Supreme Court – the right to be on the beach

_50586770__49414358_2b0a52bb-7425-4bca-b5ff-2253df1dc7fa-1The Queen (on the application of Newhaven Port and Properties Limited) v East Sussex County Council and Newhaven Town Council  [2015] SC 7 25 February 2015- read judgment

Late February is not necessarily the best time of year for a bit of UK sea swimming. But the Supreme Court has just come out with interesting judgments about whether there is a right to go to the beach and swim from it. For reasons I shall explain, they were anxious not to decide the point, but there are some strong hints, particularly in the judgment of Lord Carnwath as to what the right answer is, though some hesitation as to how to arrive at that answer. 

It arose in a most curious setting – East Sussex’s desire to register West Beach, Newhaven as a village green under the Commons Act 2006. But a beach cannot be a village green, you may say. But it is, said the Court of Appeal (see Rosalind English’s post here), and the Supreme Court did not hear argument on that point.

Now to the background for the present decision.

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No entitlement to human rights damages after ‘caste discrimination’ case collapse

Photo via Guardian.co.uk

Photo via Guardian.co.uk

Begraj v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] EWHC 250 (QB) – Read judgment

Adam Wagner acted for the Secretary of State in this case. He is not the author of  this post.

The High Court has ruled that when long-running employment tribunal hearing collapsed as the result of the judge’s recusal due to apparent bias the claimants in the action could not obtain damages for wasted costs under section 6 of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 (specifically Article 6, the right to a fair trial) or the EU Charter.

The High Court confirmed that the County Court had acted lawfully in striking out the claim for having no reasonable prospects of success and for being an abuse of process. The state immunity for judicial acts in section 9(3) HRA 1998 applied, and in any event there had been no breach of Article 6 as the judge’s recusal preserved the parties’ Article 6 rights.  Continue reading

Conscientious objection to abortion: Catholic midwives lose in Supreme Court

pic_giant_051713_Therapeutic-Cloning-of-Human-EmbryosGreater Glasgow Health Board v. Doogan and Wood [2014] UKSC 68 – read judgment here.

The Supreme Court recently handed down its judgment in an interesting and potentially controversial case concerning the interpretation of the conscientious objection clause in the Abortion Act 1967. Overturning the Inner House of the Court of Session’s ruling, the Court held that two Catholic midwives could be required by their employer to delegate to, supervise and support other staff who were involved in carrying out abortion procedures, as part of their roles as Labour Ward Co-ordinators at the Southern General Hospital in Glasgow.

We set out the background to the case and explained the earlier rulings and their ramifications on this blog here and here. The key question the Supreme Court had to grapple with the meaning of the words “to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious objection” in section 4 of the 1967 Act.

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Ping pong: CJEU air pollution ruling – back to the Supreme Court


NO2_PicR (ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food &  Rural Affairs , CJEU, 19 November 2014 – read C404-13 

In May 2013, the UK Supreme Court (here) was sufficiently concerned about the UK’s lack of compliance  with EU legislation, Directive 2008/50 (nitrogen dioxide etc in air)  to refer various issues to the CJEU in Luxembourg.

The UK has been in breach of Article 13 the Directive since 1 January 2010, because 40 “zones and agglomerations”  had nitrogen dioxide at concentrations greater than the limit values set out in the Directive. ClientEarth, an environmental NGO, sought to enforce the Directive in the national courts.  Defra admitted breach of Article 13 and, given the admission, the first instance judge and the Court of Appeal said that there was no point in granting any declaratory relief. It was for the EU Commission, if it wished, to take infraction proceedings. And those lower courts disagreed with ClientEarth’s interpretation of the Directive, which, as we shall see, has now for the first time been upheld by the CJEU.

The Supreme Court went rather further; it granted a declaration that the UK was in breach of Article 13, and posed various questions about the meaning of the Directive to the CJEU.

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Wind turbines, noise and public information

3844964938R (o.t.a Joicey) v. Northumberland County Council , 7 November 2014, Cranston J  read judgment

An interesting decision about a Council not supplying some key information about a wind turbine project to the public until very late in the day. Can an objector apply to set the grant of permission aside? Answer: yes, unless the Council can show that it would have inevitably have come to the same conclusion, even if the information had been made public earlier.

Mr Barber, a farmer, wanted to put up one turbine (47m to tip) on his land. The claimant was an objector, another farmer who lives 4km away, and who campaigns about subsidies for renewables – it is him in the pic. The planning application was complicated by the fact that an application for 6 turbines at Barmoor nearby had already been approved (where Mr Joicey is standing), and the rules on noise from wind turbines looks at the total noise affecting local people, not just from Mr Barber’s turbine.

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Control and restraint techniques used on people being removed from UK are lawful, says Court of Appeal

UK Border Agency officerR (on the application of FI) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1272 – read judgment

The Court of Appeal has held that the physical restraint of persons being removed from the UK by aircraft is subject to a sufficient framework of safeguards to fulfil the state’s obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Further, the decision of the Home Secretary not to publish aspects of the applicable policy on the use of such control and restraint is lawful.

FI was restrained by detainee custody officers during an attempt to remove her from the UK in 2011, though the issues on this appeal did not turn on the specific circumstances of her case. In issue was the sufficiency of the framework of safeguards on the use of such restraint as contained predominantly within the Use of Force Training Manual (the “Manual”).

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Letting in a chink of light to closed material cases : Bank Mellat again

brown-blanket-ray-of-lightBank Mellat v HM Treasury [2014] EWHC 3631 (Admin), Collins J, 5 November 2014 –  read judgment UPDATED POST

Fireworks here from Collins J in making sure that Bank Mellat got some disclosure of information in its fight to discharge a financial restriction order against it.

Bank Mellat is an Iranian bank, initially singled out by an 2009 order which prohibited anybody from dealing with it.  The order was part of sanctions against Iran in respect of its nuclear and ballistic missiles programme. However, it bit the dust, thanks to the Supreme Court:  see judgment. I  did a post on that decision, and followed it up with one (here) on the (dis)proportionality arguments which led to the order’s downfall. 

However the Bank was subject to two further orders, made in 2011 and 2012. They led to the freezing of €183m held by it in London. The 2012 order has since been revoked, but the 2011 one remains. This is the subject of the Bank’s application to set it aside. On any view, as Collins J recognised, it had caused very serious damage to the Bank’s business.

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