuals sought to be removed to ECAT and ECHR signatory states.

In September 2025, the SSHD amended the modern slavery guidance under s 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 with the effect set out above. The purpose of the amendment was to remove a potential barrier to the removal of individuals to France under the ‘UK-France Treaty on the Prevention of Dangerous Journeys‘ ([43]). Claims for judicial review were subsequently brought by a number of individuals who had been, or were at risk of being, removed under the Treaty. A major common issue was the lawfulness of the amendment of the modern slavery guidance.

Having heard argument at a rolled-up hearing in late April to May 2026, Sheldon J held that the amendment was unlawful on a number of grounds:

  1. The amendment was ultra vires — it was outside the scope of what Parliament contemplated in giving the SSHD discretion to make arrangements under s 49(1) of the 2015 Act because it was incompatible with a robust and effective process for identifying and supporting victims of trafficking ([125])
  2. The amendment was an improper fetter on the SSHD’s discretion — by preventing the SSHD from reopening negative decisions, it fettered her discretion to identify trafficking victims ([146])
  3. The amendment breached the Padfield principle — since the amendment diluted the efficacy of arrangements for identifying trafficking victims, it frustrated the purpose and objects of the 2015 Act, these being inter alia to support and protect victims of trafficking ([164])
  4. The amendment was contrary to the principles in R (A) v SSHD [2021] UKSC 37 — by inducing officials not to reconsider decisions which ought to be reconsidered, the amended guidance directed officials to act in a way which contradicted the law ([166]).

In reaching his main conclusion that the amendment was unlawful because it did not conduce to a robust and effective process for identifying and supporting victims of trafficking, Sheldon J’s reasoning was as follows.

The statutory scheme under the 2015 Act necessarily requires robust and effective processes, or else the rights intended to be conferred on victims of trafficking would not be available to those entitled to them ([113]).

The reasonable grounds decision is taken at considerable pace – where possible, within 5 working days. Yet individuals arriving in the UK on small boats are frequently malnourished and sleep deprived. Their first interviews may take place in the middle of the night, before they have had the opportunity to speak to a medical professional. There will also often be language difficulties, leading to questions about exploitation not being fully understood and/or incomplete accounts being given. Critical evidence supporting a situation of trafficking will often be unavailable until a later stage, after a negative reasonable grounds decision has been made ([121]-[123]).

The relevance of those factors is that an initial negative trafficking decision is at a real risk of being mistaken, and a refusal to to reconsider the decision will prevent a mistake from being corrected. That reality is reflected in the fact that, in 2025, 79% of reconsidered reasonable grounds decisions were reversed ([124]). As such, the amendment to the guidance was not consistent with the robust and effective process that Parliament intended.

On the UKHRB

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