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(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
(2) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, or the police, or of the administration of the State.
The right to freedom of assembly covers peaceful protests and demonstrations. Public and private meetings are protected under this Article. These may be limited mainly on the grounds of public order. In most cases Article 11 rights are considered together with the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 and sometimes the right to a fair trial under Article 6. The Strasbourg Court will only reach a ruling under Article 11 if it considers that this is the lex specialis to be applied in a given case, in other words whether its provisions are more relevant to the facts than those in Article 10.
The right to freedom of association guarantees the capacity of all persons to join with others to attain a particular objective. Freedom of association also implies a negative right for individuals who may not be compelled to join an association: (1) Young (2) James (3) Webster v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 38 (a case concerning closed shop agreements) and Sigurdur A Sigurjonsson v Iceland (1993) 16 EHRR 462 (compulsory membership of a taxi association breached the applicant’s right to freedom of association). In addition to this in the recent case of Demir & Baykara v. Turkey (10 November 2008), the Grand Chamber held that the right to bargain collectively had become one of the essential or core elements of the right to join and form trade unions, something of a departure from the case law on this particular element of trades unionism in the seventies. States are also under a positive obligation to provide legal safeguards for employees against actions taken by private employers. In one case a private company dismissed the applicant who was a candidate for the British National Party, because he might allegedly have offended clients of ethnic origin if they discovered his leanings. The Strasbourg Court upheld his complaint under Article 11, concluding that his right to freedom of association has been infringed and violated, because the qualifying period of one year for unfair dismissal left no room for a claim that he was discriminated against on grounds of his political beliefs: Redfearn v United Kingdom, 6 November 2012.
Freedom of assembly is often in the news as demonstrations, sit-ins, staged occupations and other forms of protest are part and parcel of the public life of a liberal democracy. We discuss the application of domestic public order laws and the extent to which they can be mitigated by Article 11 here.
R(on the application of Reilly (No. 2) and another) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2014] EWHC2182 (Admin) – read judgment
The High Court has issued a declaration of incompatibility following a successful challenge to the Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Act 2013. The regulations under the Act that sanctioned those who did not participate in unpaid “work for your benefit” schemes by depriving them of an allowance violated the rule of law protected by the Convention and this country’s unwritten constitution. However, the dispute did not engage Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR.
Factual background
The claimants, Caitlin Reilly and Jonathan Hewstone (CR and JH) had been unemployed and claimed jobseeker’s allowance. They objected to participation in schemes devised under the Jobseeker’s Allowance (Employment, Skills and Enterprise Scheme) Regulations 2011, in which they were required to work for no pay. As a sanction, the allowance could be withheld from those who refused to participate. CR complied with the requirement under the regulations to take unpaid work at Poundland so did not suffer any sanction. However, attendance on the scheme meant she was unable to continue her voluntary work in a museum, which she hoped would lead to a career in museums (see my previous post on her successful challenge to the scheme). After that ruling, the regulations were amended to overcome the defects identified by the court. But the 2013 regulations, which applied prospectively, had the effect of retrospectively validating the 2011 Regulations, which the Court of Appeal had held to be unlawful. Then the Supreme Court allowed the secretary of state’s appeal against the Court of Appeal decision on the basis that the Act was in force. But the declaration in favour of CR remained valid, following the 2013 Act and that Supreme Court judgment; indeed counsel for the Secretary of State acknowledged the fact that Ms Reilly’s position was “not affected by the 2013 Act.”
JH had not been a party to Reilly No. 1. but his position was clearly affected by that ruling. After initial attendance on a scheme for some months, he refused to participate further, and so his JSA payments were stopped for four specified periods by way of sanction. He in turn had successfully appealed against sanctions imposed by the 2013 scheme. The secretary of state’s appeal against those decisions had been stayed pending the outcome of Reilly.
The claimants submitted that the 2013 Act was incompatible with their rights under Article 6. It was an intervention in the ongoing proceedings in Reilly No. 1 which had the effect of determining the litigation in the government’s favour by retrospectively validating its unlawful acts. It thereby deprived both claimants of a fair determination of their civil rights and obligations, contrary to to the first paragraph of Article 6. JH also relied upon Article 1 Protocol 1, claiming that by withholding his JSA, the defendant deprived him of a “possession” to which he was entitled. He submitted that the deprivation could not be justified as being in the public interest.
The court allowed the applications in respect of Article 6 but not A1P1.
Reasoning behind the judgment
Article 6 and the rule of law
CR and JH had brought proceedings against the state. The 2013 Act was directly targeted at resolving the Reilly litigation. As such, this legislative act by the government had amounted to an interference in ongoing legal proceedings: it had influenced the judicial determination in the secretary of state’s favour in Reilly and was likely to do so in JH’s appeals. Although Parliament was not precluded in civil matters from adopting retrospective provisions, it cannot legislate so as to interfere with the courts’ handling of disputes before them:
the principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial contained in Article 6 preclude any interference by the legislature–other on compelling grounds of the general interest –with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute. (Zielinski v France (2001) 31 EHRR 19)
Nor did the ruling in National & Provincial Building Society v United Kingdom (1998) 25 EHRR 127 avail the defendant, even though the Strasbourg Court ruled there that legislation to close an unforeseen tax loophole was compatible with Article 6. The government in that case, the Court concluded, had “compelling public interest motives” to make the applicant societies’ judicial review proceedings and the contingent restitution proceedings unwinnable. By contrast, in the instant case the claimants could not have foreseen Parliament’s retrospective validation of its own unlawful act.
Although these principles emanate from decisions of the Strasbourg Court, in Lang J’s view, they also accurately reflected fundamental principles of the UK’s unwritten constitution, which enshrines the fundamental principle of the rule of law:
It requires, inter alia, that Parliament and the Executive recognise and respect the separation of powers and abide by the principle of legality. Although the Crown in Parliament is the sovereign legislative power, the Courts have the constitutional role of determining and enforcing legality. Thus, Parliament’s undoubted power to legislate to overrule the effect of court judgments generally ought not to take the form of retrospective legislation designed to favour the Executive in ongoing litigation in the courts brought against it by one of its citizens, unless there are compelling reasons to do so. Otherwise it is likely to offend a citizen’s sense of fair play.
The secretary of state submitted that there had been compelling public interest grounds for the retrospective legislation. Lang J acknowledged that it was understandable that a government faced with the prospect of substantial repayments would consider it in the public interest not to pay them. But it was apparent from Strasbourg’s judgments, such as Scordino and Zielinkski, that financial loss alone was not a sufficiently “compelling reason in the public interest”. If it were, then retrospective legislation of this kind would be commonplace.” (para 107).
Not only was there insufficient public interest to justify the retrospective legislation but the government had been aware of the concerns about the legality of the statute because it had been brought to the attention of its proposer by the report of the Constitution Committee. One of its members, Lord Pannick, told the House:
this Bill contravenes two fundamental constitutional principles. First, it is being fast-tracked through Parliament when there is no justification whatever for doing so. Secondly, the Bill breaches the fundamental constitutional principle that penalties should not be imposed on persons by reason of conduct that was lawful at the time of their action. Of course, Parliament may do whatever it likes – Parliament is sovereign – but the Bill is, I regret to say, an abuse of power that brings no credit whatever on this Government.
Whilst judicial review is more properly concerned with the substance of the legislation, not the reasons for it, Lang J wryly observes that the absence of any consultation with representative organisations, and the lack of scrutiny by the relevant parliamentary committees, “may have contributed to some misconceptions about the legal justification for the retrospective legislation.” (para 96). The government’s statement to Parliament explaining why the 2013 Act would be Convention compatible had not explained that Parliament was being asked to justify a departure from the legal norm, which would only be lawful if made for compelling public interest reasons. Further, the statement had erred in concluding that the case was comparable to National & Provincial as the legislation would be closing a loophole. It was not accurate to characterise the flaws in the 2011 Regulations as a loophole. The 2013 Regulations had remedied the technical defect identified by the court in the original Reilly litigation, but that did not mean there were compelling grounds to justify the interference with CR and JH’s rights under Article 6 to a judicial determination of their claims. The 2013 Act therefore violated Article 6(1) in relation to those who had pursued claims in the courts or tribunals.
Article 1 Protocol 1: had the Second Claimant been “deprived” of his “possessions”?
JH failed in his claim that he had suffered a violation of the right to respect for peaceful enjoyment of possessions. This was not because he had succeeded under Article 6 – the rights protected by the respective provisions were different (AXA General Insurance Ltd, Petitioners [2011] UKSC 46). Lang J accepted the claimants’ argument that a wholly state-funded non-contributory benefit could constitute a possession under A1P1, but JH’s right to the allowance depended on whether he met the conditions for receipt of the benefit. He had not met the conditions for future payment. He had not been deprived of an existing possession because there was no revocation of benefits previously received. This was made clear in Moskal v Poland, where the Strasbourg Court observed that
Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not create a right to acquire property. This provision places no restriction on the contracting state’s freedom to decide whether or not to have in place any form of social security scheme, or to choose the type or amount of benefits to provide under any such scheme. ((2010) 50 EHRR 22)
It was clear from this statement of principle that, in order to establish a property right, the applicant must fulfill the requirements for receipt of the benefit at the relevant time. Nor did he have a reasonable expectation that the allowance would be paid if his legal claim was successful. His claim was not an “asset” within A1P1. His only reasonable expectation had been that his appeal would be determined in accordance with the law as it stood from time to time.
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Department of Health v IC, Healey and Cecil(EA/2011/0286 & EA/2011/0287) – Read Decision
In a recent post, Panopticon brought you, hot-off-the-press, the Tribunal’s decision in the much-publicised case involving publication, under Freedom of Information Law, of the NHS Risk Register. Somewhat less hot-off-the-press are my observations. This is a very important decision, both for its engagement with the legislative process and for its analysis of the public interest with respect to section 35(1)(a) of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (formulation or development of government policy) – particularly the “chilling effect” argument. At the outset, it is important to be clear about what was being requested and when.
Risk registers in general
The DOH prepared two “risk registers” documenting the risks associated with implementing the “far-reaching and highly controversial” NHS reforms under what was then the Health and Social Care Bill. The Tribunal heard that risk registers are used widely across government for project planning. They provide snapshots (rather than detailed discussions) combining the probability of and outcomes from any given risk associated with the proposed reform; risks are then classified in red, amber or green terms. According to Lord Gus O’Donnell, who gave evidence in support of the DOH’s case, risk registers are the most important tool used across government to formulate and develop policy for risk management in advising ministers. John Healey MP, one of the requesters in this case, said that he was a minister for ten years and was never shown such a register.
Welcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your regular hurtling freight train of human rights news and views. The full list of links can be found here. You can find previous roundups here. Post by Sarina Kidd, edited and links compiled by Adam Wagner.
This week, immigration, in various forms was hotly discussed and some notable cases have been or are soon to be decided in the realm of disability rights. And not everyone is happy about the decision to televise Court of Appeal cases.
Conor Monighan brings us the latest updates in human rights law.
Credit: The Guardian
In the News:
An independent report into building regulations, commissioned by the government in the wake of the Grenfell disaster, has called for the current regulatory system to be overhauled.
However, the report surprised some because it did not recommend a ban on flammable cladding. It also declined to recommend stopping so-called ‘desktop studies’, where materials are tested without setting them on fire. The chairman of Grenfell United expressed disappointment at this conclusion. The Royal Institute of British Architects expressed support for banning inflammable cladding and the government has said it will consult on the issue. The Prime Minister has also pledged £400 million to remove flammable cladding from tower blocks.
The author of the report, Dame Judith Hackitt, said that banning the cladding was insufficient. Instead, she stated that a ‘whole system change’ is needed. Dame Hackitt warned that cost was being prioritised over safety and that ‘banning activities and particular materials […] will create a false sense of security’.
The report recommended fundamental changes to building regulations, saying that the process which drives compliance with the regulations are ‘weak and complex’. Dame Hackitt found that there was a ‘race to the bottom’ in the building industry that was putting people at risk. She also wrote that product testing must be made more transparent, and that residents’ voices were not being listened to.
The Grenfell Inquiry will open this week. For the first two weeks, the lives of those who died will be remembered in a series of commemorations. Continue reading →
The Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs Commitee of the United Nations has narrowly voted to remove sexual orientation from a draft resolution against extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.
In light of the guarantee of the right to life, liberty and security of person in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the resolution condemns all extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and demands that all States take effective action to prevent, combat, investigate and eliminate such executions.
London, UK. 11th July, 2016. Human rights campaigners protest against arms sales to Saudi Arabia outside the Defence and Security Organisation (DSO), the Government department responsible for arms export promotions.
In R (Campaign Against Arms Trade) v Secretary of State for International Trade [2019] EWCA Civ 1020, the Court of Appeal upheld a challenge to the lawfulness of the grant by the UK Government of export licences for the sale or transfer of arms or military equipment to Saudi Arabia for possible use in the conflict in Yemen.
The Campaign Against Arms Trade argued that there was a large body of evidence which demonstrates overwhelmingly that Saudi Arabia has committed repeated and serious breaches of international humanitarian law during the conflict in Yemen. CAAT claimed, in particular, that Saudi Arabia has committed indiscriminate or deliberate airstrikes against civilians, including airstrikes which have used “cluster” munitions, and which had targeted schools and medical facilities.
The Court of Appeal held that the decision-making process had been irrational, as it had not included an assessment as to whether there had been previous breaches of international humanitarian law in the past, without which there could not be a proper assessment of the risk of future breaches.
It must be something in the air. On the day the “Ratcliffe 20” were spared imprisonment for their planned attack on a power station, the Guardian published environmental lawyer Polly Higgins’ call for a new crime of ecocide and the fringe movement Campaign for Real Farming – rival to the mainstream Oxford Farming Conference – were sewing the seeds for resistance to ecologically damaging agricultural laws and practices.
The widespread perception is that the law and its custodians can no longer be trusted to safeguard the environment, or, to put it in the language of rights, that the protection that flows from current forms of rights entitlement is not only insufficient for, but positively damaging to the interests of the natural world.
Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council v KW (by her litigation friend Celia Walsh) [2014] EWCOP 45 – read judgment
Mostyn J has pulled no punches in rejecting an application for a declaration that an incapacitated person, being looked after in her own home, has been deprived of her liberty contrary to Article 5. There is a very full account of the judgment on the Mental Capacity Law and Policy blog so I will keep this summary short.
The first respondent, KW, is a 52 year old woman who is severely mentally incapacitated. She suffered brain damage while undergoing surgery to correct arteriovenous malformation in 1996. This resulted in a subarachnoid haemorrhage and long term brain damage. She was left with cognitive and mental health problems, epilepsy and physical disability. She was discharged from hospital into a rehabilitation unit and thence to her own home, a bungalow in Middleton, with 24/7 support. Physically, KW is just about ambulant with the use of a wheeled Zimmer frame. Mentally, she is trapped in the past. She believes it is 1996 and that she is living at her old home with her three small children (who are now all adult). As Mostyn J says,
Her delusions are very powerful and she has a tendency to try to wander off in order to find her small children. Her present home is held under a tenancy from a Housing Association. The arrangement entails the presence of carers 24/7 [who] attend to her every need in an effort to make her life as normal as possible. If she tries to wander off she will be brought back.
A review of the UK’s extradition laws by a former Court of Appeal judge has found that existing arrangements between the UK and USA are balanced but the Home Secretary’s discretion to intervene in human rights cases should be removed.
The review by Sir Scott Baker was commissioned shortly after the Coalition Government came to power, fulfilling the pledge in its programme for government to ”review the operation of the Extradition Act – and the US/UK extradition treaty – to make sure it is even-handed”. In my September 2010 post I said that the review marked a victory for campaigners against certain extradition agreements, most notably the supporters of alleged Pentagon hacker Gary McKinnon (pictured).
R (Moos and Anor) v The Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2011] EWHC 957 (Admin) – Read Judgment
The High Court has decided that the actions of police in “kettling” climate change protestors during the G20 summit were unlawful.
In the aftermath of the global credit crunch, the second G20 Summit, which was to commence on 2 April 2009, was an obvious target of public frustration and anger in respect of a range of economic and social issues. Thus on 1 April, two large demonstrations took place in the City of London. One was staged near the Bank of England, directed primarily at the (mis)management of the world’s financial markets by banks such as the Royal Bank of Scotland. The other was set up as a “Climate Camp” outside the Carbon Exchange Building in Bishopsgate, and was directed at environmental concerns. Continue reading →
Gurung v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 62 (02 February 2012) – read judgment
In a short but fascinating judgment which lays bare the foundation stones of judicial review, the Court of Appeal has articulated the principles to be applied when considering whether automatic deportation of a foreign criminal was “proportionate” for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention.
This was an appeal by the secretary of state against a decision of the Upper Tribunal (UT) that the deportation of the respondent (G) would interfere with his family life. The respondent had arrived in the United Kingdom in 2005 to join his father who had been granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom at the end of his service with the Gurkhas. Shortly afterwards G was involved in a group attack on a man, which led to the unconscious victim being thrown into the Thames and drowned. G was subsequently tried and convicted of manslaughter, which meant that he was subject to automatic deportation under the UK Borders Act 2007. However, the Upper Tribunal found that automatic deportation would be a disproportionate interference with his right to family life in the UK. Continue reading →
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (‘the Joint Committee’) has released its report on the Annual Renewal of Control Order Legislation 2010, in which it heavily criticised the control order scheme. The scheme, introduced in 2005, allows courts to put terror suspects under restrictions resembling house arrest by placing them under curfews of up to 16 hours a day and, typically, constraints on their movements and communications. There were 12 suspects subject to control orders in December 2009.
Whereas the Joint Committee has previously criticised the scheme, this is the first time that it has recommended for it to be discontinued. The committee said:
We have serious concerns about the control order system. Evidence shows the devastating impact of control orders on the subject of the orders, their families and their communities. In addition detailed information is now available about the cost of control orders which raises questions about whether the cost the system is out of all proportion to the supposed public benefit. We find it hard to believe that the annual cost of surveillance of the small number of individuals subject to control orders would exceed the amount currently being paid to lawyers in the ongoing litigation about control orders. Finally, we believe that because the Government has ignored our previous recommendations for reform, the system gives rise to unnecessary breaches of individuals’ rights to liberty and due process.
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Mahajna v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 2481 (Admin) (30 September 2011). Read judgment.
1 Crown Office Row’s Neil Sheldon appeared for the Secretary of State in this case. He is not the writer of this post.
The High Court has ruled that detention of a Palestinian activist, whilst he was challenging the decision to deport him on public policy grounds, was lawful in principle. However, the failure to explain to Raed Salah Mahajna the reasons for his detention in a language he could understand rendered the first 35 hours of detention unlawful.
The treatment of foreign nationals pending deportation has provoked a good deal of controversy, as reported recently. These cases are primarily ones where deportation is considered to be conducive to the public good because of serious criminal offences committed by the individual. In this case however, no crime was committed, but a history of activism perceived as anti-semitic preaching was considered a threat to security in the UK.
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Article 11 | Right to freedom of assembly and association
Department of Health v IC, Healey and Cecil(EA/2011/0286 & EA/2011/0287) – 
Welcome back to the UK Human Rights Roundup, your regular hurtling freight train of human rights news and views. The full list of links can be found 
A review of the UK’s extradition laws by a former Court of Appeal judge 
Mahajna v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 2481 (Admin) (30 September 2011). 
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