Search Results for: right%20to%20die
1 June 2010 by Adam Wagner
Article 9 | Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion
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Article 9 of the Convention provides as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
(2) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 10 of the EU Charter corresponds to Art.9 ECHR and is subject to the limitations set out in 9(2). This means, in effect, that where Member States are adopting Directives prohibiting discrimination or implementing EU working time rules, they are bound to respect the religious beliefs and activities of their citizens. This also authorises the slaughter of animals without pre stunning to satisfy the demands of Halaal consumers despite the provisions of Directive 93/104/EC on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter. The right to freedom of religion is also associated with the particularly highly protected EU right for individual to move across borders to join religious groups, preach etc.
Art.9 covers the sphere of private, personal beliefs and religious creeds. The Strasbourg authorities emphasise the democratic importance of an open forum of beliefs and opinions; atheists and agnostics may therefore claim the protection of this right (Kokkinakis v Greece (1993)17 EHRR 397).
The Strasbourg Court has accepted the following views and positions as beliefs under Art.9 :
(1) Veganism: United Kingdom Application No.00018187/91 (1993) Unreported.
(2) Scientology: Sweden Application No.0007805/77 (1979) 16 DR 68.
(3) Kosher diet: United Kingdom Application No.0008231/78 65 DR 245.
(4) Jehovah’s Witness: Kokkinakis v Greece (1993).
The right to freedom of conscience was argued in the right to die cases R v DPP ex parte Pretty and Pretty v UK following Sanles v. Spain [2001] EHRLR 348. The argument in both cases was that one’s own freedom to choose the manner and timing of one’s death should not be restricted by legislation fuelled by religious sensitivities. The argument was rejected in Strasbourg: see Pretty (2) for a critique of this element of the judgment. In general, positions taken in relation to politics and ideology do not qualify for Article 9 protection. There is no right, for example, under Article 9 to conscientious objection: Application No.0007705/76 (1977) 9 DR 196. Art.9 only protects actions and gestures that are intimately connected with a creed or belief. In Arrowsmith v United Kingdom (1978) 19 DR 5 the Commission rejected a complaint that the prosecution of the applicant for handing out leaflets to soldiers urging them not to serve in Northern Ireland breached her rights under Article 9. This was a specific action and not a general expression of her pacifist ideals. However the explicit exclusion of non-theistic belief systems by the Court may have to be reviewed in the light of the current inflamed debate about the impact of religion on various freedoms, such as the freedom to marry according to one’s choice, and of course the general freedom of expression.
There is some scepticism about an express right to respect for religion in a largely secular society and recent cases upholding the right to religious practices have attracted strong criticism. When the High Court ruled in May 2011 that a Muslim prisoner could not be disciplined for refusing to give urine for a drugs test because he was in the midst of a voluntary fast the general view was that the courts were once again cravenly giving way to abusive reliance on human rights by unsavoury characters: see the comments on our report of the case.
Furthermore, the idea that freedom of speech must give way to religious sensitivities under the increasing cloud of offence is becoming a highly contentious issue, made more so by the tensions surrounding Islamic extremism and the murderous attacks in Europe of those deemed offensive to the religion.
Article 9 does not impose a positive obligation on the State to introduce legislation to criminalise blasphemy or, where blasphemy laws are present, there is no duty on public authorities to bring proceedings against publishers of works that offend the sensitivities of any individual or group: Choudhury v United Kingdom Application No.00017439/90 (1991). States which impose conscription will not therefore be in breach of Article 9 if they sanction such objections.
Churches and associations with religious and philosophical objects are capable of exercising Article 9 rights. Profit-making corporations on the other hand cannot rely on Article 9 rights. In Refah Partisi v Turkey (2003)the Court held that the dissolution of a political party that was held to desire to establish a theocracy was consistent with the ECHR on the grounds that theocracy flew in the face of the liberal and democratic principles of the Convention.
Article 9 does not require active facilitation of religious beliefs in the workplace (Stedman v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR CD 168, although the Strasbourg Court has adopted a more generous approach in Eweida and Others v United Kingdom (2013) by concluding that the applicant’s employer had breached her Article 9 rights by refusing to allow her to wear a crucifix. This was a minor victory however since the Court also decided that a policy requiring employees to serve all customers irrespective of sexual orientation was a legitimate restriction on religious freedom (this part of the case involved a Christian registrar disciplined for refusing to register same-sex couples and a second involving a marriage therapist dismissed for refusing to counsel same-sex couples). The Strasbourg Court is generally unsympathetic to individual claims for exemption on religious grounds to generally applicable laws; thus, in Pichon and Sajous v France (an inadmissibility ruling of 2001), the conviction of pharmacists who refused on religious grounds to supply contraceptives that had been lawfully prescribed was upheld on the basis of the need to take account of both health policy and the rights and freedoms of others. In Dahlab v Switzerland (2001) the Court upheld the refusal by the authorities to allow a teacher to wear a headscarf, on the basis that the state was entitled to seek to ensure the neutrality of the education system. Beyond the private sphere, therefore, states have a broad margin of discretion in deciding what religious actions and symbols to restrict.
Section 13 Human Rights Act 1998 provides that if a court’s determination of any question might affect the exercise by a religious organisation of the Convention right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion under Art.9 , the court must have particular regard to the importance of that right. See Alison Redmond-Bate v Director of Public Prosecutions (1999) 7 BHRC 375 for judicial discussion of the practical effect of this section. However see comments by Laws LJ on the proposal to accord special treatment in the courts to claimants or defendants relying on supernatural backing for their behaviour: McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ B1 (29 April 2010)
The freedom of religion also includes a negative aspect, including the rigth not having to manifest one’s religion or beliefs. In the case of Sinan Isik v. Turkey the Strasbourg Court ruled that it was an interference with Art.9 to require a citizen to indicate his religion in his application for an ID card or formally ask for the religion box to be left empty. That in itself, in the Court’s view, violated the Convention. This presumably covers all forms of state-sanctioned identification documents or registers.
The Human Rights Act 1998 also provides that priests, ministers and officials of any church are excluded from liability under s.6 where they refuse to administer a marriage “contrary to [their] religious doctrines or convictions”.
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9 July 2020 by Sapan Maini-Thompson
In R (Reprieve & Ors) v Prime Minister [2020] EWHC 1695 (Admin), the High Court made a preliminary ruling that Article 6(1) of the ECHR does not apply to the forthcoming judicial review of the Government’s decision not to establish a public inquiry into allegations that the UK intelligence services were involved in the torture, mistreatment and rendition of detainees in the aftermath of 9/11. It was further held that the claimants are not entitled to the level of disclosure of open material outlined in SSHD v AF (No 3) [2009].
Angus McCullough QC of 1 Crown Office Row was instructed as a Special Advocate in this case.
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23 August 2016 by David Scott
Petition of the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body for an Order under Section 46 of the Court of Session Act 1988 [2016] CSOH 113 – read the judgment here
The Court of Session recently ruled in favour of the eviction of the Indy Camp outside Edinburgh Parliament.
by David Scott
Background
Since November 2015, the foot of Arthur’s Seat has been home to a continuous encampment, known as Indy Camp, promising to remain stationed until a second referendum on Scottish independence is called. In December 2015 the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body brought proceedings seeking the eviction of the camp, as it encroached on the property of the Parliament.
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6 May 2010 by Adam Wagner
For much longer?
Whichever party wins today’s General Election, freedom of information in and outside the courts will be a key issue for the incoming government. In light of this, Hugh Tomlinson QC asks whether a “right to freedom of information” is evolving through human rights case law in an interesting piece on the International Form for Responsible Media Blog (Inforrm).
The Government is under increasing pressure to release information which was once uncontroversially secret. As we posted yesterday, freedom of information is a hot topic in the courts at the moment, specifically in the context of the security services and the information they are obliged to disclose to defendants in criminal trials and claimants in civil proceedings. In those scenarios, the right to a fair trial was conditional on a right to see information which goes to the heart of that trial (Article 6 ECHR). However, when divorced from the right to a fair trial, there is as yet no explicit right to information.
Article 10 of the Convention only extends to the right to “hold opinions and to receive and impart information“. This does not necessarily entail a right to access confidential Government information. Hugh Tomlinson says:
This has often been identified as an important weakness in the Convention. However, the position is changing: the Convention is a “living instrument” and recent case law suggests that, in accordance with international trends, the Convention may be evolving its own “right to freedom of information” as a fact of the right to freedom of expression in Article 10 of the Convention.
We posted recently on the the robust freedom of expression enjoyed by those living in the United States, as compared to the arguably less robust freedoms in the UK under Article 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Freedom of expression has gone hand in hand in the United States with superior access to government information. The US Freedom of Information Act was passed by Lyndon Johnson in 1966. It is only with the Freedom of Information Act 2000, sister-legislation to the Human Rights Act, that the UK has begun to catch up. The development of a right to freedom of information would close that gap further. As Tomlinson argues:
… the Court of Human Rights has recognised that there can be a right to access to official information. In some cases this has been done by reference to Article 8 of the Convention… Most recently, in the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union case (Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, Judgment of 14 April 2009) the applicant had been refused access to a constitutional complaint made by an MP. The Court said that “the law cannot allow arbitrary restrictions which may become a form of indirect censorship should the authorities create obstacles to the gathering of information” [27]
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22 August 2012 by Guest Contributor
One of the possibilities being considered by Lord Justice Leveson as he writes the Report for Part 1 of his Inquiry is whether there should be compulsory regulation of the print media. One, widely discussed possibility is a statutory framework which would require any publisher with turnover or readership above a set threshold to join a “regulatory body”: compulsory regulation for large publishers.
The purpose of such a provision would be to deal with the so-called “Desmond problem” – the anomaly of a system of regulation which does not cover all the large newspaper publishers. But an important freedom of expression question arises: is the compulsory regulation of the print media compatible with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights? This is not a question which has ever been considered by the Court of Human Rights and the answer may not be an entirely straightforward.
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21 September 2016 by Rosalind English
Smith v Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust and another [2016] EWHC 2208 (QB) – read judgment
Under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 those who live together but are not married are not entitled to damages for bereavement. The High Court has found that though this did not directly engage the right to family life and privacy under Article 8, the difference in treatment between cohabitees and those who were married or in a civil partnership could not be justified and consideration should be given to reforming the law.
The issues before the Court
The claimant had cohabited with a man for over two years before he had died as a result of the first and second defendants’ negligence. She had made a dependency claim under s.1 of the 1976 Act, which by a 1982 amendment had been extended to people who had been cohabiting for more than two years, but the bereavement damages provisions in s.1A(2)(a) still applies only to spouses and civil partners.
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13 May 2013 by Sarina Kidd
Welcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your regular chocolate selection gift box of human rights news. The full list of links can be found here. You can also find our table of human rights cases here and previous roundups here.
This week, the Government announced plans to curb Article 8 of the ECHR, Grayling continues to cause controversy with his reforms of both the Criminal Justice System and of judicial review, and Qatada may soon be leaving us for pastures new.
by Sarina Kidd
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25 June 2014 by Rosalind English
R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) (Appellants) v Ministry of Justice (Respondent); R (on the application of AM) (AP) (Respondent) v The Director of Public Prosecutions (Appellant) [2014] UKSC 38 – read judgment
On appeal from [2013] EWCA Civ 961
The Supreme Court has declined to uphold a right to die a dignified death. However, a glimmer is is to be found in this judgment in that two out of the seven justices who concluded that it was for the United Kingdom to decide whether the current law on assisted suicide was incompatible with the right to privacy and dignity under Article 8, would have granted such a declaration in these proceedings., particularly where the means of death was one that could have been autonomously operated by the disabled appellant, leaving no doubt as to the voluntary and rational nature of his decision.
But the majority concluded that this was a matter for Parliament, not for the Courts.
The following summary is from the Supreme Court’s Press Summary
Bacground
These appeals arise from tragic facts and raise difficult and significant issues, namely whether the present state of the law of England and Wales relating to assisting suicide infringes the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”), and whether the code published by the Director of Public Prosecutions (“the DPP”) relating to prosecutions of those who are alleged to have assisted suicide is lawful.
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1 June 2010 by Adam Wagner
Article 6 | Right to a fair trial
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Article 6 provides:
(1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
(2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
(3) Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence.
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.
There is no directly corresponding provision in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 20 – the right to equality before the law – is more related to ECHR Art.14, and Article 47, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial is based on Art. 13 ECHR which guarantees the right to an effective remedy for human rights violations. However, it has been argued before the European Court of Justice that Article 6 ECHR and Article 47 contain effectively the same fair trial rights (see David Hart’s post on this issue).
The protection of Article 6 ECHR only extends to those disputes that concern a “civil right” (as well of course to the determination of any criminal charge against an individual). The jurisprudence on what does or does not constitute a “civil right” is complex and lengthy but a general rule is that the characterisation of the matter in domestic law is not determinative – Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium (1981) 4 EHRR 1 – and while such civil rights could be brought into play either by direct challenge or by administrative action, it was the nature and purpose of the administrative action that determined whether its impact on private law rights was such that a legal challenge involved a determination of civil rights. In R(Begum) v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2003] 2 AC 430 the House of Lords was prepared to assume that a decision as to housing for a homeless person did involve a “civil right” but in the more recent case of Ali v Birmingham City Council [2010] 2 AC 39 the Supreme Court confronted that question and decided that it did not.
A parent’s rights to contact with, and custody of, a child constitute “civil rights” for the purposes of Art.6. This means that they must have a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. When a mother was refused access to her child by the local authority, and she was unable to challenge that refusal in court, there was found to be a breach of her Art. 6 rights (although the case was settled after it was declared admissible in Strasbourg: Application no. 11468/85, 15 December 1986). A more recent case against Croatia indicated that exclusion of a mother from the adoption (X v Croatia, 17 July 2008).
It is hardly surprising that domestic courts encounter some confusion when they come to determine whether a matter involves a “civil right” or not; Strasbourg case law on the point is far from clear. In trying to determine whether a freezing order on a claimant’s assets affected his civil rights, Sedley LJ observed that the Strasbourg Court is very clear about the concept having an autonomous meaning, but “What is neither certain nor clear is what that meaning is.” (Maftah v FCO [2011] EWCA Civ 350, and see our post on this case here)
Particular difficulties have been caused by the fast-changing Strasbourg case law on employment disputes involving public servants, which until recently have been excluded from the purview of Article 6. The Court decided in Pellegrin v France (2001) 31 EHRR not to allow administrative servants the guarantees of Article 6 because their employment involves important state imperatives, but defining this kind of employment is far from easy, as was demonstrated by the case of an army chaplain who sought redress for alleged unfairness; after considering the authorities Nichol J found that the claimant fell within the Pellegrin exception under the test laid down in Eskelinen v Finland (2007). See our discussion on this judgment here.
The requirements of fairness imposed on Member States by this Article apply to civil and criminal litigation. Art.6 , taken as a whole, has been held to ensure not only a fair trial once litigation is under way but to impose an obligation on States to ensure access to justice (Golder v United Kingdom (1975) 1 EHRR 524: interference with a prisoner’s correspondence with a solicitor constituted a breach of his right of access to court under Art.6 , even though litigation was not pending). Most recent litigation has concerned the matter of costs; whilst the right of access to justice is implied in Article 6(1), the original case on costs, Airey v Ireland (1979), has not been interpreted to impose on states an obligation to provide a legal aid scheme. Legal aid constitutes one avenue to justice but there are others, such as the availability of representation under a contingent or conditional fee agreement. Legal representation is not considered indispensable in all cases. Where there are no particularly complicated points of law, the state is not compelled to provide a publicly funded lawyer (HH (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 504 ). In environmental challenges, on the other hand, the right of access to (affordable) access coincides with the obligation on states imposed by the Aarhus Convention to avoid prohibitive expense where individuals or groups ask the courts to enforce environmental law. The Aarhus Convention is part of EU law therefore may be relied upon in UK courts, until such time as the UK’s departure from the EU is finalised.
The requirement that the trial be conducted by an “independent and impartial tribunal” is satisfied if an internal disciplinary appeals board consists equally of members of the relevant profession and members of the judiciary: Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium (1981)4 EHRR 1.
At the Strasbourg level the most litigated requirement in Art.6 is the obligation on States to ensure that proceedings do not exceed a “reasonable time”. The circumstances of the case may determine the importance of expedition; in AIDS cases the Court’s approach has been stricter than in other areas, since the rapid dispatch of compensation claims is essential in respect to terminally ill patients (X v France (1992)14 EHRR 483). The Court has also take a strict approach to delay in child care cases where the child may have bonded with its new carers: H v United Kingdom (1987) 10 EHRR 95.
The requirement of a public hearing relates to proceedings in courts of first and only instance. The failure to provide a public hearing will not be cured by making the appeal proceedings public where the case is not reheard on its merits: Le Compte .
If the initial hearing (eg by a regulator) does not fulfil the requirements of independence and impartiality, appeal may cure the defect: Bryan v United Kingdom (1996). In any event if the matter is essentially one of policy, the detailed requirements of Art.6 do not necessarily apply: see the House of Lords ruling in Alconbury (2001) and the line of cases preceding the House of Lords’ analysis in R(Begum) v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council .In many administrative fields, such as planning, an administrator may be decision-maker, and not “an independent..tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6(1), but the process will be Article 6(1) compliant, if an aggrieved party has a right of appeal or review from that decision before such a tribunal.
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6 June 2018 by Guest Contributor
Michael Rhimes is the fourth référendaire to Judge Vajda at the Court of Justice of the European Union. He was not involved in the Coman case. This blog post is written in a purely personal capacity and reflects only the author’s views.
I have three points on the judgment, which is summarised in part 1.
1. A narrow judgment: A free movement case, not a gay marriage one.
The judgment is a narrow one. On a basic level, for the “Coman” rule to be engaged, a number of conditions must be satisfied:
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- At least one of the parties to the marriage must be a Union national;
- One of the Union nationals in question must have exercised their free movement rights (otherwise Article 21 TFEU will not be engaged, see C-434/09 McCarthy, paras 49 to 55)
- The couple must be married in a Member State that solemnises same-sex marriage.
In addition, the reasoning of the Court focuses on the right to free movement in Article 21 TFEU. The Coman judgment is not one that is predicated upon the growing recognition of same-sex marriage within the EU (on this, see my third comment, and para 56 to 58 of the Opinion) or, indeed, on fundamental rights (on this, see my second comment). Member States have to recognise the third country same-sex spouse of a Union citizen, but only so that Union citizen may freely exercise their free movement rights.
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1 June 2010 by Adam Wagner
Protocol 2 Article 1 | Right to education
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Article 2 Protocol 1 provides:
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and teaching, the state shall respect the rights of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.
Although this Article is incorporated into national law by the Human Rights Act 1998, the United Kingdom has filed a reservation in respect of the Protocol 1 Article 2 which applies to domestic interpretation of the right as well as to this country’s obligations under the Convention at international level. The reservation accepts the principle of education in conformity with parent’s religious and philosophical convictions “only so far as it is compatible with the provision of efficient instruction and training, and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure.
The leading case on Protocol 1 Article 2 is Belgian Linguistic (1968) 1 EHRR 252 in which the European Court of Human Rights stated that the rights protected in that Article are:
- a right to access to educational institutions existing at a given time;
- a right to an effective education;
- a right to official recognition of the studies a student has successfully completed;
However, this right does not impose on States an obligation to establish at their own expense, or to subsidise, education of any particular type or at any particular level. Nor does it entail a right for aliens to remain in the State of entry to take advantage of the local education system: (1) Henry Holub (2) Eva Holub v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 WLR 1359. Nor does this article impede the power of local education authorities to refuse grants for certain vocational courses (R v Birmingham City Council, ex parte Jacob Youngson (2001) LGR 218).
This right has been invoked by pupils who have been excluded from schools for disruptive behaviour, however these kinds of challenges rarely succeed. Provided schools reserve exclusion for serious cases in which less intrusive measures are inadequate, restrict the removal to as short a period as possible and make sensible efforts to provide alternative educational support, they will not be found by the domestic courts or Strasbourg to be in breach of A2P1: see Ali v United Kingdom (2011) ECHR 17 and Joe Barrett’s discussion of the case here.
It is arguable that parents may claim a right under this Article to start and run a private school: see European Commission of Human Rights decision in Ingrid Jordebo Foundation of Christian Schools Ingrid Jordebo v Sweden (1987) 51 DR 125 and the State may not use its regulatory power to make it impossible to establish private schools.
Finally, it is important to note that the “right” to an education is not a “civil right” to which the fair trial guarantees of Article 6 may apply: see R v Richmond-Upon-Thames London Borough Council ex parte JC (A Child) (2001) LGR 146.
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10 May 2011 by Rosalind English
The Strasbourg Court has ruled that the United Kingdom has not breached the right to privacy by failing to have in place a “pre-notification” requirement that would have alerted Max Mosley to the News of the World’s impending publication of covertly filmed footage – read judgment.
Adam Wagner’s prediction is bang to rights; although in this particular case the Court agreed that the newspaper had “flagrantly” violated Max Mosley’s right to privacy, it has refrained from ruling that UK law fell short of adequate protection of Article 8. “Particular care” had to be taken when examining constraints which might operate as a form of censorship prior to publication and generally have a chilling effect on journalism.
A new attitude of diffidence characterises this judgment in that the Court expressly refrains from considering the application of Convention rights to the facts of this case, since the UK Court had already decided on it. This suggests that Strasbourg is beginning to take on board criticisms that it is tending to arrogate to itself the role of supra-national court of appeal. There was no reconsideration therefore of the High Court’s assessment of the newspaper’s public interest defence nor of the balancing act that the judge had conducted between the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression. The focus of this ruling was on the question of whether a legally binding pre-notification rule was required.
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23 October 2015 by Guest Contributor
Those who want change should have to make the case for it, Baroness Helena Kennedy QC challenged her fellow panellists, at a recent event jointly organised by the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law and British Institute of International and Comparative Law, and hosted by Bindmans. The panel was one of the most stimulating contributions of the year to the debate over the proposed repeal of the Human Rights Act and its replacement with a British Bill of Rights, featuring contributions from three members of the 2012 Commission on a Bill of Rights, a number of comparative perspectives including one from Australia, and even a call for what appears to be a written constitution.
Professor Jeffrey Jowell gave some preliminary remarks to set the scene for the panel discussion. He noted that the Bingham Centre had not adopted any particular position on the proposed repeal of the Human Rights Act (HRA) and its subsequent replacement with a British Bill of Rights, since the Conservative Government had not yet published its proposals. He then quoted a recent report that the Government was planning to publish its consultation paper within the next two months, and then seek to legislate rapidly to get the British Bill of Rights on to the statute books by the end of next summer. Given this, he felt that the time was therefore right to hear a spectrum of views on the subject to assist the Bingham Centre in forming its position.
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25 March 2011 by Rosalind English
The case of Patmainiece v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions was reported in an earlier post. Here we discuss the underlying rationale for the decision and ask whether the finding that the nationality requirement amounted to mere indirect discrimination was a correct “fit” with EU principles of free movement.
Article 18 (now article 21 TFEU) provides:
1. Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States
However a different regime applies to non-economic actors as opposed to workers. Free movement of workers is one of the fundamental underpinnings of the internal market on which the EU is based. The main EU Directives and Regulations giving effect to the right to free movement of workers are Regulation No 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community (as amended by Directive 2004/38/EC) and Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of EU citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states. But the rights of those who are economically inactive to reside for more than three months in other member states is subject to certain conditions, set out in the 2004 Directive; they must
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17 July 2023 by Guest Contributor
Last month marked one year since the startling repeal of Roe v Wade on the 24th June 2022 – the day the US Supreme Court rowed back the right of American women to obtain an abortion. Almost exactly a year later, back in the UK, last month saw the conviction of Carla Foster for the late abortion of her 32-week-old foetus. The case has brought abortion law back into the public conscience this year and reignited the fears around the safety of women’s rights to abortion in the UK. Thousands of protestors descended on the steps of the Royal Courts of Justice days after the conviction was announced, fighting for a woman’s right to abortion to be enshrined in UK law and opposing the fact that, legally, abortion remains a crime in the UK.
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