Category: Case law

Roll up roll up? Human rights group’s challenge to Israeli arms supply proceeds at speed

14 May 2025 by Leo Kirby

Chamberlain J has provided new guidance on when the court may order a rolled-up hearing. The procedural point arose in the context of an ongoing piece of strategic litigation, and resulted in an interlocutory judgment in R (Al-Haq) v SSBT [2025] EWHC 173 (Admin).

Al-Haq is an independent Palestinian human rights organisation. It brought a judicial review claim to challenge various decisions of the UK government in the licensing of exports of military and dual-use goods destined for Israel for potential use in Gaza. The decisions were taken by the Secretary of State for Business and Trade. Oxfam, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were granted permission to intervene.

The BIOT Supreme Court Rules Asylum Seekers  Detained Unlawfully

27 March 2025 by Tehreem Sultan

The Supreme Court in British Indian Ocean Territory ruled in December on an important issue concerning the detention of asylum seekers in Diego Garcia. While their cause has progressed (including in a settlement reached on behalf of many, and in this judgment).

Ms Justice Obi, Acting Justice of the Supreme Court of the British Indian Ocean Territory, determined that the Claimants had been unlawfully detained since their arrival in October 2021.

Supreme Court rules Appellants were British all along

12 March 2025 by Shaheen Rahman

N3 & ZA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] UKSC 6 concerned orders depriving two British people of their citizenship on national security grounds. The Defendant (initially) contended that to do so would not render them stateless, because they were dual British Bangladeshi nationals.

The use of deprivation orders in this context has been controversial, with critics across the political spectrum. Notably, writing in the Spectator, Jacob Rees-Mogg said of the Shamima Begum case:

“The ability to deprive people, who have a claim to another citizenship, of their British passport, creates two categories of Briton. Those with no right to another nationality are in the first-class carriage. Whatever they do, they cannot be made an exile or outlaw and expelled from the country. On the other hand, those who themselves came to the UK or whose parents did so are in the second-class carriage. They may be stripped of their citizenship even if they have never claimed another foreign nationality or even visited the country. This is a fundamentally racist policy as it denies the absolute Britishness of all those who are either recent immigrants themselves or their children.”

In the instant case, the deprivation orders were subsequently withdrawn. The Supreme Court has held that the effect of that withdrawal is that the Appellants are to be treated as having been British Citizens throughout.

Gambling with Consent: Free, Specific, and Informed Consent in Data Protection Law

5 March 2025 by Matthew Leitch

Background

In RTM v Bonne Terre Ltd [2025] EWHC 111 (KB), the High Court considered claims brought in data protection and the tort of misuse of private information. The Claimant described himself as a “recovering online gambling addict” [1]. He sought damages for harm, distress and financial loss, and a declaration that his rights under data protection legislation had been infringed, from the Defendant, who operate Sky Betting and Gaming (SBG). The relevant period of the Claimant’s gambling for the claim against SBG (restricted by limitation periods) was 2017 until the end of 2018 or the start of 2019 [15].

The Claimant’s case was that SBG harvested his data using cookies without his consent. SBG the processed his personal data for marketing purposes without lawful basis, and targeted him through direct marketing emails (also without his consent) sent on average twice a day [68]. Consequently, he alleged he suffered substantial losses.

Despite the claim having started in an almost inquisitorial fashion, with the Claimant undertaking a broad investigation into gambling laws when recovering from his addiction, the narrow issue at trial was “what, if anything, [the Claimant] consented to in the marketing part of the operation” [77].

Preaching hate: free speech, religion and the Human Rights Act

28 February 2025 by Leo Kirby

In Sleeper v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2025] EWHC 151 (KB) Mr Justice Sweeting dismissed an appeal against the decision of HHJ Saggerson to dismiss a claim against the Metropolitan Police by a street preacher arrested for displaying anti-Muslim signs.

The claim was both for the tort of false imprisonment (which involved a challenge to the legality of his arrest) and for a remedy breach of his rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 directly, though the latter was time barred and not resurrected on appeal.

Mr Justice Sweeting’s judgment provides insight into how the courts assess the interplay of Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) and domestic criminal law.

Judicial Anonymity? Not this time.

17 February 2025 by Anogika Souresh

In Tickle & Anor v The BBC & Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 4, the Court of Appeal considered the High Court’s decision to anonymise the names of several judges who had made decisions in historic care proceedings and private family law proceedings (“the historic proceedings”).

The historic proceedings related to Sara Sharif, who was murdered by her father and stepmother in August 2023. On 18 August 2023, the Local Authority made an application for a wardship in respect of Sara Sharif’s five siblings. On 8 September 2023, the journalists requested disclosure of documents relating to the historic proceedings.

Mr Justice Williams made the following order, which was appealed by the claimant journalists:

… no person may publish any information arising from the disclosure of the documents from these proceedings to the public, or a section of it, which includes: …

g. The name of any third parties referred to in the historic proceedings for the avoidance of doubt including social worker, guardian other named professionals and experts instructed in the proceedings and any Judge who heard the historic proceedings (save for Mr Justice Williams). …

including not repeating such information by reference to the disclosed documents even if it is already in the public domain

[emphasis added]

Notably, when Mr Justice Williams pronounced the Order in court, no party had asked for the names of the three circuit judges who had been involved in the historic proceedings (“the historic judges”) to be anonymised. The judge had heard no submissions on the point. He had not mentioned to the parties that he had in mind to make the order he did [5].

The grounds of appeal were as follows:

i) It was a serious procedural irregularity for the judge not to have given reasons before anonymising the historic judges.

ii) The judge adopted an unfair, biased and inappropriate approach to the journalists and the media generally (including relying on his own erroneous analysis of alleged media irresponsibility), thereby unacceptably encroaching on their rights under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This ground was added by amendment and permission has not yet been granted to allow it to be pursued.

iii) The judge ought to have held that the demands of open justice meant that anonymity for a judge could not be justified within the framework of balancing article 8 and article 10 of the ECHR.

iv) The part of the Order anonymising the historic judges could not be justified in the absence of any specific application or evidential foundation, and was inimical to the proper administration of justice.

The Judgment

The Court of Appeal considered that there were three main issues to determine:

i) Whether the court had jurisdiction to prohibit the publication of the names of judges, and if so how and in what circumstances.

ii) Whether the part of the Order anonymising the historic judges was irregular for lack of submissions, evidence or reasons.

iii) Whether the judge’s comments in his judgment demonstrated inappropriate bias against or unfairness towards the media.

The Court of Appeal considered that the statutory limitations contained in section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 and section 97 of the Children Act 1989 do not displace the open justice principle or create any separate “shielded justice” environment. They provide a degree of privacy for certain proceedings relating to children according to their terms [45]. Further, section 12 of the Administration of Justice 1960 makes clear that its provisions do not apply to judges hearing the case: “Court orders always name the judge, so, in that way, section 12 of the AJA 1960 expressly excludes anonymity for the judge” [51].

The Court of Appeal notably stated that:

In accepting office, all judges will or should be aware that that is the expectation, because public scrutiny of judges and the justice process is essential to the rule of law [55].

Issue 1: Was there jurisdiction to prohibit the publication of the names of judges?

The Court of Appeal considered whether Mr Justice Williams had jurisdiction to order the anonymity of the historic judges. In resolving this question, the Court of Appeal considered that, notionally, the names of the historic judges had been in the public domain as (a) the name of the judges appeared on public documents and on each of the orders that they made and (b) the names of the judges would have appeared in the public listings as sitting on the days in question at the courts in question.

The Court of Appeal considered the relevant rights under Articles 2, 3, and 8, which apply as much to judges as to any other person. However, there was no evidential basis on which the threshold for the application of Articles 2, 3, or 8 had been reached [64]. There was no need to undertake any balancing exercise between Articles 8 and 10 as there was no evidence about the risks to the historic judges [69].

The Court of Appeal concluded that there was no jurisdictional foundation for making the anonymity order.

The following comment from the Court of Appeal (at [66] will have wider application beyond the facts of this case:

The authorities that I have cited demonstrate that judges are in a special position as regards open justice. The integrity of the justice system depends on the judge sitting in public and being named, even if they sit in private. The justice system cannot otherwise be fully transparent and open to appropriate scrutiny.

Issue 2: Was there irregularity for lack of submissions, evidence or reasons?

The appeal was allowed on this ground, on the basis that the Mr Justice Williams ought to have asked for submissions and evidence prior to making his decision.

In the absence of specific evidence about risks or threats to the ECHR rights of the historic judges, Mr Justice Williams ought not to have taken any steps to anonymise the names of the historic judges.

Issue 3: Was there inappropriate bias against or unfairness towards the media?

The Court of Appeal noted Mr Justice Williams’s language when discussing media reporting as well as his decision to adjourn the journalists’ application for permission to appeal being akin to dismissing the application.

The appeal was also allowed on this ground.

Comment

This decision will have wider application beyond the facts of this case, and beyond family law. The Court of Appeal reiterated the necessity for open justice, and confirmed that transparency requires judges to be named, even if they sit in private.

The Court of Appeal did caveat the decision by clarifying that judges are not obliged to tolerate any form of abuse or threats. The requirements to consider in such cases are:

1. Evidence about the risks to the judges;
2. The court being satisfied that those risks could not be adequately addressed by other security measures;
3. The court concluding that the risks were so grave that they provided a justification for overriding the fundamental principle of open justice.

The historic judges were given 7 days before their names are published, to allow HMCTS to put in place measures to protect them.

Anogika Souresh is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row, Brighton

No Recourse to Public Funds and Article 3: Proving Systems Duty Breaches

4 December 2024 by Matthew Leitch

Background

In SAG & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWHC 2984 (Admin), the High Court considered challenges to the Secretary of State’s determination of applications to remove no recourse to public funds (“NRPF”) conditions placed on the Claimants’ leave to remain. Each Claimant’s position was that they were at imminent risk of destitution. Several grounds of challenge were advanced:

1. The approach to the NRPF conditions was unlawful under common law

2. The approach to the NRPF conditions was a breach of s.55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009.

3. The approach to the NRPF conditions was incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 read with Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights.

This article considers the third ground of challenge under the Human Rights Act 1998.

Cheshire West revisited: deprivation of liberty and children

22 November 2024 by Esme Cairns

Introduction

Paterson v UK: Parliament and Human Rights in Strasbourg

8 October 2024 by Paula Kelly

The name ‘Chris Pincher’ has become synonymous with Boris Johnson’s downfall, but it was the case of Owen Paterson that precipitated the unrest in the Conservative Party that ultimately led to the former Prime Minister’s resignation.

Owen Paterson stepped down as an MP in November 2021, following a report by the House of Commons Select Committee on Standards that found he had breached the MPs’ Code of Conduct by engaging in paid advocacy and recommended that he be suspended from the House for thirty sitting days. After initially whipping MPs in an attempt to support Mr Paterson and to avoid a possible by-election in North Shropshire, Boris Johnson eventually conceded that the parliamentary party was not with him. Mr Paterson resigned before MPs could vote on the sanction.

The European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has dismissed a complaint by Mr Paterson (Patterson v UK App no. 23570 (ECtHR, 19 September 2024)) that the proceedings and/or the finding breached his rights under Article 8 of the Convention to respect for his private and family life.  

Nursing home held not to be a public authority for the purposes of an Article 2 claim

24 September 2024 by Dominic Ruck Keene

UK Government loses latest round in long-running Diego Garcia litigation

10 September 2024 by Edward Waldegrave

In The Commissioner for the British Indian Ocean Territory v. The King (on the application of VT and Others), the UK Government has lost the latest round in long-running litigation concerning a group of individuals accommodated in basic facilities on the remote British Indian Ocean Territory (the “BIOT”).

Background

The BIOT is an archipelago consisting of over 50 islands located roughly half way between East Africa and Indonesia. It is a British Overseas Territory and is formally administered from London by a Commissioner, who performs both legislative and executive functions.

Diego Garcia is the largest island in the archipelago. It has no settled population but accommodates a substantial US/UK military facility. The facility employs a transient population of about 4,000.

In 2021 a group of individuals of Tamil ethnicity left India by boat, apparently with the goal of reaching Canada. On 3 October 2021 their vessel encountered difficulties in the Indian Ocean and was escorted by the Royal Navy to Diego Garcia. Following their arrival in the BIOT, the individuals made claims for asylum. These claims remain un-determined, and some 61 individuals (including children) have now been living on Diego Garcia for nearly three years. There they have been housed in what have been described as “hellish” conditions. The majority live in tents in Thunder Cove (referred to as the “Camp”). Initially they were confined to the Camp itself, but as a result of an order made on 21 December 2023 they gained access to a nearby beach. They also have limited access to buildings outside the Camp for the purposes of consultations with lawyers, medical treatment and, for children, education. A few individuals who with medical complaints which could not be addressed on Diego Garcia have been flown to Rwanda for treatment.

In May 2024 eleven individuals were granted “bail” on terms which allowed them (in summary) to leave the Camp and walk along highway DG1, and to access beaches from the road. These arrangements appear to have been uncontroversial. When they were put in place, it was envisaged that the limited freedoms granted to the eleven individuals would be extended to the other migrants on Diego Garcia. In any event, it was also expected that the position of all of the individuals would be finally resolved at a hearing scheduled for July 2024. This substantive hearing has, however, been indefinitely adjourned.

The July 2024 Bail Application

In July 2024 a number of the individuals applied for extended bail. Specifically, they sought access to a “nature trail”, and also sought changes to the terms on which their bail could be exercised.

In response to this application (the “July Application”) the Commissioner sought the views of the US authorities responsible for the operation of the military facilities on Diego Garcia. The US authorities provided their views on the July Application a few hours before it was due to be heard (on 23 July 2024). The US position was stark: it opposed any extension of bail on the basis that the proposals posed “operational, security, health and safety risks [to the military facilities on Diego Garcia]… which cannot be mitigated or would be unduly burdensome to mitigate”.

The Commissioner applied for an adjournment of the hearing of the July Application to give him more time to consider the response of the US. This was rejected.

Very shortly after the hearing on 23 July, the Commissioner received letters from (i) the Director General for Africa and the Americas at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; and (ii) the Minister of State for Europe, North America and the UK Overseas Territories. Both emphasised the respect which should be accorded to the US’ concerns. These letters were provided to the Court.

On 26 July Judge Obi of the Supreme Court of the BIOT granted the July Application, subject to some relatively minor caveats. In particular, she extended bail to all the relevant individuals and permitted access to the Nature Trail.

The Commissioner appealed, and the Court of Appeal of the BIOT heard the appeal on 9 August. It handed down its decision, dismissing the appeal, on 20 August.

The Commissioner’s Grounds of Appeal

The Commissioner appealed against the Judge’s order on four grounds:

• It was procedurally unfair for the Judge to have proceeded with the hearing of the July Application on 23 July (i.e. not to have granted the Commissioner’s application for an adjournment to allow more time to consider the US response).
• The Judge exercised her discretion unreasonably because she failed properly to consider the impact of extending bail on US/UK relations.
• The Judge exercised her discretion unreasonably because she failed to attribute due weight to the assessment by the US authorities of the security implications of extending bail.
• The Judge exercised her discretion unreasonably because the July Order necessarily impacted upon decisions by the Commissioner concerning the allocation of resources.

The Court of Appeal’s Determination

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Commissioner’s appeal on all grounds.

Ground 1: Procedural Unfairness

The Court rejected the Commissioner’s contention that it was procedurally unfair for the Judge to refuse to adjourn the hearing of the July Application for two reasons.

First, the Court agreed with the Respondents that there was nothing “new” in the US’ response to the July Application. In summary it took the view that the US’ position had long been clear, and had amounted to “consistent and unvarying opposition” to any bail arrangements. Its response to the July Application was wholly consistent with this. Accordingly the Judge had been entitled to take the view that it was not necessary for the hearing to be adjourned for the Commissioner to have a fair opportunity to present his case.

Secondly, the Court noted that the Judge permitted oral submissions to be made on the two letters which the Commissioner received just after the hearing of the July Application. That further oral hearing constituted an obvious opportunity for the Commissioner to make any additional submissions on the US’ response to the July Application. The fact that he had not sought to make any such submissions undermined the contention that it had been unfair for the Judge not to adjourn the first hearing.

Ground 2: US/UK Relations

The Commissioner’s next ground of appeal relied on a contention that the Judge had failed to attach due significance to the impact that extending bail would have on US/UK relations.

The Commissioner’s case on this ground seems to have been somewhat confused. It appears to have been uncontroversial that “questions relating to international relations… are not generally justiciable”. However, it was also common ground that international relations considerations could not necessarily “dictate the outcome of the court’s enquiry”. The Commissioner’s argument before the Court of Appeal on this ground (at least in part) was that, because the grant of bail “had the potential to have a profound impact on international relations between the UK and [the US]”, the Judge should have exercised extreme caution before granting the July Application. As the Court of Appeal recognised, however, this was inconsistent with the Commissioner’s acceptance that the impact on the UK’s international relationships was just one factor to be considered in the overall balancing exercise. On that basis, the only question was whether the Judge had in fact properly evaluated the security concerns raised by the US. The Court of Appeal concluded that she had, and that there was no warrant for interfering in the evaluative conclusion which she had reached.

Ground 3: US Security Assessment

The Commissioner next argued that the Judge had failed, in summary, to accord sufficient respect to the US’ assessment that the grant of the July Application would interfere with security considerations.

Again, the Court dismissed this Ground. It accepted that it was for the relevant US authorities, rather than the Judge, to take a view on whether the grant of the July Application would have adverse security implications. However, this is not what the Judge had done. She had not questioned the US view of the relevant security implications but had, quite properly, taken that into account as a factor to be weighed alongside other relevant considerations. Her overall evaluation was that the July Application should (broadly) be granted. There was no warrant for interfering with that evaluation. In deciding that the Judge had accorded due respect to the US assessment of the security implications, the Court of Appeal seems to have relied in part on the fact that the Judge rejected aspects of the July Application (such as permitting the individuals to access a social club on Diego Garcia) because of the burdens those aspects would give rise to for the Commissioner.

Ground 4: Resource Allocation

Finally, the Commissioner argued that the Judge had strayed into another non-justiciable area because granting the July Application necessarily had implications for the allocation of resources by the Commissioner (in that there would be costs for the Commissioner associated with the extended bail arrangements).

Again, the Court found little difficulty in rejecting this Ground. It concluded that the Judge had not purported “to tell the Commissioner how to spend the funds available to the BIOT”. Rather she had explicitly recognised that this was a matter for the Commissioner. As was pointed out in argument, decisions as to bail conditions regularly have cost implications for the authorities; it would be surprising indeed if judges making such decisions were unlawfully straying into non-justiciable resource allocation territory.

Comment

It has been suggested (in particular by Joshua Rozenberg: see https://rozenberg.substack.com/p/uk-loses-diego-garcia-appeal) that the Commissioner must have recognised that he was likely to lose the appeal to the Court of Appeal, and that the appeal was only pursued in an attempt to show others (such as the US Government) that the UK was exhausting all its options in seeking to prevent bail being extended. On this view, the Court of Appeal’s decision was, from a legal perspective, “obvious”.

It is true that aspects of the Commissioner’s case before the Court of Appeal seem to have been very weak. In particular, it is difficult to see how the Commissioner could reasonably have hoped to succeed on Grounds 1 or 4.

However, the Court of Appeal’s decision does give rise to some points of genuine legal interest. In discussing Ground 2, the Court of Appeal accepted that the conduct of the UK’s foreign relations is non-justiciable in itself, but that the Crown’s foreign policy priorities can be weighed in the balance against other factors in determining a bail application. Presumably the same is true in other contexts. Similarly, in relation to Ground 3, the Court accepted that it is for the executive (in this case, in effect, the US Government) to form a view as to the state’s security interests, but that its view can be weighed among other factors in an appropriate case. This distinction is one which surely merits further academic, legal and political scrutiny. Put briefly, it is difficult to see how judges can on the one hand be expected to “keep out” of foreign policy and national security questions if the executive’s views on such matters are susceptible to being balanced against other factors (such as, in this case, the interests of individuals in being able to move more freely than has hitherto been the case). The Court’s approach to this issue seems to have been largely a result of the Commissioner’s acceptance that foreign policy and national security considerations did not constitute “trump cards” but were merely factors to be weighed in the balance. The Commissioner might have stood a better chance of success, and his case would certainly have been more intellectually coherent, had that concession not been made.

The second point arising from the Court’s judgment which is of significant interest concerns the way in which the parties and the Court all viewed the July Application through the prism of “bail”. As the Court itself recognised, this case falls far from the ordinary context in which bail principles are applied. One might see this case as demonstrating the admirable ability of English legal principles to address novel factual circumstances. Others might regret that such a unique set of facts could only be addressed by an analytical framework developed in very different cases.

Edward Waldegrave is a barrsiter at 1 Crown Office Row.

Court of Appeal finds the National Crime Agency’s refusal to investigate human rights abuse-linked cotton imports from the Uyghur region unlawful

23 July 2024 by Shaheen Rahman

R (World Uyghur Congress) v National Crime Agency [2024] EWCA Civ 715

This landmark decision was a successful appeal from the judgment of Dove J ([2023] EWHC 88 (Admin)) on the single issue of whether the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) misdirected itself when reaching the decision (i) not to investigate alleged offences under Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”) and (ii) not to commence a civil recovery investigation under Part 5, in respect of certain cotton products brought into the UK alleged to be the product of forced labour and other human rights abuses.

The Appellant contended that when taking those decisions the Defendant had laboured under two fundamental misapprehensions, namely (i) that it is necessary to identify specific product as criminal property before commencing an investigation; and (ii) that the presence within the supply chain of a person who can rely on the exemption under section 329(2)(c) of POCA has the effect of “cleansing” criminal property so as to preclude its recovery, or the recovery of the proceeds of sale.

The court noted that it was well established that the decisions of an independent prosecutor or investigator would only be disturbed in highly exceptional circumstances: see R (Corner House Research) v Serious Fraud Office (2008) UKHL 60 at paragraphs 30-32. However, the discretion of decision makers was not unfettered; they must direct themselves correctly in law.

The challenge in this case was not advanced on Wednesbury principals. Rather, it was based on the alleged errors and misdirection in law. The Appellant contended that the Judge had nonetheless proceeded to deal with the matter on the basis that it was a rationality challenge. It was also contended that the Judge had reached the wrong conclusions insofar as he did address the substance of the challenge.

The NCA contended that it did not make the first error of law alleged, on a proper reading of the decision letter. It accepted the second error had been made but contended that it was immaterial and did not affect the substance or validity of its reasoning, namely that there was insufficient evidence from which to develop an investigation which had any prospect of bearing fruit. The Appellant accepted if that was the NCA’s reasoning, they would have been entitled to take that view.

Accordingly, this appeal turned on close analysis and the correct interpretation of the decision letter.

Sir James Eadie KC on behalf of the NCA frankly accepted that as a matter of law it would be wrong to refuse to commence an investigation under POCA because criminal property could not be identified at that time. Indeed, he contended that it would have been so obviously absurd to approach matters on the basis that that you needed to know the outcome of the investigation before taking a decision to commence it, it was highly improbable that the NCA had taken that approach.

Whilst recognising this as a powerful forensic point, the Court nonetheless concluded that, on the face of the decision letter, that was indeed the approach that was taken, and it was a clear misdirection in law.

Moreover, the Court did not agree that the second error within the decision letter was immaterial. That was the identification of a hypothetical individual within the supply chain who could rely on the exemption under section 329(2)(c) of POCA, which provides that a person will not commit an offence under section 329(1) “if he acquired or used or had possession of the property for adequate consideration”. In their view, this error appeared to play an important part in the decision-maker’s line of reasoning.

The judgment also noted that it was common ground there was a “diverse, substantial and growing body of evidence that serious human rights abuses are occurring in the XUAR cotton industry on a large scale”. Further that products derived from forced labour of the proceeds of sale could amount to “criminal property” for the purposes of Part 5 of POCA and “recoverable property” for the purposes of Part 7.

The Court agreed, and it seemed to be accepted by the parties, that the Judge had never directly identified the question whether the position expressed by the NCA in correspondence amount to an error of law.

It held that there was legitimate concern that the judgment endorsed the proposition that there is a need to establish criminal conduct or criminal property before an investigation under POCA can begin. In particular, the Court noted the submissions of the Intervenor “Spotlight on Corruption” that the judgment, if left undisturbed, would discourage the NCA, the police and other UK investigative bodies from commencing investigations into corruption, particularly where it occurs overseas, in the absence of concrete evidence of particular crimes carried out by particular persons.  Spotlight also raised concerns at the suggestion that criminal liability or civil recovery was precluded where the proceeds of crime passed through several hands where adequate consideration was paid.

The Court confirmed that the proposition that, where the importer pays market value, they will not be tainted, was wrong in law. To the extent that the Judge accepted that at any point in a supply chain stretching many thousands of miles, the chain could be broken merely by using adequate consideration in any of the transactions involved, he was wrong to do so.

The Court held that there was force in the Appellant’s submission that the Judge had treated the challenge as if it were on the grounds of irrationality.  More importantly, it was clear that the NCA had misdirected itself based on the two errors of law identified by the Appellant. The question of whether to carry out an investigation under Part 7 or part 5 of POCA was accordingly remitted to the NCA for reconsideration.  

This judgment has significant implications for those trading in goods known or suspected to have been produced using forced labour or other human rights abuses, who may face investigation and prosecution even where adequate consideration has been paid. It has been hailed as a victory for those subjected to forced labour and human rights abuses.

Shaheen Rahman KC is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row Chambers

The Illegal Migration Act and its inevitable fate in Northern Ireland: Re NIHRC & JR295’s applications for judicial review

28 May 2024 by anuragdeb

Let us turn to NIHRC and JR295’s applications for judicial review [2024] NIKB 35, in which the High Court disapplied sections of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 (IMA) – the Government’s flagship statute to tackle illegal migration – in Northern Ireland. It is important to understand why, despite some alarming reactions to the judgment, it was both foreseen and avoidable – and why the alarm should be sounded in the Houses of Parliament instead.

Banning prayer in school: a lawful interference?

15 May 2024 by Guest Contributor

By Rebekah Lee

The case of R (TTT) v Michaela Community Schools Trust [2024] EWHC 843 (Admin) in the High Court before Mr Justice Linden concerned a claim brought by a pupil referred to as a TTT (“the Claimant”) against the Michaela Community Schools Trust; (“the School”). The School is a secular secondary free school in the London Borough of Brent, which appeared as an interested party. The School is ethnically and religiously diverse, although over half of the pupils, including the Claimant are Muslims [1].

This post addresses only Ground 1 of the Claimant’s claim – alleged breach of the right to religious freedom under Article 9, ECHR – although the judgment (all 83 pages of it!) includes extensive discussion on Indirect Discrimination [214-232], the Public Sector Equality Duty (“PSED”) [257-273] and school exclusions [294-311], none of which were successful save for Ground 4b which concerned procedural unfairness around exclusions.

Termination of pregnancy and wishes and feelings in the Court of Protection

25 April 2024 by Esme Cairns

Introduction

The decision of the Court of Protection in Rotherham and Doncaster and South Humber NHS Foundation Trust and NR [2024] EWCOP 17 is the latest in a line of cases where the Court has been asked to determine whether a termination of pregnancy is in a woman’s best interests. Any case about a termination engages the pregnant woman’s Article 8 rights. But where the woman also lacks capacity to decide for herself whether to have a termination, there must be a particularly careful analysis to ensure that her rights are respected. While previous decisions have frequently accorded weight to the wishes and feelings of the pregnant woman at the heart of the case, Mr Justice Hayden’s decision goes further in handing the decision over to the pregnant woman herself.