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The CJEU has ruled, in a first for that regulation, that the use of “Zero Tariff” contracts are inconsistent with its “Open Internet” regulation (Regulation 2015/2120). The regulation “aims to establish common rules to safeguard equal and non-discriminatory treatment of traffic in the provision of internet access services and end users’ rights”. Its intention is to legally establish the principle of ‘Net Neutrality’, whereby internet access providers are prohibited from giving preferential treatment (for example, limiting access or increasing traffic speeds) to specific websites and users.
The issue in this case was whether zero tariff contracts offered by Telenor, an Hungarian internet access provider, contravened net neutrality regulation. Zero tariff contracts provide data allowances to their users, (1 GB, for instance), which the consumer is allowed to use as they please. On running out of data, typically internet access would be stopped. However, in its two zero tariff contracts, called MyChat and MyMusic, certain websites and applications did not run down the data allowance. Furthermore, even once the data allowance had been used up, the same websites and applications could still be accessed, although otherwise no internet access was provided.
Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19 – read judgment
Angus McCullough Q.C. and Shaheen Rahman from 1COR acted as Special Advocates earlier in these proceedings. They had nothing to do with the writing of this post.
On first glance, this was not a judgment about human rights. It concerned the definition of statelessness under article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, and raised issues of competence and jurisdiction in relation to EU citizenship. Its specific interest for human rights lawyers lies primarily in the observations about the principle of proportionality; and in where the case, which most certainly does raise human rights issues, is likely to go next.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights has published a report which proposes that the Government must urgently consider the human rights implications of its Covid-19 measures.
The report drew attention to eight problem areas, claiming:
In the UK there are at present no rights expressly cast in terms applicable to climate change, nor have our traditional human rights been extensively interpreted as covering climate change consequences. As David Hart QC identifies in his blog, Is climate change a human rights issue?, human rights principles, to be useful for climate change litigators, have to have some democratic backing somewhere. So is there any hope, in the near future at least, of formally or even informally establishing a link between climate change and human rights in the UK? Is human rights based climate change litigation as ‘radical’ as David Hart suggests?
Consider, for example, the situation where the avoidance of further climate change damage was possible through adequate mitigation and/or adaptation, but where adaptation measures were not implemented due to financial or technical constraints. Leaving aside the issue of whether the State would be liable for a moment, could existing human rights be engaged in this situation?
Her Majesty’s Treasury (Respondent) v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (FC) (Appellants); Her Majesty’s Treasury (Respondent) v Mohammed al-Ghabra (FC) (Appellant); R (on the application of Hani El Sayed Sabaei Youssef) (Respondent) v Her Majesty’s Treasury (Appellant) [2010] UKSC 2
The Supreme Court has ruled that the Treasury cannot make orders to freeze the assets of terror suspects. The Terrorism (UN Measures) Order 2006 and the 2006 al-Qaeda and Taliban (UN Measures) Order were made under section 1 of the 1946 UN Act in order to implement resolutions of the UN Security Council, and were found by the Court to be unlawful.
As a preliminary point, the Court considered that a press report identifying M would engage article 8. In a separate judgment, the Court repealed all of the suspects’ anonymity orders, finding that these would not breach the suspects’ Article 8 rights to privacy.
Those charged with the task of protecting the public from harm resort to assertion similar to that here attributed to a GCHQ spokesperson:
Our work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework, which ensures that our activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate, and that there is rigorous oversight.
I was the Chief Surveillance Inspector at the Office of Surveillance Commissioners for eight years until August 2013. My own view is that the legal and policy framework is not strict and that oversight is not rigorous. Until they are, we should not blame public authorities for exploiting opportunities that enable them to meet their operational and investigative objectives.
Regardless of one’s views on the actions of Mr. Snowden, public knowledge of covert capabilities has encouraged those who engage in covert conduct to explain what it is they require and why. The reports published by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, the Intelligence and Security Committee and RUSI make important contributions but tend, in my view, to focus on the effect of technology and the impact of so-called mass surveillance. All agree that the law and oversight should be improved. Here’s my take on those two fundamentals. Continue reading →
Last week on this blog we published Francis Hoar’s article which argued that the Coronavirus Regulations passed by the Government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic involve breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly in relation to the interference they create in the rights to liberty, private and family life, freedom of worship, freedom of assembly, the prohibition on discrimination, the right to property and the right to education.
In this first of two response articles, Leo Davidson, a barrister at 11KBW, argues that the Regulations do not involve any breach of human rights law, as they fall within the executive’s margin of discretion for the management of this crisis, particularly given the serious potential implications of the pandemic and the reliance that the Government has placed on scientific and medical advice.
In the second article, Dominic Ruck Keene and Henry Tufnell, of 1 Crown Office Row, will argue that the interferences in rights created by the Regulations are proportionate when taken in the context of the pandemic.
Note: This article involves examination of thelegal provisions that accompany some of the restrictions on movement of individuals announced by the Government in order to protect life in the current crisis. The current Government guidance setting out these and other restrictions can be found here. Legal scrutiny is important but should not be taken to question the undeniable imperative to follow that guidance.
Police officers enforce lockdown on Brighton beach. Image: The Guardian
Introduction
With the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020, the Government has imposed a number of restrictive measures, colloquially referred to as the ‘lockdown’, in an effort to hamper the spread of the coronavirus.
These restrictions are controversial, and reasonable people disagree about whether they go too far, or not far enough. As a matter of human rights law, however, they are lawful. The Government has a positive obligation under human rights law to safeguard life and health; in balancing any conflict between this objective, and other rights, the Government has a significant margin of discretion, including in the assessment of scientific evidence.
Francis Hoar argues on this blog that the lockdown disproportionately interferes with various rights under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and is therefore unlawful. The analysis is wrong, primarily because:
It ignores the human rights implications of the pandemic itself, which must be balanced against the effects of the responsive measures.
In the circumstances, the Government has a wide margin of discretion when balancing competing rights and interests.
The margin is particularly wide given the complex scientific evidence underlying the decision.
Patmalniece (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Respondent) [2011] UKSC 11 – Read judgment / press summary
The Supreme Court has ruled that pensioners from other European Union states should not have the right to claim pension credits in the UK. Although the current ban on claiming these benefits is indirectly discriminatory, the discrimination is a justified response to the legitimate aim of protecting the public purse.
The 4-1 majority ruling (Lord Walker dissented) is likely to calm fears of “benefit tourism” and will probably be wrongly reported as a victory of sensible limits on public finances over human rights. For the record, the appeal was based squarely on EU freedom of movement law and had very little, if anything, to do with human rights.
Ilias v Hungary (Application no. 47287/15) was the first case in which the ECtHR considered a land border transit zone between two member states of the Council of Europe, where the host state, Hungary, was also a member of the EU and had applied the safe third country rule under the EU asylum regime. The Grand Chamber held that the applicants’ detention did not breach Article 5 (the right to liberty and security of the person).
Image credit: The Guardian
The applicants, Mr Ilias and Mr Ahmed, were both Bangladeshi nationals who had left Bangladesh at different times and in differing circumstances. They met in Greece and then traveled together to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, then to Serbia, and then to Hungary. On 15 September 2015 they arrived in Hungary and entered the border transit zone at Röszke. They submitted asylum requests on the same day. Within several hours their requests were rejected as being inadmissible and they were ordered to be expelled from Hungary back to Serbia as a safe third country. The applicants then spent 23 days in the transit zone whilst they appealed this decision. On 8 October 2015, following a final decision of the Hungarian courts which rejected their applications for asylum and ordered the applicants’ expulsion, Mr Ilias and Mr Ahmed were escorted out of the transit zone and crossed the border back into Serbia.
On Friday, the Guardian reported on the earlier Freemovement.org quantitative analysis relating to deprivations of British citizenship. While it has been known and reported upon for some time, the analysis demonstrates a continued trend of increased deprivations, with a significant peak in 2017, when the number of people whose citizenship was removed soared by 600%.
Protected by Article 15 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights following the Second World War, the right to a nationality was described by Hannah Arendt as the very ‘right to have rights’. Nationality underpins individuals’ belonging to states, which can be the only true guarantors of individual self-governance through the medium of inalienable rights.
Prior to 2006, the power to remove citizenship had not been used since 1973. Now, strengthened by the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, which allowed the UK government to order deprivation of citizenship against its citizens where it believes it is ‘conducive to the public good’, 175 people have had their citizenship removed on national security grounds, and 286 due to fraud (even though the latter power relating to fraud was already enshrined in s.40 of the British Nationality Act 1981). The additional power to render individuals stateless was introduced by the Immigration Act 2014, under which the Secretary of State may remove citizenship where she has reasonable grounds for believing that the person deprived ‘is able’ to become a national of another country. This was most visibly achieved in the case of Shamima Begum, considered extensively on the UK Human Rights Blog.
A niggle has broken into a very public row between the British government and the European Commission which may yet become a bare-knuckle fight – not over the Eurozone crisis or bailouts or anything in the headlines, but over the availability or not of certain classes of benefits to EU claimants who do not satisfy this country’s “right to reside” test.
British social welfare arrangments provide for a class of non-means tested benefits such as Child Benefit and Income-based Employment Allowance that are only available to people who have resided legally in the UK for five years. The European Commission has declared this fencing-off to be in breach of EU law since it indirectly discriminates non-UK nationals coming from other EU Member States. EU rules on the social security coordination (EC Regulation EC 883/2004) allow the UK to grant social benefits to those persons who habitually reside in the UK; this EU test is satisfied by those who have been resident in the UK for two years or less. It is a common law test – a question of fact on the balance of probabilities, to be determined by looking at all the circumstances in each case. But those who pass this latter qualification can only claim means-tested benefits.
In the matter of A (A Child) v Darlington Borough Council and (1) M (2) F (3) GM and GF and (4) A (by his children’s guardian) [2015] EWFC 11 (“Re A”) – read judgment
In a scathing judgment, the president of the Family Division has condemned as “social engineering” a local authority’s application to remove a baby boy permanently from the care of his father and place him for adoption.
The case was, he said,
an object lesson in, almost textbook example of, how not to embark upon and pursue a care case.
Dink v. Turkey (applications no. 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 and 7124/09) – This summary is based on the European Court of Human Rights press release.
In the case of Dink v. Turkey the European Court of Human Rights concluded that the authorities failed in their duty to protect the life and freedom of expression of the journalist Firat (Hrant) Dink, a prominent member of the Armenian minority in Turkey who was murdered in 2007.
Dink was a Turkish journalist of Armenian origin, and the publication director and editor-in-chief of Agos, a Turkish-Armenian weekly newspaper.
The United States has formally determined that Russia has committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference on Saturday, US Vice-President Kamala Harris accused Russia of ‘gruesome acts of murder, torture, rape and deportation’ and said those who had committed crimes would be held to account. UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak also spoke at the event over the weekend, where he urged leaders to ‘double down’ on military support for Kyiv.
Syria and Turkey continue to face devastating consequences in the aftermath of last week’s earthquakes. The death toll caused by the 7.8 magnitude tremor has surpassed 46,000 and is expected to continue to rise. In Turkey, the scale of the damage has been partly attributed poor construction practices and President Erdogan’s government has been criticised for failing to implement stricter building regulations.
In Syria, the UN is facing backlash for failing to deliver humanitarian relief to the north-western, opposition-held regions of the country. The Syrian government has allowed two new border crossings to be opened from Turkey. The UN’s decision, however, to wait for President Assad’s permission to use these routes has been widely condemned. Meanwhile, the British government has pledged an additional funding package to support the earthquake recovery effort.
Finally, Boris Johnson has urged Prime Minister Rishi Sunak not to abandon the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill. Set in motion by Mr Johnson’s government, the bill gives the UK Government powers to dispense of parts of the Northern Ireland Protocol. An announcement on a prospective new agreement between Sunak’s government and the EU on Northern Ireland is expected this week.
Dominic Raab has returned to the role of Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor. Brandon Lewis stepped down from the role after 50 days in office; he recently engraved his name on the foundation stone at London’s Justice Quarter, where construction of a ‘super court’ began last week.
On 25 October, Safeguarding Minister Mims Davis announced new provisions, collectively known as ‘Kay’s Law’, to better protect victims of crimes such as domestic abuse and sexual assault. The reforms, coming into force this week, include imposing a duty upon the police force to take into account the views of victims before releasing someone on bail, and encouraging the use of pre-charge bail when necessary and proportionate. These reforms coincide with further measures to support victims, including the ‘ENOUGH’ campaign. The campaign provides information on support services, safe ways to intervene if someone witnesses an incident of violence against women and girls, and offers guidance for individuals worried about their own behaviour.
The ruling has been released in the deportation case of two members of the Rochdale grooming gang. Adil Khan, 51, and Qari Abdul Rauf, 52, lost their appeal against deportation after a seven-year legal battle following their convictions of child sex offences in May 2012. Although the appeal was heard at an immigration tribunal in June, with a decision made in August, judges have only just released their legal ruling. The challenge against deportation on human rights grounds failed; in both individuals’ cases there was a “very strong public interest” in them being removed from the UK.
Lawyers representing TFL have requested permission from the High Court to take legal action against a further 121 named people following the intensification of Just Stop Oil protests. Earlier this month Mrs Justice Yip granted an injunction against 62 named “defendants” and against “persons unknown”, also making an order that the Metropolitan Police should “disclose” to TFL the names and address of individuals arrested as a result of the protests.
In other news
A report, from the Minderoo Centre for Technology and Democracy, at the University of Cambridge, has stated that live facial recognition technology (LFR) should be banned from use in streets, airports and any public spaces. The study examined three deployments of LFR, one by the Metropolitan police and two by South Wales police; it found that all three failed “to meet ethical and legal standards”.
The Law Society has found that, at the current rate of progress, it will take more than 125 years before there is proper representation within the England and Wales judiciary. Black judges make up just 1.09% of the judiciary, compared with 1.02% in 2014, and it would take until 2149 for their representation to match current estimates for the general population (3.5%). For female representation to be achieved, it is expected to be at least another decade, and for people of Asian ethnicity, that stage in anticipated to be reached by 2033.
For the first time, the information commissioner has issued a blanket warning on the ineffectiveness of ‘emotional analysis’ technologies. The attempted development of ’emotional AI’ is one of four issues that the ICO has identified in a study of the future of biometric technologies. The “pseudoscientific” nature of the field makes it untrustworthy, especially in instances of gathering information related to important decision making.
In the courts
On 21 October the Court of Appeal handed down judgement in Rowe v London Borough of Haringey[2022] EWCA Civ 1370. The case concerned HHJ Roberts’ order dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the London Borough of Haringey’s review decision dated 23 June 2021. The decision stated that the Appellant was not statutorily overcrowded under the requirements of Part X Housing Act 1985 (HA 85) and it was reasonable for her to remain in her accommodation. The dispute arose as to whether Part X HA 85 applied to the house as a whole, as the Appellant contended, or the Appellant’s room, as the Respondent contended. In post-hearing submissions, the Respondent contended whether Part X HA 85 applied at all, arguing instead that the relevant measure was that in Part 2 Housing Act 2004. The Court declined to decide on this issue, instead proceeding on the original submissions that Part X HA 85 applied. The Court held the property was not a ‘separate dwelling’ for the purposes of s.325 and s.326 HA 1985 and that no breach of overcrowding had occurred. Ground 2 of the appeal, assessing reasonableness of occupation was predicated on Ground 1, which had been dismissed. The Court held that the Respondent’s withdrawal of its original decision, via a letter dated 12 May 2022, due to their mistake in not assessing the property’s status as an unlicensed HMO did not render the claim as academic.
On 26 October, the High Court handed down judgement in Three Counties Agricultural Society v Persons Unknown & Ors[2022] EWHC 2708 (KB). The case involved an application for a precautionary injunction against ‘Persons Unknown’ by the Claimant, in an effort to curb protest activity at the Three Counties Defence and Security Exposition. The Court stated that the starting point for the grant of an injunction was s 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. In this instance European Convention rights were engaged, therefore the correct test to apply was the more stringent one laid down in Ineos Upstream Ltd v Persons Unknown [2019] 4 WLR 100. The Court held that the injunction to prevent trespass upon the Claimant’s land was appropriate and necessary. In respect of the part of the Order relating to activity on the highway, the Court stated it must strike a balance between the rights of the protestors and the rights of the Claimant to access and egress its land. The Court held that granting the injunction would not unlawfully interfere with Article 10 and 11 rights of the protestors, and that any interference presented by the injunction was proportionate.
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Patmalniece (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Respondent) [2011] UKSC 11 – 
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